[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 114-70]
RUSSIAN ARMS CONTROL CHEATING:
VIOLATION OF THE INF TREATY AND
THE ADMINISTRATION'S RESPONSES
ONE YEAR LATER
__________
JOINT HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
of the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
meeting jointly with
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE
of the
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
[Serial No. 114-138]
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
DECEMBER 1, 2015
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
97-826 WASHINGTON : 2016
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JIM COOPER, Tennessee
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado, Vice Chair LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado RICK LARSEN, Washington
MO BROOKS, Alabama JOHN GARAMENDI, California
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma MARK TAKAI, Hawaii
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska
ROB BISHOP, Utah PETE AGUILAR, California
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana
Tim Morrison, Counsel
Leonor Tomero, Counsel
Mike Gancio, Clerk
------
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
MATT SALMON, Arizona KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas GRACE MENG, New York
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TED S. YOHO, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
DANIEL DONOVAN, New York
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
TED POE, Texas, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
DARRELL E. ISSA, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
PAUL COOK, California BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed
Services....................................................... 4
Keating, Hon. William, a Representative from Massachusetts,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation,
and Trade, Committee on Foreign Affairs........................ 4
Poe, Hon. Ted, a Representative from Texas, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade,
Committee on Foreign Affairs................................... 2
Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed Services.. 1
WITNESSES
Gottemoeller, Hon. Rose E., Under Secretary for Arms Control and
International Security, U.S. Department of State............... 5
McKeon, Hon. Brian P., Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense................. 7
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Cooper, Hon. Jim............................................. 35
Gottemoeller, Hon. Rose E.................................... 36
McKeon, Hon. Brian P......................................... 43
Rogers, Hon. Mike............................................ 33
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Graphic displayed by Mr. Rogers.............................. 55
Letter from Mr. Rogers and Mr. Poe to the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff...................................... 56
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Cooper................................................... 63
Mr. Poe...................................................... 63
Mr. Rogers................................................... 59
Mr. Turner................................................... 65
RUSSIAN ARMS CONTROL CHEATING: VIOLATION OF THE INF TREATY AND THE
ADMINISTRATION'S RESPONSES ONE YEAR LATER
----------
House of Representatives, Committee on Armed
Services, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Meeting Jointly with the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade, Washington, DC,
Tuesday, December 1, 2015.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 3:30 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers
(chairman of the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on
Armed Services) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, COMMITTEE
ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Rogers. Good afternoon. I would like to welcome
everyone to this joint hearing of the House Armed Services
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and the House Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Trade, and Nonproliferation on
``Russian Arms Control Cheating: Violation of the INF Treaty
and the Administration's Responses One Year Later.''
Testifying today are the following witnesses: The Honorable
Rose Gottemoeller, Under Secretary of State for International
Security, Department of State; the Honorable Brian McKeon,
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
Department of Defense.
This is an update to last year's hearing with these
witnesses, and we are eager to learn what the administration
has been doing since we met in open and closed sessions on this
topic last December. Congress, as I promised last year, has not
been sitting idle. The recently enacted fiscal year 2016 NDAA
[National Defense Authorization Act] included section 1243,
which directs the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to begin the research and development of
military response options to Russia's violation.
INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] is, of course, not
the only treaty or agreement that Russia is violating. We
learned from Ms. Gottemoeller during last year's hearing that
on 8 of 12 treaties and agreements, Russia is not in compliance
or is in outright violation of those obligations.
INF has earned a lot of attention, but what of the Chemical
Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Open
Skies Treaty? Are we less concerned about Russian chemical or
biological weapons that can be used against the United States
than intermediate-range missiles that cannot? No, of course
not.
And this hearing is also the first opportunity for many
members to ask the administration about the recent Russian
disclosure of a nuclear-powered nuclear warhead that occurred
during review of Russia's nuclear forces that included its
President, Vladimir Putin. According to the Russian
translations of what was disclosed, this weapon would provide
Russia with a new capability to damage, quote: ``The important
components of the adversary's economy and coastal area, and
inflicting unacceptable damage to the country's territory by
creating areas of wide radioactive contamination that would be
unsustainable for military, economic, or other activity for
long periods of time,'' close quote.
[The graphic displayed can be found in the Appendix on page
55.]
Mr. Rogers. What does that say about a country that feels
that nuclear weapons are such a significant tool of its
military and diplomatic strategy that it discloses systems in
this manner? And what does it say about a country that would
invest resources in such a weapon? It is just nuts.
Yet the only time the President talks about--our President
talks about nuclear weapons is when he wants to propose
reducing them. The world is paying attention. We need our
President to change his rhetoric.
So we have a lot to talk about today. I am looking forward
to learning what the administration has been up to since this
time last year. I am looking forward to hearing, to learning
about the military assessment and review of military options
that the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
Dempsey, produced, whether in the open hearing or the closed
session.
With that, I would like to turn things over to Chairman Poe
for any opening statement that he may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the
Appendix on page 33.]
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TED POE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS,
CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND
TRADE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Mr. Poe. I thank the chairman. Last year we held a hearing
on this same topic in December of last year. It seems like it
is Groundhog Day. Here we are again, and we all agree that
Russia violated the treaty, but we are still talking about what
the appropriate response should be. Russia is not someone that
is our friend or ally, and we certainly can't take them for
their word.
In 2008, the same year Russia violated the INF Treaty, it
invaded a sovereign country, Georgia. I have been to Georgia. I
have seen the Russian tanks on the hills. Seven years later,
Russia still occupies a third of that nation.
Last year Putin was at it again. He told the world that
Russian troops were not in Crimea while the world watched
Russian tanks and little green men come into that area.
Russia is now conducting strikes in Syria to prop up a
dictator who has murdered thousands of Syrians.
Putin seems to want to expand his empire, and the Russian
bear is out of the cage, and it is time we recognize them for
what they are doing. They are being aggressive.
It is no surprise that Russia is once again breaking its
word when it comes to a signed arms control treaty. The
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty is a treaty between
the United States, which places limits on ground-launched
ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges up between 500 and
5,500 kilometers. The United States has held up our bargain.
The Russians have not.
Just according to press reports, it appears the Russians
have tested a ground-launched cruise missile. They have
responded that this is a sea-based missile, which does not fall
under the treaty. That is nonsense. According to press releases
also, the administration seems to have known about the
violations back in 2008. It took 3 years for the administration
to report concern about the Russian compliance in Congress;
took 6 years for the State Department to officially find the
Russians in violation; and this year the State Department
repeated its findings that the Russians are in violation of the
treaty.
Chairman Rogers and I have made several appeals to the
State Department and Department of Defense about this issue.
Candidly, the responses we have gotten back lead me to believe
that we are not taking the issue as seriously as we should. We
have so far made no substantial progress in bringing the
Russians back into compliance. After 7 years, there have been
no consequences for the violation of the treaty. We have told
the Russians our concerns. And their response: the Russians
deny they are violating the treaty.
What I would like to know is what I asked last year: What
are the next steps? How are we going to convince the Russians
that we do mean business--if we do mean business? What is the
administration going to do to hold the Russians' feet to the
fire and hold them accountable? There are some who want to go
easy on the Russians in that they want to ignore this
situation. I don't think that that is the appropriate response
the United States should have toward the Russians and the
stockpiling of these violations.
So I look forward to what the witnesses have to say, to be
upfront, candid, blunt about what is the strategy? What are we
doing? What is the United States and our allies doing? And then
we have the problem of two rogue nations already developing
very similar weapons that we and the Russians have supposedly
agreed not to develop, and that would be Iran and Pakistan
developing similar weapons. So what is the United States
response going to be, and what do we plan to do about it?
And I will yield back to the chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes my friend and colleague from
Tennessee, the ranking member of the Strategic Forces
Subcommittee, Mr. Cooper, for any statement he might have.
STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TENNESSEE,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think we would all
like to welcome our colleagues from the Foreign Affairs
Committee. We hope that they will treat us kindly at the next
NDAA when it comes to sequential referrals or any issues like
that. But you are always welcome in the Armed Services
Committee room.
I also hope that our friends from Foreign Affairs can join
us in the classified session to follow this hearing. In fact,
it would be good if this public portion were kept as short as
possible so that we can learn as much as possible in the
classified session. Everyone knows that Mr. Putin doesn't
conduct his business in public, and why give him an advantage
by displaying our deliberations.
We have before us today two very distinguished public
servants. I look forward to hearing their testimony, and I also
hope that our colleagues will bear in mind that international
relations are not black and white, particularly when it comes
to Russia. I know that our chairman is very sensitive to the
issue of the RD-180 rockets, which, unfortunately, we depend on
quite heavily for U.S. assured access to space.
And it is kind of an amazing thing throughout the perils of
the Cold War, we have always had a pretty reliable supply of
those rockets. So nothing is black or white. No one is
defending Mr. Putin. We know that they cheat. We are outraged
by their takeover of Crimea, the invasion of Ukraine, their
bombing of anti-Assad forces in Syria. But it is very important
that really the meat of this hearing be held in the classified
session that will be upcoming. So I look forward to seeing all
of my colleagues upstairs in a few minutes.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper can be found in the
Appendix on page 35.]
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts,
Mr. Keating, for any opening statement he may have.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM KEATING, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MASSACHUSETTS, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM,
NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Mr. Keating. Well, thank you, Chairman Rogers, and Chairman
Poe, Ranking Member Cooper, for conducting this timely hearing.
I also would like to thank our two witnesses for being here
today to discuss the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty,
both in this hearing and later on in the classified briefing to
follow.
I understand that they are limited to what you can say and
disclose in this setting, but I appreciate the opportunity to
discuss publicly the issue of Russia's compliance with the INF
Treaty, something I think that is important for the public to
know but not necessarily details that will advantage the
Russians.
Twenty-eight years after the INF Treaty was signed, it
remains one of the most important nuclear treaties that the
United States has ever signed with Russia. State Department and
numerous observers have stated that Russia has developed,
produced, and flight tested a ground-launched cruise missile in
clear violation of the INF Treaty. Russian violation of the INF
Treaty, as with the violation of any treaty, would be a serious
matter. I look forward to further details regarding the
particular Russian weapon system at issue, and a discussion of
what its deployment would mean for Russia in terms of its
military strategy and how it would impact the security in
Europe and in Asia, importantly.
If Russia is found noncompliant with the treaty, the United
States, in conjunction with our allies, should use all of the
tools at our disposal to pressure the Russians into ending
these offending activities. While the question of noncompliance
by Russia must squarely and seriously be dealt with, it is
critical that the United States for the time being continue to
observe the treaty. A withdrawal would only free Russia to
legally pursue testing and deployment of intermediate-range
missiles that currently violate the terms of the treaty.
I look forward to hearing from our panel this afternoon on
the threat posed by Russian development, production, and
testing of intermediate-range cruise missiles; Russia's
intention with respect to the INF Treaty; and, importantly,
U.S. responses.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes Ms. Gottemoeller for 5 minutes to
summarize your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROSE E. GOTTEMOELLER, UNDER SECRETARY FOR
ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
Secretary Gottemoeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman
Poe, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Members Keating and Cooper, and
distinguished members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee
and Armed Services Committee, thank you for hosting this
hearing and for having me here today. This subject is one on
which I previously briefed these same committees, including
last year at around this time as was already indicated. To
permit time for a good discussion today with your permission, I
would like to abbreviate my remarks and submit my full
testimony for the record.
Mr. Rogers. Without objection, so ordered.
Secretary Gottemoeller. Thank you, sir.
Let me begin by saying that the United States does not
undertake arms control and disarmament as an end to itself, nor
do we look at arms control and disarmament in isolation from
deterrence in the general strategic environment, including the
changing security environment in Europe. Together, arms control
and deterrence help to create the conditions for a more durable
and predictable form of strategic stability. Therefore,
together, they benefit U.S. national security. Arms control
frameworks are one available and important instrument in our
foreign policy toolkit to advance global stability and the
security of the United States, our allies, and our partners.
This has been true for over four decades for both Republican
and Democratic administrations, for a wide variety of nuclear
and conventional security issues of concern. We have worked
closely with our allies and our partners to develop the arms
control framework that we have today, and both we and our
allies and partners continue to see enormous value in these
agreements.
Over the last three decades, there have been compliance and
implementation issues with first the Soviets and then the
Russians on a variety of agreements. Former officials of both
Republican and Democratic administrations and their colleagues
in Congress were forced to grapple with many of the same
problems we face today. How do we resolve violations when faced
by blatant denials? How do we work with allies and partners on
these challenges to ensure a unified and proportionate
response? These are not easy questions to answer. This is not
easy work to accomplish.
Let me assure these committees once again that the
administration takes compliance with all arms control
agreements extremely seriously. For this reason, this
administration worked hard to produce a compliance report in
July of 2010, the first delivered to Congress after a 5-year
lapse, and has produced one every year since as required by
statute.
The focus of today's hearing is Russia's violation of the
INF Treaty, so I would like to focus my remaining remarks on
that important topic. As a first comment and in response to
some of our opening comments, I just wanted to say that we had
no information or indication in 2008 that the Russian
Federation was violating the treaty. That information emerged
in 2011, and I know we will want to discuss this more during
the hearing and also in our closed session, but I did want to
put that out right at the beginning.
In May of this year, in the unclassified portion of the
annual compliance report, the United States repeated its
determination that Russia is in violation of its INF Treaty
obligations. Since 2013, we have raised with Russia our serious
concerns regarding conduct that we ultimately determined to be
a violation of the INF Treaty and have held senior-level and
technical-level bilateral discussions with the aim of returning
Russia to verifiable compliance with its treaty obligations.
Throughout the course of this year, we have raised this issue
with Russian officials on repeated occasions and at various
levels and in various departments within the Russian Government
in order to resolve U.S. concerns. We have made very clear that
this is not a technicality, a one-off event, or a case of
mistaken identity.
Again, it was mentioned, the notion of this being a sea-
launched cruise missile. However, this is a serious Russian
violation of one of the most basic obligations under the INF
Treaty. While the United States is engaging diplomatically with
Russia as noted above, we have devoted a great deal of
attention in 2015 to consulting with our allies and partners in
the interest of pursuing a coordinated response to the Russian
violation. Our allies have made clear their interest in
preserving the INF Treaty, and their continued wish that the
United States remain in the treaty and seek to bring the
Russian Federation back into compliance.
Russia continues to be unwilling to acknowledge its
violation or address our concerns. We have shared more than
enough information with Russian officials for them to look
through their own records and identify the relevant program.
Their denials and counteraccusations clearly attempt to deflect
attention from their own violation. Therefore, we continue to
work closely with allies on a series of diplomatic, economic,
and military measures to protect the interests of the United
States and our allies, and I know that my colleague Mr. McKeon
will want to say more about the military aspects of this.
I assure this committee that the Obama administration is
committed to bringing Russia back into compliance with the INF
Treaty. While our public determination and diplomacy has yet to
lead to Russia returning to compliance, our announcement of
Russia's violation and reaffirmation of continued U.S.
commitment to the treaty has imposed significant costs on
Russia. Its covert GLCM [ground-launched cruise missile]
program has been exposed, and Moscow is not free to pursue this
effort unconstrained, as this would confirm for the world that
Russia has been violating an agreement that has been a key
instrument of stability and security for nearly three decades.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Gottemoeller can be
found in the Appendix on page 36.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. McKeon for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF HON. BRIAN P. MCKEON, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. McKeon. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Chairman
Rogers, Chairman Poe, members of the committee, I appreciate
the opportunity to testify before you today.
I will not belabor the point that you already know and
which Under Secretary Gottemoeller has already discussed, that
the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under
the INF Treaty. Since making this determination, our objective
has been to preserve the viability of the treaty by convincing
Russia to come back into compliance. We believe it is in our
national security interest and our allies' interest that the
treaty remain in force and that Russia remain a state party to
the treaty and complies with its obligations. This means that
Russia must cease its noncompliant activity and eliminate all
INF Treaty-prohibited missiles and launchers in a verifiable
manner.
Equally important, our approach is focused on ensuring that
Russia gains no significant military advantage from its
violation. Doing so will ensure that our efforts to bring
Russia back into compliance will not come at the expense of our
security or that of our friends and allies.
As a result of Russia's actions, in 2014 the Joint Staff
conducted a military assessment of the threat posed by Russia
if it were to deploy an INF Treaty-prohibited ground-launched
cruise missile in Europe or the Asia-Pacific. This assessment
tells us that the deployment of such a system would increase
the risk to our allies and pose an indirect threat to the
United States. My Joint Staff colleague can address this in
more detail in the closed session. This assessment led us to
review a broad range of military response options and to
consider the effect each option would have on convincing the
Russian leadership to return to compliance with the treaty and
on countering the capability of a Russian INF Treaty-prohibited
system. This assessment occurred at the same time we were
confronting the new strategic reality in Europe: a Russia that
is modernizing its military capabilities, a Russia that has
destabilized the European security order by purporting to annex
Crimea, and a Russia that is actively seeking to undermine NATO
[North Atlantic Treaty Organization]. Finally, Moscow's nuclear
saber-rattling has raised questions about Russia's commitment
to strategic stability.
In light of this new strategic reality, the administration
determined that we needed to consider Russian actions with
regard to the INF Treaty in the context of its overall
aggressive and bellicose behavior that flouts international
legal norms and destabilizes the European security order.
Russia is not violating the INF Treaty in isolation from its
overall aggressive behavior. Therefore, we concluded that our
responses cannot focus solely on the INF Treaty. Stated another
way, this is not just an arms control issue, but it represents
a broader challenge to transatlantic security. Accordingly, we
are developing a comprehensive response to Russian military
actions and are committing to investments now that we will make
irrespective of Russia's decision to return to compliance with
the INF Treaty.
And while we do not seek to make Russia an enemy, and we
will cooperate with Russia where it is in our interest to do
so, such as in the P5+1 [China, France, Russia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States, plus Germany] negotiations with
Iran, the President has made clear that we will uphold our
Article 5 obligation under the North Atlantic Treaty. Our core
objective remains the same: to ensure that Russia does not
obtain a significant military advantage from its INF violation.
We believe that our overall efforts to prepare for the
defense of Europe can achieve this goal and ensure that the INF
violations do not leave Russia with any appreciable advantage
over us or our allies. As we consider the changed strategic
environment in Europe we are factoring Russia's increased
cruise missile capabilities, including its INF violation, into
our planning. Our responses to Russia's activities in Ukraine
as well as the complex security challenges in the south of
Europe involve a broad range of efforts within the Department,
bilaterally with the allies and partners, and within the NATO
Alliance.
First, we have focused on posture and presence. In the last
year, under the European Reassurance Initiative, for which
Congress generously provided nearly $1 billion in fiscal 2015,
we have maintained a persistent rotational air, land, and sea
presence of U.S. forces in the Baltics and Central Europe to
reassure our allies and build up their capacity.
We are also transforming our posture in Europe to be more
responsive and sustainable for the 21st century. American
rotational forces need to move more quickly and easily to
participate in training and exercises in Europe. That is why we
are prepositioning tanks, artillery, infantry fighting
vehicles, and other equipment to rapidly respond to crises and
provocation. Six states in Europe, the three Baltic states plus
Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland, have agreed to host company- to
battalion-sized elements of this equipment, which will be moved
around the region for training and exercises.
Second, the United States and the alliance are focused anew
on planning and shaping our future military activities in
Europe. We have energized planning and resourcing efforts in
response to the changed security environment in and around
Europe.
Third, we are working to improve our defensive measures to
deny Russian offensive capabilities by modifying and expanding
air defense systems, including addressing the difficult
challenge posed by cruise missiles. As Secretary Carter stated
in a recent speech, we are investing in the technologies that
will be most relevant to Russia's provocations, developing new
unmanned systems, a long-range bomber, a new long-range
standoff cruise missile, and a number of innovative
technologies.
Fourth, we are leading the alliance to prepare for the new
challenges posed by Russia and instability and terrorism in
itself in the south of Europe. We are working to implement
agreements made at the Wales Summit and to plan for the next
summit of leaders in Warsaw next July. NATO has reorganized the
NATO Response Force, set up new command centers, and
established the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force. We are
pressing our allies to fulfill the commitment made at Wales to
invest more in defense with a particular focus on new
capabilities.
We continue to look for ways to improve alliance
capabilities and decisionmaking. With regard to NATO's nuclear
deterrence mission, allies remain strongly committed to burden
sharing as a foundational element of NATO's deterrence and
defense posture. Our dual-capable F-35A is on track and should
complete operational testing of its dual capability in 2024.
The B61-12 nuclear gravity bomb life-extension program, a
critical element in both our NATO commitment and our strategic
forces, is on schedule and on budget to meet a March 2020 first
production unit goal.
In confronting this challenge, we will take a strong and
balanced approach. We will not go back to the old Cold War
playbook of having hundreds of thousands of forces in Europe.
We are also mindful that we do not need to, nor should we,
return to a world where we match every Russian action with a
direct and mirror-imaged reaction. We will use a smaller
footprint, high-impact rotational presence, build partner
capacity, and integrate planning between space, cyber,
conventional, and nuclear forces.
In some, we will take the necessary steps to build U.S. and
NATO capabilities, posture, and plans to deter Russia's
destabilizing influence, coercion, and aggressive actions, all
while keeping the door open for cooperation when and if Russia
is willing. These efforts will require expenditures we were not
planning to make and which will be challenging under a
constrained budget. But make no mistake, we will undertake
these efforts. Our security and that of our NATO allies
requires an effective response and comprehensive strategy.
Let me conclude by reiterating that the pursuit of
strategic stability remains in the interest of both the United
States and Russia. And we hope Russia will remember why the
Soviet Union signed the treaty in the first place. By agreeing
to the treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union ensured
that both parties benefitted from the removal of weapon systems
that posed a real and credible threat to regional and
international security.
We appreciate the attention of the Congress to these
issues, and we will keep you informed of developments. Thank
you again for the opportunity to be here.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
Appendix on page 43.]
Mr. Rogers. I thank both the witnesses, and I will
recognize myself now for the first series of questions.
Ms. Gottemoeller, I was just listening to your opening
statement, and you made the point that you didn't realize that
Russia was violating the INF Treaty until 2011. I am looking at
an interview you did with The Denver Post 2 weeks ago on the
13th--it was published--of November, and you stated, ``Russia
tested starting in 2008 a ground-launched cruise missile that
flies to ranges banned by the treaty.'' And you go ahead and
explain what a ban means. If you didn't know until 2011, how do
we reconcile that statement in The Denver Post with what you
testified a few minutes ago?
Secretary Gottemoeller. Sir, we saw that they were starting
to test a cruise missile during that time period, but this is,
you know, a situation where it was only over time did we
accumulate the information that it was a ground-launched cruise
missile. So the testing series--and again, this is something we
can talk about in more detail--the testing series did begin in
2008, but it was only later in that time period did we see that
it was a ground-launched cruise missile. So I was not aware of
how The Denver Post had put that information together, but that
was not correct in the way they quoted the information.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. But you do recognize that disparity, and
it raises concerns for me that it took us 3 years. If we knew
they started testing in 2008, it took 3 years for us to realize
that they were violating the ranges that were committed under
the INF Treaty.
Secretary Gottemoeller. It is worth bearing down on this
point for a moment, sir, because under the INF Treaty, sea-
launched cruise missiles and air-launched cruise missiles are
permitted. And there is no reason why the Russians could not
have been developing during that period a new sea-launched or
air-launched cruise missile. We simply did not know until later
in the test series that it was a ground-launched system.
Mr. Rogers. Was any of that data shared with the Senate
during the 2010 hearings on the New START [Strategic Arms
Reduction] Treaty.
Secretary Gottemoeller. Sir, we did not understand at that
point of time, and again, I would like to talk about this
further in our closed session along with some of our
colleagues, but we did not know that it was not a sea-launched
or air-launched system and completely in accord with the INF
Treaty.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. This question will be for either one of
you. We were told last year in our hearing on this topic that
there were a range of responses that had been prepared and were
ready for consideration at the principal level. And these joint
committees then wrote a letter to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs urging action on those range of responses. And I will
introduce that letter for the record. Did the principals ever
meet to consider those responses? If so, when, and what did
they decide? If not, why not?
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 56.]
Secretary Gottemoeller. I will start. I will say that we
have had a series of interagency meetings on this matter up to
the senior level of principals, so it hasn't been a single
event by any means. And I will turn to Mr. McKeon to pick up on
what is next.
Mr. McKeon. Mr. Chairman, some of the things I have
described in my opening statement are decisions and responses
that we are undertaking. I can say more in closed session about
a couple of specific matters that involve the NATO Alliance
that are also decisions of the government.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. Well, I won't belabor that in open
session because I do want to pursue it in closed session, and
my guess is you are going to tell me you couldn't say it
anyway. But I am interested in knowing exactly how you are
proceeding and when you are going to proceed and if we need to
do any reprogramming in fiscal year 2016 or 2017 to accommodate
those measures.
Mr. McKeon. Well, part of what I should underscore, Mr.
Chairman, from my opening statement, is as we looked at the INF
issue, we were also confronting the broader Russia challenge
and how to respond to it, and didn't think it was appropriate
to respond just specifically to the possibility of a new
ground-launched cruise missile in Europe, but a broader
challenge to European security. So many of the things that I
outlined are part of a response to broader Russian behavior,
including the INF violation.
Mr. Rogers. You see, that is my fear: is that this set of
responses that have been prepared a year ago for consideration
are now going to just blend into the new challenges that we
have to face. And we are going to get no action on the
violations of the INF Treaty. That is a longstanding violation
that needs an appropriate response by this Nation, and it
should not be impeded or blended into any other concerns that
we are having with Russia's new activity.
Let me ask this, Ms. Gottemoeller, is it in America's
interest to continue to unilaterally comply with the INF and
these other treaties when Russia is not doing so?
Secretary Gottemoeller. Sir, we judge this treaty to be in
our national security interest, and I should say, sir, that
this is not a bilateral treaty. All of the successor states of
the Soviet Union are also signatories of this treaty. So it is
a significant treaty sustaining stability in Eurasia. We
judge--and our partners and allies in Asia and in Europe--judge
it to be in their national security interests as well. So I
will say that--and by the way, we judge that Russia in some
ways has had itself brought up short by our calling them out on
this violation of the treaty.
Mr. Rogers. I would love to know how.
Secretary Gottemoeller. Well, they have been saying quite
regularly and publicly that they are in compliance with the INF
Treaty, which we don't buy, but also that they are not
preparing to withdraw from the treaty, which I think is a good
thing because it allows us to continue to drive forward
pursuing them diplomatically as well as with other responses
and countermeasures.
Mr. Rogers. I don't know why they would want to withdraw.
They are not having to comply with it anyway. They don't have
any pressure on them. We are the only ones that are in
compliance, and I just think it is foolhardy.
But, with that, I will stop and turn to Chairman Poe.
Mr. Poe. I agree with the chairman's comments about we are
the only ones complying.
Let's talk about the specific types of missiles in a
broader scale. The United States and Russia and the former
Soviet Republics have agreed to limit the number of missiles.
Is that correct?
Secretary Gottemoeller. Yes, that is.
Mr. Poe. However, there are other countries that are
pursuing these very specific types of missiles, such as Iran,
Pakistan, North Korea, China, possibly. So, to your knowledge,
either one of you, are those four countries and maybe others
pursuing the development of these very types of missiles?
Secretary Gottemoeller. It is common knowledge, sir, and
indeed the Russians have said publicly that there are other
countries developing intermediate-range nuclear and ballistic
and cruise missiles. So they do talk about that publicly as
being a reason why they have a debate going on in the Russian
Federation today about the treaty.
Mr. Poe. It is not a gotcha question. I am just looking at
the global situation. The United States has said, we are going
to do this. We are going to limit the number of missiles we
have. We are working with the Russians and the former Soviet
Republics. We all agree, we are going to limit, but out there
in the world, you have got probably some rogue countries, like
North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, and then you have the Chinese who
are not bound by this treaty or any other treaty to limit these
types of missiles. Is that a concern of the United States?
Secretary Gottemoeller. Let me recollect for just a moment,
and then I will turn to Mr. McKeon for what he would like to
add. But say for just a moment that it is useful to remember
the reason we entered into this treaty in the first place back
in 1988. That is that these types of missiles represent very
short flight time to target. And, therefore, they do pose a
threat of short-warning attacks on important targets. That is a
very great concern for our allies in both Europe and Asia, and
for that reason, we continue to believe that it is important to
sustain this ban on the treaty with regard to the Russian
Federation.
Now, I will note that we have other means of responding to
intermediate-range nuclear missiles being developed elsewhere
or conventional missiles, for that matter, and I will turn to
Mr. McKeon now.
Mr. Poe. Well, I don't know that I understood your answer.
Does that concern us that these types of missiles--North Korea
could send them to South Korea. Pakistan could send them to
India. China could send them to Russia. I mean, there are all
different scenarios of the short-range capability of these
missiles. Does that fact alone concern us as a nation? Mr.
McKeon, you can answer it.
Mr. McKeon. Mr. Chairman, if I could first address part of
your question which is, the INF Treaty only bans a type of
missile, a ground-launched cruise missile and associated
launcher. It doesn't ban a number of other types of missiles.
And we have an ample supply of sea-launched and air-launched
conventional cruise missiles in our inventory. So we are not
limited in any respect from those capabilities.
As Under Secretary Gottemoeller said, Iran has a missile
program which we are quite concerned about, medium-range
program that they have engaged some testing and they have
ambition for a longer-range system. That is part of the reason
for the European Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense in
Europe, which is progressing. We are concerned about North
Korea's missile program. There is no question about that. It is
why we made some of the investments we have made in the
homeland missile defense in the last few years.
Mr. Poe. I am not suggesting that we should get out of the
treaty. I am just suggesting that we are bound by a treaty to
limit certain types of missiles. Russia is the only other
country and the former Soviet Republics are the only other
entities that are bound by this. Other nations are not. That
was my question. And does that concern us as a nation?
Mr. McKeon. Sir, as a matter of our ability to protect the
United States and our allies, as I noted in the statement, the
Russian capability does pose a threat, but it continues to be
our view in the Department that we have sufficient capability
to meet our defense requirements at present.
Mr. Poe. How about our allies like South Korea?
Mr. McKeon. Our work with our allies in South Korea is an
ongoing, continuing project. They are doing well in investing.
We are having conversations with them about certain
capabilities which--and they are worried more about short-range
missiles, not any medium-range missiles that exist, and
wouldn't, even if this treaty applied to the Koreans, wouldn't
affect the short-range system.
Mr. Rogers. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Cooper for any
questions he may have.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Gottemoeller, I believe in your testimony you said that
there was a 5-year lapse in reporting that the State Department
had to Congress. There were no reports between 2005 and 2010,
but then reporting was resumed.
Secretary Gottemoeller. Yes, sir. That is correct. I will
underscore that the so-called annual compliance report is an
interagency effort. It is not just the Department of State that
carries it out, although the Department of State is responsible
for leading the effort. But there was a period between 2005 and
2010 when it was not published on an annual basis.
Mr. Cooper. But since 2010, the reports have been made
annually.
Secretary Gottemoeller. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. Cooper. The Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty is of
primary benefit to our allies, for example, in NATO and in
Asia. What is their reaction from your diplomatic experience?
Do they want us to stay members of the treaty? Are they urging
Russian compliance? What is their general attitude?
Secretary Gottemoeller. Sir, they have been very keen to
ensure that the INF Treaty remains in force. They have been
very keen to see Russia reenter into full compliance with the
INF Treaty, and they have really been very eager to work with
us in this regard.
Mr. Cooper. Can you refresh my memory, since you have been
on duty at the State Department, how many times you have
briefed Congress or informed us of what is going on in this
area? Because I think some of my colleagues have the mistaken
impression that we have been uninformed on these issues. And I
think it is a number of times. Could you refresh my memory on
that?
Secretary Gottemoeller. Sir, we went back and looked it
over. In my experience, we have not briefed any issue more than
we have briefed this particular issue, and it is not only me
alone, but a number of colleagues at both the political and
expert level, and the number of briefings, hearings, and
meetings amounts to about 60.
Mr. Cooper. Sixty. Like six-zero?
Secretary Gottemoeller. Correct.
Mr. Cooper. That is quite a number. And there are many
disturbing Russian activities, as my colleagues have pointed
out, so for this issue to have received disproportionate
attention would seem to indicate that Ukraine, Syria, Crimea,
other issues, such as Russian military doctrine talking about
escalatory dominance, the preemptive use of nuclear weapons,
that would be a topic nuclear related that we should perhaps
give as much attention to as this.
Secretary Gottemoeller. Sir, there are many troubling
issues with the Russian Federation right now. And this is among
a number of very troubling issues. I will only say that.
Mr. Cooper. I thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. I look
forward to the classified session.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. I would agree this issue
has received a lot of talk. Unfortunately, it has received no
action.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Keating for any questions he
may have.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am curious how much you could comment on the fact that,
in my view, Russia has an enormous stockpile of strategic and
other nuclear weapons already, and I am just trying to think of
a real good reason why this is so strategically important to
them. I am just curious what your thinking might be. What are
Russia's real gains doing this, given their stockpile and the
other assets that they have at their disposal already?
Secretary Gottemoeller. It is a very good point, Mr.
Keating, that all of the potential targets around the Eurasian
periphery for intermediate-range, either cruise or ballistic
systems, could be handled by their central strategic forces.
The Russians have also been developing very capable cruise
missiles, both air-launched and sea-launched. So to be honest
with you, sir, we are puzzled as to why they think they need a
ground-launched cruise missile that is in violation of this
important treaty because we see they have, in our view,
adequate capabilities to cover these threats with other systems
at their disposal and that are entirely in accord with the INF
Treaty.
Mr. Keating. Yeah, do you see any, you know, in terms of
Asia, in terms of Japan, South Korea, China, are they worried
at all that, you know, those countries are advancing somehow
and getting a strategic edge? Is that part of what their
thinking might be? I know you are asking to get yourself inside
of Putin's head. We have had many hearings trying to do that
with little success.
Secretary Gottemoeller. I can only say, sir, following on
my earlier answer, Mr. Putin himself said in public last August
that he is concerned about the emergence of intermediate-range
systems--missile systems in China, in India, and Pakistan, and
in Iran. So, you know, I understand that there is that concern
that has been perhaps present in the Kremlin, in Moscow, but I
am only really speculating and based on what he had to say
publicly.
Mr. Keating. And then it is very tricky especially at a
hearing dealing with verification issues. But it is clear that
the evidence is there. They can deny it and then seek more
information, and in doing so, we might be giving our sources
and means of intelligence that we don't want to give to them
indirectly.
But, you know, looking at things, has there been discussion
to set up an Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty Special
Verification Commission [SVC] as provided for in the INF
Treaty? Has that been a source of discussion?
Secretary Gottemoeller. Mr. Keating, if we had some inkling
that the Russians would acknowledge this missile and would
engage productively in an SVC discussion to try to resolve
these concerns, we would be happy to convene an SVC session.
Recognizing the complexities I mentioned earlier, saying this
is a multilateral treaty with a number of countries who are now
members of the treaty from across the former Soviet Union, but
nevertheless, if we had some inkling that it would help, we
would be delighted to convene an SVC session.
Mr. Keating. That leads us to the issue of responses, which
I am afraid is going to really be a subject matter in the
classified setting.
So I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Gottemoeller. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Nebraska, Mr. Oklahoma--the gentleman from Oklahoma--I have got
too many people talking to me up here--Mr. Bridenstine. Sorry
about the Nebraska comment.
Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just had a question. Of course, the INF violation is of
high importance to everybody here, but I think it is emblematic
of many larger issues that I think this committee is bringing
up and I think appropriately so. One is a question that I have
about the Open Skies Treaty. Admiral Haney, commander of U.S.
Strategic Command, stated quote: ``The treaty has become a
critical component of Russia's intelligence collection
capability directed at the United States. In addition to
overflying military installations, Russian Open Skies flights
can overfly and collect on DOD and national critical
infrastructure. The vulnerabilities exposed by exploitation of
this data and costs of mitigation are increasingly difficult to
characterize,'' unquote. Do you agree with Admiral Haney that
Russia can use Open Skies to surveil national critical
infrastructure? Ms. Gottemoeller.
Secretary Gottemoeller. Sir, the Open Skies Treaty is
designed, in fact, for overflight of other territories. We
overfly the Russian Federation in the same way. In fact, we
find it quite useful to overfly their rail lines, for example.
I wanted to stress that one of the advantages of the Open Skies
Treaty is that information, imagery that is taken is shared
openly among all of the treaty parties. So one of the
advantages with the Open Skies Treaty is that we know exactly
what the Russians are imaging because they must share the
imagery with us. So that has an advantage over the so-called
national technical means of the Russian Federation, where we
are not sure exactly what they are imaging.
Mr. Bridenstine. So are they imaging national critical
infrastructure that has nothing to do with defense?
Secretary Gottemoeller. What I can say is, based on, again,
the Open Skies Treaty regime is producing imagery that is open
to all, and they have imaged a number of sites around the
country.
Mr. Bridenstine. Does possible surveillance of U.S.
national critical infrastructure fit with Russia's warfighting
doctrine?
Secretary Gottemoeller. Well, sir, I would say that under
the Open Skies Treaty, we are all basically opening up our
territory so that the other countries can have a chance to
overfly and observe, you know, what is going on in the country.
That was the original idea behind President Eisenhower's
proposal of the treaty back in the late 1950s, that it would
permit predictability and confidence-building among all the
parties to the treaty. So it has been very valuable from that
perspective.
Mr. Bridenstine. So a lot of technological advancements
have happened since Eisenhower was President. Will the
administration permit Russia to fly over the United States with
a new advanced digital electro-optical sensor?
Secretary Gottemoeller. Well, sir, the digital sensors that
are permitted under the Open Skies Treaty are permitted to all
parties to the treaty. So----
Mr. Bridenstine. So will the administration permit Russia
to fly over the United States with a new advanced digital
electro-optical sensor?
Secretary Gottemoeller. As I said, sir, digital sensors are
permitted to all treaty parties. Not only to Russia----
Mr. Bridenstine. So the answer is yes?
Secretary Gottemoeller [continuing]. The United States and
our European allies and partners; to all treaty parties.
Mr. Bridenstine. Would information on U.S. national
critical infrastructure facilitate targeting of that
infrastructure with a Russian cruise missile, for example?
Secretary Gottemoeller. I think it is worthwhile
considering, sir, in this context what increment of information
the Russia Federation receives from the Open Skies Treaty to
all of the other sources of information that they have,
including their national----
Mr. Bridenstine. So you are suggesting that maybe we don't
need it anymore?
Secretary Gottemoeller. No, sir, I am not. I am
suggesting----
Mr. Bridenstine. But it is not of value?
Secretary Gottemoeller. I am suggesting that you need to
look at the incremental value of the treaty in particular
settings. I can say it has been of enormous value over Eastern
Ukraine, in that setting in this current crisis. And it is
important again to bear in mind the importance that our allies
and partners place upon this treaty and to make a good
calculation of what particular risks predictability and
openness have for our national security. We judge that this
treaty does not pose such risks to our national security.
Mr. Bridenstine. Regarding our allies that you mentioned,
to the extent that allies value the imagery that they collect
from Open Skies, has the administration assessed what
commercial imagery the United States could provide to allies
without exposing us to the risk of Russian aircraft with
Russian sensors being allowed to overfly the United States?
What other could we provide our allies using other sources,
other methods to our allies that do not include us having to
give up overflight rights of the United States?
Secretary Gottemoeller. Well, I think it is a good point,
sir, to underscore that a lot is available on commercial
imagery now to everyone--every country around the world,
whether it is the Russian Federation, or our allies and
partners. What is valuable, again, about the Open Skies Treaty,
is that every image is taken by any plane flying, by any party
over any territory, is that all parties have it available to
them. And, for that reason, we know exactly what is being
gained by overflights of our territory.
Mr. Bridenstine. Last question in my last few seconds. Have
you asked the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency for their
analysis on this?
Secretary Gottemoeller. Sir, again, I think this is the
kind of discussion that would be good to have if you wish to
pursue it in our closed session.
Mr. Bridenstine. Roger.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
Garamendi, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Garamendi. Sixty times we have gone through this, and
still I am not sure we really recognize the long history of
these treaties, compliance and noncompliance over a long, long
period of time, dating back to Ronald Reagan and the question
of enforcement at that time of the treaties. And so we have
gone back and forth. There really has been a tit for tat over
these maybe almost 40 years now. But the bottom line is
significant progress has been made, a very, very significant
reduction in nuclear weapons, warheads, as well as delivery
systems. And while this INF issue is a big one, it is not the
only one.
And, Mr. McKeon, I am taken by your testimony, and----
Mr. McKeon. In a good way, I hope.
Mr. Garamendi. And, frankly, it is a testimony that
basically says: We are going to go at this in a very aggressive
way. And I am looking here at--``Russia does not obtain a
significant military advantage from its INF violation.'' And
then you go on to discuss how we can do that. Would you like to
elaborate a bit on how we can be assured that they do not have
a significant military advantage from their INF violation?
Mr. McKeon. Congressman, as I explained in my opening
statement, and there is a longer statement for the record, we
are looking at the challenge posed by Russia's military
modernization and its activities in Europe, including the INF
violation, as a whole, and looking at the Department as to what
investments we are already making, what new investments we will
need to make in the coming years to come to grips with that
challenge. I would not--I have characterized it as aggressive,
but prudent planning in response to what we see in terms of
Russian capability, Russian intent.
Mr. Garamendi. So this is from your testimony, new unmanned
systems, new long-range bomber, new long-range standoff cruise
missile, a number of innovative things, including the B61 bomb
life-extension programs and on and on. Bottom line, are we at a
disadvantage vis-a-vis Russia with our military standing today?
Mr. McKeon. Congressman, we still have the most capable
military on the planet.
Mr. Garamendi. And these additional investments would make
us even more so?
Mr. McKeon. We need to keep pace with the modernization of
both Russia and China and militaries of both countries as we
look around the globe. Those are the two peer or near-peer
competitors. And as I said, we see capability on the part of
Russia that is growing as well as the Chinese. It is hard to
measure President Putin's intent, but we have seen some of his
actions in Europe, so we can----
Mr. Garamendi. There is an interesting line in one of your
testimonies--I will ask this question of both of you--that
Russia thinks that we have violated the INF. Could you quickly
tell us why, what Russia thinks we have done that violates it?
Mr. McKeon. Yes, when we met with them in Moscow a year ago
September, we went through this in some detail. A couple of
things that they raised. One, they complained about our armed
unmanned aerial vehicles, saying that they violate the terms of
the treaty. Secondly, they claim that our Aegis Ashore
capability, which we are putting in place under the European
Phased Adaptive Approach----
Mr. Garamendi. That would be both Romania and Poland.
Mr. McKeon. The one in Romania is essentially nearing
completion, and it will reach operational capability later this
year, and IOC [initial operational capability] next year, and
Poland is a couple of years away.
Mr. Garamendi. That is an anti-missile system. How can that
be considered to be anything but?
Mr. McKeon. Their claim, which we have rebutted, is that it
is simply a Tomahawk cruise missile system set off, that is not
on a ship but is on land, and can be postured to fire cruise
missiles in their direction.
Mr. Garamendi. Are they right?
Mr. McKeon. They are not right.
Mr. Garamendi. Why?
Mr. McKeon. It doesn't have all of the same capabilities
and fire control system that you see on a Tomahawk setup on a
Navy ship.
Mr. Garamendi. How long did it take Ronald Reagan to get
Russia back in compliance with the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty]?
Mr. McKeon. I believe it was 7 or 8 years. It is some time
in the mid-1980s where we identified the Krasnoyarsk radar as a
violation, and it was worked through, to the end of the Reagan
administration and into the first Bush administration before in
negotiations. It was before the Soviet Union collapsed. I think
it was in 1989 and conversations between Secretary Baker and
then Foreign Minister Shevardnadze where they came to an
agreement----
Mr. Garamendi. When did the United States withdraw from the
ABM Treaty?
Mr. McKeon. In 2001 or 2002, under President Bush.
Mr. Garamendi. Was that a unilateral withdrawal?
Mr. McKeon. It was, yes, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Perry for any
questions he may have.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Gottemoeller, or Secretary Gottemoeller, about a year
ago, as I recall, we had a very similar hearing to this one.
Secretary Gottemoeller. Uh-huh.
Mr. Perry. And you had enumerated, and through the course
of the conversation, we came to an understanding of the alleged
violations. And I think, at that time, we kind of realized or
kind of confirmed that it took years--I mean, the
administration knew years had passed at that point that the
violation had been made, but we hadn't been made aware of them.
And at that time I asked you very specifically what was going
to be done? What was the panoply of options that might be
available to us? And I think we reserved that for an executive
session, but I am wondering at this point, because it is also
my understanding that by now the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
has offered a series of options to remedy the situation to
bring Russia back into compliance, is there any plan to
implement any of them? And if there is a plan, is it available
to be heard in open session?
Mr. McKeon. Well, Congressman, I have laid out in my
opening statement our overall response to Russia's behavior,
including its INF violation. There is more that I can say in
closed session about some measures we are going to undertake in
partnership with our NATO allies.
Mr. Perry. Is there a plan to implement it, though? I know
there are options, but is there a plan to implement it with a
timeline? The administration seems to be happy to give our
adversaries timelines when we will withdraw from countries and
combat, et cetera. Is there a timeline when Russia can expect
implementation of this plan?
Mr. McKeon. Sir, there are a number of capabilities that we
are investing in, some of which were already on the books, some
of which will be new or increased in the fiscal year 2017
budget and built into the Future Years Defense Program. And so
it will be a continuing effort, as I said, to respond to what
we see in terms of Russia's growing military modernization and
its capabilities and its behavior, including its INF violation.
So there won't be a specific point where you will say, ``Aha,
everything is in place.'' We are working to counter what we see
as the threat posed by Russia's activities, including the INF
violation.
Mr. Perry. So we don't have milestones that we can measure
their accountability and their compliance, are there
milestones?
Mr. McKeon. Well, sir, I am outlining for you what the
Department of Defense is going to be doing over the coming year
and into the future past this administration, assuming these
plans are carried forward. We continue to have a separate
conversation with Russia about coming into compliance with the
treaty. They will see these activities, and they will see them
in our budget, and they will start to understand, we believe,
that this response is not making them any more secure.
Mr. Perry. Well, with all due respect--and I will end my
questioning--it seems to me that our response years and years
in the making without any forced compliance, without any
repercussions to failure of compliance, is just going to lead
Russia to believe that they can continue to be in noncompliance
without any accountability. And that is what I have seen. That
is what I learned a year ago, and it doesn't seem to me that
much has changed in the year between now and then, with all due
respect.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes Ms. Kelly for 5 minutes.
Ms. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. McKeon, in your assessment, other than the INF Treaty,
are there any arms control obligations that Russia is not
complying with or is in violation of treaty agreements with the
United States?
Mr. McKeon. Congresswoman, I would probably defer to Under
Secretary Gottemoeller, who controls the pen on the compliance
report. The Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] Treaty is one
of them. We have concerns, compliance concerns, about other
treaties, including the Open Skies Treaty.
Secretary Gottemoeller. Ma'am, I will only add that as far
as the additional treaties, we have long-standing concerns
about the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological
Weapons Convention. We cannot confirm Russian compliance with
those treaties because they have not provided, as we believe,
full information and data about Soviet-era programs, their past
programs before the Soviet Union fell apart.
Nevertheless, they are good treaty partners. In the
Chemical Weapons Convention, they are continuing to destroy
tons and tons of Soviet-era chemical weapons and are doing so
according to an agreed schedule. So--and they are working with
us in Syria to bring to final conclusion Syria's destruction
and elimination of its chemical weapons arsenal.
Ms. Kelly. Where they are not good partners, what are we
doing about that?
Secretary Gottemoeller. Where they are not good partners,
in my world, we are continuing to make sure that they are aware
that they must come back into compliance with the INF Treaty
specifically, that that is in their interest as well as for the
rest of the international community.
In the case of the CFE Treaty, we actually took
countermeasures inside the treaty context and ceased
implementing the treaty with regard to the Russian Federation,
but, again, the CFE Treaty, the Conventional Forces in Europe
Treaty, brings a lot of predictability and mutual confidence to
other partners and signatories of the treaty, especially during
this period of crisis, not only in Ukraine but in other places
such as Georgia and so forth. So it is helpful to continue to
ensure that information is flowing, that inspections take
place, and notifications of activities are flowing.
Ms. Kelly. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Arizona, Mr. Franks, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for both for being here.
Ms. Gottemoeller, I understand that Ambassador Thomas
Graham has suggested publicly that the administration is
looking to circumvent the Constitution and allow--or actually
pursue a prohibition of nuclear testing through a U.N. Security
Council resolution. I, obviously, would recoil at any security
council dictating American defense policy.
Can you assure this committee that the administration is
not pursuing this idea?
Secretary Gottemoeller. Sir, I have been in constant battle
with our NGO [nongovernmental organization] colleagues over
this issue. We do not agree with this notion.
Mr. Franks. All right. Well, and I appreciate that. And you
are assuring me that that is not being pursued?
Secretary Gottemoeller. Correct.
Mr. Franks. Okay. That is good. See, answers can happen.
Knowing that, since the 1996 era, three countries have
broken the de facto comprehensive nuclear test ban moratorium
and tested nuclear weapons--that is India and Pakistan in 1998,
and then North Korea in 2006 and 2009 and again in 2013. Your
compliance report this year states that each state with a
testing moratorium complied with it in 2014. So is it--in other
words, is it correct now to state that no state last year
conducted a nuclear weapons test that produced a nuclear yield?
Secretary Gottemoeller. Sir, within this century, the only
state that has tested nuclear weapons is--in a way that
produced a nuclear yield--is North Korea, so since the
beginning of this century.
Mr. Franks. So are you saying India and Pakistan in 1998,
that did not occur?
Secretary Gottemoeller. No, sir. Since 2000, is what I am
saying.
Mr. Franks. Oh, I am sorry.
Secretary Gottemoeller. The only state that has tested to
nuclear yield is North Korea.
Mr. Franks. And so no state last year conducted any nuclear
yield tests or any tests that resulted in any nuclear yield?
Secretary Gottemoeller. Correct.
Mr. Franks. All right. Well, listen, that is all the
questions I have.
And I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Fleming for any
questions he may have.
Dr. Fleming. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
For both of our panelists today, I would like to ask this
question. You both mentioned in your testimony that the
administration continues to reiterate to Russia its need to
come into compliance with the INF Treaty. Do you have any
specific details of actions taken by Russia to suggest that
Russia actually intends to come into compliance with the INF,
that the administration's urgings are having any effect?
Secretary Gottemoeller. Sir, what I can say is that the
Russian Federation claims that it is in full compliance with
the treaty. It does not acknowledge this violation that we have
regularly expressed grave concerns to it about, it does not
acknowledge the missile, the ground-launch cruise missile. So
it claims it is in compliance with the treaty, number one, and
it also in that context asserts its commitment to continue for
the present time to stay in the INF Treaty. And so that is the
position that we hear from the Russians time and time again.
Dr. Fleming. I assume you confront them with the actual
data. How do they respond when you actually show it to them?
Secretary Gottemoeller. I have told them, you know, that
they have received from us sufficient information to be able to
determine what missile we are talking about, but they claim
that they cannot tell what missile we are talking about.
Dr. Fleming. Do you feel like their unwillingness to comply
with INF may actually get worse; they may actually continue in
the wrong direction?
Secretary Gottemoeller. Well, one, I think, benefit of
calling them out on their violation of the INF Treaty is that
they are aware that the world is watching, watching very
closely, and that we are watching very closely their continued
behavior with regard to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Treaty, so I do believe that it is having an effect upon them.
Dr. Fleming. Has the U.S. implemented any economic
sanctions because of their failure to comply with INF?
Secretary Gottemoeller. We have been working with our
allies to consider economic sanctions. And you are aware, sir,
that we have imposed a wide range of economic sanctions in
complete agreement with the European Union [EU] to respond to
their incursion into Crimea, and that, I think, has been
extraordinarily effective. We continue to consider economic
measures with regard to the INF Treaty, but up to this point,
we have not pursued it.
Dr. Fleming. When you say ``effective,'' what is the metric
for that? How do you know that is being effective?
Secretary Gottemoeller. Well, I think effective is, in the
case of economic sanctions, it is clear that it is having an
economic impact.
Dr. Fleming. It is hurting their economy, you are saying?
Secretary Gottemoeller. Right. Right.
Dr. Fleming. Is that mostly in the oil and gas type of
venue or is----
Secretary Gottemoeller. Well, when we look across the range
of sanctions, and this is a topic that if you are interested in
deserves a separate briefing, but when we are looking across
the range of sanctions undertaken with the EU, it is not only
the oil and gas sector. It is manufacturing. It is across the
board, really.
Dr. Fleming. Mr. McKeon, you mentioned in a hearing last
year that the DOD [Department of Defense] is examining a range
of military options to respond to Russia's INF violations.
Congress has moved this process along. This year's NDAA just
signed by the President last week included language to require
the DOD to make plans of, again, development of the kind of
systems that you outlined in your testimony. So what can you
tell me about that?
Mr. McKeon. Well, in terms of the report, Congressman, we
are aware of the reporting requirement and will endeavor to
meet it on time, although I will confess I know we are not
always the best at being timely with our reporting because we
have a lot of reporting requirements.
In terms of capabilities that we are looking at, I outlined
those in some detail in my statement, and I will go into a
little bit more in closed session on some ideas that we are
going to pursue in Europe.
Dr. Fleming. Okay. So if the administration's urgings to
Russia regarding INF compliance are not changing Russian
behavior, we see that it may have some effect on their economy,
but not their behavior, and in fact, Russia's behavior may be
moving in the opposite direction. Why is the administration
delaying other economic and military lines of effort that would
actually have an effect on the diplomatic line of effort? For
either one or both.
Mr. McKeon. Well, sir, I don't think we are delaying
implementation of military measures, and we can talk about that
in the closed session. These investments we are--some of these
investments we are going to make, we weren't planning to make 2
or 3 years ago. They are in response not just to the INF
violation but other Russian activity.
In terms of economic measures, I would defer to Rose on
that, but if we continue down this course and the measures we
are taking do not lead to Russian compliance, we can always
assess whether to take other measures.
Secretary Gottemoeller. If I may just very quickly comment,
sir. In addition to the points that Mr. McKeon has made about
denying Russia any significant military advantage if it
persists in its violation of the INF Treaty, so that is at the
top of the list, but nevertheless, I do believe that it is
important to back diplomacy up with strong action in these
other areas.
Dr. Fleming. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. McKeon, I want to clarify something--or get
clarification on something you just talked about. You are not
just required to present a report. Aren't you supposed to start
carrying out the responses under 1243?
Mr. McKeon. Mr. Chairman, I will defer to you on what your
language says because I have not studied it closely. So I will
get back and read it when I get back to the Department. I am
generally aware of a list of requirements that you have put
into the new NDAA, but I will confess I have not read them
closely.
Mr. Rogers. I thank you. The Chair now recognizes Mr.
Turner for any questions he may have for 5 minutes.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Gottemoeller, you were very, very prepared with the
question from the ranking member as to how many times you have
been here, and I appreciate the quantification of the number of
times that you and people from your office, as you said, have
made themselves available. I think what you understand is it is
not how many times you appear before us; it is what you say.
And on the ``what you say,'' there are two categories that are
important to us. One, action. That is what most of our
questions to both of you today have been: What are we doing,
and what is going to happen as a result of the change in the
circumstances in the world or what our non-allies, what Russia
is doing? The second is information. It is, what do you tell
us? If you come before us and you are not telling us the whole
story, then it doesn't matter if you are here 170 times. If we
don't get the whole story, it is a worthless exchange of
dialogue between us.
And we all know that there is considerable consternation
between this administration and this committee on the fact that
the administration knew in intelligence information of Russia's
violation in 2008 of the INF Treaty and waited until 2014 to
announce the violation publicly. And as we all know, as we were
going through the critical negotiations of the New START
Treaty, that type of information was incredibly important. So,
action and information.
So my first question is about information. Ms.
Gottemoeller, Russia recently has admitted to the disclosure of
the existence of a nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered undersea
delivery system. It is not really necessarily a missile because
it is not coming off of a sub or of a ship. It is its own
undersea delivery system. It is not an ICBM [intercontinental
ballistic missile] because it is not in the air, but it is in
effect the same thing; it is only traveling under the water.
So back to our two concerns with this dialogue. Ms.
Gottemoeller, were you aware of the existence of this system
when you were in negotiations with the New START Treaty?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Department of State witness at this hearing
misunderstood the nature of the question and later provided a detailed
response to the closed hearing. The administration, through the work of
the Intelligence Community, regularly provided Congress assessments of
what the U.S. knows and does not know on this topic. The Director of
National Intelligence has a responsibility to protect sources and
methods while being as transparent as possible. The public's interest
is considered to the maximum extent possible while protecting
information as necessary, protecting the safety of those who work in or
with the IC, or otherwise protecting national security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Secretary Gottemoeller. Sir, if I may, I would just like to
say the answer to that question is an unequivocal no, but if
you want to get into talking about this system in more detail,
it is very good to do so in our closed session, and we will
be----
Mr. Turner. Well, I would be glad to do it in closed
session, but one of the great aspects of having this
conversation with you--because it is always so much more
convenient for us to talk behind closed doors because the
accountability obviously isn't as difficult for you--is that
this is something that is openly being discussed. I didn't hear
of this from a classified briefing from you where I am now
asking you a question about it. It is in the news, and Russia
is admitting or is apparently, you know, indicating that it has
been developing the system.
So I want to ask you, though, if you say unequivocally no--
that means you didn't know--if you didn't know, should it have
been included in the treaty? I mean, is this system a problem
when you look at the overall balance that you were trying to
accomplish in the New START Treaty?
Secretary Gottemoeller. Well, I think, sir, that it will
have to be, you know, considered in the context of where the
Russians go with the system.
Mr. Turner. Well, their intention is to go here, ma'am. I
mean, let's be clear. Right?
Secretary Gottemoeller. No.
Mr. Turner. I mean, it is not--they are not going from, you
know, one area of Russia to another. Their intent is to go
here.
Secretary Gottemoeller. I know we are concerned about it,
of course we are concerned about it as a threat to the United
States, but if it turns into a system that is widely put into
operational deployment, you know, that is----
Mr. Turner. Widely. One would probably be sufficiently
troubling, right?
Secretary Gottemoeller. I think it is a troubling system,
sir. There is no question about it.
Mr. Turner. Now we are going to get to the second aspect of
this communication of the over 60 times that you and your staff
have been here, is action. It is in the public. It is not like
no one knows that it is occurring. What have you done? What has
the State Department done in communicating to Russia concerning
this system? I mean----
Secretary Gottemoeller. I can assure you, sir, that I never
hesitate to raise issues of concern, including----
Mr. Turner. I didn't ask you if you hesitate.
Secretary Gottemoeller [continuing]. Including about this--
--
Mr. Turner. I asked you, what did you do?
Secretary Gottemoeller [continuing]. Including about this
system with my Russian counterparts.
Mr. Turner. You have? What did you do? Did you----
Secretary Gottemoeller. I never hesitate to raise issues of
concern.
Mr. Turner. What does ``raise'' mean? I mean, you are this,
you know, Under Secretary of State for International Security.
``Hey, I saw this in the news''?
Secretary Gottemoeller. It makes it clear to them that it
is a concern, an official concern of the United States of
America.
Mr. Turner. I think you probably didn't need to tell them
that. I think they probably understood it was a concern.
Did you tell them anything else about what our official
policy was, what action the United States might be taking, what
consequences would occur as a result of this being a threat to
the United States?
Secretary Gottemoeller. I will be very happy to talk to you
more about this, sir, in closed----
Mr. Turner. I am looking forward to that.
Secretary Gottemoeller. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Colorado, Mr. Lamborn, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank both the chairmen for having this hearing.
Thank you both for being here.
I want to dwell a little bit more on what we knew about the
INF violating the--excuse me, Russia violating the INF Treaty
before 2011, that you said just now that that is when you knew
for sure that they were in violation, but you had suspicions
before 2011, didn't you?
Secretary Gottemoeller. No, sir. As I said, the system
could be sea-launched, air-launched. And it is perhaps
worthwhile to say that, starting in 2011, we had the
opportunity to talk to the Hill about it, but we have never--we
have never ever kept any information back about this system at
all, and I want to assure these two committees of that matter.
We have been very upfront and come up here repeatedly to inform
you when we knew about this system being not in compliance with
the INF Treaty.
Mr. Lamborn. When did you first have suspicions?
Secretary Gottemoeller. Sir, I have said it was the end of
2011 when we first had indications that this missile was a
missile of concern.
Mr. Lamborn. I am not sure that is my recollection of what
we have talked about in earlier hearings. You haven't--you
didn't even have suspicions before 2011?
Secretary Gottemoeller. No, sir.
Mr. Lamborn. Let me visit another subject here. You stated
recently that the Russians have been pretty good partners over
the years, frankly, yet you have also said that they, the
Russians, are cheating or are not in compliance with the INF
Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons
Convention, the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, the
Open Skies Treaty, the Budapest Memorandum, and other
agreements. So with that track record, how can you say they
have been, frankly, pretty good partners over the years?
Secretary Gottemoeller. Sir, I think it makes sense to look
at specifically where the partnership has been effective. The
list that you just read out is attached to certain nuances,
which is very important to understand. They are in outright
violation of the INF Treaty and the Conventional Forces in
Europe Treaty. In certain areas, like the Open Skies Treaty, we
have what we call compliance concerns, and that is natural in
any treaty environment. There are concerns that come up in its
implementation, and those are discussed in the implementation
bodies of those treaties. We work to resolve them. And so that
is why there are some differences here.
In the case of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the
Biological Weapons Convention, actually, we have never been
able to confirm the Soviet-era holdings. They have never
provided us information on that. But it is in that context I
said that they have been a good partner in the Chemical Weapons
Convention. They really worked with us to get 1,300 tons of
chemical weapons out of Syria, which I am very glad are no
longer in Syria at this moment. We continue to have concerns
about what Syria is doing with chemical weapons, and we will
continue to wrestle with that problem. But it is in that
context that I said the Russians have been a good partner.
Mr. Lamborn. Well, in view of all those violations, I guess
we have different definitions of what makes a pretty good
partner.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair would point out that we have just been called for
votes. I apologize. They didn't ask me about when to call them.
But we will recess temporarily while we go vote, and then
reconvene immediately after votes in room 2216. We now stand in
recess.
[Whereupon, at 4:51 p.m., the subcommittees proceeded in
closed session.]
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A P P E N D I X
December 1, 2015
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
December 1, 2015
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
December 1, 2015
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
December 1, 2015
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS
Mr. Rogers. On what date did Secretary Kerry last discuss Russian
non-compliance with the INF Treaty with his Russian counterpart?
Secretary Gottemoeller. Secretary Kerry has discussed Russian non-
compliance with the INF Treaty with his Russian counterpart on several
occasions. For specifics with regards to dates, I would refer to you
the relevant portions of the Report on Noncompliance by the Russian
Federation with its Obligations under the INF Treaty, required by
Congress in response to Subsection 10(c) of the Ukraine Freedom Support
Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-272), where this information is provided in
detail.
Mr. Rogers. Is there a Circular 175 that has been approved covering
discussions or negotiations with Pakistan on nuclear weapons or related
matters?
If so, as of what date was it approved?
Secretary Gottemoeller. The Administration is not pursuing
negotiations on a legally-binding international agreement with Pakistan
on nuclear weapons or related matters and has accordingly not engaged
in the Circular 175 process for authorizing the negotiation or
conclusion of an international agreement.
Mr. Rogers. Does the administration assess Russia plans to remain
in the INF Treaty?
Secretary Gottemoeller. The Administration believes that it is in
the mutual security interests of all parties to the INF Treaty that
Russia and the other 11 successor States to the Soviet Union remain
parties to the Treaty and comply with their obligations. All levels of
the Russian government have repeatedly reaffirmed Russia's commitment
to the INF Treaty.
Mr. Rogers. Is the ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) the only
system under development or in some stage of planning that could
violate the INF?
If not, how many systems are you personally aware of?
How many systems do they (the Russians) have to be developing or
plan to develop to suggest they don't plan to return to compliance with
the INF treaty?
Secretary Gottemoeller. There is an interagency process in place
for assessing Parties' compliance with regard to systems under
development or in some stage of planning that may have INF Treaty
implications. This process involves the Intelligence Community's
reporting on potential systems of concern, discussions and
determinations by the interagency Verification and Compliance Analysis
Working Group, and, ultimately reporting of compliance findings in the
Annual Report to Congress on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms
Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments.
I would refer to you the annual Compliance Report for questions on
violations.
Mr. Rogers. Please list your meetings with Russian officials to
resolve it compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and Presidential Nuclear
Initiatives (PNI).
Secretary Gottemoeller. As the former Assistant Secretary for the
Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC) and now as
Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, it
continues to be a top priority of mine and of the Administration to
regularly consult with Russia on matters pertaining to compliance with
arms control obligations and commitments. During my tenure as the
Assistant Secretary for AVC, and since 2009, it has been my practice to
directly engage the Russian Ambassador to the United States on matters
of compliance, particularly in connection with the public release of
the annual compliance report. At those meetings, I discussed U.S.
concerns regarding Russia's compliance on a number of treaties,
including the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological
Weapons Convention (BWC) and extended the opportunity for expert level
discussions to resolve them. The United States has a consistent record
of pursuing concerns with Russia regarding its compliance with the CWC
and BWC, as both Treaties contribute to international stability and
security. Since entry into force of the CWC in 1997, we have inquired
and engaged Russia on numerous occasions regarding its obligations
under the CWC. On matters regarding the BWC, U.S. experts at my
direction engaged their Russian counterparts in November at the UN in
Geneva on issues specifically related to the implementation of the BWC
and on identifying areas of commonality to advance our shared
interests. Nevertheless, Russia has declined to respond positively or
constructively to U.S. efforts to cooperate in resolving CWC and BWC
compliance concerns. We will, however, continue to pursue opportunities
for engagement. We have not held any meetings with Russian officials
aimed specifically at resolving questions relating to Russia's
adherence to the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs). The PNIs were
non-legally binding, unilateral commitments made by the United States
and Russian Federation. These commitments did not provide for a
verification regime to confirm that either side has fully implemented
their pledges.
Mr. Rogers. Under what circumstances is Russia, under the New START
treaty, required to exhibit a new type of missile to the United States?
Does the RS-26 Rubezh meet that standard?
As of what date did it meet that standard?
Have State Department or other employees of the United States
government asked Russia to exhibit it to the United States?
On what date? What was Russia's response?
Secretary Gottemoeller. Paragraph 2 of Section VIII of Part Five of
the Protocol to the New START Treaty provides that ``[e]ach Party shall
conduct exhibitions, and shall have the right to take part in the
exhibitions conducted by the other Party, in order to demonstrate the
distinguishing features and to confirm technical characteristics of
each new type, variant, or version of an ICBM, SLBM, heavy bomber
equipped for nuclear armaments, and, as provided for in Part Two of the
Protocol, an ICBM launcher, in the periods of time specified in
corresponding notifications.'' These exhibition requirements apply to
the RS-26 Rubezh as a new type of ICBM. The Russian Ministry of has
made public statements concerning an expected exhibition of the RS-26
ICBM in 2016.
Mr. Rogers. What are the economic activities of the Russian firms
Novator and Titan in the U.S.?
In terms of dollars, how much economic activity do they conduct in
the U.S. each year?
Are they banned today from economic activity in the U.S. by any
sanction or other U.S. Government action?
Secretary Gottemoeller. While OKB Novator and Holding Titan-2 are
not on the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list, they are subject
to existing U.S. export control policies, including restrictions for
any high technology defense articles or services for export to Russia,
such as those announced on April 28, 2014. We are happy to discuss
further details of U.S. policies in this area in the appropriate
setting.
Mr. Rogers. Following up on Mr. Franks's question, is it your
belief that neither Russia nor China conducted any nuclear test-
activity that produced any--I repeat any--nuclear yield (down to the
level of even single or double digit tons of yield) since 2000?
Does the Intelligence Community share this view?
Secretary Gottemoeller. The U.S. Atomic Energy Detection System has
not detected any nuclear test by Russia or China since 2000. The Office
of the Director of National Intelligence would be happy to provide
further information on the subject as needed.
Mr. Rogers. The INF Treaty prohibits flight-testing and production
of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles between a certain
range. It does not prohibit deployment, right?
We know from the administration that Russia has flight-tested a
ground-launched cruise missile, but has Russia also produced any
quantity of these systems? How many?
Do you agree that if Russia was training any of its forces in the
use of this system, that would suggest that Russia intends to deploy
it?
Does the administration have any reason to believe any of these
systems have achieved an initial operating capability?
Secretary Gottemoeller. The INF Treaty prohibits the possession,
production, and flight-testing of ground-launched ballistic and cruise
missiles with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The Article-by-
Article Analysis for the Article VI of the INF Treaty noted that a
flight-test ban is a natural element in any treaty that eliminates an
entire class of missile systems and serves to strengthen the production
ban, as any covertly produced missile could not be adequately flight
tested without likely U.S. detection. The analysis further noted that
without realistic testing, a Party's confidence in the operational
capability of any covertly produced missile system would be degraded.
The INF Treaty prohibits the possession of missile systems whether
deployed or non-deployed. In regards to your specific questions
pertaining to the Russian ground-launched cruise missile, I would refer
to you the relevant portions of the Report on Noncompliance by the
Russian Federation with its Obligations under the INF Treaty, submitted
to Congress in accordance with Subsection 10(c) of the Ukraine Freedom
Support Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-272).
Mr. Rogers. The President committed to modernize the U.S. nuclear
triad, including the LRSO, which is the replacement of our air-launched
cruise missile, as an element of ratification of the New START treaty,
did he not? Do you believe there is anything inconsistent with the LRSO
and the President's Prague Legacy? Do you believe dual-capable cruise
missiles are destabilizing?
Secretary Gottemoeller. As certified to the Senate in accordance
with the New START Treaty Resolution of Advice and Consent to
Ratification, the President is committed to modernizing U.S. nuclear
forces, including replacing the air-launched cruise missile with the
LRSO. The LRSO is not destabilizing and not inconsistent with the
President's Prague Agenda. In his Prague speech, the President declared
that ``make no mistake: as long as these weapons exist, the United
States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal to deter any
adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies.'' The LRSO cruise
missile is a key element of our plan for ensuring our nuclear deterrent
remains effective.
Mr. Rogers. Can you tell me, during the period the JCPOA was being
reviewed by the Congress, did the administration or any administration
official receive any notification from or gain from any other means
reason to believe that any other country in the region would seek a
right to enrich uranium or possibly renegotiate its 123 Agreement with
the United States? If so, were you one of those officials?
Secretary Gottemoeller. I did not have any discussions with
countries in the region regarding a right to enrich uranium or the
renegotiation of a 123 Agreement during this time period. At your
request, the Department of State would be happy to provide a classified
briefing on any relevant conversations with other State Department
officials that occurred during that time.
Mr. Rogers. On what date did the Secretary of Defense last discuss
Russian non-compliance with the INF treaty with his Russian
counterpart?
Mr. McKeon. Then-Secretary of Defense Hagel discussed Russian non-
compliance with the INF Treaty with Defense Minister Shoygu on August
15, 2014, during a phone call that focused on events in Ukraine. As a
result of Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea, the Department of
Defense suspended military-to-military cooperation with the Russian
Ministry of Defense and curtailed engagement to a bare minimum. In
keeping with this, in September 2015, Secretary Carter spoke with
Minister Shoygu to emphasize the importance of the safety for U.S.
personnel in light of Russian air operations in Syria. No other topics
were discussed during this phone call.
Mr. Rogers. Does the administration assess Russia plans to remain
in the INF Treaty?
Mr. McKeon. Russian officials have repeatedly and publicly affirmed
Russia's commitment to the INF Treaty, although it is uncertain at this
point whether Russia will take the necessary steps to make good on that
commitment. The Administration believes that it is in the mutual
security interests of all parties to the INF Treaty that Russia and the
other 11 successor States to the Soviet Union remain parties to the
Treaty and comply with their obligations.
Mr. Rogers. Is the Russian ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM)
the only system under development or in some stage of planning that
could violate the INF?
If not, how many systems are you personally aware of?
How many systems do they (the Russians) have to be developing or
plan to develop to suggest they don't plan to return to compliance with
the INF Treaty?
Mr. McKeon. We would be happy to provide a classified briefing on
this subject. I would additionally refer you to the Annual Report to
Congress on Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control,
Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, which
reports on compliance questions and compliance findings.
Mr. Rogers. Please take a look at Ms. Gottemoeller's answer to Mr.
Keating's question: Is there a military benefit to Russia from its
violation of the INF Treaty?
Does it help fill what Russia believes is a capability gap or
targeting gap?
Mr. McKeon. DOD's core objective remains the same: to ensure that
Russia does not obtain a significant military advantage from its INF
Treaty violation. Russia may gain some military benefit from its
violation; however, that gain is limited since the Russian Federation
already possesses deployed air- and sea-launched intermediate-range
cruise missiles. Statements made by Russian officials over the last
decade or more indicate that Russia believes that it has a capability
gap that can only be filled by fielding missiles currently prohibited
under the INF Treaty.
Mr. Rogers. Please describe your understanding of the Department of
Defense's obligations under section 1243 of the FY 2016 NDAA regarding
the INF Treaty?
Mr. McKeon. The Secretary of the Defense and the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff are obligated to submit the notifications and
reports delineated in subparagraphs (c), (d)(5), and (d)(6) of Section
1243 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2016.
Section 1243 also obligates the Department of Defense to submit a
plan for the development of the military capabilities listed in
subparagraphs (d)(1)(A), (d)(1)(B), and (d)(1)(C) unless the conditions
of subparagraph (d)(1) have been met. The Secretary of Defense is to
carry out the development of those capabilities that are recommended by
the Chairman, using amounts authorized to be appropriated for FY 2016
by Section 201 of the NDAA for FY 2016.
Mr. Rogers. Would you please explain why the modernization of the
LRSO is a key component of the President's program to modernize our
nuclear forces?
Mr. McKeon. The Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) cruise missile is a key
element of our plan for ensuring our nuclear deterrent remains
effective. The LRSO replaces the aging Air-Launched Cruise Missile
(ALCM), which is our only air-launched standoff nuclear capability and
which is already decades beyond its planned service life. The LRSO
strengthens our overall survivable deterrence capabilities and provides
the President with credible options for signaling U.S. resolve and
responding across a broad spectrum of crises. The LRSO will also
provide an important hedge against technical problems in other parts of
the Triad, and against problems with generating other nuclear forces to
alert. The LRSO will extend the service life of our current bomber
force by extending the effective range of stealthy and non-stealthy
bombers through standoff. Finally, cruise missiles create an extremely
difficult air defense problem for anyone seeking to negate the air leg
of our deterrent.
Mr. Rogers. Why did it take the U.S. a full six years from the time
of Russia's violation of the INF Treaty in 2008 and three years from
our determination in 2011 that it was a violation until we notified our
NATO allies in 2014?
Mr. McKeon. The United States did not have information in 2008 that
the Russian Federation was violating the INF Treaty. We have repeatedly
noted that prior to the ratification in December 2010 of the New START
Treaty, the Intelligence Community was not aware of any Russian
activity inconsistent with the INF Treaty. Information regarding this
system's testing history, the intelligence reporting associated with
this program, the compliance determinations, and our work with allies
has been made available to Congress many times through appropriate
channels. We are happy to again provide a briefing to clarify the
timeline of the verification regarding Russia's violation.
Mr. Rogers. It has now been 7 years since Russia first violated the
INF Treaty. Last year, when we were in this same room, Ms. Gottemoeller
and Mr. McKeon, you testified that a list of responses was being
prepared for a principals meeting. Were any of those responses ever
approved? If so, what is the plan to implement those responses? Will we
see anything in the administration's fiscal year 2017 budget request?
Will any of the fiscal year 2016 funds be re-appropriated to implement
these responses? If not, when can we expect a decision on those
responses?
Mr. McKeon. The Department has reviewed a broad range of military
response options and, with the interagency, considered the effect each
option could have on either convincing Russian leadership to return to
compliance with the INF Treaty or on countering the capability of the
prohibited ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) system. This
assessment was conducted at the same time as we began confronting new
strategic realities in Europe--a Russia that is destabilizing the
European security order by purporting to annex Crimea and conducting
illegal activities in eastern Ukraine, a Russia that is actively
seeking to undermine NATO, and a Russia that is modernizing its
military capabilities across a range of systems.
In 2015, the Administration determined that the United States
needed to consider Russian actions with regard to the INF Treaty in the
context of its overall aggressive and bellicose behavior that flouts
international legal norms and destabilizes the European security order.
Russia is not violating the INF Treaty in isolation from its overall
aggressive behavior; therefore, the Administration concluded that
responses cannot focus solely on the INF Treaty.
U.S. responses to Russia's increased aggressive actions, including
its violation of the INF Treaty, involve a broad range of efforts--
within the Department, bilaterally with allies and partners, and within
the NATO Alliance. These responses include increasing posture and
presence, refocusing planning and shaping of future military activities
in Europe, and improving defensive measures to neutralize or undercut
Russia offensive capabilities.
For example, DOD plans to continue the European Reassurance
Initiative (ERI), with $789.3 million requested in Fiscal Year (FY)
2016. Under the ERI, the United States has increased our persistent,
rotational air, land, and sea presence in the Baltics and in Central
Europe to reassure Allies and to deter Russian aggression. ERI also
enables the United States to expand bilateral and multilateral
exercises in Europe in order to improve interoperability and to
strengthen U.S. warfighting capability in the face of newer threats
from Russia. DOD will continue to seek funding for ERI in FY 2017.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. POE
Mr. Poe. You stated in your testimony that ``the Administration
will continue its work to identify and implement appropriate response
options.'' The INF Treaty established the Special Verification
Commission to address compliance concerns. Why have we not yet called a
meeting of the Special Verification Commission to address Russia's
violation?
Secretary Gottemoeller. If we had any indication that the Russians
would acknowledge this missile and engage productively in a Special
Verification Commission (SVC) discussion to try to resolve these
concerns, we would consider convening an SVC session. We have yet to
see the political will from Moscow that would make such an experts-
level meeting productive. An additional complexity comes from the fact
that an SVC session would be multilateral in nature, with additional
countries, such as Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, participating.
That is because all the Soviet successor states became parties to the
INF Treaty after the demise of the USSR. We will continue to raise our
concerns bilaterally on multiple occasions and at various levels and
departments with the Russian government.
Mr. Poe. Why did it take the U.S. a full 6 years from the time of
Russia's violation of the INF Treaty in 2008 and 3 years from our
determination in 2011 that it was a violation until we notified our
NATO allies in 2014?
Secretary Gottemoeller. The United States did not have information
in 2008 that the Russian Federation was violating the treaty. We have
repeatedly noted that prior to the ratification in December 2010 of the
New START Treaty, the intelligence community was not aware of any
Russian activity inconsistent with the INF Treaty. Information
regarding this system's testing history, the intelligence reporting
associated with this program, the compliance determinations, and our
work with allies has been made available to Congress many times through
appropriate channels. This Administration believes that it is extremely
important that this timeline be properly described and understood.
Misunderstandings about the timeline could serve to confuse our allies
or inadvertently obscure the nature of the Russian violation. We are
happy to again provide a briefing to clarify the timeline of the
violation.
Mr. Poe. It has now been 7 years since Russia first violated the
INF Treaty. Last year, when we were in this same room, Ms. Gottemoeller
and Mr. McKeon, you testified that a list of responses was being
prepared for a principals meeting. Were any of those responses ever
approved? If so, what is the plan to implement those responses? Will we
see anything in the administration's fiscal year 2017 budget request?
Will any of the fiscal year 2016 funds be re-appropriated to implement
these responses? If not, when can we expect a decision on those
responses?
Secretary Gottemoeller. We continue to consult with allies and
review a range of appropriate options, including diplomatic, economic,
and military options should Russia persist in its violation. Mr. McKeon
can better speak to any potential budget requests and appropriations
matters.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER
Mr. Cooper. Is it still the administration's position that Russia
should return to compliance with the treaty? Why is this in our
interests versus withdrawing from the treaty now?
Secretary Gottemoeller. The INF Treaty benefits the security of the
United States, our allies, and the Russian Federation and contributes
to stability in Europe and the Asia-Pacific regions. Accordingly, the
priority of the United States is to return Russia to compliance with
the INF Treaty and to ensure the Treaty's continued viability. Since
2013, the United States has raised its concerns on multiple occasions
and at various levels and departments within the Russian government in
an effort to resolve this violation. It is in our national security
interest and in our allies' interest that the INF Treaty remains in
force and that Russia remains a State Party to the Treaty and complies
with its obligations. We have made clear to Russia, however, that the
United States will protect our security and the security of our allies
and that Russian security will not be enhanced by continuing its
violation. U.S. withdrawal from the Treaty at this time would be
detrimental to the interests of the United States, our allies, and our
partners for several important reasons. First, as Mr. McKeon noted in
his testimony, the United States currently has sufficient capability to
meet our defense requirements through sea-launched and air-launched
cruise missiles which are not prohibited by the INF Treaty. Second,
withdrawal would allow Russia to proceed unconstrained with the
production and deployment of this ground-launched cruise missile
system. Russia remains under limitations associated with covertly
producing a reliable system, while more and more public scrutiny and
knowledge builds with respect to this ground-launched cruise missile
program. Third, a U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty would free Russia
from its legal obligations under the Treaty, essentially letting Russia
off the hook for its violation. Russia now has to make the political
decision whether to come back into compliance with its obligations by
eliminating the missiles and launchers in question or to withdraw from
the Treaty and accept the damaging consequences for European and Asian
security while attempting to proceed with the development of a ground-
launched cruise missile system under conditions of increased public
visibility. We should not relieve Russia of the need to make this
decision and allow it to attempt to shift blame to the United States
for the demise of this Treaty.
Mr. Cooper. How long did it take for Russia to return to the ABM
Treaty when President Reagan urged the Soviet Union to return to
compliance with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in the 1980s? Did we
stop nuclear weapons reductions and related negotiations during the
Soviet violation of the ABM Treaty?
Secretary Gottemoeller. It took six years for the Soviet Union to
take any significant steps to return to compliance with the ABM Treaty
after the United States first revealed in the summer of 1983 that it
had detected a large early warning radar under construction at
Krasnoyarsk in the Soviet Union. This installation was roughly 800
kilometers from the nearest border and thus in violation of the ABM
Treaty (which required that all such radars be located on a party's
periphery and oriented outward). The United States raised the issue
with the Soviet Union in the fall 1983 Standing Consultative Commission
(SCC) session dedicated to the ABM Treaty's second five-year review. In
the autumn of 1989, the Soviet Union conceded that the Krasnoyarsk
radar was a violation of the ABM Treaty and agreed to eliminate the
radar without preconditions. Negotiations on both the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (1981-1991) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Treaty (1981-1987) continued during the period of the Soviet violation
of the ABM Treaty.
Mr. Cooper. Is it still the administration's position that Russia
should return to compliance with the treaty? Why is this in our
interests versus withdrawing from the treaty now?
Mr. McKeon. The INF Treaty contributes to the security of the
United States, our allies and partners, and the Russian Federation
while also enhancing stability in Europe and the Asia-Pacific regions.
Accordingly, the priority of the United States is for Russia to return
to compliance with the INF Treaty and to ensure the Treaty's continued
viability. Since 2013, the United States has raised its concerns on
multiple occasions and at various levels within the Russian Government
in an effort to address this violation. We have also made clear to
Russia that the United States will protect its security and the
security of our allies and partners and that Russian security will not
be enhanced by continuing its violation.
U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty at this time would allow Russia
to proceed unconstrained with the production and deployment of this
ground-launched cruise missile system. A U.S. withdrawal from the INF
Treaty would free Russia from its legal obligations under the Treaty,
essentially eliminating the consequences of Russia's violation.
Russia now has to make the decision whether to come back into
compliance with its obligations by eliminating the missiles and
launchers in question or to withdraw from the INF Treaty and accept the
damaging consequences for European and Asian security. We should not
permit the Russians to avoid the onus of making this decision.
Mr. Cooper. Is there a military requirement to respond to the
Russian violation?
Mr. McKeon. The deployment of an INF Treaty-prohibited ground-
launched cruise missile system by the Russian Federation would increase
the risk to U.S. allies and pose an indirect threat to the United
States. As a result, the Department reviewed a broad range of military
response options to consider the effect each option could have on
countering the capability of a Russian INF Treaty-prohibited system.
The Administration determined that the United States needed to
consider Russian actions with regard to the INF Treaty in the context
of its overall aggressive and bellicose behavior that flouts
international legal norms and destabilizes the European and global
security order. Since Russia is not violating the INF Treaty in
isolation from its overall aggressive behavior, the Administration
concluded that U.S. military responses cannot focus solely on the INF
Treaty violation.
More broadly, DOD continues to develop a comprehensive response to
Russian military actions, taking into account the broader strategic
environment and Russia's aggressive behavior, including its violation
of the INF Treaty. U.S. responses involve a broad range of efforts--
within the Department, bilaterally with allies and partners, and within
the NATO Alliance. These responses include increasing posture and
presence, refocusing planning and shaping of future military activities
in Europe, and improving defensive measures to neutralize or undercut
Russia offensive capabilities.
DOD's core objective remains the same: to ensure that Russia does
not obtain a significant military advantage from its INF Treaty
violation.
Mr. Cooper. Does the Russian violation undermine U.S. military
advantage or capabilities?
What additional target coverage does Russia's INF noncompliant GLCM
provide that cannot be covered by Russia's existing air- and sea-
launched cruises missiles?
Does the Russian violation pose additional threats to the United
States or its allies? What kind?
Does the Russian violation undermine U.S. nuclear deterrent
capabilities in any way?
Mr. McKeon. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Turner. During the December 1st hearing before the House Armed
Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, I asked you a question
regarding Russia's recent disclosure of the existence of a nuclear-
armed, nuclear-powered undersea delivery system. Specifically, I asked
you whether or not you were aware of the existence of this system when
you negotiated the New START treaty?
During the open session, you stated that the answer to my question
was an ``unequivocal no!''.
At this time, would you like to retract or revise your original
answer?
Were you aware of the existence of a Russian nuclear-armed,
nuclear-powered undersea delivery system when you negotiated the New
START treaty?
Secretary Gottemoeller. Thank you for your question. During the
hearing, I misunderstood the nature of your question and I apologize
for any confusion this may have caused. I appreciated the opportunity
to be able to discuss this issue in detail during the closed session
that immediately followed the open session. It was helpful to be able
to talk in that environment, given the sensitivity of this issue. I
understand that the Intelligence Community (IC) has reached out to the
Committee regarding this issue, and I appreciate your attention to this
matter. Further background information on this topic is also being
provided to this Committee by the IC under separate cover as a
classified annex. The Administration, through the work of the IC,
regularly provides Congress with authoritative assessments of what the
United States knows and does not know regarding Russian nuclear weapons
systems. This sharing of information is done regularly to keep staff
and members abreast of these issues, to better inform our diplomacy and
policymaking in the Administration, and to aid in the legislative
process. Following the December 1 public hearing, Administration
briefers, including me, provided members and staff with information in
a closed setting to respond in detail to a number of sensitive issues
raised during the open hearing, in order to (1) inform both
subcommittees with the most substantive, detailed information possible,
and (2) best protect the sources and methods by which the IC obtains
information. We are happy to continue to discuss this issue in the
appropriate setting.
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