*Chapter 5
Contents*
**International
Traffic in Arms Regulations** and the U.S. Munitions List
**Department
of Defense Monitoring Role**
**The
Optus B2 Licenses**
**The
Optus B2 Fails To Achieve Orbit**
**Failure
Investigation Teams**
**Failure
Investigation Begins**
**Hughes'
Export Administrators Deal** with the Licensing Question
**A
'Political' Business Solution**
**The
Optus B3: Hughes' Efforts to Improve** the Long March
Continue
**The
Apstar 2 License**
**The
Apstar 2 Failure**
**Failure
Investigation Teams**
**Failure
Investigation Schedule**
**The
Need for a License**
**Commerce
Department Conference**
**Same
Fairing Failure Identified by Hughes**
**A
'Political' Business Solution, Again?**
**The
Commerce Department Approves Data Release to the PRC**
**Hughes
Tries to Get the PRC to Accept Its Findings**
**CIA
Analyst Visits Hughes**
**A
'Consolidated Solution'**
**Final
Failure Investigation Report Released** to the PRC by the Commerce
Department
**Implementing
the 'Consolidated Solution'**
**U.S.
Government Actions Following** the Apstar 2 Launch Failure
**Defense
Department Assessments** of Damage to National Security
*Damage
to National Security from* the Apstar 2 Failure
Investigation
*Damage
to National Security from the Sharing* of Coupled Loads
Analysis
*Damage
to National Security from Providing the PRC* with Information
Concerning Deficiencies in the Fairing, and Resultant Improvements
to PRC Rockets and Ballistic Missiles
*Other
Information Learned by the PRC,* and Defense Department
Reaction
**State
Department Assessments of Damage to National Secuirty**
**Damage
to National Security Identified** by the Select Committee's Technical
Consultant
####
*Chapter 5
Summary*
ughes Space and Communications
International, Inc. (Hughes) attempted to launch two communications
satellites from the PRC on Long March rockets which exploded before
reaching orbit, one in 1992 and one in 1995. Allegations regarding
technology transfer arose in connection with failure analysis
investigations conducted by Hughes employees in the aftermath of these
failed launches. Specifically, in 1992 and 1995, China Great Wall Industry
Corporation, a PRC government entity, launched two Hughes satellites
manufactured for Australian (Optus B2) and Asian (Apstar 2) customers from
a PRC launch facility in Xichang, PRC.
**Both satellites were launched on a Long March 2E rocket. In both
cases, an explosion occurred** after take-off and before separation of
the satellite. Hughes investigated the causes of both of these failed
launches and determined that the rocket was the cause of the failures.
**In the course of the investigations, Hughes communicated technical
information regarding the rocket to the PRC that assisted the PRC in
improving the Long March 2E rocket.** The activities of Hughes employees
in connection with the investigation of the failed launch in 1992 resulted
in the transmission to the PRC of technical information that appears to
have been approved by a U.S. Government representative but not properly
licensed. In the case of the 1995 Hughes failure investigation, Hughes
employees exported technical information that also was approved by a U.S.
Government representative but should not have been authorized for export
to the PRC.
**In both cases, Hughes disclosed information to the PRC that related
to improving the Long March 2E fairing, a portion of the rocket that
protects the payload during launch.** Such information was outside the
scope of the original licenses Hughes obtained from the State and Commerce
Departments, respectively, with respect to the export and launch of the
Optus B2 and Apstar 2 satellites. Hughes claims that the 1993 Optus B2
failure analysis disclosures were cleared in advance by U.S. Government
officials, but neither Hughes nor the pertinent U.S. Government agencies
retained records that would substantiate this claim fully.
**The lessons learned by the PRC from Hughes during the 1995 Apstar 2
failure investigation are directly applicable to fairings on other
rockets, including those used to launch PRC military satellites.**
**Although the Long March 2E has not been used since 1995, it is
possible that the PRC may have transferred the lessons learned from this
launch failure investigation to its ballistic missile programs.** These
lessons could lead to the development of a more reliable fairing for use
with advanced payloads on military ballistic missiles.
**Hughes obtained a clearance for the 1995 disclosures that was
improperly issued by a Commerce Department official.** Hughes was
confident that the cause of the 1992 launch failure on the PRC's Long
March 2E rocket was the fairing. Hughes then ascertained with more
certainty that the fairing was responsible for the 1995 launch failure.
Hughes required that the PRC take appropriate corrective measures so that
future launches of Hughes satellites on the Long March 2E rocket could
occur and be insured.
**Hughes employees conveyed to the PRC the engineering and design
information necessary to identify and remedy the structural deficiencies
of the fairing.** At the time of the 1992 failure, the export of both
the satellite and any information that might improve the rocket were
subject to State Department licensing jurisdiction.
**Hughes knew that the fairing was part of the rocket and that a State
Department license was required to discuss improvements with the PRC.
**Although Hughes did not have a license to disclose information to the
PRC relating to improvement of the fairing, Hughes, nonetheless, made such
disclosures. Hughes claims that each disclosure was authorized by the
Defense Technology Security Administration monitor. Contemporaneous Hughes
records partially support this assertion. The monitor says he doubts that
he in fact approved the disclosure, but says he cannot fully recall these
matters.
**Neither Hughes nor any relevant U.S. Government agency has been able
to produce records substantiating all of the claimed approvals.** Even
if such approvals were in fact given, they would have exceeded the
authority of the Defense Technology Security Administration monitor since
he was not empowered to expand the scope of the license granted by the
State Department. The monitor also should have known that a separate
license was needed for the launch failure analysis activities. By the time
of the 1995 failure investigation, partial jurisdiction for commercial
satellites had been transferred to the Commerce Department, but licensing
for improvements to any part of the rocket, such as the fairing, remained
with the State Department.
**Hughes officials who were responsible for the launch failure
investigation in 1995 knew that technical information that would improve
the rocket, including the fairing, was still subject to State Department
jurisdiction and was not licensed for export.** Nonetheless, Hughes
sought Commerce Department approval to disclose information regarding the
fairing to the PRC. A Commerce Department official, without consulting
with Defense Department or State Department experts, approved that
disclosure, he says, on the assumption that the fairing was part of the
satellite, not the rocket. He now acknowledges that this decision was a
mistake.
**The Defense Department recently determined that the information
Hughes made available to the PRC was sufficiently specific to inform the
PRC of the kinds of rocket changes and operational changes that would make
the Long March 2E, and perhaps other rockets, more reliable.** In
particular, Hughes assisted the PRC in correcting the deficiencies in its
models of the stresses or loads (such as buffeting and wind shear) that
the rocket and payload experience during flight.
**There are differing views within the U.S. Government as to the
extent to which the information that Hughes imparted to the PRC may assist
the PRC in its ballistic missile development.** There is agreement that
any such improvement would pertain to reliability and not to range or
accuracy. It is not clear, at present, whether the PRC will use a fairing
that was improved as a result of Hughes' disclosures in a current or
future ballistic missile program. Currently-deployed PRC ballistic
missiles do not use fairings, and the PRC's future mobile land-based
intercontinental ballistic missiles will probably not use a fairing.
However, fairings are used by the PRC in launching military communications
satellites and could be used for a submarine-launched ballistic
missile.
**In the opinion of the Select Committee's independent expert, Dr.
Alexander Flax, fairing improvements could also be of benefit to multiple
independently-targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) development,** should the
PRC decide to move in that direction. (See the Technical Afterword at the
end of this chapter for additional details on the possible uses of
fairings in intercontinental ballistic missiles.)
**Hughes also provided the PRC with practical insight into diagnostic
and failure analysis techniques for identifying and isolating the cause of
a launch failure. **Whether or not the structural improvements to the
fairing suggested by Hughes are of immediate use to the PRC's missile
programs, that information expanded the PRC's repertoire of available
technical solutions to future problems that it may encounter in its space
and missile programs.
**Finally, the Select Committee's independent expert has concluded
that Hughes provided the PRC with the benefit of its engineering
experience and know-how. **As a result, PRC engineers better understand
how to conduct a failure analysis and how to design and build more
reliable fairings for rockets: "This will stand them in good stead in
developing fairings (or shrouds) for ballistic missiles."
*Chapter 5
Text*
OPTUS B2, APSTAR 2 LAUNCH
FAILURES PRC GAINS
SENSITIVE KNOWLEDGE FROM HUGHES INVESTIGATIONS
n 1992 and 1995, two Hughes Space and
Communications International, Inc. (Hughes) satellites were launched from
the People's Republic of China on Long March 2E rockets and failed to
achieve orbit. It has been alleged that, in the failure investigations
that followed, Hughes provided technical information to the PRC that
assisted the PRC in improving the Long March 2E. This portion of the
report examines the events that underlie those allegations.
The 1992 failure involved the Optus B2 satellite, while the Apstar 2
satellite was destroyed in 1995.
For each event, provided below is a brief discussion of the export
licenses for the satellite, and the restrictions that the licenses
contained.1 A short discussion of the actual events of the failed launches
follows, along with a detailed review of the failure investigations that
Hughes conducted and of the U.S. Government's actions that related to
those investigations.
Hughes' efforts during the investigations to provide technical
information to the PRC for the purpose of assuring success in future
launches are explained, as is the extent of the U.S. Government's
knowledge and approval of Hughes' actions.
Finally, the actual improvements that were made to the Long March 2E by
the PRC, and assessments of the potential damage to national security
resulting from those improvements, are discussed.
## The Prohibition Against Technology Transfer
In Foreign Launches
**International
Traffic in Arms Regulations** and the U.S. Munitions List
Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act2 (AECA) authorizes the
President to control the export and import of defense articles and
services. The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (April 1, 1992
edition) contain the following definitions of defense articles and defense
services:3
**Section 120.7 Defense article.**
*Defense article means any item designated in Section 121.1. This
term includes models, mockups, and other such items which reveal
technical data directly relating to items designated in section
121.1*
**Section 120.9 Defense service.**
*Defense service means:* (a) The furnishing of assistance
(including training) to foreign persons whether in the United States or
abroad in the design, engineering, development, production, processing,
manufacture, use, operation, overhaul, repair, maintenance, modification
or reconstruction of defense articles, whether in the United States or
abroad...
The U.S. Munitions List also enumerates articles that are controlled
under the authority of the AECA in relevant part as follows:
**Section 121.1 General. The United States Munitions List**
*(a) The following articles, services and related technical data
are designated as defense articles and services.*
*Category IV Launch Vehicles [rockets].*
*(b) Launch vehicles and missile and anti-missile systems including
but not limited to guided, tactical and strategic missiles, launchers,
and systems.*
*(h) All specifically designed or modified components, parts,
accessories, attachments and associated equipment for the articles in
this category.*
**Department of
Defense Monitoring Role**
U.S. Air Force Instruction 10-1210, "Technology Safeguard Monitoring
for Foreign Launches of US Commercial Satellites," identifies the Defense
Technology Security Administration4 as having responsibility for the
objectives of the technology safeguard program, which include:
*to support the US non-proliferation policy for space * and
missile technology, . . . the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations, and the US Munitions List.5
Defense Technology Security Administration monitors are responsible for
"controlling the disclosure of technical information."6
*The U.S. Air Force Technology Safeguard Monitor Handbook*
describes the role of the Defense Technology Security Administration
monitor in debris recovery and accident investigations as follows: "If an
anomaly (i.e., crash) occurs during the launch campaign you will need to
prevent technology transfer throughout the debris recovery and accident
investigation." 7 It continues:
*after an anomaly occurs, the chance for technology transfer is the
highest. As a US government technology safeguard monitor you will be
overseeing the accident investigation discussions. Failure analysis
discussions are sensitive because both sides want explanations and ask
technical questions. The worst case for possible technology transfer
occurs when both the spacecraft [satellite] and launch vehicle [rocket]
are suspect; however, technology transfer is still a problem even if the
anomaly was clearly caused by a launch vehicle [rocket]
problem.*
## Optus B2
**The Optus B2
Licenses**
On May 2, 1991, the U.S. Department of State issued export license
483414, renewing license 384476, dated March 16, 1989. The 1991 license
permitted the export of two Hughes Model HS-601 satellites (see
illustration) to Australia for delivery in space to Aussat (later renamed
Optus), Australia's national communications satellite company.
The foreign intermediate consignee was Hughes, in care of China Great
Wall Industry Corporation, Xichang Satellite Launch Center, Xichang,
PRC.
The license was qualified by a letter dated May 2, 1991 from the Office
of Defense Trade Controls of the State Department that sets forth
limitations and provisos. In relevant part:
*1. Hughes (which term includes all Hughes employees and agents)
must conform strictly to the terms of Hughes own technology control plan
with the China Great Wall Industry Corporation, as well as to the terms
of the Satellite Technology Safeguards Agreement between the U.S.
Government and the People's Republic of China (the Agreement) and the
U.S. Government's measures for the implementation of that
agreement.*
** * **
*5. Unless it obtains the prior separate approval of the Office
* of Defense Trade Controls of the U.S. Department of State, Hughes
must not provide any hardware or technical assistance whatsoever to its
Chinese counterparts which might assist China to design, develop, or
enhance the performance of any of its contemplated or existing Long
March launch vehicles or missiles.
**The Optus B2
Fails To Achieve Orbit**
On December 21, 1992, the Hughes-manufactured Optus B2 satellite was
launched from Xichang Launch Center in the PRC.
The following description of the failure is excerpted from the Hughes
report:
*A normal performing launch vehicle [rocket] would have passed
through the point of maximum dynamic pressure at 62 seconds after
liftoff. The failure occurred approximately 48 seconds after liftoff.
The launch vehicle [Long Mrach 2E rocket] was in the transonic buffeting
period of its flight, at an altitude of approximately 7000 meters, when
the failure occurred . . .8*
Debris recovery began almost immediately and continued for about three
weeks.
**Officials from the China Academy
of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT) and Hughes began to investigate the
cause of the crash.** Hughes President and CEO Steven Dorfman appointed
Vice President Donald Cromer to lead the Hughes investigation to determine
the cause of the failure.9
Before joining Hughes, Cromer, had been an Air Force Lieutenant
General, and had managed the Space Division of Air Force Systems Command.
In that position, he was responsible for the design, development, and
acquisition of Air Force space launch, command and control, and satellite
systems.10
Cromer's principal assistant in directing the Optus B2 failure
investigation was Dr. Stephen L. Cunningham, a senior-level Hughes
executive and Ph.D. physicist who has worked in satellite programs at
Hughes since 1977.11
**Failure
Investigation Teams**
Hughes established several teams to conduct the Optus B2 launch failure
investigation. The teams comprised 27 individuals, and their activities
covered over 20 days of meetings with the PRC, including at least 15 days
of meetings in the PRC.
A Failure Investigation Team was chartered to examine all aspects of
the failure, including both the satellite and the rocket.
A second team, called the Spacecraft Focus Team, was to limit its focus
to the satellite.
A third team, the Independent Review Team, was made up of experts from
outside the Hughes organization. It was charged with reviewing the work of
the other two Hughes teams and with making an independent assessment of
the failure.
Finally, because Hughes recognized that the findings of its teams could
be in conflict with those of the PRC accident investigators representing
the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT), it established the
International Oversight Team made up of three members: one from Intelsat,
one from the China Aerospace Corporation (CASC), and the Chairman of the
Hughes Independent Review Team.
The Hughes teams were organized by functional specialties as
illustrated in the chart previous.12
The organization chart identifies Peter M. Herron, who was the Optus B2
Assistant Program Manager, as responsible for U.S. Government/PRC
coordination for the failure investigation. In this role, Herron was the
person responsible for obtaining U.S. Government approval for all
information transfers from Hughes to the PRC during the failure
investigation.13
**Failure
Investigation Begins**
The failure investigation began immediately, and proceeded as shown
below.14
As the debris recovery progressed, Defense Technology Security
Administration monitors who were present for the launch continued to
monitor the recovery efforts.15 Defense Technology Security Administration
monitors were also present during the subsequent failure investigation,
both in Beijing and Xichang, whenever Hughes employees had meetings with
PRC officials.
U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Allen Coates was one of the Defense
Technology Security Administration monitors. He was present in Beijing
from January 4 to 14, 1993 as a Defense Technology Security Administration
monitor for the failure investigation.
Lt. Col. Coates specifically recalls informing Hughes senior
management, including Vice President Donald Cromer, Chief Technologist Al
Wittmann, Chief Scientist Robert Steinhauer, and Optus B2 Assistant
Program Manager Peter Herron of the restrictions in Hughes' export license
regarding the transfer of any information related to the design of the
satellite or the rocket.16 He additionally advised Hughes personnel there,
specifically Herron, and possibly Steinhauer and Wittmann, that Hughes
could not discuss modifications to the fairing.17 At that time, Al
Wittmann, Chief Technologist at Hughes, reported directly to CEO Steven
Dorfman.18
**In the early stages of the
investigation, the PRC focused its analytic efforts on the rocket, and
Hughes examined the satellite. **Both the PRC and Hughes were seeking to
determine whether their respective hardware was responsible for the
failure. Because the first visible sign of an explosion appeared as a
flame at the top of the rocket, there was some question as to whether the
satellite could have exploded.
As part of the investigation, Wittmann, Hughes' Chief Technologist, and
the other engineers first looked into the possibility that the satellite
fuel tank structures failed. They later determined the fuel tanks did not
fail.19
Upon his return from the PRC, Wittmann had an accident that forced him
to recuperate at home. During his recuperation, he was assisted by Spencer
Ku, another Hughes engineer. In reviewing some of Ku's analysis, it
occurred to Wittmann that statements made to him by PRC personnel
regarding the structure and materials strength of the rocket's fairing
(that is, the portion of the rocket including the nose cone that surrounds
the satellite) were not realistic.20
Wittmann was sure in January 1993, while still in recuperation, that
the fairing21 that surrounds the satellite failed, thus collapsing and
crushing the satellite.22
As the investigation progressed, Hughes scientists became more and more
certain that the fairing on the Long March 2E rocket had indeed failed,
causing the launch failure.
**Hughes' Export
Administrators Deal with the Licensing Question**
Hughes' Technology Export Control Coordinator, Donald Leedle, was the
focal point in the company from 1992 until 1996 for technology licensing
issues. A program or contracts manager who needed to export a satellite
would consult him for information regarding licensing requirements. He was
responsible for maintaining current knowledge of governmental regulations
related to export licensing.23
Leedle describes himself as one of the most knowledgeable Hughes
employees on the subject of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations
as they relate to communications satellites. He says he was responsible
for briefing Hughes program managers on these regulations. He was also
responsible for coordinating licensing conditions and requirements for the
Hughes programs. He consulted with Hughes Electronics' corporate
International Traffic in Arms Regulations expert, Dar Weston, when
necessary.24
Leedle says that the Optus B2 licenses, as many as 18, had been
approved before he was involved in the Optus program. Some licenses had
expired, however, and he was involved in the renewal by the State
Department of the expired licenses.25
In response to a general question about the need for a license for a
failure investigation, Leedle says that an accident investigation might be
covered by the original license, or it might need a new license, but such
a decision would be made by the U.S. Government. He advises that technical
data would require different State Department licenses than the satellite
hardware. Further, he says that Hughes was not permitted under the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations to make suggestions that would
help improve PRC rockets.26
Leedle is aware that rockets are included on the Munitions List and
that a fairing is a part of the rocket.27
**Sometime after the Optus failure,
Leedle met with a group of Hughes employees, among them Hughes attorney
Jennifer Smolker28 and Peter Herron, who had been the Assistant Program
Manager for the Optus B2 satellite, to determine whether a license was
needed for the failure investigation.29** Hughes CEO Dorfman describes
Smolker as "the first point of accountability, from my perspective, on the
whole licensing process." 30
In April 1993, Leedle most likely contacted Donald E. Majors, Director
for International Affairs at Hughes' Washington, D.C. office, regarding
Hughes communications with the PRC concerning Long March 2E rocket fairing
deficiencies. Although he does not specifically recall the conversation,
he says that he talked frequently to Majors during that period.31
On April 9, 1993, Majors wrote a memorandum to Leedle on "License
Requirements for Long March Fairing Discussions," in which he summarized
informal discussions with the State Department regarding the Optus B2
launch failure investigation.32 The text read:
*1.** In response to our informal inquiry, the
cognizant State Department licensing official expressed the following
views:*
*a. Information or professional opinion on fairing deficiencies
as a potential cause of the Optus B2 launch failure probably constitutes
technical data as defined in ITAR [International Traffic in Arms
Regulations]. If Hughes decides this is in fact the case, an export
license would be required to provide such information or opinion to the
PRC. If Hughes decides otherwise, the subject is moot.*
*b. **If a license is required, chances of obtaining it
would * be good if Hughes could make an unequivocal case that the
technical data to be transferred could not be used for any purpose other
than increasing the safety of the spacecraft during a new
launch.
*c. A license request would almost certainly be denied if even
the slightest possibility or inference, real or perceived, remained
undispelled that the technical data could directly or indirectly impact
PRC ballistic missile interests.*
*2. **Should [Hughes] elect to submit a license
application on this subject we recommend that (a) all the technical data
to be transferred be precisely stated and (b) detailed rationale be
included to counter all potential arguments that the data could in some
way enhance PRC ballistic missile capabilities.*
*3. Considering the extreme sensitivity that certain USG
agencies attach to technology transfers to the PRC, we should also give
some thought to an advance softening up process.** This could
include advance technical level briefings for friends and adversaries
alike, and a degree of precoordination of the data to be released.
[Emphasis added]*
Majors' memorandum to Leedle was also sent to Herron and Smolker.
Additionally, copies of the memorandum were forwarded to the following
Hughes executives: CEO Steven Dorfman, P. C. Dougherty, M. J. Houterman,
W. D. Merritt and J. S. Perkins.
Majors' office served as the Washington liaison between Hughes
corporate offices and the State Department on licensing issues. His
primary contact on satellite issues at the State Department licensing
office was Kenneth Peoples.33
Peoples had issued State Department export license number 483414 to
Hughes for the export of the Aussat B (later Optus B) satellite. He says
that the license defined authorized activities, and that any activity not
specifically authorized by a license is prohibited.34
Peoples advises that rockets are on the Munitions List and that a
fairing, the nosecone that protects the satellite, is a part of a
rocket.35 Peoples does not specifically recall speaking to Majors about
the fairing, but he describes the recommendation in Majors' memorandum as
"excellent advice." The fact that rocket information was on the Munitions
List in 1993 was well-known, he says, and Peoples has difficulty accepting
that Hughes officials would not have been aware at that time that a
license would be needed to convey to the PRC information related to
rockets.36
Mere unlicensed discussion of technical data with foreign nationals is
sufficient to constitute a violation of the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations, in Peoples' opinion. In addition to the license restrictions,
Hughes was prohibited from transferring technology to the PRC by
provisions of the U.S./PRC nation-to-nation agreement on technology
transfer.37
**Stephen Cunningham, who led the
Optus B2 launch failure investigation, had also been the Program Manager
for the Optus B1,** which was launched in the PRC in August 1992. He is
familiar with the International Traffic in Arms Regulations and the
Munitions List. Cunningham agrees that Hughes needed prior, separate
approval from the State Department to provide any technical assistance
that might assist the PRC in enhancing the performance of its Long March
rockets.38
Around the time of Majors' April 9, 1993 memorandum, Cunningham recalls
"specific discussions with [Defense Technology Security Administration
monitor Lt. Col.] Al Coates regarding whether the fairing we are talking
about had any relevance to ballistic missiles, and we did not receive a
specific answer from Al Coates, but he said he would go find out from his
sources." 39
Cunningham says that Hughes hypothesized that the fairing on a
commercial satellite had no relevance to ballistic missiles:
*We were all very sensitive to the issue on anything that would
help the ballistic missile interest, but - and there are a lot of things
in the commercial satellite business that are irrelevant to weapons use
and so the real question was, in our minds, is the fairing that we are
talking about in the category of commercial use only or is it in the
category of missile technology? 40*
**On April 19, 1993, ten days after
the Majors memorandum, a senior level staff meeting took place at Hughes
to discuss how to deal with the fairing issue. **Officials at the
highest levels of Hughes, including possibly Vice President Cromer,
attended the meeting, which was held to discuss a planned trip to the PRC
regarding both the Optus B2 failure and the future launch by the PRC of
Optus B3, the satellite that was to replace the destroyed Optus B2.41
Cunningham's participation in the trip to the PRC was in connection
with his duties to discuss and resolve issues related to the Optus B2
failure. While on the same trip, his colleague Peter Herron was involved
in negotiations regarding the Optus B3.42
By April 1993, Cunningham says, "We strongly believed that the fairing
caused the problem . . . We believed that the fairing had to be modified
in order to get insurance to launch." 43
Herron had prepared view graph slides, outlining the issues and
alternatives for senior management to consider at the strategy meeting.
One of the slides used in the briefing stated the following:
*We are concerned about several aspects of the design [of the Long
March 2E fairing]. What do they fix? How do they validate the
redesign?*
*The USG will require a specific license if we want to discuss the
design problems. It is unlikely that we could get the license.*
*We would have to show that there would be no resultant improvement
in the Chinese ICBMs.44*
**A 'Political'
Business Solution**
Hughes' Director of Launch Service Acquisition, John S. Perkins, was
responsible for the negotiation of the Optus B3 launch services contract
with the PRC. In that role, he had contact with the team investigating the
Optus B2 failure. Although he was not part of the Optus B2 failure
investigation team, he was in the PRC conducting Optus B3 negotiations
while the failure investigation was proceeding.45
Perkins recalls being aware during the failure investigation that some
Hughes engineers thought that the fairing on the Long March 2E rocket may
have failed. He recalls that there were discussions within the company
that Hughes would require the PRC to improve the fairing, and that without
improvements to the fairing, the Optus B3 would not be launched.46 Perkins
says that the negotiations for an agreement to announce the conclusion of
the Optus B2 failure investigations took several weeks of "wordsmithing to
subtly try to imply the other party was at fault, without being at fault,
to point the finger at us or to point the finger at the Chinese." 47
The negotiations for Optus B3 were difficult, because the PRC would not
acknowledge any fault in the Optus B2 failure. It is Perkins' belief that
the Defense Technology Security Administration eventually approved some
discussions with the PRC about fairing improvements.48
Perkins also participated in discussions with the PRC that led to a
written agreement that took the following form:
**MINUTES OF MEETING HELD IN BEIJING ** ON 11 TO
12 MAY 1993 BETWEEN HUGHES AND CGWIC REGARDING THE CONCLUSION
OF THE OPTUS B2 FAILURE INVESTIGATIONS
*1. **On December 21, 1992 the Optus B2 satellite was
launched on an LM-2E Launch Vehicle from Xichang Satellite Launch
Center, China. At approximately 48 seconds into the flight, the Optus B2
spacecraft exploded.*
*2. **Based on analysis of the Launch Vehicle
telemetry, inspection of the Launch Vehicle fairing debris and special
tests, it was determined by CGWIC/CALT [China Great Wall Industry
Corporation/ China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology] that there is
no design or manufacturing or integration flaw in the Launch Vehicle or
the fairing which caused the failure. Hughes accepts this
conclusion.*
*3. **Based on analysis of the Launch Vehicle
telemetry, inspection of the spacecraft debris, and special tests, it
was determined by Hughes that no design or manufacturing flaw can be
found in the spacecraft which caused the failure. CGWIC/CALT accepts
this conclusion.*
*4. **Both CGWIC/CALT and Hughes agreed to conclude the
Optus B2 investigation and use their best effort to launch another Optus
satellite by June 94.*
*5. **During the Optus B2 failure investigation, both
CGWIC and Hughes observed strictly the requirements of the USA/PRC
agreements on technical security.*
*6. **Both parties expressed the same willingness to
promote the existing friendly cooperation between them. Hughes expressed
the willingness to purchase Long March launch services for other future
satellite programs, and CGWIC expressed the willingness to influence its
partners to purchase Hughes' satellites.*
*Signed on the 12th day of May 1993*
*Donald L. Cromer Wang Dechen* John S. Perkins Chen
Shouchun
Perkins describes this agreement as an agreement not to publicly blame
the fairing as the cause of the failure. Perkins says of the
agreement:
*Politically we could not write down on paper that the fairing had
failed and that they were at fault. It was a non-starter in China. They
were very concerned that we would say that. This document was trying to
say we are not going to say that. Now, go fix the fairing.
49*
**Hughes' intermediary in the PRC
was Bansang "Bill" W. Lee, who worked in the Hughes Beijing office**
from 1991 until around October 1994 as a salaried employee.50 As Hughes'
chief representative in Beijing, he had three duties: marketing Hughes
satellites in the PRC; serving as a liaison between various Hughes
organizations and the PRC; and providing logistics support for all Hughes
visitors to the PRC.51
Although Bansang Lee was not actually a member of the Optus B2 failure
investigation team, he was present at meetings in the PRC and was involved
in the negotiations that led to the May 12 agreement between Hughes and
China Great Wall Industry Corporation not to blame each other for the
launch failure. He was also involved in negotiations for the Optus B3
launch.52
Lee's major involvement in the failure investigation was crafting an
acceptable public explanation as to the cause of the failure. The PRC
would not accept that the Long March 2E rocket was at fault, and Hughes
was almost certain that the satellite had not caused the failure. Lee says
that in the May 12, 1993 agreement each side stated: "I have no objection
to your position . . . and you have no objection to my position.
Basically, the conclusion is no conclusion." 53
Lee says that his involvement in efforts between April and October 1993
was generally along the lines of persuading each side not to point fingers
at the other. He says that he was not directly involved in attempts by
Hughes to convince the PRC that the fairing was the problem, although he
was aware that a number of people within Hughes believed that. He was also
aware of at least one, Harold Rosen, who did not hold that belief.54
Lee further says that in the negotiations, during which Lee served as
Hughes CEO Dorfman's liaison to PRC Minister Liu Jiyuan,55 Minister Liu
confirmed Hughes' understanding that once a suitable agreement had been
signed, the PRC would be willing to consider making modifications to the
Long March 2E rocket before the next launch.56
In addition, Lee says that Hughes "is not saying how to fix it, but
wording [sic] requirement that they have to finally fix it." Lee says he
was aware that a number of Hughes engineers, particularly Al Wittmann,
believed that the fairing had indeed failed.57
**In June 1993, Hughes Chief
Technologist Al Wittmann wrote a paper analyzing how he thought the
fairing had failed, and how the fairing could be improved** to prevent a
similar failure in the forthcoming Optus B3 launch. The paper sought
permission within Hughes to communicate the results of his analysis to the
PRC. Wittmann says he discussed the recommendations in his paper with
Peter Herron, who was coordinating the launch failure investigation with
the PRC; Hughes Vice President Donald Cromer; and Stephen Cunningham, who
was heading up the launch failure investigation.58
Wittmann recommended that Hughes not launch the Optus B3 on the Long
March 2E rocket unless the PRC made improvements to the fairing. He says
that 70 to 80 percent of the Hughes team members agreed with him, and that
Cromer, Cunningham, and Herron supported his view that the Optus B3 should
not be launched without changes to the fairing.59
When Wittmann discussed his paper with Herron, Herron responded by
telling Wittmann that, unless the fairing recommendations in the paper
were simplified considerably, he was not willing to ask the U.S.
Government for approval to share it with the PRC. Wittmann says Cunningham
had also asked him to revise the paper for the same reason. 60
Hughes CEO Dorfman also recalls discussions with Wittmann about the
fairing:
*Q:** Would you describe the changes that . . .Wittmann
may have brought to your attention as changes which would improve the
fairing?*
*A:** Well, the only thing I can remember is that Mr.
Wittmann . . . felt that the fairing . . . had an overlap problem, and
that there would be a gap that could be caused during ascent between the
two halves of the fairing, and that that gap might cause a pressure
differential which would separate the fairing.*
*Q: **Would that suggestion constitute, in your view,
an improvement to the fairing?*
*A:** I don't know.*
*Q: **Is it a modification to the fairing?*
*A:** If they made a change, it would have been a
modification.*
*Q:** So Mr. Wittmann recommended something which, if
it had been accomplished, would have been a modification to the
fairing?*
*A:** Yes. 61*
Additionally, Hughes Vice President Cromer recalls the following
discussion with Wittmann about the fairing:
*Q:** When Mr. Wittmann first approached you about his
concerns regarding the fairing, do you recall some of the technical
aspects that he mentioned . . . ?*
*A:** Yes.*
*Q:** Can you tell us what some of those were?*
*A:** He was concerned about two aspects particularly.
One is the strength of the rivets that held the fairing together and
this was an issue of having adequate strength to withstand the launch
loads but still having sufficient ability to open the fairing when you
needed to. So it's a balance of strength versus separating the fairing
under the right conditions. Also the nose cap and its design and how it
might be affected by the loads during the ascent. 62*
Hughes launch failure investigators Herron and Cunningham subsequently
prepared a group of viewgraph slides that simplified the contents of
Wittmann's paper. Herron, who was responsible for coordinating with the
PRC, then submitted these to Defense Technology Security Administration
monitor Al Coates for approval. Coates' signature approving the transfer
of this information to the PRC appears on a facsimile transmittal sheet,
dated June 25, 1993.
**Lt. Col. Coates says he does not
recall approving this transfer, and he doubts that he would have ever
approved the disclosure of such prohibited information. **He further
says he did not have the authority to approve the disclosure of
information that could have improved the PRC rocket. He also says that it
was always clear to Hughes that no data that could improve the rocket
could be transferred to the PRC.63
Generally, Coates recalls that the Defense Technology Security
Administration always emphasized in briefings for Hughes employees the
prohibition against improving the rocket. He says that Hughes personnel
were very knowledgeable about the export control process, and that Herron
undoubtedly knew of the restrictions regarding rocket improvements.64
Coates specifically recalls telling Herron that he could not discuss
the design of the fairing with the PRC.65
Coates says he maintained a program file at the Defense Technology
Security Administration that contained all his approvals related to the
Optus B2.66 Such a file could not be found among the materials provided to
the Committee by the Defense Technology Security Administration.
Hughes failed to respond to the Committee's interrogatories (which
included a request for documents) regarding these approvals.
Donald Leedle, who was responsible for Hughes' technology export
control, says Herron contacted him to inform him that Coates had approved
communicating the information on improving the fairing to the PRC. In
Leedle's deposition, the following exchange regarding improvements to the
Long March 2E rocket occurred:
*Q:** Does this document suggest specific changes to
the Long March 2E fairing for the Hughes satellite that would improve
the fairing?*
*A:** At the bottom of the page it says. 'Add a bracket
or block to prevent any possibility of overlap of the two fairing
halves.'*
*Q:** What about on page 2?*
*A:** 'Increase the strength of the rivets along the
separation line.'*
*Q: **So, in your view, does this document propose
specific technical improvements to the fairing?*
*A:** I think they are fairly generic. Add a bracket
and strengthen a rivet is not very specific.*
*Q:** Are those improvements to the fairing?*
*A:** They may be.*
*Q:** Is Mr. Herron suggesting in his letter that they
are?*
*A:** He certainly feels that if these things are
accomplished, that there is less likelihood of it failing.*
*Q:** So would you view this letter as Mr. Herron's
statement that these changes would improve the fairing?*
*A:** Well, I'm not sure 'improve' is a difficult
word. It would prevent failure It might prevent a failure.*
*Q:** Mr. Wittmann suggested improvements to the
fairing in his letter, correct?*
*A:** Uh-huh.*
*Q:** Mr. Herron in a letter to Mr. Lee is now
suggesting changes need to be made to the fairing. Those changes
presumably would improve the fairing, would they not?*
*A:** I don't know the answer to that.*
*Q:** I'm asking you to look at Mr. Herron's letter
you had discussions with Mr. Herron and tell me whether you
think he is suggesting things that would improve the fairing?*
*A:** He is making recommendations to prevent a
failure.*
*Q:** By 'prevent a failure,' would you say that
improving the fairing would help prevent a failure?*
*A:** Something would have to be done to the fairing to
prevent a failure.*
*Q:** Improving the fairing is what this letter is
about; is that correct?*
*A:** Uh-huh.*
*Q: **And you've already told us that the fairing is a
part of the launch vehicle; is that correct?*
*A:** That's correct.*
*Q:** So the improvements to this fairing, it logically
follows, would result in improvements to the launch vehicle. Do you
agree?*
*A:** If they were actually
improvements.67*
In Cunningham's deposition, the following exchange about improvements
to the fairing took place:
*Q:** So, in your view, that doesn't constitute an
improvement in the fairing?*
*A:** If they do these correctly, and they have to
define correctly, this would improve the fairing. But if they do
but without further analysis, this would not improve the fairing. This
in itself does not improve the fairing.*
*Q:** Is it a modification of the fairing?*
*A:** Yes.*
*Q:** I want to go back just briefly to Exhibit 1,
paragraph 120.9, defense service; it's on the second page of Exhibit
1.*
*'120.9 (a), Defense service means: the furnishing of assistance
to foreign persons,' skip a little bit,'whether in the United States
or abroad in the design, development, engineering, manufacture,
production, assembly, testing, repair, maintenance, modification,
operations, demilitarization, destruction, processing or use of
defense articles.'*
*Is - would these suggested improvements constitute a modification
of the fairing?*
*A:** Yes, they would.*
*Q: **To modify a fairing or to modify a defense
article, do you need a license - according to what you read in ITAR
[International Traffic in Arms Regulations] earlier?*
*A:** Yes, we do.*
*Q:** And did you obtain a license to provide this
information to the Chinese?*
*A:** No.68*
Leedle says he was surprised that Herron, Hughes' Assistant Program
Manager for the Optus B2 and the person responsible for coordinating the
failure investigation with both the U.S. Government and the PRC, bypassed
him and approached the Defense Department's Coates directly. Leedle
acknowledges that the purpose of Wittmann's fairing recommendations was to
prevent the rocket from failing in future launches. Leedle and Cunningham
acknowledge that improvements to the rocket required a State Department
license, and that, to the best of their knowledge, no such license was
ever applied for.69
**On July 15, 1993, Hughes CEO
Dorfman wrote expressing his concerns about the cause of the Optus B2
launch failure to PRC Minister Liu Jiyuan,** President of China
Aerospace Corporation, in care of Hughes' Bansang Lee, stating in
part:
*After listening to Wang Dechen's [the PRC designer of the Long
March 2E rocket] presentation last week, I've become very concerned that
we will not convince our customer and insurers that it is safe to launch
Optus B3.*
*I emphasize that you must 1) demonstrate a thorough and objective
evaluation of potential causes for the accident, and 2) ***make
appropriate design and process changes to prevent recurrence,** even
if a definitive cause cannot be identified.
*Our people have made some specific suggestions which I urge you
to consider.**70 [Emphasis added]*
On July 18, 1993, Bansang Lee reported to Dorfman the results of the
meeting with Minister Liu at which he delivered Dorfman's letter. Lee
wrote about the PRC's strong negative reaction to Hughes' statements that
appeared to blame the PRC rocket for the Optus B2 failure, in violation of
the May 12 agreement:
*Mr. John Perkins letter of July 9, 1993 clearly pointed out the
[Long March 2E rocket's] fairing was the cause of the launch failure . .
.*
*It is true that it looks like the whole world appears to believe
the trouble was caused by the rocket . . . CGWIC [China Great Wall
Industry Corporation] has reasons to believe that Hughes is making a
trap to get them . . . If they agree to make any change to the fairing
now, they are walking into the trap themselves.71*
As Bansang Lee continued to negotiate, he says he thought that Hughes
Chief Scientist Robert Steinhauer, who had worked closely with the PRC for
almost ten years, might be able to help allay the PRC's concerns.
**On August 5, 1993, Bansang Lee
wrote to Hughes CEO Dorfman suggesting that Steinhauer bring the Optus B2
failure report to the PRC** and meet with the chief designer of the Long
March 2E rocket, Wang Dechen, to go over the findings.72
On August 15, 1993, Hughes and China Great Wall Industry Corporation
issued a joint news release, reported in Space News, stating that although
no design flaws were found, both companies would make improvements to
their products. Space News quotes an insurance broker as saying that,
"evidence points to a structural flaw in the rocket's fairing which
probably imploded during launch." It also quotes a U.S. satellite
underwriter as saying the companies
*had narrowed the cause of the launch failure to a few
possibilities, but struck a compromise on the announcement because they
are still doing business together.*
*Hughes also wants to support the Long March because the company is
concerned about becoming overdependent on the Arianespace launch
consortium of Evry, France.73*
On August 23, 1993, Steinhauer went to the PRC and met with the
designer of the Long March 2E rocket, Wang Dechen. Since 1985, Steinhauer
had been Hughes' primary contact with the PRC on the use of their rockets.
He also served as a consultant to the Optus B2 failure investigation team
from January 1993 through October 1993, attending many of the failure
investigation team meetings, and also meeting with the PRC regarding the
failure investigation.
The purpose of Steinhauer's August meeting in the PRC was to try to
help resolve things between the two companies. In particular, Steinhauer
focused on Wang Dechen, the designer of the Long March 2E. Hughes believed
that Wang Dechen was the key PRC individual who had to be turned
around.
**On September 14, 1993, Hughes
Chief Scientist Steinhauer wrote a memorandum to Hughes Vice President
Cromer suggesting a hard negotiating position with the PRC on the issue of
the fairing failure.** The memorandum said: ". . . Hughes should make an
unequivocal statement to Minister Liu Jiyuan that Optus B3, or any other
Hughes spacecraft, will not fly on the LM-2E without modifications to
their launch vehicle fairing."
The memorandum also describes Wang Dechen as "digging in his heels"
against the idea of a unified presentation identifying the failure cause
for the insurance community. Cunningham advises that earlier in the
investigation Wang Dechen had publicly stated that the rocket was not the
cause of the failure.74
Hughes Vice President Donald Cromer says that it was his decision
whether Hughes would launch Optus B3 on a Long March 2E rocket. His
decision was that Hughes would not launch unless the China Academy of
Launch Vehicle Technology made improvements to the fairing.75
In a September 9, 1993 message to Cromer, Bansang Lee made a number of
recommendations related to future business relations between Hughes and
the PRC in preparation for the Optus B3 insurance underwriters' briefing
that was scheduled later in September. Bansang Lee wrote:
*In reality by insisting that the rocket has a problem at the
fairing will do [sic] harm to Hughes in the following major
areas:*
*It will be even more difficult for the rocket to obtain insurance.
This will make the Optus B3 program more expensive and more difficult to
resolve.*
*Furthermore, it will make the APT II [the PRC-controlled Asia
Pacific Telecommunications Satellite Co.'s next Hughes satellite] more
difficult to obtain insurance as well. This will hurt Hughes a lot more
than CGWIC [China Great Wall Industry Corporation].*
*We will have a 'war' to fight, not only with CGWIC, but with China
in general. This will not only hurt our satellite * business in China
but will generally be harmful to all Hughes activities in China for
years to come.
*What do we get out from [sic] this? I could not think of any [sic]
that is good and useful to Hughes. The only small thing that I could
think of is that in the future we could claim better reliability
statistics on our satellites.*
*If we swallow this one and let our Chinese friends off the hook,
it will actually do more good for Hughes . . .76*
**On September 10, 1993, Hughes
Vice President Cromer asked Bansang Lee to bring Cromer's concerns to the
attention of the highest levels of the PRC:**
*However, of even greater disappointment is the continued
insistence by Wang Dechen [the PRC's Long March 2E rocket designer] that
we change the conclusion of our failure investigation. He has signed an
agreement that he accepts the results of our investigation yet he
continues to demand we modify the results to suit his view of the
accident . . .*
*We (Hughes and CALT) must make a full disclosure of all relevant
facts and data surrounding the accident to the insurance community . .
.*
*It is mandatory that we both make whatever changes are necessary
to add margin to our designs. We are doing so on the satellite side and
are prepared to disclose these at the insurance briefing. The Chinese
must be able to state that they will do likewise . . .*
*They cannot be superficial improvements - they must be substantial
and directly related to a possible failure cause.77*
On September 15, 1993, the Hughes official coordinating the launch
failure investigation with the PRC, Peter Herron, wrote to Bansang Lee
about the insurance briefings. Herron asked Lee to inform the PRC that
Hughes was willing to remove all information from the insurance briefing
related to the Long March 2E rocket from its presentation at the insurance
briefing. But Hughes would do this only if the China Academy of Launch
Vehicle Technology presented the data that Hughes was deleting. In his
letter, Herron wrote:
*While we would not plan to talk about the fairing debris, it is
important for full disclosure that CALT [China Academy of Launch Vehicle
Technology] also address the following:*
*Debris - The CALT report makes blanket statements that there were
no delaminations. However, it is obvious that there were a number of
small delaminations, both on the inside of the cylindrical portion of
the fairing and along one edge of the nose cap. They [CALT] must explain
why they think these occurred and what the relationship to the event
[crash of the Long March 2E] is, if any . . .78*
By late September, Hughes and the PRC had decided, pursuant to their
May 1993 agreement, that Hughes would not brief the issue of the fairing
to the insurers.
**The PRC had earlier signaled to
Hughes' Bansang Lee that it would consider making modifications to the
fairing for the Optus B3 launch.79 **Hughes Vice President Cromer
confirms that Hughes made a decision to go forward with Optus B3 because
the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology had committed itself to
modifications to the Long March 2E rocket's fairing.80
On September 30, 1993, Hughes and PRC representatives met with the
Optus B3 space insurance underwriters in London to discuss the conclusions
and results of the Optus B2 failure investigation. Cunningham, as the head
of the Hughes failure investigation, led the company's presentation.81
At the time of the insurance briefing, the Hughes final investigation
report was not yet finished. Although Cunningham was the author of the
Hughes Optus B2 Failure Report, he says he did not distribute the report
to anyone outside of Hughes, and he does not know whether anyone else at
Hughes did so.82
Cunningham says that the Hughes failure investigation report was
sufficiently technical that Defense Technology Security Administration
approval would have been necessary for it to be exported. He does not know
whether the report was ever given to the PRC, but he doubts it was.83
Cunningham says that the U.S. insurance underwriters may have been
separately briefed by Hughes about its concern that the Long March 2E
fairing was defective and needed modifications. Hughes claims that the
Defense Technology Security Administration was not present at the
insurance briefing because it chose not to attend. Defense Department
monitor Coates claims he was told by Hughes that no PRC representatives
would be present at the briefing.84
Hughes Vice President Cromer testified that C. Michael Armstrong, at
that time Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Hughes Electronics
Corporation, was generally aware of the analysis of the 1992 failure.
Cromer updated Armstrong on the progress of the investigation.85
Armstrong, however, testified that although he was aware of the Optus
B2 failure, he could not recall any information about a failure
investigation.86
**The Optus B3:
Hughes' Efforts to Improve** the Long March Continue
Between October 1993 and August 1994, when the Optus B3 was
successfully launched, Hughes continued its efforts to have the PRC
improve the Long March 2E fairing.
On October 13, 1993, Peter Herron, in his role as Program Manager for
Optus B3, wrote to Bansang Lee regarding changes to the Long March 2E.
Herron wrote, in part:
*4. We need to discuss the possible changes to the LM-2E [Long
March 2E]. How do we get the changes made?*
*I suspect it is unlikely that CALT [China Academy of Launch
Vehicle Technology] will recommend changes to the fairing, since that
might be seen by them as an admission that something was wrong. (Why
else make a change?)*
*They have stated that they would make changes that their customers
require. This was stated in the press release, was stated by Wang Liheng
at the dinner with Don Cromer in September, and was stated by Wang
Dechen during the meeting with the underwriters in London. However, we
are not LV [rocket] experts and are not in a position to make
* recommendations for improvements.
*Further, the USG would not be likely to allow us to make
recommendations in the current environment.*
*This is my idea. Last summer we requested that CALT respond to our
concern with the nose cap (you will recall the four viewgraphs we
prepared and showed to Wang Dechen [the PRC's Long March 2E designer] as
well as the bad reaction that resulted).*
*I think we can use these same viewgraphs to request that CALT
examine some 'Hughes requested' changes to the fairing. Specifically, we
can ask for CALT ideas on how they would implement changes that
would,*
*1. Add a bracket or block to prevent any possibility of overlap of
the two fairing halves,*
*2. Increase the strength of the rivets along the separation line.
. . [Emphasis added]*
**The Defense Department's Lt. Col.
Coates says that, had he been asked, he would not have approved the
transmittal of this information to the PRC. **He also says that Hughes
personnel knew that each separate transmission of information to the PRC
required specific approval.87
On October 20, 1993, Peter Herron, Hughes' program manager for the
Optus B3, wrote to Chen Shouchun, Vice President of the China Great Wall
Industry Corporation, regarding Optus B3 meetings scheduled for November
1993 at Hughes. One topic of Herron's letter is ". . . discussions of ways
to improve margins for the next launch. CALT [the China Academy of Launch
Vehicle Technology] has already committed to make some changes to the
LM-2E [Long March 2E rocket] in accordance with our needs."
Hughes and the PRC held design meetings in November 1993, to discuss
the proposed modifications to the fairing.
The Optus B3 was licensed by the Commerce Department, not the State
Department. Other than the license for the Optus B3, which was approved by
the Commerce Department, Herron did not submit any Optus B3 fairing
improvement documents to the U.S. Government for approval.
Steven Burke, a structural analysis engineer at Hughes and principal
investigator on the Optus B2 investigation, recalls attending a number of
Optus B3 design review meetings with the PRC. During the early portion of
the Optus B2 failure investigation, Burke had been responsible for
analyzing Optus B2 rocket telemetry data supplied by the PRC. Burke and
fellow engineer Spencer Ku had determined, along with Hughes' Chief
Technologist Al Wittmann, that the fairing had caused the failure.88
**On May 9, 1994, Burke wrote a
detailed technical paper entitled "Optus B3/LM-2E Fairing Design
Review,"** discussing a meeting with the PRC that occurred on May 2,
1994 regarding fairing improvements to the Long March 2E needed for the
upcoming Optus B3 launch. He says the meetings were both political and
technical in nature: political in that the PRC was unwilling to admit
fault, while from a technical perspective, they were willing to make
changes.
Burke further says that as a result of the Hughes investigation, Hughes
had asked the PRC to strengthen the weak parts of the fairing.89
In the paper, Burke wrote that the PRC proposed changes to what it
termed the "already adequate" capabilities of the fairing. His paper
continued, identifying PRC proposals for the following changes to the Long
March 2E rocket's fairing:
*a. Increased number of nose cap attachment screws from 21 to 41.
Increased number of cover strip attachment screws from 12 to 23.*
*Comment: These changes add strength to joints that would not need
strengthening if the dome were stiff enough.*
*In my opinion, these changes do not address the real problem with
the nose cap design, nor do they constitute an effective "crutch" that
would preclude another fairing failure. They do offer some integrity
enhancement, but against loads that could best be * limited by
maintaining the as-designed dome configuration.
*In short, these [the fairing changes proposed by the PRC] are
token changes that are easy to implement but do not preclude another
fairing failure because they neither stiffen the sawcut edges of the
dome halves nor stiffen the dome base frame at its
discontinuities.90*
Burke's paper went on to discuss other technical deficiencies and
questioned how Hughes could get the PRC to propose truly effective changes
to the Long March 2E rocket's fairing design.91
Burke recalls Peter Herron, who was now Program Manager for the Optus
B3 satellite, telling him that Herron had provided documentation to the
PRC suggesting changes to the Long March 2E rocket's fairing during the
Optus B2 failure investigation.92
On July 30, 1994, Herron wrote to the PRC requesting additional
information about the PRC changes to the fairing. Herron showed his letter
to Burke, and asked for his views on the additional modifications proposed
by the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology. Burke says that he and
others provided Herron with questions on the CALT proposed changes.93
**On August 4, 1994, Hughes' Chief
Technologist Al Wittmann wrote to Vice President Donald Cromer, stating
that he believed the changes to the fairing proposed by the PRC were
adequate** for the upcoming Optus B3 launch.94
In August 1994, Burke says he attended a Hughes senior management
meeting to review the changes made by the PRC to the fairing for the
scheduled Optus B3 launch. The briefing slides for the meeting are dated
August 8, 1994. By the time of this meeting, Burke says that Wang Dechen,
the PRC designer for the Long March 2E rocket, had told him that the PRC
had made improvements to the rocket's fairing. Burke further says that his
review of the documents from the August 8 briefing show that the changes
made were a combination of PRC ideas and Hughes ideas.95
According to Donald Leedle, responsible for Hughes' technology export
controls, a design review in which Hughes provided information to the PRC
should have required a State Department license.96
The Optus B3 was launched successfully on August 28, 1994, aboard a PRC
Long March 2E rocket. |