*Chapter 2
Contents*
**Mobile
and Submarine-Launched Missiles**
**Acceleration
of PRC Weapons Development**
**Effect
on PRC Nuclear Doctrine**
**Multiple
Warhead Development**
**Proliferation**
**Russian
Assistance to the PRC's Nuclear Weapons Program**
**The
"Walk-In"**
**Investigation
of Theft of Design Information** for the Neutron Bomb
**Investigation
of Thefts of Information Related to the Detection of Submarines and of
Laser Testing of Miniature Nuclear Weapons Explosions**
**Investigation
of Theft of Design Information** for the W-88 Trident D-5 Thermonuclear
Warhead
**Investigation
of Additional Incidents**
####
####
*Chapter 2
Summary*
**he People's Republic of China (PRC)
has stolen classified information on all of the United States' most
advanced thermonuclear warheads,** and several of the associated reentry
vehicles. These thefts are the result of an intelligence collection
program spanning two decades, and continuing to the present. The PRC
intelligence collection program included espionage, review of unclassified
publications, and extensive interactions with scientists from the
Department of Energy's national weapons laboratories.
**The stolen U.S. secrets have helped the PRC fabricate and
successfully test modern strategic thermonuclear weapons.** The stolen
information includes classified information on seven U.S. thermonuclear
warheads, including every currently deployed thermonuclear warhead in the
U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile arsenal. Together, these include
the W-88 Trident D-5 thermonuclear warhead, and the W-56 Minuteman II, the
W-62 Minuteman III, the W-70 Lance, the W-76 Trident C-4, the W-78
Minuteman III Mark 12A, and the W-87 Peacekeeper thermonuclear warheads.
The stolen information also includes classified design information for an
enhanced radiation weapon (commonly known as the "neutron bomb"), which
neither the United States, nor any other nation, has ever deployed.
**In addition, in the mid-1990s the PRC stole from a U.S. national
weapons laboratory classified U.S. thermonuclear weapons information**
that cannot be identified in this unclassified Report. Because this recent
espionage case is currently under investigation and involves sensitive
intelligence sources and methods, the Clinton administration has
determined that further information can not be made public without
affecting national security or ongoing criminal investigations.
**The W-88 is a miniaturized, tapered thermonuclear warhead. It is the
United States' most sophisticated strategic thermonuclear weapon.** In
the U.S. arsenal, the W-88 warhead is mated to the D-5 submarine-launched
ballistic missile carried aboard the Trident nuclear submarine. The United
States learned about the theft of the W-88 Trident D-5 warhead
information, as well as about the theft of information regarding several
other thermonuclear weapons, in 1995.
**On two occasions, the PRC has stolen classified U.S. information
about neutron bomb warheads from a U.S. national weapons laboratory.
**The United States learned of these thefts of classified information on
the neutron bomb in 1996 and in the late 1970s, when the first theft -
including design information on the W-70 warhead - occurred. The W-70
warhead contains elements that may be used either as a strategic
thermonuclear weapon, or as an enhanced radiation weapon ("neutron bomb").
The PRC subsequently tested the neutron bomb. The U.S. has never deployed
a neutron weapon.
**In addition, the Select Committee is aware of other PRC thefts of
U.S. thermonuclear weapons-related secrets.** The Clinton administration
has determined that further information about these thefts cannot be
publicly disclosed without affecting national security.
**The Select Committee judges that the PRC will exploit elements of
the stolen U.S. design information for the development of the PRC's new
generation strategic thermonuclear warheads.** Current PRC silo-based
missiles were designed for large, multi-megaton thermonuclear warheads
roughly equivalent to U.S. warheads of the late 1950s. The PRC plans to
supplement these silo-based missiles with smaller, modern mobile missiles
that require smaller warheads. The PRC has three mobile ICBM programs
currently underway two road-mobile and one submarine launched
program all of which will be able to strike the United States.
**The first of these new People's Liberation Army (PLA) mobile ICBMs,
the DF-31, may be tested in 1999 and could be deployed as soon as 2002.
**The DF-31 ICBM and the PRC's other new generation mobile ICBMs will
require smaller, more compact warheads. The stolen U.S. information on the
W-70 or W-88 Trident D-5 will be useful for this purpose.
**The PRC has the infrastructure and technical ability to use elements
of the stolen U.S. warhead design information in the PLA's next generation
of thermonuclear weapons.** If the PRC attempted to deploy an exact
replica of the U.S. W-88 Trident D-5 warhead, it would face considerable
technical challenges. However, the PRC could build modern thermonuclear
warheads based on stolen U.S. design information, including the stolen
W-88 design information, using processes similar to those developed or
available in a modern aerospace or precision guided munitions industry.
The Select Committee judges that the PRC has such infrastructure and is
capable of producing small thermonuclear warheads based on the stolen U.S.
design information, including the stolen W-88 information.
**The Select Committee judges that the PRC is likely to continue its
work on advanced thermonuclear weapons based on the stolen U.S. design
information.** The PRC could begin serial production of advanced
thermonuclear weapons based on stolen U.S. design information during the
next decade in connection with the development of its new generation of
intercontinental ballistic missiles.
**The Select Committee judges that the PRC's acquisition of U.S.
classified information regarding thermonuclear warhead designs from the
Department of Energy's national weapons laboratories saved the PRC years
of effort** and resources, and helped the PRC in its efforts to
fabricate and successfully test a new generation of thermonuclear
warheads. The PRC's access to, and use of, classified U.S. information
does not immediately alter the strategic balance between the U.S. and PRC.
Once the PRC's small, mobile strategic ballistic missiles are deployed,
however, they will be far more difficult to locate than the PRC's current
silo-based missiles. This will make the PRC's strategic nuclear force more
survivable. Small, modern nuclear warheads also enable the PRC to deploy
multiple reentry vehicles (MRVs or MIRVs, multiple
independently-targetable reentry vehicles) on its ICBMs should it choose
to do so.
**The PRC's collection of intelligence on smaller U.S. thermonuclear
warheads began in the 1970s,** when the PRC recognized its weaknesses in
physics and the deteriorating status of its nuclear weapons programs. The
Select Committee judges that the PRC's intelligence collection efforts to
develop modern thermonuclear warheads are focused primarily on the U.S.
Department of Energy's National Laboratories at:
**ï¿½ Los Alamos**
**ï¿½ Lawrence Livermore**
**ï¿½ Oak Ridge**
**ï¿½ Sandia**
The FBI has investigated a number of U.S. National Laboratory employees
in connection with suspected espionage.
The Select Committee judges that the U.S. national weapons laboratories
have been and are targeted by PRC espionage, and almost certainly remain
penetrated by the PRC today.
**The United States did not become fully aware of the magnitude of the
counterintelligence problem at Department of Energy national weapons
laboratories until 1995.** A series of PRC nuclear weapons test
explosions from 1992 to 1996 began a debate in the U.S. Government about
whether the PRC's designs for its new generation of nuclear warheads were
in fact based on stolen U.S. classified information. The apparent purpose
of these PRC tests was to develop smaller, lighter thermonuclear warheads,
with an increased yield-to-weight ratio. In 1995, a "walk-in" approached
the Central Intelligence Agency outside the PRC and provided an official
PRC document classified "Secret" that contained specific design
information on the W-88 Trident D-5, and technical information on other
thermonuclear warheads. The CIA later determined that the "walk-in" was
directed by the PRC intelligence services. Nonetheless, CIA and other
Intelligence Community analysts that reviewed the document concluded that
it contained U.S. warhead design information.
**The National Security Advisor was briefed on PRC thefts of
classified U.S. thermonuclear warhead design information in April 1996**
(when he was the Deputy National Security Advisor), and again in August
1997. In response to specific interrogatories from the Select Committee,
the National Security Advisor informed the Select Committee that the
President was not briefed about the issue and the long-term
counterintelligence problems at the Department of Energy until early 1998.
The Secretary of Energy was briefed about the matter in late 1995 and
early 1996. At the writing of this report, the Secretary of Defense has
been briefed, but not the Secretaries of State and Commerce.
**Congress was not provided adequate briefings on the extent of the
PRC's espionage program.**
**Under Presidential Decision Directive 61 issued in February 1998,
the Department of Energy was required to implement improved
counterintelligence measures.** In December 1998, the Department of
Energy began to implement a series of recommended improvements to its
counterintelligence program approved by Secretary Richardson in November
1998. Based on testimony by the new head of the Department of Energy's
counterintelligence program, the unsuccessful history of previous
counterintelligence programs at the Department of Energy, and other
information that is not publicly available, the Select Committee judges
that the new counterintelligence program at the Department of Energy will
not be even minimally effective until at least the year 2000.
**Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and continuing today, Russia
is cooperating with the PRC in numerous military and civilian programs,
including the PRC's civilian nuclear program.** The Select Committee is
concerned about the possibility of cooperation between Russia and the PRC
on nuclear weapons. The Select Committee judges that Russian nuclear
weapons testing technology and experience could significantly assist the
PRC's nuclear weapons program, including the PRC's exploitation of stolen
U.S. thermonuclear warhead design information. This is especially true if
the PRC complies with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which does not
permit the physical testing of nuclear weapons.
*Chapter 2
Text*
PRC THEFT OF U.S. THERMONUCLEAR WARHEAD
DESIGN INFORMATION
he
People's Republic of China's penetration of our national weapons
laboratories spans at least the past several decades, and almost certainly
continues today.
The PRC's nuclear weapons intelligence collection efforts began after
the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, when the PRC assessed its
weaknesses in physics and the deteriorating status of its nuclear weapons
programs.
The PRC's warhead designs of the late 1970s were large, multi-megaton
thermonuclear weapons that could only be carried on large ballistic
missiles and aircraft. The PRC's warheads were roughly equivalent to U.S.
warheads designed in the 1950s. The PRC may have decided as early as that
time to pursue more advanced thermonuclear warheads for its new generation
of ballistic missiles.
The PRC's twenty-year intelligence collection effort against the U.S.
has been aimed at this goal. The PRC employs a "mosaic" approach that
capitalizes on the collection of small bits of information by a large
number of individuals, which is then pieced together in the PRC. This
information is obtained through espionage, rigorous review of U.S.
unclassified technical and academic publications, and extensive
interaction with U.S. scientists and Department of Energy
laboratories.
The Select Committee judges that the PRC's intelligence collection
efforts to develop modern thermonuclear warheads are focused primarily on
the Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, Sandia, and Oak Ridge National
Laboratories.
As a result of these efforts, the PRC has stolen classified U.S.
thermonuclear design information that helped it fabricate and successfully
test a new generation of strategic warheads.
**The PRC stole classified
information on every currently deployed U.S. intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). **The
warheads for which the PRC stole classified information include: the W-56
Minuteman II ICBM; the W-62 Minuteman III ICBM; the W-70 Lance short-range
ballistic missile (SRBM); the W-76 Trident C-4 SLBM; the W-78 Minuteman
III Mark 12A ICBM; the W-87 Peacekeeper ICBM; and the W-88 Trident D-5
SLBM. The W-88 warhead is the most sophisticated strategic nuclear warhead
in the U.S. arsenal. It is deployed on the Trident D-5 submarine-launched
missile.
In addition, in the mid-1990s the PRC stole from a U.S. national
weapons laboratory classified U.S. thermonuclear weapons information that
cannot be identified in this unclassified Report. Because this recent
espionage case is currently under investigation and involves sensitive
intelligence sources and methods, the Clinton administration has
determined that further information may not be made public without
affecting national security or ongoing criminal investigations.
The PRC also stole classified information on U.S. weapons design
concepts, on weaponization features, and on warhead reentry vehicles (the
hardened shell that protects a warhead during reentry).
The PRC may have acquired detailed documents and blueprints from the
U.S. national weapons laboratories.
The U.S. Intelligence Community reported in 1996 that the PRC stole
neutron bomb technology from a U.S. national weapons laboratory. The PRC
had previously stolen design information on the U.S. W-70 warhead in the
late 1970s; that earlier theft, which included design information, was
discovered several months after it took place. The W-70 has elements that
can be used as a strategic thermonuclear warhead or an enhanced radiation
("neutron bomb") warhead. The PRC tested a neutron bomb in 1988.
The PRC may have also acquired classified U.S. nuclear weapons computer
codes from U.S. national weapons laboratories. The Select Committee
believes that nuclear weapons computer codes remain a key target for PRC
espionage. Nuclear weapons codes are important for understanding the
workings of nuclear weapons and can assist in weapon design, maintenance,
and adaptation. The PRC could make use of this information, for example,
to adapt stolen U.S. thermonuclear design information to meet the PRC's
particular needs and capabilities.
During the mid-1990s, it was learned that the PRC had acquired U.S.
technical information about insensitive high explosives. Insensitive high
explosives are a component of certain thermonuclear weapons. Insensitive
high explosives are less energetic than high explosives used in some other
thermonuclear warheads, but have advantages for other purposes, such as
thermonuclear warheads used on mobile missiles.
The PRC thefts from our national weapons laboratories began at least as
early as the late 1970s, and significant secrets are known to have been
stolen as recently as the mid-1990s. Such thefts almost certainly continue
to the present.
The Clinton administration has determined that additional information
about PRC thefts included in this section of the Select Committee's Report
cannot be publicly disclosed without affecting national security.
## The PRC's Next Generation Nuclear
Warheads
The PRC has acquired U.S. nuclear weapons design information that could
be utilized in developing the PRC's next generation of modern
thermonuclear warheads.
The Department of Energy identifies two general design paths to the
development of modern thermonuclear warheads:
**ï¿½ The first path, which
apparently has been followed by the Russians, emphasizes simplicity and
reliability in design**
**ï¿½ The second path, which the
U.S. has taken, utilizes innovative designs and lighter-weight
warheads**
The Select Committee judges that the combination of the PRC's
preference for U.S. designs, the PRC's theft of design information on our
most advanced thermonuclear warheads, and the PRC's demand for small,
modern warheads for its new generation of mobile intercontinental
ballistic missiles will result in the PRC emulating the U.S. design path
to develop its next generation of thermonuclear warheads.
**The PRC has already begun working
on smaller thermonuclear warheads.** During the l990s, the PRC was
working to complete testing of its modern thermonuclear weapons before it
signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996.1 The PRC conducted a
series of nuclear tests from 1992 to 1996. Based on what is known about
PRC nuclear testing practices, combined with data on PRC warhead yield and
on PRC missile development, it is clear that the purpose of the 1992 to
1996 test series was to develop small, light warheads for the PRC's new
nuclear forces.2
These tests led to suspicions in the U.S. Intelligence Community that
the PRC had stolen advanced U.S. thermonuclear warhead design information.
These suspicions were definitely confirmed by the "walk-in" information
received in 1995.
The Select Committee judges that the PRC is developing for its next
generation of road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles smaller,
more compact thermonuclear warheads that exploit elements of stolen U.S.
design information, including the stolen design information from the U.S.
W-70 Lance warhead or the W-88 Trident D-5 warhead.
The timeline on the next two-page spread shows an unclassified history
of the PRC's thermonuclear weapons development and its acquisition of
classified information from the United States.
Completing the development of its next-generation warhead poses
challenges for the PRC. The PRC may not currently be able to match
precisely the exact explosive power and other features of U.S. weapons.
Nonetheless, the PRC may be working toward this goal, and the difficulties
it faces are surmountable. Work-arounds exist, using processes similar to
those developed or available in a modern aerospace or precision-guided
munitions industry. The PRC possesses these capabilities already.
## The Impact of the PRC's Theft of U.S.
Thermonuclear Warhead Design Information
**Mobile and
Submarine-Launched Missiles**
The main application of the stolen U.S. thermonuclear warhead
information will likely be to the PRC's next-generation intercontinental
ballistic missiles.
The PRC is developing several new, solid-propellant, mobile
intercontinental ballistic missiles. These include both road-mobile and
submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Road-mobile ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic
missiles require smaller, more advanced thermonuclear warheads. The Select
Committee judges it is likely that the PRC will use a new, smaller
thermonuclear warhead on its next generation road-mobile, solid-propellant
ICBM, the DF-31.
The DF-31 is likely to undergo its first test flight in 1999, and could
be deployed as early as 2002. Introduction of the PRC's new, smaller
thermonuclear warhead into PLA service could coincide with the initial
operational capability of the new road-mobile DF-31 ballistic missile
system.
The Select Committee judges that the PRC's thermonuclear warheads will
exploit elements of the U.S. W-70 Lance or W-88 Trident D-5 warheads.
While the PRC might not reproduce exact replicas of these U.S.
thermonuclear warheads, elements of the PRC's devices could be
similar.
**Acceleration
of PRC Weapons Development**
The PRC's theft of classified U.S. weapons design information saved the
PRC years of effort and resources in developing its new generation of
modern thermonuclear warheads. It provided the PRC with access to design
information that worked and was within the PRC's ability to both develop
and test. And it saved the PRC from making mistakes or from pursuing blind
alleys.
The loss of design information from the Department of Energy's national
weapons laboratories helped the PRC in its efforts to fabricate and
successfully test its next generation of nuclear weapons designs. These
warheads give the PRC small, modern thermonuclear warheads roughly
equivalent to current U.S. warhead yields.
Assessing the extent to which design information losses accelerated the
PRC's nuclear weapons development is complicated because so much is
unknown. The full extent of U.S. information that the PRC acquired and the
sophistication of the PRC's indigenous design capabilities are unclear.
Moreover, there is the possibility of third country assistance to the
PRC's nuclear weapons program, which could also assist the PRC's
exploitation of the stolen U.S. nuclear weapons information. Nonetheless,
it is patent that the PRC has stolen significant classified U.S. design
information on our most modern thermonuclear warheads.
**While it is sometimes argued that
eventually the PRC might have been able to produce and test an advanced
and modern thermonuclear weapon on its own,** the PRC had conducted only
45 nuclear tests in the more than 30 years from 1964 to 1996 (when the PRC
signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty), which would have been
insufficient for the PRC to have developed advanced thermonuclear warheads
on its own. This compares to the approximately 1,030 tests by the United
States, 715 tests by the Soviet Union, and 210 by France.3
The following illustrates the evolution of smaller U.S.
warheads.4
**Effect on PRC
Nuclear Doctrine**
Deploying new thermonuclear weapons provides the PRC with additional
doctrinal and operational options for its strategic forces that, if
exercised, would be troublesome for the United States.
Smaller, more efficient thermonuclear warheads would provide the PRC
with the opportunity to develop and deploy a multiple
independently-targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) should it decide to do so.
These smaller designs would allow the use of lighter and faster reentry
vehicles that may be better able to stress and to overcome ballistic
missile defenses.
The following two pages illustrate the development of smaller, more
efficient U.S. thermonuclear warheads, specifically the W-87 Peacekeeper,
a warhead for which the PRC stole classified U.S. weapons information.
The PRC has expressed considerable opposition to U.S. deployment of
ballistic missile defenses.
Other advantages of increased warhead yield-to-weight ratios include
extended missile ranges and accuracy improvements. Smaller warheads result
in a more compact missile payload, extending the range of ballistic
missiles. This permits the use of smaller-diameter sea-launched ballistic
missiles and mobile missiles to strike long-range targets. Longer range
could enable PRC ballistic missile submarines to strike the U.S. from
within PRC waters, where they can operate safely.
**Multiple
Warhead Development**
The deployment of multiple warheads on a single missile requires
smaller warheads that the PRC has not possessed.
The Select Committee has no information on whether the PRC currently
intends to develop and deploy multiple independently targetable reentry
vehicle systems. However, the Select Committee is aware of reports that
the PRC has undertaken efforts related to multiple warhead technology.
Experts believe that the PRC currently has the technical capability to
develop and deploy silo-based ballistic missiles with multiple reentry
vehicles (MRVs) and multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles
(MIRVs). Experts also agree that the PRC could develop and deploy its new
generation of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles with MRVs or
MIRVs within a short period of years after a decision to do so, and
consistent with the presumed timeframe for its planned deployment of its
next-generation intercontinental ballistic missiles.
**Proliferation**
The PRC is one of the world's leading proliferators of weapons
technologies. Concerns about the impact of the PRC's thefts of U.S.
thermonuclear warhead design information, therefore, include the possible
proliferation of the world's most sophisticated nuclear weapons technology
to nations hostile to the United States.
**Russian
Assistance to the PRC's Nuclear Weapons Program**
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the PRC and Russian scientists
became increasingly cooperative in civilian nuclear technology, and
apparently, military technology. The Select Committee is concerned that
the growing cooperation between Russia and the PRC is an indication of
current or future nuclear weapons cooperation. The Select Committee judges
that Russia's nuclear weapons testing technology and experience could
significantly assist the PRC with its nuclear weapons program under the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which does not permit physical testing.
While the PRC could share its knowledge of U.S. advanced thermonuclear
warhead designs with Russia, Russia may not be interested in deviating
from its past developmental path, since existing Russian warhead designs
are apparently simple and reliable. The large throw-weight of Russian
ballistic missiles has given them less cause for concern about the size
and weight of their warheads. Russia's nuclear stockpile maintenance
requirements under a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty are thus very different
than those of the United States.
The prospect of PRC-Russian cooperation, if that were to include
military cooperation, would give rise to concerns in several areas,
including nuclear weapons development and nuclear stockpile maintenance,
nuclear weapons modeling and simulation, and nuclear weapons testing
data.
## How the PRC Acquired Thermonuclear
Warhead Design Inmformation from the United States: PRC Espionage
and Other PRC Techniques
The Select Committee judges that the PRC's intelligence collection
efforts to develop modern thermonuclear warheads have focused primarily on
the following U.S. National Laboratories: Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore,
Oak Ridge, and Sandia. These efforts included espionage, rigorous review
of U.S. unclassified technical and academic publications, and extensive
interaction with U.S. scientists and Department of Energy
laboratories.
**Espionage played a central part
in the PRC's acquisition of classified U.S. thermonuclear warhead design
secrets.** In several cases, the PRC identified lab employees, invited
them to the PRC, and approached them for help, sometimes playing upon
ethnic ties to recruit individuals.
The PRC also rigorously mined unclassified technical information and
academic publications, including information from the National Technical
Information Center and other sources. PRC scientists have even requested
reports via e-mail from scientists at the U.S. national weapons
laboratories. Peter Lee, who had been a scientist at both Lawrence
Livermore and Los Alamos National Laboratories and was convicted in 1997
of passing classified information to the PRC, gave the PRC unclassified
technical reports upon request. The PRC also learned about conventional
explosives for nuclear weapon detonation from reviewing unclassified
technical reports published by Department of Energy national weapons
laboratories.
PRC scientists have used their extensive laboratory-to-laboratory
interactions with the United States to gain information from U.S.
scientists on common problems, solutions to nuclear weapons physics, and
solutions to engineering problems. The PRC uses elicitation in these
meetings, where it shows familiarity with U.S. information in an effort to
"prime the pump" in order to try to glean information about U.S. designs.
U.S. scientists have passed information to the PRC in this way that is of
benefit to the PRC's nuclear weapons program.
Specific examples of the loss of classified U.S. information in this
manner are detailed in the Select Committee's classified Final Report. The
Clinton administration has determined that these examples cannot be
publicly discussed without affecting national security.
The PRC's espionage operations, which use traditional intelligence
gathering organizations as well as other entities, are aggressively
focused on U.S. weapons technology.
The PRC's Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP), which is under the
Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense
(COSTIND), is the entity in charge of the PRC's nuclear weapons program.
It is responsible for the research and development, testing, and
production of all of the PRC's nuclear weapons. The figure on the
following page shows the organization of the PRC's nuclear
infrastructure.5
**The China Academy of Engineering
Physics has pursued a very close relationship with U.S. national weapons
laboratories, sending scientists as well as senior management to Los
Alamos and Lawrence Livermore.** Members of the China Academy of
Engineering Physics senior management have made at least two trips during
the mid-to-late 1990s to U.S. national weapons laboratories to acquire
information and collect intelligence. These visits provide the opportunity
for the PRC to collect intelligence. The presence of such PRC nationals at
the U.S. national weapons laboratories facilitates the PRC's targeting of
U.S. weapons scientists for the purpose of obtaining nuclear weapons
information.
U.S. and PRC lab-to-lab exchanges were ended in the late 1980s, but
were resumed in 1993. Scientific exchanges continue in many areas
including high-energy physics.6 Discussions at the U.S. national weapons
laboratories in connection with the foreign visitors program are supposed
to be strictly limited to technical arms control and material accounting
issues. Nonetheless, these visits and scientific conferences provide
opportunities for the PRC to interact with U.S. scientists outside of
official meetings, and facilitate the PRC's targeting of U.S. weapons
scientists.
The U.S. national weapons laboratories argue that there are reciprocal
gains from the exchanges. The Department of Energy describes some of the
insights gained from these exchanges as unique. On the other hand, PRC
scientists have misled the U.S. about their objectives and technological
developments. Despite considerable debate in Congress and the Executive
branch, including several critical Government Accounting Office reports,
the U.S. Government has never made a definitive assessment of the risks
versus the benefits of scientific exchanges and foreign visitor programs
involving the U.S. national weapons laboratories.7
## How the U.S. Government Learned of
the PRC's Theft of Our Most Advanced Thermonuclear Warhead Design
Information
The U.S. Government did not become fully aware of the magnitude of the
counterintelligence problems at the Department of Energy laboratories
until 1995. The first indication of successful PRC espionage against the
laboratories arose in the late 1970s. During the last several years, more
information has become available concerning thefts of U.S. thermonuclear
warhead design information, and how the PRC may be exploiting it. A series
of PRC nuclear tests conducted from 1992 to 1996 that furthered the PRC's
development of advanced warheads led to suspicions in the U.S.
intelligence community that the PRC had stolen advanced U.S. thermonuclear
warhead design information.
**The
"Walk-In"**
In 1995, a "walk-in" approached the Central Intelligence Agency outside
of the PRC and provided an official PRC document classified "Secret" that
contained design information on the W-88 Trident D-5 warhead, the most
modern in the U.S. arsenal, as well as technical information concerning
other thermonuclear warheads.
The CIA later determined that the "walk-in" was directed by the PRC
intelligence services. Nonetheless, the CIA and other Intelligence
Community analysts that reviewed the document concluded that it contained
U.S. thermonuclear warhead design information.
The "walk-in" document recognized that the U.S. nuclear warheads
represented the state-of-the-art against which PRC thermonuclear warheads
should be measured.
**ESPIONAGE DEFINITION of a
"WALK-IN"**
A "walk-in" is an individual who voluntarily offers to conduct
espionage. The Encyclopedia of Espionage defines a "walk-in" as "an
unheralded defector or a dangle, a 'walk-in' is a potential agent or a
mole who literally walks into an embassy or intelligence agency without
prior contact or recruitment." See the Spy Book, The Encyclopedia of
Espionage, by Norman Polmar and Thomas B. Allen (RH Reference &
Information Publishing, Random House).
The individual who approached the CIA in 1995 is suspected of being a
"directed walk-in": a "walk-in" purposefully directed by the PRC to
provide this information to the United States. There is speculation as to
the PRC's motives for advertising to the United States the state of its
nuclear weapons development.
Over the following months, an assessment of the information in the
document was conducted by a multidisciplinary group from the U.S.
Government, including the Department of Energy and scientists from the
U.S. national weapons laboratories. The Department of Energy and FBI
investigations focused on the loss of the U.S. W-88 Trident D-5 design
information, but they did not focus on the loss of technical information
about the other five U.S. thermonuclear warheads. A Department of Energy
investigation of the loss of technical information about the other five
U.S. thermonuclear warheads had not begun as of January 3, 1999, after the
Select Committee had completed its investigation. Also, the FBI had not
yet initiated an investigation as of January 3, 1999.
## The PRC's Future Thermonuclear Warhead
Requirements: The PRC's Need for Nuclear Test Data and High Performance
Computers
Since signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996, the PRC
has faced new challenges in maintaining its modern thermonuclear warheads
without physical testing. Indeed, even after signing the CTBT, the PRC may
be testing sub-critical or low yield nuclear explosive devices underground
at its Lop Nur test site.
The PRC likely does not need additional physical tests for its older
thermonuclear warhead designs. But maintenance of the nuclear weapons
stockpile for these weapons does require testing. The ban on physical
testing to which the PRC agreed in 1996 has therefore increased the PRC's
interest in high performance computing and access to sophisticated
computer codes to simulate the explosion of nuclear weapons.8
The Select Committee judges that the PRC has likely developed only a
very modest complement of codes from inputting its own testing data into
high performance computers. The PRC would, therefore, be especially
interested in acquiring U.S. thermonuclear weapons codes for any new
weapons based on elements of stolen U.S. design information.
The Department of Energy reports that the PRC has in fact acquired some
U.S. computer codes, including: the MCNPT code; the DOT3.5 code; and the
NJOYC code.9 MCNPT is a theoretical code that is useful in determining
survivability of systems to electronic penetration and dose penetration in
humans. DOT3.5 is a two-dimensional empirical code that performs the same
kinds of calculations as MCNPT, except uses numerical integration. NJOYC
acts as a numerical translator between DOT3.5 and MCNPT.
**Given the limited number of
nuclear tests that the PRC has conducted, the PRC likely needs additional
empirical information about advanced thermonuclear weapon performance that
it could obtain by stealing the U.S. "legacy" computer codes,** such as
those that were used by the Los Alamos National Laboratory to design the
W-88 Trident D-5 warhead. The PRC may also need information about dynamic
three-dimensional data on warhead packaging, primary and secondary
coupling, and the chemical interactions of materials inside the warhead
over time.
The Select Committee is concerned that no procedures are in place that
would either prevent or detect the movement of classified information,
including classified nuclear-weapons design information or computer codes,
to unclassified sections of the computer systems at U.S. national weapons
laboratories. The access granted to individuals from foreign countries,
including students, to these unclassified areas of the U.S. national
weapons laboratories' computer systems could make it possible for others
acting as agents of foreign countries to access such information, making
detection of the persons responsible for the theft even more
difficult.
The Select Committee believes that the PRC will continue to target its
collection efforts not only on Los Alamos National Laboratory, but also on
the other U.S. National Laboratories involved with the U.S. nuclear
stockpile maintenance program.
The PRC may also seek to improve its hydrostatic testing capabilities
by learning more about the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrotest (DARHT)
facility at Los Alamos.
## U.S. Government Investigations of Nuclear
Weapons Design Information Losses
**Investigation
of Theft of Design Information** for the Neutron Bomb
The Select Committee received information about the U.S. Government's
investigation of the PRC's theft of classified U.S. design information for
the W-70 thermonuclear warhead. The W-70, which is an enhanced radiation
nuclear warhead (or "neutron bomb"), also has elements that can be used
for a strategic thermonuclear warhead. In 1996 the U.S. Intelligence
Community reported that the PRC had successfully stolen classified U.S.
technology from a U.S. Nuclear Weapons Laboratory about the neutron
bomb.
This was not the first time the PRC had stolen classified U.S.
information about the neutron bomb. In the late 1970s, the PRC stole
design information on the U.S. W-70 warhead from Lawrence Livermore
Laboratory. The U.S. Government first learned of this theft several months
after it took place. The PRC subsequently tested a neutron bomb in
1988.
The FBI developed a suspect in the earlier theft. The suspect worked at
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and had access to classified
information including designs for a number of U.S. thermonuclear weapons
in the U.S. stockpile at that time.
In addition to design information about the W-70, this suspect may have
provided to the PRC additional classified information about other U.S.
weapons that could have significantly accelerated the PRC's nuclear
weapons program.
The Clinton administration has determined that further information
about these thefts cannot be publicly disclosed without affecting national
security or ongoing criminal investigations.
**Investigation
of Thefts of Information Related to** the Detection of Submarines and of
Laser Testing of Miniature Nuclear Weapons Explosions
Peter Lee is a naturalized U.S. citizen who was born in Taiwan. Lee
worked at Los Alamos National Laboratory from 1984 to 1991, and for TRW
Inc., a contractor to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, from 1973 to
1984 and again from 1991to 1997.10
Lee has admitted to the FBI that, in 1997, he passed to PRC weapons
scientists classified research into the detection of enemy submarines
under water. This research, if successfully completed, could enable the
PLA to threaten previously invulnerable U.S. nuclear submarines.
Lee made the admissions in 1997 during six adversarial interviews with
the FBI. According to Lee, the illegal transfer of this sensitive research
occurred while he was employed by TRW, Inc., a contractor for the Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory. The classified U.S.information was
developed by Lawrence Livermore as part of a joint United States-United
Kingdom Radar Ocean Imaging project for anti-submarine warfare
applications.
Specifically, on or about May 11, 1997, Lee gave a lecture in Beijing
at the PRC Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics
(IAPCM). Among the attendees were nuclear weapons scientists from the
IAPCM and the China Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP).
Lee described for the PRC weapons scientists the physics of microwave
scattering from ocean waves. Lee specifically stated that the purpose of
the research was anti-submarine warfare.
At one point in his presentation, Lee displayed an image of a surface
ship wake, which he had brought with him from the United States. He also
drew a graph and explained the underlying physics of his work and its
applications. He told the PRC scientists where to filter data within the
graph to enhance the ability to locate the ocean wake of a vessel.
Approximately two hours after his talk was over, Lee erased the graph
and tore the ship wake image "to shreds" upon exiting the PRC
institute.11
In 1997, the decision was made to not prosecute Lee for passing this
classified information on submarine detection to the PRC. Because of the
sensitivity of this area of research, the Defense Department requested
that this information not be used in a prosecution.
Throughout much of the l990s, the FBI conducted a multi-year
investigation of Peter Lee, employing a variety of techniques, but without
success in collecting incriminating evidence. Finally, in 1997, Lee was
charged with willfully providing to the PRC classified information on
techniques for creating miniature nuclear fusion explosions.
Specifically, Lee explained to PRC weapons scientists how deuterium and
tritium can be loaded into a spherical capsule called a target and
surrounded by a "hohlraum," and then heated by means of laser bombardment.
The heat causes the compression of these elements, creating a nuclear
fusion micro-explosion. This so-called "inertial confinement" technique
permits nuclear weapons scientists to study nuclear explosions in
miniature - something of especial usefulness to the PRC, which has agreed
to the ban on full-scale nuclear tests in the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty.
Lee's admission that he provided the PRC with this classified
information about nuclear testing using miniaturized fusion explosions
came in the course of the same 1997 adversarial FBI interviews that
yielded his admission of passing submarine detection research to the PRC.
Lee's delivery of the miniature nuclear testing information to the PRC
occurred in 1985, while he was employed as a researcher at Los Alamos
National Laboratory.
Lee said that during a lecture in the PRC he answered questions and
drew diagrams about hohlraum construction. In addition, Lee is believed to
have provided the PRC with information about inertial confinement lasers
that are used to replicate the coupling between the primary and secondary
in a thermonuclear weapon.
Lee was formally charged with one count of "gathering, transmitting or
losing defense information," in violation of Section 793 of Title 18 of
the U.S. Code, and one count of providing false statements to a U.S.
government agency, in violation of Section 1001, Title 18. On December 8,
1997, Lee pled guilty to willfully passing classified U.S. defense
information to PRC scientists during his 1985 visit to the PRC. Lee also
pled guilty to falsifying reports of contact with PRC nationals in
1997.
Lee was sentenced to 12 months in a halfway house, a $20,000 fine and
3,000 hours of community service.12
The Select Committee judges that, between 1985 and 1997, Lee may have
provided the PRC with more classified thermonuclear weapons-related
information than he has admitted.
The PRC apparently co-opted Lee by appealing to his ego, his ethnicity,
and his sense of self-importance as a scientist.
**Investigation
of Theft of Design Information** For the W-88 Trident D-5 Thermonuclear
Warhead
The Select Committee received information about the U.S. Government's
ongoing investigation of the loss of information about the W-88 Trident
D-5 thermonuclear warhead design.
During the PRC's 1992 to 1996 series of advanced nuclear weapons tests,
a debate began in the U.S. Government about whether the PRC had acquired
classified U.S. thermonuclear weapons design information. The Department
of Energy began to investigate. In 1995, following the CIA's receipt of
evidence (provided by the PRC-directed "walk-in") that the PRC had
acquired technical information on a number of U.S. thermonuclear warheads,
including not only the W-88 Trident D-5 but five other warheads as well,
the Department of Energy's investigation intensified. That investigation,
however, focused on the W-88 and not the other weapons.
Early in its investigation, the Department of Energy cross-referenced
personnel who had worked on the design of the W-88 with those who had
traveled to the PRC or interacted with PRC scientists. One individual who
had hosted PRC visitors in the past emerged from this inquiry as a suspect
by the spring of 1995.
Even after being identified as a suspect, the individual, who still had
a security clearance, continued to work in one of the most sensitive
divisions at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Division X, which handles
thermonuclear weapons designs and computer codes. In this position, the
suspect requested and received permission to hire a PRC graduate student
who was studying in the U.S. for the summer.
In December 1998, the suspect traveled to Taiwan. Following his return
from Taiwan in December 1998, he was removed from Division X.
The FBI initiated a full investigation in the middle of 1996, which
remains ongoing. At the date of the Select Committee's January 3, 1999
classified Final Report, the suspect continues to work at the Los Alamos
National Laboratory, and continues to have access to classified
information.
The FBI investigation of this suspect's possible involvement in the
theft of classified design information on the W-88 warhead and other
matters is ongoing.
The Clinton administration has determined that further information on
this matter cannot be disclosed publicly without affecting national
security or ongoing criminal investigations.
**Investigation
of Additional Incidents**
The Select Committee reviewed one case that offers a troublesome
example of the manner in which scientific exchanges in the PRC can be
exploited for espionage purposes. The incident involved the inadvertent,
bordering on negligent, disclosure of classified technical information by
a U.S. scientist lecturing in the PRC.
The U.S. scientist, who was representing a U.S. National Laboratory
during a lab-to-lab exchange with a PRC laboratory, was pressured by PRC
counterparts to provide a solution to a nuclear weapons-related problem.
Rather than decline, the scientist, who was aware of the clear distinction
between the classified and unclassified technical information that was
under discussion, provided an analogy. The scientist immediately saw that
the PRC scientists had grasped the hint that was provided and realized
that too much had been said.
The PRC employs various approaches to co-opt U.S. scientists to obtain
classified information. These approaches include: appealing to common
ethnic heritage; arranging visits to ancestral homes and relatives; paying
for trips and travel in the PRC; flattering the guest's knowledge and
intelligence; holding elaborate banquets to honor guests; and doggedly
peppering U.S. scientists with technical questions by experts, sometimes
after a banquet at which substantial amounts of alcohol have been
consumed.
On average, the FBI has received about five security-related referrals
each month from the Department of Energy. Not all of these concern the
PRC. These referrals usually include possible security violations and the
inadvertent disclosure of classified information.
The FBI normally conducts investigations of foreign individuals working
at the National Laboratories.
The Clinton administration has determined that additional information
in this section cannot be publicly disclosed without affecting national
security or ongoing criminal investigations.
## The Department of Energy's
Counterintelligence Program at the U.S. National Weapons
Laboratories
With additional funds provided by Congress in 1998, the Department of
Energy is attempting to reinvent its counterintelligence programs at the
U.S. national weapons laboratories to prevent continued loss of
information to the PRC's intelligence collection activities.
Funding for the Department of Energy's counterintelligence program,
including seven employees at the Department of Energy's headquarters, was
$7.6 million in Fiscal Year 1998. For Fiscal Year 1999, Congress has
increased that amount to $15.6 million.
With the support of the Director of Central Intelligence and the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the President issued
Presidential Decision Directive 61 (PDD-61) in February 1998. PDD-61
requires that a senior FBI counterintelligence agent be placed in charge
of the Department of Energy's program, which has been done.
PDD-61 also instructed that a counterintelligence report with
recommendations be presented to the Secretary of Energy. The report was
submitted to the Secretary on July 1, 1998, with 33 specific
recommendations. The Secretary had 30 days to respond to the National
Security Council. However, due to the transition from Secretary Pena to
Secretary Richardson, the response was delayed. In late November 1998, the
Secretary of Energy approved all substantive recommendations. In December
1998, the Directors of the U.S. National Laboratories agreed to the
counterintelligence plan during a meeting with the Secretary of Energy.
The Department of Energy is now implementing the plan.
The Secretary's action plan instructs the Directors of the U.S.
National Laboratories to implement the recommendations. It directs the
Department of Energy's Office of Counterintelligence to fund
counterintelligence positions at individual laboratories so that they work
directly for the Department of Energy, not the contractors that administer
the laboratories.
The Department of Energy will create an audit trail to track
unclassified computer use and protect classified computer networks. The
action plan also directs the creation of counterintelligence training
programs and a counterintelligence analysis program.
The Department of Energy will also implement stricter requirements for
reporting all interactions with foreign individuals from sensitive
countries, including correspondence by e-mail. Laboratory Directors will
be responsible for scrutinizing foreign visitors, in coordination with
Department of Energy's Counterintelligence Office.
The Department of Energy will require counterintelligence polygraphs of
those who work in special access programs (SAP) and sensitive areas with
knowledge of nuclear weapons design, or actually have hands-on access to
nuclear weapons (about 10 percent of the total cleared population within
the Department of Energy). Such persons will also undergo financial
reviews and more rigorous background investigations conducted through
local field offices of the FBI.
**The FBI reportedly has sent
several agents to the Department of Energy in the last 10 years to try to
improve the counterintelligence program, but has repeatedly been
unsuccessful. **A significant problem has been the lack of
counterintelligence professionals, and a bureaucracy that "buried" them
and left them without access to senior management or the Secretary of
Energy. The Department of Energy's new Counterintelligence Director now
has direct access to the Secretary.
After traveling to the laboratories and interviewing
counterintelligence officials, the Department of Energy's new
Counterintelligence Director reported in November 1998:
The counterintelligence program at DOE [the Department of Energy] does
not even meet minimal standards ... there is not a counterintelligence
[program], nor has there been one at DOE [the Department of Energy] for
many, many years.
The Department of Energy's counterintelligence program requires
additional training, funding, and accountability, according to this
counterintelligence official.
At present, the Department of Energy's background investigations are
conducted by an Office of Personnel Management contractor. The new
Director's opinion is that the present background investigations are
"totally inadequate" and "do [not] do us any good whatsoever."
Another problem area is that the Department of Energy's
counterintelligence process presently does not have any mechanism for
identifying or reviewing the thousands of foreign visitors and workers at
the U.S. national weapons laboratories. On one occasion reviewed by the
Select Committee, for example, scientists from a U.S. National Laboratory
met foreign counterparts in a Holiday Inn in Albuquerque, New Mexico, in
order to circumvent their laboratory's security procedures.
One responsibility of the Department of Energy's new
counterintelligence program will be to find out who visits the
laboratories, including those from sensitive countries, what they work on
while they visit, and whether their access is restricted to protect
classified information. Mechanisms have been recommended to identify
visitors and fully vet them. The Department of Energy will attempt to
improve the database used for background checks.
**Classified information has been
placed on unclassified networks, with no system for either detection or
reliable prevention. **There are no intrusion detection devices to
determine whether hackers have attacked the Department of Energy's
computer network. According to damage assessments reviewed by the Select
Committee, however, attacks on the computers at the U.S. national weapons
laboratories are a serious problem. E-mail is also a threat: the U.S.
national weapons laboratories cannot track who is communicating with whom.
For example, over 250,000 unmonitored e-mails are sent out of the Sandia
National Laboratory alone each week.
In the year 2000, the Department of Energy will concentrate on
increasing its analytical and investigative capabilities. Until at least
the year 2000, the Department of Energy's counterintelligence program will
not be adequate.
The five U.S. National Laboratories (Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos,
Oak Ridge, Sandia, and Pacific Northwest) are the primary focus of the
counterintelligence plan. The Department of Energy is hiring senior
counterintelligence experts who will report directly to the Directors of
these laboratories.
Many of the specific recommendations in the Presidential Decision
Directive are not new, and similar changes have been attempted
unsuccessfully before.
## Notification of the President and Senior
U.S. Officials
In response to interrogatories from the
Select Committee, the National Security Advisor testified in writing that
the President did not learn about the issue of successful PRC espionage at
the U.S. national weapons laboratories and long-term counterintelligence
problems at the Department of Energy until early 1998.13
The Department of Energy briefed the Secretary of Energy about the
matter in late 1995 and early 1996.
The Department of Energy first briefed the Deputy National Security
Advisor in April 1996.
The Department of Energy briefed the Director of Central Intelligence,
the Director of the FBI, the Secretary of Defense, and the Attorney
General during this period.
The Department of Energy has not briefed the Secretary of State or the
Secretary of Commerce. The Congress was not fully briefed until late 1998,
as a result of the efforts of the Select Committee.
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