United States Government Publishing Office publisher pbl distributor dst United States Government Accountability Office Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division author aut Government Organization text government publication eng GAOREPORTS Legislative Agency Publications gao legislative 2010-08-12 U.S. Government Printing Office 1998-10-14 monographic deposited born digital 13 p. GA 1.13:T-RCED-99-28 https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GAOREPORTS-T-RCED-99-28 P0b002ee18037d395 f:rc99028t DGPO 2010-08-12 2011-03-24 GAOREPORTS-T-RCED-99-28 machine generated eng fdlp REPORT GAOREPORTS-T-RCED-99-28 T-RCED-99-28 Nuclear weapons plant security Aliens Laboratories Atomic energy defense activities Classified information Security clearances Internal controls Information leaking Weapons research Foreign governments India China Soviet Union Testimony RCED GAO discussed the Department of Energy's (DOE) controls over foreign nationals who visit, or participate in unclassified activities at, DOE's three nuclear weapons laboratories.<p/>GAO noted that: (1) GAO found at two of the three laboratories, few background checks were performed on visitors from countries DOE views as sensitive; (2) as a result, visitors suspected of having foreign intelligence connections obtained access to the laboratories without DOE's or the laboratories' advance knowledge of these connections; (3) visits involving sensitive subjects were not always identified; (4) some sensitive subjects, such as the detection of unsanctioned nuclear explosions, may have been discussed with foreign visitors without DOE's knowledge or approval; (5) the security controls in areas most frequently visited by foreign nationals do not preclude them from obtaining sensitive information; (6) foreign nationals have been allowed after-hours and unescorted access to buildings; (7) in some instances, they have had access to sensitive and classified information; (8) DOE's headquarters and laboratory counterintelligence programs may not be fully effective in mitigating foreign intelligence efforts; (9) these programs have lacked comprehensive threat assessments to focus their efforts, as well as performance measures to evaluate their effectiveness; (10) these problems could lead to the loss of sensitive information to foreign countries regarded as posing a risk to national security or nuclear nonproliferation goals; (11) while DOE is initiating actions to improve the management and oversight of foreign visits to the weapons laboratories, DOE has not demonstrated a lasting commitment to improving controls over foreign visitors; and (12) DOE's plan to devolve the authority for approving foreign visits to the laboratories may not be appropriate until significant recommendations that GAO has made are addressed. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-T-RCED-99-28/html/GAOREPORTS-T-RCED-99-28.htm https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-T-RCED-99-28/pdf/GAOREPORTS-T-RCED-99-28.pdf GAO/T-RCED-99-28 https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GAOREPORTS-T-RCED-99-28 Testimony GAO/T-RCED-99-28; Department of Energy: DOE Needs To Improve Controls Over Foreign Visitors To Its Weapons Laboratories; Nuclear weapons plant security Aliens Laboratories Atomic energy defense activities Classified information Security clearances Internal controls Information leaking Weapons research Foreign governments India China Soviet Union