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<classification authority="sudocs">GA 1.13:NSIAD-99-210</classification>
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 <subject>Combat readiness</subject>
 <subject>Army supplies</subject>
 <subject>Military training</subject>
 <subject>Army personnel</subject>
 <subject>Data collection</subject>
 <identifier>Army Training and Evaluation Program</identifier>
 <identifier>Army Training and Doctrine Command Remedial Action Program</identifier>
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<titleInfo>
 <title>Military Readiness: Full Training Benefits From Army&apos;s</title>
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<abstract>Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the training provided
to active Army units at the National Training Center (NTC) in Fort
Irwin, California, the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) in Fort
Polk, Louisiana, and the Combat Maneuver Training Center in Hohenfels,
Germany, focusing on: (1) whether units training at the centers are
adequately prepared for the exercises; (2) whether training exercises
are realistic in terms of expected battlefield conditions; (3) whether
pre-positioned equipment adequately supports the training mission; (4)
how units use lessons learned at the centers; and (5) how the Army uses
the results of the exercises to help revise training and improve the
Army&apos;s training doctrine.&lt;p/&gt;GAO noted that: (1) although the majority of units that trained at the
Army&apos;s combat training centers in 1998 favorably assessed their
training, neither the Army nor individual units are achieving the full
benefits of this training; (2) this is because: (a) many units are
arriving ill prepared for the exercises; (b) training is not as
realistic as it could be; (c) the condition and age of pre-positioned
equipment has adversely affected training at two centers; and (d)
neither individual units nor the Army itself is able to effectively
capitalize on lessons learned from the centers&apos; exercises; (3) personnel
shortages, turnover, and high operating tempo have adversely affected
units&apos; ability to prepare for their rotations to the centers, and as a
result, units are arriving ill prepared to engage in the exercises; (4)
in February 1999, Army Forces Command issued new guidance that requires
unit commanders to establish training &quot;gates&quot; at their home stations to
gauge whether their units are prepared to move to more complex training
levels, including training center exercises; (5) since the guidance does
not address the causes of insufficient preparation, strict adherence to
the guidance may simply serve to exclude some units from valuable
training center experiences; (6) because units lack proficiency at the
battalion level, the centers routinely modify conditions in ways that
provide less challenging and thereby less realistic scenarios than might
be encountered on a real battlefield; (7) by limiting conditions and not
accurately portraying current and future threats, the training centers
undermine realism and limit the value of training exercises; (8) the
poor condition and age of some pre-positioned equipment at NTC and JRTC
further degrade training; (9) as of July 1999, the Army was considering
various alternatives to improve pre-positioned equipment at NTC; (10)
commanders cannot take full advantage of the lessons learned at the
centers due to ineffective take-home materials, a lack of training
opportunities once they return home, and personnel turnover that
prevents them from attending to the identified weaknesses; (11) although
the centers have collected large amounts of data, the Army has never
standardized data collection and therefore cannot combine information to
assess trends; and (12) consequently, the Army cannot take full
advantage of its lessons learned and does not know the extent to which
center exercises are improving unit and leader proficiency.</abstract>
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<identifier type="preferred citation">GAO/NSIAD-99-210</identifier>
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<note>Letter Report</note>
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 <searchTitle>GAO/NSIAD-99-210; Military Readiness: Full Training Benefits From Army&apos;s;
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<subject>
 <topic>Combat readiness</topic>
 <topic>Army supplies</topic>
 <topic>Military training</topic>
 <topic>Army personnel</topic>
 <topic>Data collection</topic>
 <topic>Army Training and Evaluation Program</topic>
 <topic>Army Training and Doctrine Command Remedial Action Program</topic>
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