United States Government Publishing Office publisher pbl distributor dst United States Government Accountability Office National Security and International Affairs Division author aut Government Organization text government publication eng GAOREPORTS Legislative Agency Publications gao legislative 2010-08-12 U.S. Government Printing Office 1999-06-30 monographic deposited born digital 23 p. GA 1.13:NSIAD-99-142 https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-99-142 P0b002ee1803963d7 f:ns99142 DGPO 2010-08-12 2011-03-28 GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-99-142 machine generated eng fdlp REPORT GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-99-142 NSIAD-99-142 Ballistic missiles Air defense systems Defense contingency planning Cost plus fixed fee contracts Defense capabilities Operational testing Department of Defense contractors Weapons systems THAADS User Operational Evaluation System THAADS SDI Theater High Altitude Area Defense System Letter Report NSIAD Studies done by the military and independent sources cited the following problems in the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Program: First, the program's compressed flight-test schedule did not allow for adequate ground testing, and officials could not spot problems before flight tests. The schedule also left too little time for preflight testing, postflight analysis, and corrective measures. Second, the requirement that an early prototype system be deployed quickly has diverted attention from the normal interceptor development process and resulted in interceptors that were not equipped with sufficient instruments to provide optimum test data. Third, quality assurance received too little emphasis and resources during component production, resulting in unreliable components. Fourth, the contract to develop the interceptor was a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract, which placed all of the financial risk on the government and did not hold the contractor accountable for less than optimum performance. The restructure program addresses each of these four underlying problems. However, the reliability of current flight-test interceptors remains a concern because most components were produced when the contractor's quality assurance system was inadequate. Test failures caused primarily by manufacturing defects rather than advanced technology problems have prevented the Army from demonstrating that THAAD can reliably intercept targets in all required regions. The restructuring of the THAAD program raised the issue of what the purpose of the User Operational Evaluation System battalion at Fort Bliss should now be. Whether all or only part of the battalion would warrant deployment for contingency operations would depend on the capabilities it could provide to warfighters and the priority of the need for one or more of those capabilities. However, there would be little basis for making a deployment determination because the Defense Department does not plan to conduct an operational assessment of the User Operational Evaluation System. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-99-142/html/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-99-142.htm https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-99-142/pdf/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-99-142.pdf GAO/NSIAD-99-142 https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-99-142 Letter Report GAO/NSIAD-99-142; Missile Defense: THAAD Restructure Addresses Problems But; Ballistic missiles Air defense systems Defense contingency planning Cost plus fixed fee contracts Defense capabilities Operational testing Department of Defense contractors Weapons systems THAADS User Operational Evaluation System THAADS SDI Theater High Altitude Area Defense System