United States Government Publishing Office publisher pbl distributor dst United States Government Accountability Office National Security and International Affairs Division author aut Government Organization text government publication eng GAOREPORTS Legislative Agency Publications gao legislative 2010-08-12 U.S. Government Printing Office 1997-09-19 monographic deposited born digital 29 p. GA 1.13:NSIAD-97-175 https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-97-175 P0b002ee1803a519e f:ns97175 DGPO 2010-08-12 2011-03-23 GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-97-175 machine generated eng fdlp REPORT GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-97-175 NSIAD-97-175 Missiles Military inventories Terrorism Inventory control systems Logistics Facility security Larceny Weapons Stinger Missile Dragon Missile Javelin Antitank Weapon C-4 Explosive Redeye Missile AT-4 Weapon System Desert Storm Bofors Infantry Light and Lethal Antitank Weapon Letter Report NSIAD Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the actions taken by the Department of Defense (DOD) to correct weaknesses cited in GAO's September 1994 report on the military services' most sensitive category I missiles and to determine if problems still remained. GAO also reviewed DOD's oversight of category I rockets and the vulnerability of category I missiles and rockets and category II grenades, mines, and explosives to theft from U.S. military arsenals by terrorists or extremists.<p/>GAO noted that: (1) DOD has taken actions to improve the oversight of category I handheld missiles; (2) it conducted a worldwide inventory of handheld missiles; established a new baseline inventory count as of December 31, 1994; and implemented procedures to track changes to the baseline; (3) DOD also established procedures to check containers to ensure that each had a missile and verify serial numbers; (4) DOD reemphasized physical security procedures to be followed at its facilities; (5) despite DOD's progress toward better oversight of handheld missiles, some weaknesses remain; (6) adjustments continue to be made to the baseline as additional missiles are located and errors are discovered; (7) discrepancies still exist between records of the number of missiles and GAO's physical count; (8) the missiles may be vulnerable to insider theft because DOD is not always selecting a representative sample of containers to be opened during maintenance checks; (9) some facilities are not fully complying with DOD physical security requirements; (10) although GAO was able to match the physical count of AT4 and light antitank weapon (LAW) rockets at each site visited with the item manager's records, GAO also found oversight weaknesses with the category I rockets; (11) the Marine Corps reported three AT4 rockets missing from shipments returning from the Gulf after Operation Desert Storm; (12) the Naval Criminal Investigative Service reached no conclusions on whether the rockets were missing, lost, or stolen, and the investigations were closed; (13) the services have different procedures and requirements for maintaining oversight of the rockets; (14) DOD's accounting and related systems, including its logistics systems, are not integrated; (15) in accordance with the Chief Financial Officer's (CFO) Act of 1990, each agency is to establish an integrated financial management system; (16) establishing an integrated, general ledger controller system, which ties together DOD's accounting systems with its logistics and other key management systems, is critical if DOD is to effectively ensure oversight and control over its sensitive material; (17) GAO did not find any documentation that terrorists or other extremists had stolen any category I handheld missiles or rockets or category II munitions or explosives from DOD arsenals; (18) some weapons continue to be vulnerable to insider theft as quantities of various category II items have been stolen by uniformed or DOD civilians; and (19) DOD and intelligence sources did not have any indication that the stolen items were intended for terrorists. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-97-175/html/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-97-175.htm https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-97-175/pdf/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-97-175.pdf GAO/NSIAD-97-175 https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-97-175 Letter Report GAO/NSIAD-97-175; Inventory Management: Vulnerability of Sensitive Defense Material to Theft; Missiles Military inventories Terrorism Inventory control systems Logistics Facility security Larceny Weapons Stinger Missile Dragon Missile Javelin Antitank Weapon C-4 Explosive Redeye Missile AT-4 Weapon System Desert Storm Bofors Infantry Light and Lethal Antitank Weapon