United States Government Publishing Office publisher pbl distributor dst United States Government Accountability Office National Security and International Affairs Division author aut Government Organization text government publication eng GAOREPORTS Legislative Agency Publications gao legislative 2010-08-12 U.S. Government Printing Office 1996-02-20 monographic deposited born digital 76 p. GA 1.13:NSIAD-96-64 https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-96-64 P0b002ee180387554 f:ns96064 DGPO 2010-08-12 2011-03-24 GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-96-64 machine generated eng fdlp REPORT GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-96-64 NSIAD-96-64 Department of Defense contractors Foreign corporations Proprietary data Classified records Computer security Information disclosure Technology transfer Conflict of interest International trusteeships Intelligence gathering operations B-2 Aircraft F-22 Aircraft F-117 Aircraft DOD Industrial Security Program Advanced Technology Bomber United Kingdom Switzerland Sweden France Netherlands Germany Worldwide Military Command and Control System D-5 Missile DOD Special Access Acquisition Program FBI National Security Threat List Program Chapter Report NSIAD Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed security arrangements used to protect sensitive information from foreign-owned U.S. defense contractors that perform on classified Department of Defense (DOD) contracts.<p/>GAO found that: (1) security arrangements are intended to protect foreign-owned U.S. defense contractors from undue foreign control and to prevent foreign owners' access to classified information; (2) there are 54 foreign-owned U.S. defense contractors operating under security arrangements, such as voting trusts, proxy agreements, and special security agreements; (3) although such companies are not permitted access to classified information due to the risk of foreign control, DOD authorized access to 12 of 33 special security agreement companies; (4) each foreign-owned U.S. defense contractor must have a visitation agreement with its parent company to protect against foreign owners' unauthorized access to classified information; (5) individuals contacted by the parent company are required to report on the technical discussions that took place under visitation agreements; (6) U.S. citizens are selected for the boards of directors of foreign-owned U.S. defense firms to protect against undue foreign control and unauthorized access to classified information; and (7) most trustees feel they have limited oversight roles and do not actively check on the implementation of security policies or engage in management issues, and some appear to have conflicts of interest. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-96-64/html/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-96-64.htm https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-96-64/pdf/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-96-64.pdf GAO/NSIAD-96-64 https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-96-64 Chapter Report GAO/NSIAD-96-64; Defense Industrial Security: Weaknesses in U.S. Security Arrangements With Foreign-Owned Defense Contractors; Department of Defense contractors Foreign corporations Proprietary data Classified records Computer security Information disclosure Technology transfer Conflict of interest International trusteeships Intelligence gathering operations B-2 Aircraft F-22 Aircraft F-117 Aircraft DOD Industrial Security Program Advanced Technology Bomber United Kingdom Switzerland Sweden France Netherlands Germany Worldwide Military Command and Control System D-5 Missile DOD Special Access Acquisition Program FBI National Security Threat List Program