United States Government Publishing Office publisher pbl distributor dst United States Government Accountability Office National Security and International Affairs Division author aut Government Organization text government publication eng GAOREPORTS Legislative Agency Publications gao legislative 2010-08-12 U.S. Government Printing Office 1996-06-21 monographic deposited born digital 23 p. GA 1.13:NSIAD-96-170 https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-96-170 P0b002ee18038621b f:ns96170 DGPO 2010-08-12 2011-03-23 GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-96-170 machine generated eng fdlp REPORT GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-96-170 NSIAD-96-170 Defense capabilities Defense contingency planning Computer modeling Combat readiness Military operations Warfare Military research Strategic planning Mobilization Military systems analysis DOD Nimble Dancer Exercise DOD Bottom-Up Review Letter Report NSIAD Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the the Department of Defense's (DOD) Nimble Dancer war game, a simulation designed to assess U.S. forces' ability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRC), focusing on whether the methodology, scope, and results were reasonable.<p/>GAO found that: (1) DOD may have overstated the effectiveness of Nimble Dancer in testing the Bottom-Up Review's basic assumptions of fighting two simultaneous MRC; (2) Nimble Dancer promoted interaction among DOD organizations and identified some critical issues for meeting the two-MRC requirement, but it used many of the same favorable assumptions used in Bottom-Up Review guidance; (3) Nimble Dancer's testing of some key assumptions was limited, since DOD did not consider the sensitivity of some of these assumptions; (4) Nimble Dancer included favorable assumptions on the mobilization of reserve forces, amount of separation time between MRC, amount of warning time before an attack, activation of the civil reserve air fleet, and geographic location of conflict end states; (5) during Nimble Dancer, DOD did not adequately address the 2001-2005 time frame, fully examine the impact of chemical warfare or extraction of forces from peace operations, or conduct detailed analyses of the sufficiency of support forces, intelligence capabilities, and enhanced combat brigades; (6) because DOD limited sensitivity analysis of certain key assumptions, it could not analyze how U.S. forces would fare in the two-MRC requirement under more adverse circumstances; and (7) although military judgment is necessary when analyzing war scenarios, DOD often relied heavily and sometimes exclusively on military judgment to reach conclusions when supporting data were not available. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-96-170/html/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-96-170.htm https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-96-170/pdf/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-96-170.pdf GAO/NSIAD-96-170 https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-96-170 Letter Report GAO/NSIAD-96-170; Bottom-Up Review: Analysis of DOD War Game to Test Key Assumptions; Defense capabilities Defense contingency planning Computer modeling Combat readiness Military operations Warfare Military research Strategic planning Mobilization Military systems analysis DOD Nimble Dancer Exercise DOD Bottom-Up Review