United States Government Publishing Office publisher pbl distributor dst United States Government Accountability Office National Security and International Affairs Division author aut Government Organization text government publication eng GAOREPORTS Legislative Agency Publications gao legislative 2010-08-12 U.S. Government Printing Office 1994-10-13 monographic deposited born digital GA 1.13:NSIAD-95-16 https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-95-16 P0b002ee18037879d f:ns95016 DGPO 2010-08-12 2011-03-24 GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-95-16 machine generated eng fdlp REPORT GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-95-16 NSIAD-95-16 Defense contingency planning Nuclear powered submarines Shipbuilding industry Future budget projections Military cost control Navy procurement Combat readiness Naval warfare Military budgets Antisubmarine warfare Los Angeles Class Attack Submarine SSN-637 Nuclear Attack Submarine Seawolf Attack Submarine SSN-21 Submarine SSN-688 Submarine SSN-688I Submarine SSN-726 Submarine Trident Submarine DOD Bottom-Up Review JCS National Military Strategy Chapter Report NSIAD Faced with a changed world threat, a new defense posture, and shrinking budgets, the Navy is reducing the size of its nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) fleet. To maintain a force of 45 to 55 SSN submarines, as directed in the Defense Department's bottom-up review budgets, the Navy plans to extend the amount of time SSN operate between major maintenance period, allow no more than three costly SSN-699 submarine refuelings per year, and operate the submarines for their service life of 30 years. At the same time, the Navy plans to buy 31 SSN through 2014 at an estimated cost of $48 billion. GAO identified several alternatives that would allow the Navy to free up money and still maintain the minimum force structure of 45 SSN. For example, if the Navy were to acquire only 25 SSN through 2014, it would save $9 billion and maintain close to 55 SSN through 2013, but declining to 45 SSN by 2020--still within the range directed by the bottom-up review. Under another alternative, the Navy could study the feasibility of operating some SSN-688 beyond 30 years and defer spending an additional $8 billion in procurement costs. A third alternative would be to defer new construction of SSN and free up billions of dollars in the near term. This alternative offers the opportunity to defer near-term costs at a time when defense budgets have been reduced. Further, studies have shown that the estimated reconstitution costs to restart submarine construction in 2003 are less than the potential $9 billion in savings, suggesting that a deferral strategy warrants further study. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-95-16/html/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-95-16.htm GAO/NSIAD-95-16 https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-95-16 Chapter Report GAO/NSIAD-95-16; Attack Submarines: Alternatives for a More Affordable SSN Force Structure; Defense contingency planning Nuclear powered submarines Shipbuilding industry Future budget projections Military cost control Navy procurement Combat readiness Naval warfare Military budgets Antisubmarine warfare Los Angeles Class Attack Submarine SSN-637 Nuclear Attack Submarine Seawolf Attack Submarine SSN-21 Submarine SSN-688 Submarine SSN-688I Submarine SSN-726 Submarine Trident Submarine DOD Bottom-Up Review JCS National Military Strategy