United States Government Publishing Office publisher pbl distributor dst United States Government Accountability Office National Security and International Affairs Division author aut Government Organization text government publication eng GAOREPORTS Legislative Agency Publications gao legislative 2010-08-12 U.S. Government Printing Office 1994-04-26 monographic deposited born digital GA 1.13:NSIAD-94-119 https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-94-119 P0b002ee18037dd94 f:ns94119 DGPO 2010-08-12 2011-03-28 GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-94-119 machine generated eng fdlp REPORT GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-94-119 NSIAD-94-119 Nuclear proliferation Arms control agreements Interagency relations Foreign governments Technology transfer Licenses Internal controls International relations Export regulation Inspection Argentina Brazil India Iran Iraq Israel Pakistan South Africa Dept. of Commerce Nuclear Referral List Dept. of Commerce Export Control Automated Support System Dept. of Commerce Nuclear Non-Proliferation Special Country List Persian Gulf War DOE Nuclear Proliferation Watch List Chapter Report NSIAD Iraq's use of so-called dual-use equipment--items with civilian uses that can also be used to build nuclear explosives or produce weapons grade uranium and plutonium--has raised concerns about the effectiveness of export controls over this material. The United States approved more than 1,500 licenses for dual-use items, mainly high-speed computers, to eight countries with suspected nuclear weapons programs, significantly increasing the risk that U.S. exports are fueling nuclear proliferation. Weaknesses in the interagency licensing review process have resulted in the approval of a number of sensitive license applications without review by the Energy Department or other members of the Subgroup on Nuclear Export Coordination, an interagency group. U.S. government approval of sensitive exports dictates the need for effective ways to prevent or detect export diversions, but GAO discovered several weaknesses in current procedures. These include (1) inadequate criteria for selecting prelicense checks and postshipment verifications, (2) ineffective methods used to do these inspections, and (3) a lack of verification of government-to-government assurances against nuclear end uses. GAO summarized this report in testimony before Congress; see: Nuclear Nonproliferation: Licensing Procedures for Dual-Use Export Need Strengthening, by Joseph E. Kelley, Director of International Affairs Issues, before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. GAO/T-NSIAD-94-163, May 17, 1994 (20 pages). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-94-119/html/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-94-119.htm GAO/NSIAD-94-119 https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-94-119 Chapter Report GAO/NSIAD-94-119; Nuclear Nonproliferation: Export Licensing Procedures for Dual-Use Items Need to Be Strengthened; Nuclear proliferation Arms control agreements Interagency relations Foreign governments Technology transfer Licenses Internal controls International relations Export regulation Inspection Argentina Brazil India Iran Iraq Israel Pakistan South Africa Dept. of Commerce Nuclear Referral List Dept. of Commerce Export Control Automated Support System Dept. of Commerce Nuclear Non-Proliferation Special Country List Persian Gulf War DOE Nuclear Proliferation Watch List