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<classification authority="sudocs">GA 1.13:NSIAD-00-225</classification>
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 <subject>Contract costs</subject>
 <subject>Contract oversight</subject>
 <subject>Department of Defense contractors</subject>
 <subject>Contract performance</subject>
 <subject>Logistics</subject>
 <subject>Military cost control</subject>
 <subject>Armed forces abroad</subject>
 <subject>Internal controls</subject>
 <subject>Defense contingency planning</subject>
 <identifier>Bosnia</identifier>
 <identifier>Kosovo</identifier>
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<titleInfo>
 <title>Contingency Operations: Army Should Do More to Control</title>
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<abstract>Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed Army&apos;s efforts to
control the costs of its Balkans Support Contract, focusing on whether:
(1) the Army is taking effective actions to contain costs; and (2)
improvements are needed in how the Army and other Department of Defense
(DOD) agencies involved in Balkan operations manage activities under the
primary Balkan contract.&lt;p/&gt;GAO noted that: (1) both the Army and its contractor, Brown and Root
Services, have taken various actions to control the cost of services
provided under the Balkans Support Contract; (2) these actions include a
contract provision requiring the contractor to regularly identify cost
savings, recycling materials from elsewhere in the Balkans and Europe,
and using soldiers to perform tasks such as building construction
whenever possible; (3) nevertheless, the Army should have done more to
control costs; (4) one step it should have taken was to give more
consideration to costs in making decisions on the extent of services to
be provided by the contractor; (5) another step the Army should have
taken was to place greater emphasis on the level and efficiency with
which recurring services were being provided; (6) in July 2000, the Army
directed that a quarterly review be conducted to assess whether all the
services it receives under the contract are still needed; (7) however,
it has not called for the review to include an examination of the level
of these services and the efficiency with which they are being provided;
(8) the Army has also directed that standards be developed for each
service provided at its camps, but as of July 2000 had not set a date
for the standards&apos; completion; (9) each standard is to describe the
service to be performed, the necessary facilities and personnel, when
and how the services are to be performed, and the level at which they
are to be performed; (10) the Army plans to achieve efficiencies in the
level of services and the way in which they are provided by mandating
that officials in Kosovo and Macedonia identify $40 million in cost
savings for fiscal year 2001; (11) the Army expects costs to be reduced
by this amount by reducing the number of contractor personnel providing
services, scaling back service levels, and reducing on-hand inventories;
(12) the Army should improve its management of the Balkans Support
Contract; (13) officials at facilities in the Balkans have not been as
specific as they should have been about what they expect from the
contractor; (14) they frequently have simply accepted the level of
services the contractor provided without questioning whether they could
be provided more efficiently or less frequently and at lower cost; (15 )
GAO found a widespread view among Army and other DOD agencies&apos; officials
in the Balkans that they had little control over the contractor&apos;s
actions once it was authorized to perform tasks; and (16) contract
administrators are deployed for a limited time which hinders effective
contract oversight.</abstract>
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<identifier type="preferred citation">GAO/NSIAD-00-225</identifier>
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<note>Correspondence</note>
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<subject>
 <topic>Contract costs</topic>
 <topic>Contract oversight</topic>
 <topic>Department of Defense contractors</topic>
 <topic>Contract performance</topic>
 <topic>Logistics</topic>
 <topic>Military cost control</topic>
 <topic>Armed forces abroad</topic>
 <topic>Internal controls</topic>
 <topic>Defense contingency planning</topic>
 <topic>Bosnia</topic>
 <topic>Kosovo</topic>
 <topic>Army Logistics Civil Augmentation Program</topic>
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