United States Government Publishing Office publisher pbl distributor dst United States Government Accountability Office General Government Division author aut Government Organization text government publication eng GAOREPORTS Legislative Agency Publications gao legislative 2010-08-12 U.S. Government Printing Office 1996-11-20 monographic deposited born digital 136 p. GA 1.13:GGD-97-23 https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GAOREPORTS-GGD-97-23 P0b002ee18039c190 f:gg97023 DGPO 2010-08-12 2011-03-28 GAOREPORTS-GGD-97-23 machine generated eng fdlp REPORT GAOREPORTS-GGD-97-23 GGD-97-23 Banking regulation Bank management Bank failures Reporting requirements Bank examination Financial institutions Regulatory agencies Bank holding companies Foreign governments Law enforcement Canada Japan France Germany United Kingdom Chapter Report GGD Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed its previous work on the structure and operations of bank oversight in five countries, focusing on: (1) aspects of those systems that may be useful for Congress to consider in any future modernization efforts; (2) perceived problems with federal bank oversight in the United States; and (3) principles for modernizing the U.S. federal bank oversight structure.<p/>GAO found that: (1) the five foreign banking systems reviewed had less complex and more streamlined oversight structures than the United States; (2) in all five countries, fewer national agencies were involved with bank regulation and supervision than in the United States; (3) in all but one of these countries, both the central bank and the ministry of finance had some role in bank oversight, and several of these countries relied on the work of the banks' external auditors to perform certain oversight functions; (4) in all cases, there was one entity that was clearly responsible and accountable for consolidated oversight of banking organizations as a whole; (5) the bank oversight structure in the United States is relatively complex, with four different federal agencies having the same basic oversight responsibilities for those banks under their respective purview; (6) industry representatives and expert observers have contended that multiple examinations and reporting requirements resulting from the shared oversight responsibilities of four different regulators contribute to banks' regulatory burden, and that the federal oversight structure is inherently inefficient; (7) having one agency responsible for examining all U.S. bank holding companies, with a different agency or agencies responsible for examining the holding companies' principal banks, could result in overlap and a lack of clear responsibility and accountability for consolidated oversight of U.S. banking operations; and (8) any modernized banking structure should provide for clearly defined responsibility and accountability for consolidated and comprehensive oversight, independence from undue political pressure, consistent rules, consistently applied for similar activities, and enhanced efficiency and reduced regulatory burden. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-GGD-97-23/html/GAOREPORTS-GGD-97-23.htm https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-GGD-97-23/pdf/GAOREPORTS-GGD-97-23.pdf GAO/GGD-97-23 https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GAOREPORTS-GGD-97-23 Chapter Report GAO/GGD-97-23; Bank Oversight Structure: U.S. and Foreign Experience May Offer Lessons for Modernizing U.S. Structure; Banking regulation Bank management Bank failures Reporting requirements Bank examination Financial institutions Regulatory agencies Bank holding companies Foreign governments Law enforcement Canada Japan France Germany United Kingdom Public Law 101-73