<mods xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3" version="3.3" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-3.xsd" ID="P0b002ee18038456a">
<name type="corporate">
 <namePart>United States Government Publishing Office</namePart>
 <role>
  <roleTerm authority="marcrelator" type="text">publisher</roleTerm>
  <roleTerm authority="marcrelator" type="code">pbl</roleTerm>
</role>
 <role>
  <roleTerm authority="marcrelator" type="text">distributor</roleTerm>
  <roleTerm authority="marcrelator" type="code">dst</roleTerm>
</role>
</name>
<name type="corporate">
 <namePart>United States</namePart>
 <namePart>Government Accountability Office</namePart>
 <role>
  <roleTerm authority="marcrelator" type="text">author</roleTerm>
  <roleTerm authority="marcrelator" type="code">aut</roleTerm>
</role>
 <description>Government Organization</description>
</name>
<typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource>
<genre authority="marcgt">government publication</genre>
<language>
 <languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">eng</languageTerm>
</language>
<extension>
 <collectionCode>GAOREPORTS</collectionCode>
 <category>Legislative Agency Publications</category>
 <waisDatabaseName>gao</waisDatabaseName>
 <branch>legislative</branch>
 <dateIngested>2010-08-12</dateIngested>
</extension>
<originInfo>
 <publisher>U.S. Government Printing Office</publisher>
 <dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">2002-08-30</dateIssued>
 <issuance>monographic</issuance>
</originInfo>
<physicalDescription>
 <note type="source content type">deposited</note>
 <digitalOrigin>born digital</digitalOrigin>
 <extent>51 p.</extent>
</physicalDescription>
<classification authority="sudocs">GA 1.13:GAO-02-781</classification>
<identifier type="uri">https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GAOREPORTS-GAO-02-781</identifier>
<identifier type="local">P0b002ee18038456a</identifier>
<identifier type="former package identifier">f:d02781</identifier>
<recordInfo>
 <recordContentSource authority="marcorg">DGPO</recordContentSource>
 <recordCreationDate encoding="w3cdtf">2010-08-12</recordCreationDate>
 <recordChangeDate encoding="w3cdtf">2011-03-24</recordChangeDate>
 <recordIdentifier source="DGPO">GAOREPORTS-GAO-02-781</recordIdentifier>
 <recordOrigin>machine generated</recordOrigin>
 <languageOfCataloging>
  <languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">eng</languageTerm>
</languageOfCataloging>
</recordInfo>
<accessCondition type="GPO scope determination">fdlp</accessCondition>
<extension>
 <docClass>REPORT</docClass>
 <accessId>GAOREPORTS-GAO-02-781</accessId>
 <reportNumber>GAO-02-781</reportNumber>
 <subject>Defense capabilities</subject>
 <subject>Military intelligence</subject>
 <subject>Military satellites</subject>
 <subject>National preparedness</subject>
 <subject>Satellites</subject>
 <subject>Information resources management</subject>
 <subject>Electronic data interchange</subject>
 <subject>DOT Global Positioning System</subject>
 <subject>Galaxy IV Satellite</subject>
 <type>Other Written Product</type>
 <accountNo>A04799</accountNo>
</extension>
<titleInfo>
 <title>Critical Infrastructure Protection: Commercial Satellite Security Should Be More Fully Addressed</title>
</titleInfo>
<abstract>Government and private-sector entities rely on satellites for
services such as communication, navigation, remote sensing,	 
imaging, and weather and meteorological support. Disruption of	 
satellite services, whether intentional or not, can have a major 
adverse economic impact. Techniques to protect satellite systems 
from unauthorized use and disruption include the use of robust	 
hardware on satellites, physical security and logical access	 
controls at ground stations, and encryption of the signals for	 
tracking and controlling the satellite and of the data being sent
to and from satellites. When using commercial satellites, federal
agencies reduce risks by securing the data links and ground	 
stations that send and receive data. However, federal agencies do
not control the security of the tracking and control links,	 
satellites, or tracking and control ground stations, which are	 
typically the responsibility of the satellite service provider.  
It is important to the nation&apos;s economy and security to protect  
against attacks on its computer-dependent critical		 
infrastructures (such as telecommunications, energy, and	 
transportation), many of which are privately owned. In light of  
the nation&apos;s growing reliance on commercial satellites to meet	 
military, civil, and private sector requirements, omitting	 
satellites from the nation&apos;s approach to protecting critical	 
infrastructure leaves an important aspect of our nation&apos;s	 
infrastructures without focused attention.</abstract>
<location>
 <url displayLabel="HTML rendition" access="raw object">https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-GAO-02-781/html/GAOREPORTS-GAO-02-781.htm</url>
 <url displayLabel="PDF rendition" access="raw object">https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-GAO-02-781/pdf/GAOREPORTS-GAO-02-781.pdf</url>
</location>
<identifier type="preferred citation">GAO-02-781</identifier>
<location>
 <url displayLabel="Content Detail" access="object in context">https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GAOREPORTS-GAO-02-781</url>
</location>
<note>Other Written Product</note>
<extension>
 <searchTitle>GAO-02-781; Critical Infrastructure Protection: Commercial Satellite Security Should Be More Fully Addressed;
            </searchTitle>
</extension>
<subject>
 <topic>Defense capabilities</topic>
 <topic>Military intelligence</topic>
 <topic>Military satellites</topic>
 <topic>National preparedness</topic>
 <topic>Satellites</topic>
 <topic>Information resources management</topic>
 <topic>Electronic data interchange</topic>
 <topic>DOT Global Positioning System</topic>
 <topic>Galaxy IV Satellite</topic>
</subject>
</mods>