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 <subject>Bank failures</subject>
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<titleInfo>
 <title>Bank Regulation: Analysis of the Failure of Superior Bank, FSB, Hinsdale, Illinois</title>
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<abstract>Shortly after Superior Bank&apos;s closure on July 27, 2001, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) projected that the  
failure would result in a $426-$526 million loss to the deposit  
insurance fund. Superior Bank&apos;s business strategy of originating 
and securing subprime loans on a large scale was associated with 
the failure. In addition to the concentration in risky assets,	 
the bank failed to properly value and account for the interests  
that it had retained in pooled home mortgages. Superior&apos;s	 
external auditor, Ernst &amp; Young, also failed to detect the	 
improper valuation of Superior&apos;s retained interest until the	 
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) and FDIC insisted that the	 
issue be reviewed by the auditor&apos;s national office. Federal	 
regulators did not identify and act on the bank&apos;s problems early 
enough to prevent a material loss to the deposit insurance fund. 
OTS, Superior&apos;s primary supervisor, was mainly responsible for	 
not acting earlier. FDIC was the first to recognize the problems 
in late 1998. Both agencies were aware of the substantial	 
concentration of retained interests that Superior held, but the  
apparently high level of earnings, the apparently adequate	 
capital, and the belief that the management was conservatively	 
managing the institution limited their actions.</abstract>
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<note>Testimony</note>
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 <topic>Bank management</topic>
 <topic>Bank examination</topic>
 <topic>Losses</topic>
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