United States Government Publishing Office publisher pbl distributor dst United States Government Accountability Office author aut Government Organization text government publication eng GAOREPORTS Legislative Agency Publications gao legislative 2010-08-12 U.S. Government Printing Office 2002-03-05 monographic deposited born digital 42 p. GA 1.13:GAO-02-298 https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GAOREPORTS-GAO-02-298 P0b002ee1803965f0 f:d02298 DGPO 2010-08-12 2011-03-24 GAOREPORTS-GAO-02-298 machine generated eng fdlp REPORT GAOREPORTS-GAO-02-298 GAO-02-298 Cost analysis Developmental testing Fighter aircraft Military cost control Operational testing Performance measures Air Force F-22 Engineering and Manufacturing Development Program Other Written Product A02848 The F-22 aircraft is designed to be less detectable, capable of flying at higher speeds for longer distances, and able to provide the pilot with substantially improved awareness of the surrounding situation than the F-15 it will replace. The Air Force began the F-22 development program in 1991 and plans to complete it by March 2004. In 1998, following repeated increases in the program's estimated development cost, Congress capped developmental costs at $20.443 billion. The F-22 program did not meet key schedule goals for 2001, the cost to complete planned development is likely to exceed the $21 billion reported to Congress, and the program is not far enough along in flight-testing to confirm Air Force estimates of the aircraft's performance. Despite progress in testing the aircraft's capabilities, problems and delays continue to plague the assembly and delivery of development test aircraft, and the flight-test program is less efficient than planned. Furthermore, flight-test delays make it unlikely that the planned development program can be completed within the current cost goal. On the basis of initial testing, the Air Force projects that the F-22 will meet or exceed its performance goals by the end of development. However, testing to demonstrate performance is not far enough along to allow the Air Force to confirm its projections. The Air Force has implemented process and manufacturing changes to the horizontal tail section and for cracking in the cockpit canopy that GAO reported on last year. Although the results to date appear adequate, the Air Force continues to monitor the results to ensure the corrective actions will be sufficient. In September 2001, the Air Force submitted to Congress a revised acquisition plan to increase the number of aircraft committed to low-rate production before the completion of operational testing. Buying production articles before they are adequately tested can be costly if further testing identifies problems that then require costly modifications. Moreover, an increase in production commitments could occur without the F-22 program office knowing if the contractor's key manufacturing processes are adequate. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-GAO-02-298/html/GAOREPORTS-GAO-02-298.htm https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-GAO-02-298/pdf/GAOREPORTS-GAO-02-298.pdf GAO-02-298 https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GAOREPORTS-GAO-02-298 Other Written Product GAO-02-298; Tactical Aircraft: F-22 Delays Indicate Initial Production Rates Should Be Lower to Reduce Risks; Cost analysis Developmental testing Fighter aircraft Military cost control Operational testing Performance measures Air Force F-22 Engineering and Manufacturing Development Program