United States Government Publishing Office publisher pbl distributor dst United States Government Accountability Office author aut Government Organization text government publication eng GAOREPORTS Legislative Agency Publications gao legislative 2010-08-12 U.S. Government Printing Office 2001-08-07 monographic deposited born digital 20 p. GA 1.13:GAO-01-735 https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GAOREPORTS-GAO-01-735 P0b002ee18039ea97 f:d01735 DGPO 2010-08-12 2011-03-28 GAOREPORTS-GAO-01-735 machine generated eng fdlp REPORT GAOREPORTS-GAO-01-735 GAO-01-735 Information systems Military research and development Naval procurement Operational testing Concurrency Weapons systems Defense capabilities Navy Command and Control Processor Navy Digital Wideband Transmission System Other Written Product A01537

During its review of the Navy's Space and Naval Warfare (SPAWAR) Systems Command's fiscal year 2001 budget request, GAO found that many information technology systems were being procured and fielded in relatively large quantities--sometimes exceeding 50 percent of the total--during low-rate initial production and before completing operational testing. The primary purpose of low-rate initial production is to produce enough units for operational testing and evaluation and to establish production capabilities to prepare for full-rate production. Limiting initial production affords the opportunity to confirm the stability and soundness of a new system before producing larger quantities. Commercial and Department of Defense (DOD) best practices have shown that completing a system's testing prior to producing significant quantities will substantially lower the risk of costly fixes and retrofits. For major weapons systems, there are statutory provisions that limit the quantities of systems produced during low-rate initial production to the minimum quantity necessary and require justification for quantities exceeding 10 percent of total production. Although these provisions do not apply to non-major systems, DOD and Navy acquisition regulations encourage these programs to make use of the low-rate initial production concept where appropriate. This report reviews (1) why information systems were being procured and fielded for SPAWAR in large numbers before operational testing, (2) what effects this practice was having on SPAWAR and the fleet, and (3) what the Navy is doing to mitigate the risks associated with this practice. GAO found that (1) the main reason for the high percentage of low-rate initial production quantities is to more quickly respond to fleet demands for information systems improvements, (2) many information technology systems purchased and fielded during low-rate initial production and prior to completing operational testing experienced problems that negatively impacted fleet operations and capabilities, and (3) SPAWAR has taken a number of steps to mitigate the risks of high percentage low-rate initial production procurements, such as requiring program managers to use a standardized checklist and establishing an Acquisition Reform Office to serve as a focal point and command-wide disseminator of lessons learned and process improvements. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-GAO-01-735/html/GAOREPORTS-GAO-01-735.htm https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-GAO-01-735/pdf/GAOREPORTS-GAO-01-735.pdf GAO-01-735 https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GAOREPORTS-GAO-01-735 Other Written Product GAO-01-735; Defense Acquisitions: Actions to Improve Navy SPAWAR Low-Rate Initial Production Decisions; Information systems Military research and development Naval procurement Operational testing Concurrency Weapons systems Defense capabilities Navy Command and Control Processor Navy Digital Wideband Transmission System Title 10 Section 2400 10 U.S.C. 2400