

must be fought with trained personnel and highly specialized counter-child-exploitation strategies and technologies.

“(3) The United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement of the Department of Homeland Security serves a critical national security role in protecting the United States from the growing international threat of child exploitation and human trafficking.

“(4) The Cyber Crimes Center of the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement is a vital national resource in the effort to combat international child exploitation, providing advanced expertise and assistance in investigations, computer forensics, and victim identification.

“(5) The returning military heroes of the United States possess unique and valuable skills that can assist law enforcement in combating global sexual and child exploitation, and the Department of Homeland Security should use this national resource to the maximum extent possible.

“(6) Through the Human Exploitation Rescue Operative (HERO) Child Rescue Corps program, the returning military heroes of the United States are trained and hired to investigate crimes of child exploitation in order to target predators and rescue children from sexual abuse and slavery.”

§ 474. Homeland security critical domain research and development

(a) In general

(1) Research and development

The Secretary is authorized to conduct research and development to—

(A) identify United States critical domains for economic security and homeland security; and

(B) evaluate the extent to which disruption, corruption, exploitation, or dysfunction of any of such domain poses a substantial threat to homeland security.

(2) Requirements

(A) Risk analysis of critical domains

The research under paragraph (1) shall include a risk analysis of each identified United States critical domain for economic security to determine the degree to which there exists a present or future threat to homeland security in the event of disruption, corruption, exploitation, or dysfunction to such domain. Such research shall consider, to the extent possible, the following:

(i) The vulnerability and resilience of relevant supply chains.

(ii) Foreign production, processing, and manufacturing methods.

(iii) Influence of malign economic actors.

(iv) Asset ownership.

(v) Relationships within the supply chains of such domains.

(vi) The degree to which the conditions referred to in clauses (i) through (v) would place such a domain at risk of disruption, corruption, exploitation, or dysfunction.

(B) Additional research into high-risk critical domains

Based on the identification and risk analysis of United States critical domains for economic security pursuant to paragraph (1)

and subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, respectively, the Secretary may conduct additional research into those critical domains, or specific elements thereof, with respect to which there exists the highest degree of a present or future threat to homeland security in the event of disruption, corruption, exploitation, or dysfunction to such a domain. For each such high-risk domain, or element thereof, such research shall—

(i) describe the underlying infrastructure and processes;

(ii) analyze present and projected performance of industries that comprise or support such domain;

(iii) examine the extent to which the supply chain of a product or service necessary to such domain is concentrated, either through a small number of sources, or if multiple sources are concentrated in one geographic area;

(iv) examine the extent to which the demand for supplies of goods and services of such industries can be fulfilled by present and projected performance of other industries, identify strategies, plans, and potential barriers to expand the supplier industrial base, and identify the barriers to the participation of such other industries;

(v) consider each such domain’s performance capacities in stable economic environments, adversarial supply conditions, and under crisis economic constraints;

(vi) identify and define needs and requirements to establish supply resiliency within each such domain; and

(vii) consider the effects of sector consolidation, including foreign consolidation, either through mergers or acquisitions, or due to recent geographic realignment, on such industries’ performances.

(3) Consultation

In conducting the research under paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of paragraph (2), the Secretary may consult with appropriate Federal agencies, State agencies, and private sector stakeholders.

(4) Publication

Beginning one year after December 27, 2021, the Secretary shall publish a report containing information relating to the research under paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of paragraph (2), including findings, evidence, analysis, and recommendations. Such report shall be updated annually through 2026.

(b) Submission to Congress

Not later than 90 days after the publication of each report required under paragraph (4) of subsection (a), the Secretary shall transmit to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate each such report, together with a description of actions the Secretary, in consultation with appropriate Federal agencies, will undertake or has undertaken in response to each such report.

(c) Definitions

In this section:

(1) United states critical domains for economic security

The term “United States critical domains for economic security” means the critical infrastructure and other associated industries, technologies, and intellectual property, or any combination thereof, that are essential to the economic security of the United States.

(2) Economic security

The term “economic security” means the condition of having secure and resilient domestic production capacity, combined with reliable access to the global resources necessary to maintain an acceptable standard of living and to protect core national values.

(d) Authorization of appropriations

There is authorized to be appropriated \$1,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 to carry out this section.

(Pub. L. 107-296, title VIII, §890B, as added Pub. L. 117-81, div. F, title LXIV, §6409(a), Dec. 27, 2021, 135 Stat. 2406.)

§ 475. Transnational Criminal Investigative Units

(a) In general

The Secretary, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, shall operate Transnational Criminal Investigative Units within Homeland Security Investigations.

(b) Composition

Each Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit shall be composed of trained foreign law enforcement officials who shall collaborate with Homeland Security Investigations to investigate and prosecute individuals involved in transnational criminal activity.

(c) Vetting requirement

(1) In general

Before entry into a Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit, and at periodic intervals while serving in such a unit, foreign law enforcement officials shall be required to pass certain security evaluations, which may include a background check, a polygraph examination, a urinalysis test, or other measures that the Secretary determines to be appropriate.

(2) Leahy vetting required

No member of a foreign law enforcement unit may join a Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit if the Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary of State, has credible information that such foreign law enforcement unit has committed a gross violation of human rights, consistent with the limitations set forth in section 2378d of title 22.

(3) Approval and concurrence

The establishment and continued support of the Transnational Criminal Investigative Units who are assigned under paragraph (1)—

(A) shall be performed with the approval of the chief of mission to the foreign country to which the personnel are assigned;

(B) shall be consistent with the duties and powers of the Secretary of State and the

chief of mission for a foreign country under section 4802 of title 22 and section 3927 of title 22, respectively; and

(C) shall not be established without the concurrence of the Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.

(4) Report

The Executive Associate Director of Homeland Security Investigations shall submit a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives that describes—

(A) the procedures used for vetting Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit members to include compliance with the vetting required under this subsection; and

(B) any additional measures that should be implemented to prevent personnel in vetted units from being compromised by criminal organizations.

(d) Monetary stipend

The Executive Associate Director of Homeland Security Investigations is authorized to pay vetted members of a Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit a monetary stipend in an amount associated with their duties dedicated to unit activities.

(e) Annual briefing

The Executive Associate Director of Homeland Security Investigations, during the 5-year period beginning on December 23, 2022, shall provide an annual unclassified briefing to the congressional committees referred to in subsection (c)(4), which may include a classified session, if necessary, that identifies—

(1) the number of vetted members of Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit in each country;

(2) the amount paid in stipends to such members, disaggregated by country;

(3) relevant enforcement statistics, such as arrests and progress made on joint investigations, in each such country; and

(4) whether any vetted members of the Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit in each country were involved in any unlawful activity, including human rights abuses or significant acts of corruption.

(Pub. L. 107-296, title VIII, §890C, as added Pub. L. 117-263, div. G, title LXXI, §7105(b)(1), Dec. 23, 2022, 136 Stat. 3623.)

§ 475a. Mentor-protégé program

(a) Establishment

There is established in the Department a mentor-protégé program (in this section referred to as the “Program”) under which a mentor firm enters into an agreement with a protégé firm for the purpose of assisting the protégé firm to compete for prime contracts and subcontracts of the Department.