

“(b) CONTENT OF THE AGREEMENT.—The Russian Federation Nonproliferation Investment Agreement shall ensure that—

“(1) an amount equal to the value of the debt reduced pursuant to this subtitle will be made available by the Russian Federation for agreed nonproliferation programs and projects;

“(2) each program or project funded pursuant to the Agreement will be approved by the President;

“(3) the administration and oversight of nonproliferation programs and projects will incorporate best practices from established threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance programs;

“(4) each program or project funded pursuant to the Agreement will be subject to monitoring and audits conducted by or for the United States Government to confirm that agreed funds are expended on agreed projects and meet agreed targets and benchmarks;

“(5) unobligated funds for investments pursuant to the Agreement will not be diverted to other purposes;

“(6) funds allocated to programs and projects pursuant to the Agreement will not be subject to any taxation by the Russian Federation;

“(7) all matters relating to the intellectual property rights and legal liabilities of United States firms in any project will be agreed upon before the expenditure of funds would be authorized for that project; and

“(8) not less than 75 percent of the funds made available for each nonproliferation program or project under the Agreement will be spent in the Russian Federation.

“(c) USE OF EXISTING MECHANISMS.—It is the sense of Congress that, to the extent practicable, the boards and administrative mechanisms of existing threat reduction and nonproliferation programs should be used in the administration and oversight of programs and projects under the Agreement.

“(d) JOINT AUDITING.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States and the Russian Federation should consider commissioning the United States Government Accountability Office and the Russian Chamber of Accounts to conduct joint audits to ensure that the funds saved by the Russian Federation as a result of any debt reduction are used exclusively, efficiently, and effectively to implement agreed programs or projects pursuant to the Agreement.

“(e) STRUCTURE OF THE AGREEMENT.—It is the sense of Congress that the Agreement should provide for significant penalties—

“(1) if funds obligated for approved programs or projects are determined to have been misappropriated; and

“(2) if the President is unable to make the certification required by section 1317(a) for two consecutive years.

“SEC. 1316. INDEPENDENT MEDIA AND THE RULE OF LAW.

“Notwithstanding section 1315 (a)(1) and (b)(1), up to 10 percent of the amount equal to the value of the debt reduced pursuant to this subtitle may be used to promote a vibrant, independent media sector and the rule of law in the Russian Federation through an endowment to support the establishment of a ‘Center for an Independent Press and the Rule of Law’ in the Russian Federation, which shall be directed by a joint United States-Russian Board of Directors in which the majority of members, including the chairman, shall be United States personnel, and which shall be responsible for management of the endowment, its funds, and the Center’s programs.

“SEC. 1317. RESTRICTION ON DEBT REDUCTION AUTHORITY.

“(a) PROLIFERATION TO STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM.—Subject to the provisions of subsection (c), the debt reduction authority provided by section 1314 may not be exercised unless and until the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the Russian Federation has made material

progress in stemming the flow of sensitive goods, technologies, material, and know-how related to the design, development, and production of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them to state sponsors of international terrorism.

“(b) ANNUAL DETERMINATION.—If, in any annual report to Congress submitted pursuant to [former] section 1321, the President cannot certify that the Russian Federation continues to meet the condition required in subsection (a), then, subject to the provisions of subsection (c), the debt reduction authority provided by section 1314 may not be exercised unless and until such certification is made to the appropriate congressional committees.

“(c) PRESIDENTIAL WAIVER.—The President may waive the requirements of subsection (a) or (b) for a fiscal year if the President—

“(1) determines that application of the subsection for a fiscal year would be counter to the national interest of the United States; and

“(2) so reports to the appropriate congressional committees.

“SEC. 1318. DISCUSSION OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION DEBT REDUCTION FOR NONPROLIFERATION WITH OTHER CREDITOR STATES.

“It is the sense of Congress that the President and such other appropriate officials as the President may designate should pursue discussions with other creditor states with the objectives of—

“(1) ensuring that other advanced industrial democracies, especially the largest holders of Soviet-era Russian debt, dedicate significant proportions of their bilateral official debt with the Russian Federation or equivalent amounts of direct assistance to the G-8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, as agreed upon in the Statement by G-8 Leaders on June 27, 2002; and

“(2) reaching agreement, as appropriate, to establish a unified Russian Federation official debt reduction fund to manage and provide financial transparency for the resources provided by creditor states through debt reductions.

“SEC. 1319. IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED STATES POLICY.

“It is the sense of Congress that implementation of debt-for-nonproliferation programs with the Russian Federation should be overseen by the coordinating mechanism established pursuant to section 1334 of this Act [50 U.S.C. 2357b].

“SEC. 1320. CONSULTATIONS WITH CONGRESS.

“The President shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees on a periodic basis to review the implementation of this subtitle and the Russian Federation’s eligibility for debt reduction pursuant to this subtitle.

“[SEC. 1321. Repealed. Pub. L. 112-74, div. I, title VII, § 7034(n), Dec. 23, 2011, 125 Stat. 1217.]”

§ 2357c. Purposes and authority

(a) Purposes

(1) In general

The primary purpose of the coordination mechanism established pursuant to section 2357b of this title should be—

(A) to exercise continuing responsibility for coordinating worldwide United States nonproliferation and threat reduction efforts to ensure that they effectively implement United States policy; and

(B) to enhance the ability of participating departments and agencies to anticipate growing nonproliferation areas of concern.

(2) Program monitoring and coordination

The coordination mechanism established pursuant to section 2357b of this title should

have primary continuing responsibility within the executive branch of the Government for—

(A) United States nonproliferation and threat reduction efforts, and particularly such efforts in the independent states of the former Soviet Union; and

(B) coordinating the implementation of United States policy with respect to such efforts.

(b) Authority

In carrying out the responsibilities described in subsection (a), the coordination mechanism established pursuant to section 2357b of this title should have, at a minimum, the authority to—

(1) establish such subcommittees and working groups as it deems necessary;

(2) direct the preparation of analyses on issues and problems relating to coordination within and among United States departments and agencies on nonproliferation and threat reduction efforts;

(3) direct the preparation of analyses on issues and problems relating to coordination between the United States public and private sectors on nonproliferation and threat reduction efforts, including coordination between public and private spending on nonproliferation and threat reduction programs and coordination between public spending and private investment in defense conversion activities of the independent states of the former Soviet Union;

(4) provide guidance on arrangements that will coordinate, deconflict, and maximize the utility of United States public spending on nonproliferation and threat reduction programs, and particularly such efforts in the independent states of the former Soviet Union;

(5) encourage companies and nongovernmental organizations involved in nonproliferation efforts of the independent states of the former Soviet Union or other countries of concern to voluntarily report these efforts to it;

(6) direct the preparation of analyses on issues and problems relating to the coordination between the United States and other countries with respect to nonproliferation efforts, and particularly such efforts in the independent states of the former Soviet Union; and

(7) consider, and make recommendations to the President with respect to, proposals for such new legislation or regulations relating to United States nonproliferation efforts as may be necessary.

(Pub. L. 107-228, div. B, title XIII, §1335, Sept. 30, 2002, 116 Stat. 1450.)

§ 2357d. Administrative support

All United States departments and agencies shall provide, to the extent permitted by law, such information and assistance as may be requested by the coordination mechanism established pursuant to section 2357b of this title, in carrying out its functions and activities under this subchapter.

(Pub. L. 107-228, div. B, title XIII, §1336, Sept. 30, 2002, 116 Stat. 1451.)

§ 2357e. Confidentiality of information

Information which has been submitted to or received by the coordination mechanism established pursuant to section 2357b of this title in confidence shall not be publicly disclosed, except to the extent required by law, and such information shall be used by it only for the purpose of carrying out the functions set forth in this subchapter.

(Pub. L. 107-228, div. B, title XIII, §1337, Sept. 30, 2002, 116 Stat. 1451.)

§ 2357f. Statutory construction

Nothing in this subchapter—

(1) applies to the data-gathering, regulatory, or enforcement authority of any existing United States department or agency over nonproliferation efforts in the independent states of the former Soviet Union, and the review of those efforts undertaken by the coordination mechanism established pursuant to section 2357b of this title shall not in any way supersede or prejudice any other process provided by law; or

(2) applies to any activity that is reportable pursuant to title V of the National Security Act of 1947 [50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.].

(Pub. L. 107-228, div. B, title XIII, §1338, Sept. 30, 2002, 116 Stat. 1451.)

Editorial Notes

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The National Security Act of 1947, referred to in par. (2), is act July 26, 1947, ch. 343, 61 Stat. 495, which was formerly classified principally to chapter 15 (§401 et seq.) of this title, prior to editorial reclassification in chapter 44 (§3001 et seq.) of this title. Title V of the Act is now classified generally to subchapter III (§3091 et seq.) of chapter 44 of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Tables.

§ 2357g. Reporting and consultation

(a) Presidential report

Not later than 120 days after each inauguration of a President, the President shall submit a report to the Congress on his general and specific nonproliferation and threat reduction objectives and how the efforts of executive branch agencies will be coordinated most effectively, pursuant to section 2357b of this title, to achieve those objectives.

(b) Consultation

The President should consult with and brief, from time to time, the appropriate committees of Congress regarding the efficacy of the coordination mechanism established pursuant to section 2357b of this title in achieving its stated objectives.

(Pub. L. 107-228, div. B, title XIII, §1339, Sept. 30, 2002, 116 Stat. 1451.)

SUBCHAPTER V—MISCELLANEOUS

§ 2361. Sense of Congress concerning contracting policy

It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Sec-