

United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

DONALD J. TRUMP.

GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING

Memorandum of President of the United States, Mar. 4, 2009, 74 F.R. 9755, provided:

Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies

The Federal Government has an overriding obligation to American taxpayers. It should perform its functions efficiently and effectively while ensuring that its actions result in the best value for the taxpayers.

Since 2001, spending on Government contracts has more than doubled, reaching over \$500 billion in 2008. During this same period, there has been a significant increase in the dollars awarded without full and open competition and an increase in the dollars obligated through cost-reimbursement contracts. Between fiscal years 2000 and 2008, for example, dollars obligated under cost-reimbursement contracts nearly doubled, from \$71 billion in 2000 to \$135 billion in 2008. Reversing these trends away from full and open competition and toward cost-reimbursement contracts could result in savings of billions of dollars each year for the American taxpayer.

Excessive reliance by executive agencies on sole-source contracts (or contracts with a limited number of sources) and cost-reimbursement contracts creates a risk that taxpayer funds will be spent on contracts that are wasteful, inefficient, subject to misuse, or otherwise not well designed to serve the needs of the Federal Government or the interests of the American taxpayer. Reports by agency Inspectors General, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and other independent reviewing bodies have shown that noncompetitive and cost-reimbursement contracts have been misused, resulting in wasted taxpayer resources, poor contractor performance, and inadequate accountability for results.

When awarding Government contracts, the Federal Government must strive for an open and competitive process. However, executive agencies must have the flexibility to tailor contracts to carry out their missions and achieve the policy goals of the Government. In certain exigent circumstances, agencies may need to consider whether a competitive process will not accomplish the agency's mission. In such cases, the agency must ensure that the risks associated with noncompetitive contracts are minimized.

Moreover, it is essential that the Federal Government have the capacity to carry out robust and thorough management and oversight of its contracts in order to achieve programmatic goals, avoid significant overcharges, and curb wasteful spending. A GAO study last year of 95 major defense acquisitions projects found cost overruns of 26 percent, totaling \$295 billion over the life of the projects. Improved contract oversight could reduce such sums significantly.

Government outsourcing for services also raises special concerns. For decades, the Federal Government has relied on the private sector for necessary commercial services used by the Government, such as transportation, food, and maintenance. Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76, first issued in 1966, was based on the reasonable premise that while inherently governmental activities should be performed by Government employees, taxpayers may receive more value for their dollars if non-inherently governmental activities that can be provided commercially are subject to the forces of competition.

However, the line between inherently governmental activities that should not be outsourced and commercial activities that may be subject to private sector competition has been blurred and inadequately defined. As a result, contractors may be performing inherently governmental functions. Agencies and departments must operate under clear rules prescribing when outsourcing is and is not appropriate.

It is the policy of the Federal Government that executive agencies shall not engage in noncompetitive con-

tracts except in those circumstances where their use can be fully justified and where appropriate safeguards have been put in place to protect the taxpayer. In addition, there shall be a preference for fixed-price type contracts. Cost-reimbursement contracts shall be used only when circumstances do not allow the agency to define its requirements sufficiently to allow for a fixed-price type contract. Moreover, the Federal Government shall ensure that taxpayer dollars are not spent on contracts that are wasteful, inefficient, subject to misuse, or otherwise not well designed to serve the Federal Government's needs and to manage the risk associated with the goods and services being procured. The Federal Government must have sufficient capacity to manage and oversee the contracting process from start to finish, so as to ensure that taxpayer funds are spent wisely and are not subject to excessive risk. Finally, the Federal Government must ensure that those functions that are inherently governmental in nature are performed by executive agencies and are not outsourced.

I hereby direct the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in collaboration with the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Administrator of General Services, the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, and the heads of such other agencies as the Director of OMB determines to be appropriate, and with the participation of appropriate management councils and program management officials, to develop and issue by July 1, 2009, Government-wide guidance to assist agencies in reviewing, and creating processes for ongoing review of, existing contracts in order to identify contracts that are wasteful, inefficient, or not otherwise likely to meet the agency's needs, and to formulate appropriate corrective action in a timely manner. Such corrective action may include modifying or canceling such contracts in a manner and to the extent consistent with applicable laws, regulations, and policy.

I further direct the Director of OMB, in collaboration with the aforementioned officials and councils, and with input from the public, to develop and issue by September 30, 2009, Government-wide guidance to:

(1) govern the appropriate use and oversight of sole-source and other types of noncompetitive contracts and to maximize the use of full and open competition and other competitive procurement processes;

(2) govern the appropriate use and oversight of all contract types, in full consideration of the agency's needs, and to minimize risk and maximize the value of Government contracts generally, consistent with the regulations to be promulgated pursuant to section 864 of Public Law 110-417;

(3) assist agencies in assessing the capacity and ability of the Federal acquisition workforce to develop, manage, and oversee acquisitions appropriately; and

(4) clarify when governmental outsourcing for services is and is not appropriate, consistent with section 321 of Public Law 110-417 (31 U.S.C. 501 note).

Executive departments and agencies shall carry out the provisions of this memorandum to the extent permitted by law. This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

The Director of OMB is hereby authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the Federal Register.

BARACK OBAMA.

§3102. Delegation and assignment of powers, functions, and responsibilities

(a) IN GENERAL.—Except to the extent expressly prohibited by another law, the head of an executive agency may delegate to another of-

ficer or official of that agency any power under this division.

(b) PROCUREMENTS FOR OR WITH ANOTHER AGENCY.—Subject to subsection (a), to facilitate the procurement of property and services covered by this division by an executive agency for another executive agency, and to facilitate joint procurement by executive agencies—

(1) the head of an executive agency may delegate functions and assign responsibilities relating to procurement to any officer or employee within the agency;

(2) the heads of 2 or more executive agencies, consistent with section 1535 of title 31 and regulations prescribed under section 1074 of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (Public Law 103-355, 31 U.S.C. 1535 note), may by agreement delegate procurement functions and assign procurement responsibilities from one executive agency to another of those executive agencies or to an officer or civilian employee of another of those executive agencies; and

(3) the heads of 2 or more executive agencies may establish joint or combined offices to exercise procurement functions and responsibilities.

(Pub. L. 111-350, §3, Jan. 4, 2011, 124 Stat. 3743.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Table with 3 columns: Revised Section, Source (U.S. Code), Source (Statutes at Large). Row 3102: Revised Section 3102, Source 41:261, Source June 30, 1949, ch. 288, title III, §311, as added Pub. L. 103-355, title I, §1552, Oct. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 3299.

§ 3103. Acquisition programs

(a) CONGRESSIONAL POLICY.—It is the policy of Congress that the head of each executive agency should achieve, on average, 90 percent of the cost, performance, and schedule goals established for major acquisition programs of the agency.

(b) ESTABLISHMENT OF GOALS.—

(1) BY HEAD OF EXECUTIVE AGENCY.—The head of each executive agency shall approve or define the cost, performance, and schedule goals for major acquisition programs of the agency.

(2) BY CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER.—The chief financial officer of an executive agency shall evaluate the cost goals proposed for each major acquisition program of the agency.

(c) IDENTIFICATION OF NONCOMPLIANT PROGRAMS.—When it is necessary to implement the policy set out in subsection (a), the head of an executive agency shall—

(1) determine whether there is a continuing need for programs that are significantly behind schedule, over budget, or not in compliance with performance or capability requirements; and

(2) identify suitable actions to be taken, including termination, with respect to those programs.

(Pub. L. 111-350, §3, Jan. 4, 2011, 124 Stat. 3743.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Table with 3 columns: Revised Section, Source (U.S. Code), Source (Statutes at Large). Row 3103: Revised Section 3103, Source 41:263, Source June 30, 1949, ch. 288, title III, §313, as added Pub. L. 103-355, title V, §5051(a), Oct. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 3351; Pub. L. 105-85, div. A, title VIII, §851(a), Nov. 18, 1997, 111 Stat. 1851.

§ 3104. Small business concerns

It is the policy of Congress that a fair proportion of the total purchases and contracts for property and services for the Federal Government shall be placed with small business concerns.

(Pub. L. 111-350, §3, Jan. 4, 2011, 124 Stat. 3744.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Table with 3 columns: Revised Section, Source (U.S. Code), Source (Statutes at Large). Row 3104: Revised Section 3104, Source 41:252(b), Source June 30, 1949, ch. 288, title III, §302(b), 63 Stat. 393; July 12, 1952, ch. 703, §1(m), 66 Stat. 594; Pub. L. 98-369, div. B, title VII, §2714(a)(1)(A), July 18, 1984, 98 Stat. 1184.

The word “declared” is omitted as unnecessary.

§ 3105. New contracts and grants and merit-based selection procedures

(a) CONGRESSIONAL POLICY.—It is the policy of Congress that—

(1) an executive agency should not be required by legislation to award—

(A) a new contract to a specific non-Federal Government entity; or

(B) a new grant for research, development, test, or evaluation to a non-Federal Government entity; and

(2) a program, project, or technology identified in legislation be procured or awarded through merit-based selection procedures.

(b) NEW CONTRACT AND NEW GRANT DESCRIBED.—For purposes of this section—

(1) a contract is a new contract unless the work provided for in the contract is a continuation of the work performed by the specified entity under a prior contract; and

(2) a grant is a new grant unless the work provided for in the grant is a continuation of the work performed by the specified entity under a prior grant.

(c) REQUIREMENTS FOR AWARDED NEW CONTRACT OR NEW GRANT.—A provision of law may not be construed as requiring a new contract or a new grant to be awarded to a specified non-Federal Government entity unless the provision of law specifically—

(1) refers to this section;

(2) identifies the particular non-Federal Government entity involved; and

(3) states that the award to that entity is required by the provision of law in contravention of the policy set forth in subsection (a).

(d) EXCEPTION.—This section does not apply to a contract or grant that calls on the National Academy of Sciences to investigate, examine, or