

motivated by gender (as defined in subsection (d)).

(c) Cause of action

A person (including a person who acts under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State) who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender and thus deprives another of the right declared in subsection (b) shall be liable to the party injured, in an action for the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and such other relief as a court may deem appropriate.

(d) Definitions

For purposes of this section—

(1) the term “crime of violence motivated by gender” means a crime of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim’s gender; and

(2) the term “crime of violence” means—¹

(A) an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony against the person or that would constitute a felony against property if the conduct presents a serious risk of physical injury to another, and that would come within the meaning of State or Federal offenses described in section 16 of title 18, whether or not those acts have actually resulted in criminal charges, prosecution, or conviction and whether or not those acts were committed in the special maritime, territorial, or prison jurisdiction of the United States; and

(B) includes an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony described in subparagraph (A) but for the relationship between the person who takes such action and the individual against whom such action is taken.

(e) Limitation and procedures

(1) Limitation

Nothing in this section entitles a person to a cause of action under subsection (c) for random acts of violence unrelated to gender or for acts that cannot be demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, to be motivated by gender (within the meaning of subsection (d)).

(2) No prior criminal action

Nothing in this section requires a prior criminal complaint, prosecution, or conviction to establish the elements of a cause of action under subsection (c).

(3) Concurrent jurisdiction

The Federal and State courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction over actions brought pursuant to this part.

(4) Supplemental jurisdiction

Neither section 1367 of title 28 nor subsection (c) of this section shall be construed, by reason of a claim arising under such subsection, to confer on the courts of the United States jurisdiction over any State law claim seeking

the establishment of a divorce, alimony, equitable distribution of marital property, or child custody decree.

(Pub. L. 103-322, title IV, §40302, Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 1941.)

Editorial Notes

REFERENCES IN TEXT

This part, referred to in subsecs. (a) and (e)(3), was in the original “this subtitle”, meaning subtitle C of title IV of Pub. L. 103-322, Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 1941. For complete classification of subtitle C of title IV of Pub. L. 103-322 to the Code, see Short Title of 1994 Act note set out under section 10101 of this title and Tables.

CODIFICATION

Section was formerly classified to section 13981 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare, prior to editorial reclassification and renumbering as this section. Section is comprised of section 40302 of Pub. L. 103-322. Subsec. (e)(5) of section 40302 of Pub. L. 103-322 amended section 1445 of Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure.

CONSTITUTIONALITY

For information regarding the constitutionality of this section, see the Table of Laws Held Unconstitutional in Whole or in Part by the Supreme Court on the Constitution Annotated website, constitution.congress.gov.

PART D—EQUAL JUSTICE FOR WOMEN IN COURTS

SUBPART 1—EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR JUDGES AND COURT PERSONNEL IN STATE COURTS

§ 12371. Grants authorized

The State Justice Institute may award grants for the purpose of developing, testing, presenting, and disseminating model programs to be used by States (as defined in section 10701 of title 42) in training judges and court personnel in the laws of the States and by Indian tribes in training tribal judges and court personnel in the laws of the tribes on rape, sexual assault, domestic violence, dating violence, and other crimes of violence motivated by the victim’s gender. Nothing shall preclude the attendance of tribal judges and court personnel at programs funded under this section for States to train judges and court personnel on the laws of the States.

(Pub. L. 103-322, title IV, §40411, Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 1942; Pub. L. 106-386, div. B, title IV, §1406(c)(2), (d)(1), Oct. 28, 2000, 114 Stat. 1516.)

Editorial Notes

CODIFICATION

Section was formerly classified to section 13991 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare, prior to editorial reclassification and renumbering as this section.

AMENDMENTS

2000—Pub. L. 106-386 inserted “dating violence,” after “domestic violence,” and “Nothing shall preclude the attendance of tribal judges and court personnel at programs funded under this section for States to train judges and court personnel on the laws of the States.” at end.

¹ So in original. The word “means” probably should appear after “(A)” below.

Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries

SHORT TITLE

For short title of subtitle D of title IV of Pub. L. 103-322, which is classified to this part, as the "Equal Justice for Women in the Courts Act of 1994", see section 40401 of Pub. L. 103-322, set out as a Short Title of 1994 Act note under section 10101 of this title.

§ 12372. Training provided by grants

Training provided pursuant to grants made under this part may include current information, existing studies, or current data on—

(1) the nature and incidence of rape and sexual assault by strangers and nonstrangers, marital rape, and incest;

(2) the underreporting of rape, sexual assault, and child sexual abuse;

(3) the physical, psychological, and economic impact of rape and sexual assault on the victim, the costs to society, and the implications for sentencing;

(4) the psychology of sex offenders, their high rate of recidivism, and the implications for sentencing;

(5) the historical evolution of laws and attitudes on rape and sexual assault;

(6) sex stereotyping of female and male victims of rape and sexual assault, racial stereotyping of rape victims and defendants, and the impact of such stereotypes on credibility of witnesses, sentencing, and other aspects of the administration of justice;

(7) application of rape shield laws and other limits on introduction of evidence that may subject victims to improper sex stereotyping and harassment in both rape and nonrape cases, including the need for sua sponte judicial intervention in inappropriate cross-examination;

(8) the use of expert witness testimony on rape trauma syndrome, child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome, post-traumatic stress syndrome, and similar issues;

(9) the legitimate reasons why victims of rape, sexual assault, and incest may refuse to testify against a defendant;

(10) the nature and incidence of domestic violence and dating violence (as defined in section 10447¹ of this title);

(11) the physical, psychological, and economic impact of domestic violence and dating violence on the victim, the costs to society, and the implications for court procedures and sentencing;

(12) the psychology and self-presentation of batterers and victims and the implications for court proceedings and credibility of witnesses;

(13) sex stereotyping of female and male victims of domestic violence and dating violence, myths about presence or absence of domestic violence and dating violence in certain racial, ethnic, religious, or socioeconomic groups, and their impact on the administration of justice;

(14) historical evolution of laws and attitudes on domestic violence;

(15) proper and improper interpretations of the defenses of self-defense and provocation, and the use of expert witness testimony on battered woman syndrome;

(16) the likelihood of retaliation, recidivism, and escalation of violence by batterers, and the potential impact of incarceration and other meaningful sanctions for acts of domestic violence including violations of orders of protection;

(17) economic, psychological, social and institutional reasons for victims' inability to leave the batterer, to report domestic violence or dating violence or to follow through on complaints, including the influence of lack of support from police, judges, and court personnel, and the legitimate reasons why victims of domestic violence or dating violence may refuse to testify against a defendant;

(18) the need for orders of protection, and the implications of mutual orders of protection, dual arrest policies, and mediation in domestic violence and dating violence cases;

(19) recognition of and response to gender-motivated crimes of violence other than rape, sexual assault and domestic violence, such as mass or serial murder motivated by the gender of the victims;

(20) the issues raised by domestic violence in determining custody and visitation, including how to protect the safety of the child and of a parent who is not a predominant aggressor of domestic violence, the legitimate reasons parents may report domestic violence, the ways domestic violence may relate to an abuser's desire to seek custody, and evaluating expert testimony in custody and visitation determinations involving domestic violence;

(21) the issues raised by child sexual assault in determining custody and visitation, including how to protect the safety of the child, the legitimate reasons parents may report child sexual assault, and evaluating expert testimony in custody and visitation determinations involving child sexual assault, including the current scientifically-accepted and empirically valid research on child sexual assault;²

(22) the extent to which addressing domestic violence and victim safety contributes to the efficient administration of justice;³

(Pub. L. 103-322, title IV, §40412, Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 1943; Pub. L. 106-386, div. B, title IV, §1406(a)(1), (d)(2), Oct. 28, 2000, 114 Stat. 1515, 1517.)

Editorial Notes

REFERENCES IN TEXT

Section 10447 of this title, referred to in par. (10), was subsequently repealed and a new section 10447 enacted which does not define the terms "domestic violence" or "dating violence". However, such terms are defined in section 12291 of this title.

CODIFICATION

Section was formerly classified to section 13992 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare, prior to editorial reclassification and renumbering as this section. Some section numbers or references in amendment notes below reflect the classification of such sections or references prior to editorial reclassification.

² So in original. Probably should be followed by "and".

³ So in original. The semicolon probably should be a period.

¹ See References in Text note below.