

(2) An analysis of Iran's labeling practices of exported petroleum and petroleum products.

(3) A description of companies involved in the exporting and sale of Iranian petroleum and petroleum products.

(4) A description of ships involved in the exporting and sale of Iranian petroleum and petroleum products.

(5) A description of ports involved in the exporting and sale of Iranian petroleum and petroleum products.

**(b) Form**

The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

**(c) Publication**

The unclassified portion of the report required by subsection (a) shall be posted on a publicly available website of the Energy Information Administration.

**(d) Termination**

The requirement to submit reports under this section shall be terminated on the date on which the President makes the certification described in section 8572(i) of this title.

(Pub. L. 118-50, div. J, § 4, Apr. 24, 2024, 138 Stat. 967.)

**Editorial Notes**

**CODIFICATION**

Section was enacted as part of the Stop Harboring Iranian Petroleum Act, also known as the SHIP Act, and not as part of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 which comprises this chapter.

**§ 8574. Strategy to counter role of the People's Republic of China in evasion of sanctions with respect to Iran**

**(a) In general**

Not later than 120 days after April 24, 2024, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a written strategy, and provide to those committees an accompanying briefing, on the role of the People's Republic of China in evasion of sanctions imposed by the United States with respect to Iranian-origin petroleum products that includes an assessment of options—

(1) to strengthen the enforcement of such sanctions; and

(2) to expand sanctions designations targeting the involvement of the People's Republic of China in the production, transportation, storage, refining, and sale of Iranian-origin petroleum products.

**(b) Elements**

The strategy required by subsection (a) shall include—

(1) a description and assessment of the use of sanctions in effect before April 24, 2024, to target individuals and entities of the People's Republic of China that are directly or indirectly associated with smuggling of Iranian-origin petroleum products;

(2) an assessment of—

(A) Iranian-owned entities operating in the People's Republic of China and involved in petroleum refining supply chains;

(B) the People's Republic of China's role in global petroleum refining supply chains;

(C) how the People's Republic of China leverages its role in global petroleum supply chains to achieve political objectives;

(D) the People's Republic of China's petroleum importing and exporting partners;

(E) what percent of the People's Republic of China's energy consumption is linked to illegally imported Iranian-origin petroleum products; and

(F) what level of influence the Chinese Communist Party holds over non-state, semi-independent "teapot" refineries;

(3) a detailed plan for—

(A) monitoring the maritime domain for sanctionable activity related to smuggling of Iranian-origin petroleum products;

(B) identifying the individuals, entities, and vessels engaging in sanctionable activity related to Iranian-origin petroleum products, including—

(i) vessels—

(I) transporting petrochemicals subject to sanctions;

(II) conducting ship-to-ship transfers of such petrochemicals;

(III) with deactivated automatic identification systems; or

(IV) that engage in "flag hopping" by changing national registries;

(ii) individuals or entities—

(I) storing petrochemicals subject to sanctions; or

(II) refining or otherwise processing such petrochemicals; and

(iii) through the use of port entry and docking permission of vessels subject to sanctions;

(C) deterring individuals and entities from violating sanctions by educating and engaging—

(i) insurance providers;

(ii) parent companies; and

(iii) vessel operators;

(D) collaborating with allies and partners of the United States engaged in the Arabian Peninsula, including through standing or new maritime task forces, to build sanctions enforcement capacity through assistance and training to defense and law enforcement services; and

(E) using public communications and global diplomatic engagements to highlight the role of illicit petroleum product smuggling in bolstering Iran's support for terrorism and its nuclear program; and

(4) an assessment of—

(A) the total number of vessels smuggling Iranian-origin petroleum products;

(B) the total number of vessels smuggling such petroleum products destined for the People's Republic of China;

(C) the number of vessels smuggling such petroleum products specifically from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps;

(D) interference by the People’s Republic of China with attempts by the United States to investigate or enforce sanctions on illicit Iranian petroleum product exports;

(E) the effectiveness of the use of sanctions with respect to insurers of entities that own or operate vessels involved in smuggling Iranian-origin petroleum products;

(F) the personnel and resources needed to enforce sanctions with respect to Iranian-origin petroleum products; and

(G) the impact of smuggled illicit Iranian-origin petroleum products on global energy markets.

**(c) Form**

The strategy required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified index.

(Pub. L. 118–50, div. J, §5, Apr. 24, 2024, 138 Stat. 967.)

**Editorial Notes**

CODIFICATION

Section was enacted as part of the Stop Harboring Iranian Petroleum Act, also known as the SHIP Act, and not as part of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 which comprises this chapter.

**§ 8575. Definitions**

In this subchapter:

**(1) Appropriate congressional committees**

The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.

**(2) Covered family member**

The term “covered family member”, with respect to a foreign person who is an individual, means a spouse, adult child, parent, or sibling of the person who engages in the sanctionable activity described under section 8572 of this title or who demonstrably benefits from such activity.

(Pub. L. 118–50, div. J, §6, Apr. 24, 2024, 138 Stat. 969.)

**Editorial Notes**

CODIFICATION

Section was enacted as part of the Stop Harboring Iranian Petroleum Act, also known as the SHIP Act, and not as part of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 which comprises this chapter.

**CHAPTER 93—UNITED STATES-ISRAEL COOPERATION**

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**§ 8601. Findings**

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Since 1948, United States Presidents and both houses of Congress, on a bipartisan basis and supported by the American people, have repeatedly reaffirmed the special bond between the United States and Israel, based on shared values and shared interests.

(2) The Middle East is undergoing rapid change, bringing with it hope for an expansion of democracy but also great challenges to the national security of the United States and our allies in the region, particularly to our most important ally in the region, Israel.

(3) The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is continuing its decades-long pattern of seeking to foment instability and promote extremism in the Middle East, particularly in this time of dramatic political transition.

(4) At the same time, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to enrich uranium in defiance of multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions.

(5) A nuclear-weapons capable Iran would fundamentally threaten vital United States interests, encourage regional nuclear proliferation, further empower Iran, the world’s leading state sponsor of terror, and pose a serious and destabilizing threat to Israel and the region.

(6) Over the past several years, with the assistance of the Governments of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Syria, Hizbollah and Hamas have increased their stockpile of rockets, with more than 60,000 now ready to be fired at Israel. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to add to its arsenal of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, which threaten Iran’s neighbors, Israel, and United States Armed Forces in the region.

(7) As a result, Israel is facing a fundamentally altered strategic environment.

(8) Pursuant to chapter 5 of title 1 of the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003 (Public Law 108–11; 117 Stat. 576), the authority to make available loan guarantees to Israel is currently set to expire on September 30, 2012.

(Pub. L. 112–150, §2, July 27, 2012, 126 Stat. 1146.)

**Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

SHORT TITLE OF 2014 AMENDMENT

Pub. L. 113–296, §1, Dec. 19, 2014, 128 Stat. 4075, provided that: “This Act [enacting section 8606 of this title, amending sections 2321h and 2776 of this title and section 17337 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare, enacting provisions set out as notes under this section and sections 8602, 8603, and 8606 of this title, and amending provisions set out as a note under section 2776 of this title] may be cited as the ‘United States-Israel Strategic Partnership Act of 2014.’”