

gated for use by, or for support of, the International Criminal Court unless the United States has become a party to the Court pursuant to a treaty made under Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States on or after November 29, 1999.

**(c) International Criminal Court defined**

In this section, the term “International Criminal Court” means the court established by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court on July 17, 1998.

(Pub. L. 106-113, div. B, §1000(a)(7) [div. A, title VII, §705], Nov. 29, 1999, 113 Stat. 1536, 1501A-460.)

**Editorial Notes**

CODIFICATION

Section was formerly set out as a note under section 262-1 of this title.

**Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

SHORT TITLE

Pub. L. 107-206, title II, §2001, Aug. 2, 2002, 116 Stat. 899, provided that: “This title [enacting subchapter II of this chapter] may be cited as the ‘American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002’.”

**§ 7402. Prohibition on extradition or transfer of United States citizens to the International Criminal Court**

**(a) Prohibition on extradition**

None of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available by this or any other Act may be used to extradite a United States citizen to a foreign country that is under an obligation to surrender persons to the International Criminal Court unless that foreign country confirms to the United States that applicable prohibitions on reextradition apply to such surrender or gives other satisfactory assurances to the United States that the country will not extradite or otherwise transfer that citizen to the International Criminal Court.

**(b) Prohibition on consent to extradition by third countries**

None of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available by this or any other Act may be used to provide consent to the extradition or transfer of a United States citizen by a foreign country to a third country that is under an obligation to surrender persons to the International Criminal Court, unless the third country confirms to the United States that applicable prohibitions on reextradition apply to such surrender or gives other satisfactory assurances to the United States that the third country will not extradite or otherwise transfer that citizen to the International Criminal Court.

**(c) Definition**

In this section, the term “International Criminal Court” has the meaning given the term in section 7401(c) of this title.

(Pub. L. 106-113, div. B, §1000(a)(7) [div. A, title VII, §706], Nov. 29, 1999, 113 Stat. 1536, 1501A-461.)

**Editorial Notes**

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**SUBCHAPTER II—AMERICAN SERVICEMEMBERS’ PROTECTION**

**§ 7421. Findings**

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) On July 17, 1998, the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, meeting in Rome, Italy, adopted the “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court”. The vote on whether to proceed with the statute was 120 in favor to 7 against, with 21 countries abstaining. The United States voted against final adoption of the Rome Statute.

(2) As of April 30, 2001, 139 countries had signed the Rome Statute and 30 had ratified it. Pursuant to Article 126 of the Rome Statute, the statute will enter into force on the first day of the month after the 60th day following the date on which the 60th country deposits an instrument ratifying the statute.

(3) Since adoption of the Rome Statute, a Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court has met regularly to draft documents to implement the Rome Statute, including Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Elements of Crimes, and a definition of the Crime of Aggression.

(4) During testimony before the Congress following the adoption of the Rome Statute, the lead United States negotiator, Ambassador David Scheffer stated that the United States could not sign the Rome Statute because certain critical negotiating objectives of the United States had not been achieved. As a result, he stated: “We are left with consequences that do not serve the cause of international justice.”

(5) Ambassador Scheffer went on to tell the Congress that: “Multinational peacekeeping forces operating in a country that has joined the treaty can be exposed to the Court’s jurisdiction even if the country of the individual peacekeeper has not joined the treaty. Thus, the treaty purports to establish an arrangement whereby United States armed forces operating overseas could be conceivably prosecuted by the international court even if the United States has not agreed to be bound by the treaty. Not only is this contrary to the most fundamental principles of treaty law, it could inhibit the ability of the United States to use its military to meet alliance obligations and participate in multinational operations, including humanitarian interventions to save civilian lives. Other contributors to peacekeeping operations will be similarly exposed.”

(6) Notwithstanding these concerns, President Clinton directed that the United States sign the Rome Statute on December 31, 2000. In a statement issued that day, he stated that in view of the unremedied deficiencies of the Rome Statute, “I will not, and do not rec-