

the use, development, production, and stockpiling of chemical weapons;

(3) seek and support effective international means of monitoring and reporting regularly on commerce in equipment, materials, and technology applicable to the attainment of a chemical or biological weapons capability; and

(4) pursue and give full support to multilateral sanctions pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 620, which declared the intention of the Security Council to give immediate consideration to imposing “appropriate and effective” sanctions against any country which uses chemical weapons in violation of international law.

(b) Multilateral controls on chemical agents, precursors, and equipment

It is also the policy of the United States to strengthen efforts to control chemical agents, precursors, and equipment by taking all appropriate multilateral diplomatic measures—

(1) to continue to seek a verifiable global ban on chemical weapons at the 40 nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva;

(2) to support the Australia Group’s objective to support the norms and restraints against the spread and the use of chemical warfare, to advance the negotiation of a comprehensive ban on chemical warfare by taking appropriate measures, and to protect the Australia Group’s domestic industries against inadvertent association with supply of feedstock chemical equipment that could be misused to produce chemical weapons;

(3) to implement paragraph (2) by proposing steps complementary to, and not mutually exclusive of, existing multilateral efforts seeking a verifiable ban on chemical weapons, such as the establishment of—

(A) a harmonized list of export control rules and regulations to prevent relative commercial advantage and disadvantages accruing to Australia Group members,

(B) liaison officers to the Australia Group’s coordinating entity from within the diplomatic missions,

(C) a close working relationship between the Australia Group and industry,

(D) a public unclassified warning list of controlled chemical agents, precursors, and equipment,

(E) information-exchange channels of suspected proliferants,

(F) a “denial” list of firms and individuals who violate the Australia Group’s export control provisions, and

(G) broader cooperation between the Australia Group and other countries whose political commitment to stem the proliferation of chemical weapons is similar to that of the Australia Group; and

(4) to adopt the imposition of stricter controls on the export of chemical agents, precursors, and equipment and to adopt tougher multilateral sanctions against firms and individuals who violate these controls or against countries that use chemical weapons.

(Pub. L. 102-182, title III, § 303, Dec. 4, 1991, 105 Stat. 1245.)

§ 5603. United States export controls

The President shall—

(1) use the authorities of the Arms Export Control Act [22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.] to control the export of those defense articles and defense services, and

(2) use the authorities of the Export Administration Act of 1979 to control the export of those goods and technology,

that the President determines would assist the government of any foreign country in acquiring the capability to develop, produce, stockpile, deliver, or use chemical or biological weapons.

(Pub. L. 102-182, title III, § 304(a), Dec. 4, 1991, 105 Stat. 1246.)

Editorial Notes

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The Arms Export Control Act, referred to in par. (1), is Pub. L. 90-629, Oct. 22, 1968, 82 Stat. 1320, which is classified principally to chapter 39 (§ 2751 et seq.) of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 2751 of this title and Tables.

The Export Administration Act of 1979, referred to in par. (2), is Pub. L. 96-72, Sept. 29, 1979, 93 Stat. 503, which was classified principally to chapter 56 (§ 4601 et seq.) of Title 50, War and National Defense, prior to repeal by Pub. L. 115-232, div. A, title XVII, § 1766(a), Aug. 13, 2018, 132 Stat. 2232, except for sections 11A, 11B, and 11C thereof (50 U.S.C. 4611, 4612, 4613).

§ 5604. Determinations regarding use of chemical or biological weapons

(a) Determination by President

(1) When determination required; nature of determination

Whenever persuasive information becomes available to the executive branch indicating the substantial possibility that, on or after October 28, 1991, the government of a foreign country has made substantial preparation to use or has used chemical or biological weapons, the President shall, within 60 days after the receipt of such information by the executive branch, determine whether that government, on or after October 28, 1991, has used chemical or biological weapons in violation of international law or has used lethal chemical or biological weapons against its own nationals. Section 5605 of this title applies if the President determines that that government has so used chemical or biological weapons.

(2) Matters to be considered

In making the determination under paragraph (1), the President shall consider the following:

(A) All physical and circumstantial evidence available bearing on the possible use of such weapons.

(B) All information provided by alleged victims, witnesses, and independent observers.

(C) The extent of the availability of the weapons in question to the purported user.

(D) All official and unofficial statements bearing on the possible use of such weapons.

(E) Whether, and to what extent, the government in question is willing to honor a re-