

son, including a United States company that conducts business in the PRC, exercising its freedom of speech.

SEC. 2. *Establishment.* There is established within the Executive Office of the President the China Censorship Monitor and Action Group (Task Force).

SEC. 3. *Membership.* (a) The Task Force shall be chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, or his or her designee, and vice-chaired by the Director of the National Economic Council, or his or her designee.

(b) In addition to the Chair and the Vice Chair, the Task Force shall consist of representatives from the following executive departments and agencies (agencies), the heads of which shall designate or appoint personnel at the level of Assistant Secretary or above to participate in the Task Force:

- (i) the Department of State;
- (ii) the Department of the Treasury;
- (iii) the Department of Defense;
- (iv) the Department of Justice;
- (v) the Department of Agriculture;
- (vi) the Department of Commerce;
- (vii) the Department of Education;
- (viii) the Department of Homeland Security;
- (ix) the Office of the Director of National Intelligence;
- (x) the Office of the United States Trade Representative;
- (xi) the Central Intelligence Agency;
- (xii) the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and
- (xiii) other agencies and offices as the President may, from time to time, designate.

SEC. 4. *Mission and Function.* The Task Force shall meet not less frequently than twice per year to oversee the development and execution of the integrated Federal Government strategy described in section 5515(b)(3)(A) of the Act (22 U.S.C. 3363(b)(3)(A)). That strategy shall reflect the collective views of the members of the Task Force and shall be informed by consultations with agencies and independent agencies that are not represented on the Task Force; relevant stakeholders in the private sector and the media; and relevant stakeholders among foreign allies and partners of the United States.

SEC. 5. *Annual Report of the Task Force.* (a) Within 120 days of the date of this memorandum [Dec. 12, 2024], the Task Force shall submit to the President and the appropriate congressional committees, as defined in section 5515(a)(1) of the Act (22 U.S.C. 3363(a)(1)), the strategy described in section 5515(b)(3)(A) of the Act.

(b) Within 180 days of the date of this memorandum, the Task Force shall submit to the President and the appropriate congressional committees, and make publicly available to the extent consistent with national security and other executive branch confidentiality interests, the first annual report described in section 5515(b)(6)(A)–(B) of the Act (22 U.S.C. 3363(b)(6)(A), (B))).

(c) Within 1 year of submitting the first annual report described in subsection (b) of this section, and every year thereafter, the Task Force shall submit to the President and the appropriate congressional committees, and make publicly available to the extent consistent with national security and other executive branch confidentiality interests, the required follow-on annual reports described in section 5515(b)(6)(A)–(B) of the Act, until the requirement terminates as specified in section 5515(d) of the Act (22 U.S.C. 3363(d)).

SEC. 6. *Definition.* For purposes of this memorandum, the term “United States person” shall have the meaning provided in section 5515(a)(3) of the Act (22 U.S.C. 3363(a)(3)).

SEC. 7. *General Provisions.* (a) Nothing in this memorandum shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

- (i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
- (ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b) This memorandum shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(c) This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

(d) The Attorney General is authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the Federal Register.

J.R. BIDEN, JR.

SUBCHAPTER III—INCLUSION OF TAIWAN IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

§ 3371. Findings

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Since 2016, the Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, El Salvador, the Solomon Islands, and Kiribati have severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan in favor of diplomatic relations with China.

(2) Taiwan was invited to participate in the World Health Assembly (WHA), the decision-making body of the World Health Organization (WHO), as an observer annually between 2009 and 2016. Since the 2016 election of President Tsai, the PRC has increasingly resisted Taiwan’s participation in the WHA. Taiwan was not invited to attend the WHA in 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, or 2021.

(3) The Taipei Flight Information Region reportedly served 1,750,000 flights and 68,900,000 passengers in 2018, and is home to Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport, the eleventh busiest airport in the world. Taiwan has been excluded from participating at the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) since 2013.

(4) United Nations (UN) General Assembly Resolution 2758 does not address the issue of representation of Taiwan and its people at the United Nations, nor does it give the PRC the right to represent the people of Taiwan.

(Pub. L. 117–263, div. E, title LV, § 5516, Dec. 23, 2022, 136 Stat. 3317.)

§ 3372. Strategy to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations

(a) In general

Not later than 180 days after December 23, 2022, the Secretary of State, in consultation with other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy—

(1) to advance Taiwan’s¹ meaningful participation in a prioritized set of international organizations (IOs); and

(2) that responds to growing pressure from the PRC on foreign governments, IOs, commercial actors, and civil society organizations to comply with its “One-China Principle”, with respect to Taiwan.

(b) Matters to be included

The strategy required under subsection (a) should include the following elements:

¹ So in original. Probably should be “Taiwan’s”.

(1) An assessment of the methods the PRC uses to coerce actors to into adhering to its “One-China Principle.” The methods should include those employed against governments, IOs, and civil society organizations. The assessment should also include pressure on commercial actors, to the extent it is relevant in the context of Taiwan’s meaningful participation in IOs.

(2) An assessment of the policies of foreign governments toward the PRC and Taiwan, to identify likeminded allies and partners who might become public or private partners in the strategy.

(3) A systematic analysis of all IOs, as practicable, to identify IOs that best lend themselves to advancing Taiwan’s participation.

(4) A plan to expand economic, security, and diplomatic engagement with nations that have demonstrably strengthened, enhanced, or upgraded relations with Taiwan, in accordance with United States interests.

(5) A survey of IOs that have allowed Taiwan’s meaningful participation, including an assessment of whether any erosion in Taiwan’s engagement has occurred within those organizations and how Taiwan’s participation has positively strengthened the capacity and activity of these organizations, thereby providing positive models for Taiwan’s inclusion in other similar forums.

(6) A list of no more than 20 IOs at which the United States Government will prioritize for using its voice, vote, and influence to advance Taiwan’s meaningful participation over the three-year period following December 23, 2022. The list should be derived from the IOs identified in paragraph (3).

(7) A description of the diplomatic strategies and the coalitions the United States Government plans to develop to implement paragraph (6).

(c) Form of report

The strategy required in subsection (a) shall be classified, but it may include an unclassified summary.

(d) Support for meaningful participation

The Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations and other relevant United States officials shall actively support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in all appropriate international organizations.

(Pub. L. 117–263, div. E, title LV, § 5518, Dec. 23, 2022, 136 Stat. 3318.)

§ 3373. Meaningful participation of Taiwan in the International Civil Aviation Organization

(a) Sense of Congress

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) should allow Taiwan to meaningfully participate in the organization, including in ICAO triennial assembly sessions, conferences, technical working groups, meetings, activities, and mechanisms;

(2) Taiwan is a global leader and hub for international aviation, with a range of expertise, information, and resources and the fifth busiest airport in Asia (Taoyuan International

Airport), and its meaningful participation in ICAO would significantly enhance the ability of ICAO to ensure the safety and security of global aviation; and

(3) coercion by the Chinese Communist Party and the People’s Republic of China has ensured the systematic exclusion of Taiwan from meaningful participation in ICAO, significantly undermining the ability of ICAO to ensure the safety and security of global aviation.

(b) Plan for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the International Civil Aviation Organization

The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Transportation, is authorized—

(1) to initiate a United States plan to secure Taiwan’s meaningful participation in ICAO, including in ICAO triennial assembly sessions, conferences, technical working groups, meetings, activities, and mechanisms; and

(2) to instruct the United States representative to the ICAO to—

(A) use the voice and vote of the United States to ensure Taiwan’s meaningful participation in ICAO, including in ICAO triennial assembly sessions, conferences, technical working groups, meetings, activities, and mechanisms; and

(B) seek to secure a vote at the next ICAO triennial assembly session on the question of Taiwan’s participation in that session.

(c) Report concerning Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the International Civil Aviation Organization

Not later than 90 days after December 23, 2022, and not later than April 1 of each year thereafter for the following 6 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives an unclassified report that—

(1) describes the United States plan to ensure Taiwan’s meaningful participation in ICAO, including in ICAO triennial assembly sessions, conferences, technical working groups, meetings, activities, and mechanisms;

(2) includes an account of the efforts made by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce to ensure Taiwan’s meaningful participation in ICAO, including in ICAO triennial assembly sessions, conferences, technical working groups, meetings, activities, and mechanisms; and

(3) identifies the steps the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce will take in the next year to ensure Taiwan’s meaningful participation in ICAO, including in ICAO triennial assembly sessions, conferences, technical working groups, meetings, activities, and mechanisms.

(Pub. L. 117–263, div. E, title LV, § 5519, Dec. 23, 2022, 136 Stat. 3319.)