

of the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act which comprises this chapter.

SUBCHAPTER II—COUNTERING PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S COERCION AND INFLUENCE CAMPAIGNS

§ 3361. Strategy to respond to influence and information operations targeting Taiwan

(a) In general

Not later than 180 days after December 23, 2022, and annually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall develop and implement a strategy to respond to—

(1) covert, coercive, and corrupting activities carried out to advance the Chinese Communist Party's "United Front" work related to Taiwan, including activities directed, coordinated, or otherwise supported by the United Front Work Department or its subordinate or affiliated entities; and

(2) information and disinformation campaigns, cyber attacks, and nontraditional propaganda measures supported by the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party that are directed toward persons or entities in Taiwan.

(b) Elements

The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include descriptions of—

(1) the proposed response to propaganda and disinformation campaigns by the People's Republic of China and cyber-intrusions targeting Taiwan, including—

(A) assistance in building the capacity of Taiwan's public and private-sector entities to document and expose propaganda and disinformation supported by the Government of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party, or affiliated entities;

(B) assistance to enhance Taiwan's ability to develop a holistic strategy to respond to sharp power operations, including election interference; and

(C) media training for Taiwan officials and other Taiwan entities targeted by disinformation campaigns;

(2) the proposed response to political influence operations that includes an assessment of the extent of influence exerted by the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party in Taiwan on local political parties, financial institutions, media organizations, and other entities;

(3) support for exchanges and other technical assistance to strengthen the Taiwan legal system's ability to respond to sharp power operations; and

(4) programs carried out by the Global Engagement Center to expose misinformation and disinformation in the Chinese Communist Party's propaganda.

(Pub. L. 117–263, div. E, title LV, § 5513, Dec. 23, 2022, 136 Stat. 3309.)

§ 3362. Task force to counter economic coercion by the People's Republic of China

(a) Sense of Congress

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the People's Republic of China's (PRC) increasing use of economic coercion against foreign governments, companies, organizations, other entities, and individuals requires that the United States devise a comprehensive, effective, and multilateral response;

(2) the private sector is a crucial partner in helping the United States Government respond to the PRC's coercive economic practices and hold the PRC accountable;

(3) improved engagement and communication with the private sector, including receiving information from the United States private sector about the PRC's coercive economic practices would help the United States Government and private sector stakeholders conduct early assessments of potential pressure points and vulnerabilities; and

(4) PRC coercive economic practices create pressures for the private sector to behave in ways antithetical to United States national interests and competitiveness.

(b) Establishment of Task Force

Not later than 180 days after December 23, 2022, the President shall establish an interagency task force to be known as the "Countering Economic Coercion Task Force" (referred to in this section as the "Task Force").

(c) Duties

(1) In general

The Task Force shall—

(A) oversee the development and implementation of an integrated United States Government strategy to respond to People's Republic of China (PRC) coercive economic practices, which shall include—

(i) systematically monitoring and evaluating—

(I) the costs of such practices on United States businesses and overall United States economic performance;

(II) instances in which such practices taken against a non-PRC entity has benefitted other parties; and

(III) the impacts such practices have had on United States national interests; and

(ii) facilitating coordination among Federal departments and agencies when responding to such practices as well as proactively deterring such economic coercion, including by clarifying the roles for Federal departments and agencies identified in subsection (d) in implementing the strategy; and

(iii) forming policy recommendations for the implementation of relevant United States authorities to respond to instances of PRC coercive economic practices;

(B) consult with United States allies and partners on the feasibility and desirability of collectively identifying, assessing, and responding to PRC coercive economic practices, as well as actions that could be taken

to expand coordination with the goal of ensuring a consistent, coherent, and collective response to such practices and establishing long-term deterrence of such practices;

(C) effectively engage the United States private sector, particularly sectors, groups, or other entities that are susceptible to such PRC coercive economic practices, on concerns related to such practices; and

(D) develop and implement a process for regularly sharing relevant information, including classified information to the extent appropriate and practicable, on such PRC coercive economic practices with United States allies, partners, and the private sector.

(2) Consultation

In carrying out its duties under this subsection, the Task Force should regularly consult, to the extent necessary and appropriate, with the following:

(A) Relevant stakeholders in the private sector.

(B) Federal departments and agencies that are not represented on the Task Force.

(C) United States allies and partners.

(d) Membership

The President shall—

(1) appoint the chair of the Task Force from among the staff of the National Security Council;

(2) appoint the vice chair of the Task Force from among the staff of the National Economic Council; and

(3) determine the Federal departments and agencies that will serve on the task force, and direct the head of those agencies to appoint personnel at the level of Assistant Secretary or above to participate in the Task Force.

(e) Reports

(1) Initial report

Not later than 1 year after December 23, 2022, the Task Force shall submit to Congress a report that includes the following elements:

(A) A comprehensive review of the array of economic tools the Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) employs or could employ in the future to coerce other governments and non-PRC companies (including United States companies) including the Government of the PRC's continued efforts to codify informal practices into its domestic law.

(B) The strategy required by subsection (c)(1)(A).

(C) An interagency definition of PRC coercive economic practices that captures both—

(i) the use of informal or extralegal PRC coercive economic practices; and

(ii) the inappropriate use of economic tools, including those authorized under the laws and regulations of the PRC.

(D) A comprehensive review of the array of tools the United States Government employs or could employ to respond to economic coercion against the government, companies, and other entities of the United States or its allies and partners.

(E) A list of unilateral or multilateral—

(i) preemptive practices to defend or deter against PRC coercive economic practices; and

(ii) actions taken in response to the Government of the PRC's general use of coercive economic practices, including the imposition of costs on the PRC.

(F) An assessment of United States allies and partners key vulnerabilities to PRC coercive economic practices.

(G) A description of gaps in existing resources or capabilities for United States Government departments and agencies to respond effectively to PRC coercive economic practices directed at United States entities and assist United States allies and partners in their responses to PRC coercive economic practices.

(H) An analysis of the circumstances under which the PRC employs different types of economic coercion and against what kinds of targets.

(I) An assessment of United States and international rules and norms as well as any treaty obligations the PRC has stretched, circumvented, or broken through its economically coercive practices and the United States response in each instance.

(2) Interim reports

(A) First interim report

Not later than 1 year after the date on which the report required by paragraph (1) is submitted to Congress, the Task Force shall submit to Congress a report that includes the following elements:

(i) Updates to information required by subparagraphs (A) through (G) of paragraph (1).

(ii) A description of activities conducted by the Task Force to implement the strategy required by subsection (c)(1)(A).

(iii) An assessment of the implementation and effectiveness of the strategy, lessons learned from the past year and planned changes to the strategy.

(B) Second interim report

Not later than 1 year after the date on which the report required by subparagraph (A) is submitted to Congress, the Task Force shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes an update to the elements required under the report required by subparagraph (A).

(3) Final report

Not later than 30 days after the date on which the report required by paragraph (2)(B) is submitted to Congress, the Task Force shall submit to Congress a final report that includes the following elements:

(A) An analysis of PRC coercive economic practices and the cost of such coercive practices to United States businesses.

(B) A description of areas of possible vulnerability for United States businesses and businesses of United States partners and allies.

(C) Recommendations on how to continue the effort to counter PRC coercive economic

practices, including through further coordination with United States allies and partners.

(D) Illustrative examples.

(4) Form

The reports required by this subsection shall be submitted in classified form, but may include an unclassified summary.

(f) Sunset

(1) In general

The Task Force shall terminate at the end of the 60-day period beginning on the date on which the final report required by subsection (e)(3) is submitted to Congress.

(2) Additional actions

The Task force¹ may use the 60-day period referred to in paragraph (1) for the purposes of concluding its activities, including providing testimony to Congress concerning the final report required by subsection (e)(3).

(g) Assistance for countries and entities targeted by the People's Republic of China for economic coercion

The Secretary of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, the United States International Development Finance Corporation, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of the Treasury shall provide appropriate assistance to countries and entities that are subject to coercive economic practices by the People's Republic of China.

(Pub. L. 117-263, div. E, title LV, § 5514, Dec. 23, 2022, 136 Stat. 3310.)

Executive Documents

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COUNTERING ECONOMIC COERCION
TASK FORCE

Memorandum of President of the United States, Dec. 12, 2024, 89 F.R. 102669, provided:

Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, and to improve efforts to respond to coercive economic practices of countries of concern, including the People's Republic of China (PRC), it is hereby ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. Policy. Consistent with section 5514 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117-263, 22 U.S.C. 3362) (the "Act"), I am directing the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Director of the National Economic Council to oversee an inter-agency effort to address the increasing use of economic coercion by countries of concern, including the PRC; to assess potential vulnerabilities of countries, including within their private sectors, to such coercion; and to develop concrete recommendations for a comprehensive, effective, and, as appropriate, multilateral response, including to deter future coercive economic behavior.

SEC. 2. Establishment. There is established within the Executive Office of the President the Countering Economic Coercion Task Force (Task Force).

SEC. 3. Membership. (a) The Task Force shall be chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, or his or her designee, and vice-

chaired by the Director of the National Economic Council, or his or her designee.

(b) In addition to the Chair and the Vice Chair, the Task Force shall consist of representatives from the following executive departments and agencies (agencies), the heads of which shall designate or appoint personnel at the level of Assistant Secretary or above to participate in the Task Force:

- (i) the Department of State;
- (ii) the Department of the Treasury;
- (iii) the Department of Defense;
- (iv) the Department of Justice;
- (v) the Department of Agriculture;
- (vi) the Department of Commerce;
- (vii) the Department of Labor;
- (viii) the Department of Health and Human Services;
- (ix) the Department of Energy;
- (x) the Department of Homeland Security;
- (xi) the Office of the Director of National Intelligence;
- (xii) the Office of the United States Trade Representative;
- (xiii) the Central Intelligence Agency;
- (xiv) the United States Agency for International Development;
- (xv) the Export-Import Bank of the United States;
- (xvi) the Trade and Development Agency;
- (xvii) the United States International Development Finance Corporation; and
- (xviii) other agencies and offices as the President may, from time to time, designate.

SEC. 4. Mission and Function. The Task Force shall work across agencies and offices to oversee the development and implementation of an integrated United States Government strategy to respond to and deter coercive economic practices by countries of concern, including the PRC. That strategy shall include the elements outlined in section 5514(c)(1)(A) of the Act (22 U.S.C. 3362(c)(1)(A)) and shall, consistent with section 5514(c)(2) of the Act (22 U.S.C. 3362(c)(2)), be informed by consultations with relevant stakeholders, including, as necessary and appropriate, stakeholders in the private sector, agencies that are not represented on the Task Force, and foreign allies and partners of the United States. The Task Force shall also perform the other responsibilities set forth in section 5514(c)(1) of the Act (22 U.S.C. 3362(c)(1)).

SEC. 5. Reporting on the Work and Recommendations of the Task Force. (a) Within 180 days of the date of this memorandum [Dec. 12, 2024], the Task Force shall submit to the Congress the initial report described in section 5514(e)(1) of the Act (22 U.S.C. 3362(e)(1)).

(b) Within 1 year of submitting the initial report described in subsection (a) of this section, the Task Force shall submit to the Congress the first interim report described in section 5514(e)(2)(A) of the Act (22 U.S.C. 3362(e)(2)(A)).

(c) Within 1 year of submitting the first interim report described in subsection (b) of this section, the Task Force shall submit to the Congress the second interim report described in section 5514(e)(2)(B) of the Act (22 U.S.C. 3362(e)(2)(B)).

(d) Within 30 days of submitting the second interim report described in subsection (c) of this section, the Task Force shall submit to the Congress the final report described in section 5514(e)(3) of the Act (22 U.S.C. 3362(e)(3)).

(e) The Task Force shall also consolidate any input received and submit periodic recommendations to the President on policies and regulatory actions to address systemic harms from PRC economic coercion.

SEC. 6. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this memorandum shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

- (i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
- (ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b) This memorandum shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

¹ So in original. Probably should be capitalized.

(c) This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

(d) The Attorney General is authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the Federal Register.

J.R. BIDEN, JR.

§ 3363. China censorship monitor and action group

(a) Definitions

In this section:

(1) Appropriate congressional committees

The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(2) Qualified research entity

The term “qualified research entity” means an entity that—

(A) is a nonpartisan research organization or a Federally funded research and development center;

(B) has appropriate expertise and analytical capability to write the report required under subsection (c); and

(C) is free from any financial, commercial, or other entanglements, which could undermine the independence of such report or create a conflict of interest or the appearance of a conflict of interest, with—

(i) the Government of the People’s Republic of China;

(ii) the Chinese Communist Party;

(iii) any company incorporated in the People’s Republic of China or a subsidiary of such company; or

(iv) any company or entity incorporated outside of the People’s Republic of China that is believed to have a substantial financial or commercial interest in the People’s Republic of China.

(3) United States person

The term “United States person” means—

(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or

(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.

(b) China Censorship Monitor and Action Group

(1) In general

The President shall establish an interagency task force, which shall be known as the “China Censorship Monitor and Action Group” (referred to in this subsection as the “Task Force”).

(2) Membership

The President shall take the following actions with respect to the membership of, and participation in, the Task Force:

(A) Appoint the chair of the Task Force from among the staff of the National Security Council.

(B) Appoint the vice chair of the Task Force from among the staff of the National Economic Council.

(C) Determine the Federal departments and agencies that will serve on the Task Force, and direct the head of those agencies to appoint personnel at the level of Assistant Secretary or above to participate in the Task Force.

(3) Responsibilities

The Task Force shall—

(A) oversee the development and execution of an integrated Federal Government strategy to monitor and address the impacts of efforts directed, or directly supported, by the Government of the People’s Republic of China to censor or intimidate, in the United States or in any of its possessions or territories, any United States person, including United States companies that conduct business in the People’s Republic of China, which are exercising their right to freedom of speech; and

(B) submit the strategy developed pursuant to subparagraph (A) to the appropriate congressional committees not later than 120 days after December 23, 2022.

(4) Meetings

The Task Force shall meet not less frequently than twice per year.

(5) Consultations

The Task Force should regularly consult, to the extent necessary and appropriate, with—

(A) Federal agencies that are not represented on the Task Force;

(B) independent agencies of the United States Government that are not represented on the Task Force;

(C) relevant stakeholders in the private sector and the media; and

(D) relevant stakeholders among United States allies and partners facing similar challenges related to censorship or intimidation by the Government of the People’s Republic of China.

(6) Reporting requirements

(A) Annual report

The Task Force shall submit an annual report to the appropriate congressional committees that describes, with respect to the reporting period—

(i) the strategic objectives and policies pursued by the Task Force to address the challenges of censorship and intimidation of United States persons while in the United States or any of its possessions or territories, which is directed or directly supported by the Government of the People’s Republic of China;

(ii) the activities conducted by the Task Force in support of the strategic objectives and policies referred to in clause (i); and

(iii) the results of the activities referred to in clause (ii) and the impact of such ac-