

of the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act which comprises this chapter.

SUBCHAPTER II—COUNTERING PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S COERCION AND INFLUENCE CAMPAIGNS

§ 3361. Strategy to respond to influence and information operations targeting Taiwan

(a) In general

Not later than 180 days after December 23, 2022, and annually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall develop and implement a strategy to respond to—

(1) covert, coercive, and corrupting activities carried out to advance the Chinese Communist Party's "United Front" work related to Taiwan, including activities directed, coordinated, or otherwise supported by the United Front Work Department or its subordinate or affiliated entities; and

(2) information and disinformation campaigns, cyber attacks, and nontraditional propaganda measures supported by the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party that are directed toward persons or entities in Taiwan.

(b) Elements

The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include descriptions of—

(1) the proposed response to propaganda and disinformation campaigns by the People's Republic of China and cyber-intrusions targeting Taiwan, including—

(A) assistance in building the capacity of Taiwan's public and private-sector entities to document and expose propaganda and disinformation supported by the Government of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party, or affiliated entities;

(B) assistance to enhance Taiwan's ability to develop a holistic strategy to respond to sharp power operations, including election interference; and

(C) media training for Taiwan officials and other Taiwan entities targeted by disinformation campaigns;

(2) the proposed response to political influence operations that includes an assessment of the extent of influence exerted by the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party in Taiwan on local political parties, financial institutions, media organizations, and other entities;

(3) support for exchanges and other technical assistance to strengthen the Taiwan legal system's ability to respond to sharp power operations; and

(4) programs carried out by the Global Engagement Center to expose misinformation and disinformation in the Chinese Communist Party's propaganda.

(Pub. L. 117–263, div. E, title LV, § 5513, Dec. 23, 2022, 136 Stat. 3309.)

§ 3362. Task force to counter economic coercion by the People's Republic of China

(a) Sense of Congress

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the People's Republic of China's (PRC) increasing use of economic coercion against foreign governments, companies, organizations, other entities, and individuals requires that the United States devise a comprehensive, effective, and multilateral response;

(2) the private sector is a crucial partner in helping the United States Government respond to the PRC's coercive economic practices and hold the PRC accountable;

(3) improved engagement and communication with the private sector, including receiving information from the United States private sector about the PRC's coercive economic practices would help the United States Government and private sector stakeholders conduct early assessments of potential pressure points and vulnerabilities; and

(4) PRC coercive economic practices create pressures for the private sector to behave in ways antithetical to United States national interests and competitiveness.

(b) Establishment of Task Force

Not later than 180 days after December 23, 2022, the President shall establish an interagency task force to be known as the "Countering Economic Coercion Task Force" (referred to in this section as the "Task Force").

(c) Duties

(1) In general

The Task Force shall—

(A) oversee the development and implementation of an integrated United States Government strategy to respond to People's Republic of China (PRC) coercive economic practices, which shall include—

(i) systematically monitoring and evaluating—

(I) the costs of such practices on United States businesses and overall United States economic performance;

(II) instances in which such practices taken against a non-PRC entity has benefitted other parties; and

(III) the impacts such practices have had on United States national interests; and

(ii) facilitating coordination among Federal departments and agencies when responding to such practices as well as proactively deterring such economic coercion, including by clarifying the roles for Federal departments and agencies identified in subsection (d) in implementing the strategy; and

(iii) forming policy recommendations for the implementation of relevant United States authorities to respond to instances of PRC coercive economic practices;

(B) consult with United States allies and partners on the feasibility and desirability of collectively identifying, assessing, and responding to PRC coercive economic practices, as well as actions that could be taken