

essing of requests from Taiwan under the Foreign Military Sales program, and may not delay the processing of requests for bundling purposes.

(2) Duration

The requirement under paragraph (1) shall continue until the Secretary of State determines and certifies to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that the threat to Taiwan has significantly abated.

(c) Interagency policy

The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly review and update interagency policies and implementation guidance related to Foreign Military Sales requests from Taiwan, including incorporating the preclearance provisions of this section.

(Pub. L. 117-263, div. E, title LV, §5507, Dec. 23, 2022, 136 Stat. 3301.)

Editorial Notes

REFERENCES IN TEXT

This chapter, referred to in subsec. (a)(2)(B), was in the original “this Act”, meaning Pub. L. 117-263, div. E, title LV, subtitle A (§§5501-5540), Dec. 23, 2022, 136 Stat. 3292, known as the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act, which is classified principally to this chapter. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 3351 of this title and Tables.

The Arms Export Control Act, referred to in subsec. (a)(2)(B), is Pub. L. 90-629, Oct. 22, 1968, 82 Stat. 1320, which is classified principally to chapter 39 (§2751 et seq.) of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 2751 of this title and Tables.

§ 3357. Findings and statement of policy

(a) Findings

Congress finds the following:

(1) Advancing peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific has been a central element of United States foreign policy toward the region.

(2) The Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), especially since the election of Tsai Ing-Wen in 2016, has conducted a coordinated campaign to weaken Taiwan diplomatically, economically, and militarily in a manner that threatens to erode United States policy and create a *fait accompli* on questions surrounding Taiwan’s future.

(3) To secure United States interests and preserve the ability of the people of Taiwan to determine their own future, it is necessary to reinforce Taiwan’s diplomatic, economic, and territorial space.

(b) Statement of policy

It is the policy of the United States to—

(1) maintain the position that peace and stability in the Western Pacific are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern; and

(2) work with allies and partners to promote peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific and

deter military acts or other forms of coercive behavior that would undermine regional stability.

(Pub. L. 117-263, div. E, title LV, §5511, Dec. 23, 2022, 136 Stat. 3308.)

§ 3357a. Statement of policy on Taiwan

(a) Statement of policy

Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), it shall be the policy of the United States to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist a *fait accompli* that would jeopardize the security of the people on Taiwan.

(b) *Fait accompli* defined

In this section, the term “*fait accompli*” refers to the resort to force by the People’s Republic of China to invade and seize control of Taiwan before the United States can respond effectively.

(Pub. L. 117-263, div. A, title XII, §1263, Dec. 23, 2022, 136 Stat. 2858.)

Editorial Notes

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The Taiwan Relations Act, referred to in subsec. (a), is Pub. L. 96-8, Apr. 10, 1979, 93 Stat. 14, which is classified generally to chapter 48 (§3301 et seq.) of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 3301 of this title and Tables.

CODIFICATION

Section was enacted as part of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Pub. L. 117-263), but not as part of the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act (Pub. L. 117-263, div. E, title LV, subtitle A) which comprises this chapter.

§ 3357b. Establishment of training, advising, and institutional capacity-building program for military forces of Taiwan

Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and pursuant to section 3353 of this title, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with appropriate officials of Taiwan, shall establish a comprehensive training, advising, and institutional capacity-building program for the military forces of Taiwan using the authorities provided in chapter 16 of title 10 and other applicable statutory authorities available to the Secretary of Defense.

(Pub. L. 118-31, div. A, title XIII, §1309(a), Dec. 22, 2023, 137 Stat. 494.)

Editorial Notes

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The Taiwan Relations Act, referred to in text, is Pub. L. 96-8, Apr. 10, 1979, 93 Stat. 14, which is classified generally to chapter 48 (§3301 et seq.) of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 3301 of this title and Tables.

CODIFICATION

Section was enacted as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, and not as part

¹ So in original. The period probably should not appear.

of the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act which comprises this chapter.

SUBCHAPTER II—COUNTERING PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S COERCION AND INFLUENCE CAMPAIGNS

§ 3361. Strategy to respond to influence and information operations targeting Taiwan

(a) In general

Not later than 180 days after December 23, 2022, and annually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall develop and implement a strategy to respond to—

(1) covert, coercive, and corrupting activities carried out to advance the Chinese Communist Party's "United Front" work related to Taiwan, including activities directed, coordinated, or otherwise supported by the United Front Work Department or its subordinate or affiliated entities; and

(2) information and disinformation campaigns, cyber attacks, and nontraditional propaganda measures supported by the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party that are directed toward persons or entities in Taiwan.

(b) Elements

The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include descriptions of—

(1) the proposed response to propaganda and disinformation campaigns by the People's Republic of China and cyber-intrusions targeting Taiwan, including—

(A) assistance in building the capacity of Taiwan's public and private-sector entities to document and expose propaganda and disinformation supported by the Government of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party, or affiliated entities;

(B) assistance to enhance Taiwan's ability to develop a holistic strategy to respond to sharp power operations, including election interference; and

(C) media training for Taiwan officials and other Taiwan entities targeted by disinformation campaigns;

(2) the proposed response to political influence operations that includes an assessment of the extent of influence exerted by the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party in Taiwan on local political parties, financial institutions, media organizations, and other entities;

(3) support for exchanges and other technical assistance to strengthen the Taiwan legal system's ability to respond to sharp power operations; and

(4) programs carried out by the Global Engagement Center to expose misinformation and disinformation in the Chinese Communist Party's propaganda.

(Pub. L. 117–263, div. E, title LV, § 5513, Dec. 23, 2022, 136 Stat. 3309.)

§ 3362. Task force to counter economic coercion by the People's Republic of China

(a) Sense of Congress

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the People's Republic of China's (PRC) increasing use of economic coercion against foreign governments, companies, organizations, other entities, and individuals requires that the United States devise a comprehensive, effective, and multilateral response;

(2) the private sector is a crucial partner in helping the United States Government respond to the PRC's coercive economic practices and hold the PRC accountable;

(3) improved engagement and communication with the private sector, including receiving information from the United States private sector about the PRC's coercive economic practices would help the United States Government and private sector stakeholders conduct early assessments of potential pressure points and vulnerabilities; and

(4) PRC coercive economic practices create pressures for the private sector to behave in ways antithetical to United States national interests and competitiveness.

(b) Establishment of Task Force

Not later than 180 days after December 23, 2022, the President shall establish an interagency task force to be known as the "Countering Economic Coercion Task Force" (referred to in this section as the "Task Force").

(c) Duties

(1) In general

The Task Force shall—

(A) oversee the development and implementation of an integrated United States Government strategy to respond to People's Republic of China (PRC) coercive economic practices, which shall include—

(i) systematically monitoring and evaluating—

(I) the costs of such practices on United States businesses and overall United States economic performance;

(II) instances in which such practices taken against a non-PRC entity has benefitted other parties; and

(III) the impacts such practices have had on United States national interests; and

(ii) facilitating coordination among Federal departments and agencies when responding to such practices as well as proactively deterring such economic coercion, including by clarifying the roles for Federal departments and agencies identified in subsection (d) in implementing the strategy; and

(iii) forming policy recommendations for the implementation of relevant United States authorities to respond to instances of PRC coercive economic practices;

(B) consult with United States allies and partners on the feasibility and desirability of collectively identifying, assessing, and responding to PRC coercive economic practices, as well as actions that could be taken