

Do not forget, 5 years ago, rioters, incited by President Trump, tried to destroy our democracy.

Trump pardoned, glorified them, even empowering some of them in key administration offices. We cannot allow him to rewrite history.

Do not forget. Police were brutally attacked, injured, and killed for doing their job to enable a peaceful democratic transition of power. They still bear the scars. So does our democracy.

Do not forget democracy is not guaranteed. It cannot be taken for granted. Do not forget it is our duty to remember the truth.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.

Ms. KLOBUCHAR. Mr. President, I rise today with so many of my colleagues to recognize the anniversary of one of the hardest days our democracy has faced, and I also want to focus on some of the work that we have done to respond and the work we still must do.

Five years ago, insurrectionists—they tried to overturn an election. They assaulted our heroic Capital Police officers and attacked not only this building but American democracy itself.

The President wants to rewrite the story of what happened that day, but he wasn't at that Capitol when the violent mob attacked. I was there.

As the incoming chair of the Rules Committee, it was my job and Roy Blunt's job to make sure all of the electoral ballots were counted. That morning began with pomp and circumstance. Senator Blunt and I and the Vice President led a train of elected officials from the Senate to the House to start the ceremony.

Three pairs of young women held the mahogany boxes with the electoral ballots for the entire country and then came the insurrection. We got back here. I remember speaking—my desk was up there. I remember the police telling me that this was happening, and I had to, in my role, tell the Senators to get away from the windows, and we were brought to an undisclosed location.

Capitol Police officers were attacked, pepper-sprayed, clubbed, and trampled. We were in that room together. I remember praying. I remember incoming President Biden on the TV. I remember the Senators trying to call the National Guard to see if anyone could help.

I remember in there coordinating, talking to Senator SCHUMER while Senator Blunt talked to Senator MCCONNELL about what we were going to do. And we vowed that morning, whatever happened, we were going to come back, and we were going to finish our job, no matter what time it was.

So Senator Blunt negotiated the negotiations about the number of objections. I worked on keeping everyone in that room and other things, and then, together, we got it done.

And at 3:30 in the morning, the only Senators left were Senator Blunt and

myself and Vice President Pence, along with those same six women carrying those mahogany boxes from this Chamber to the other. But this time, it wasn't pageantry. It wasn't a parade. It was just the Vice President, Senator Blunt and myself and those boxes. But this time we were walking over broken glass. We were walking past marble pillars spray-painted with racist vulgarities.

But we made the walk. We got to the House. The House Members were there. Speaker PELOSI, at the time, was there waiting for us, and we did our jobs. That was January 6.

Tragically, five brave officers who reported for duty that day ultimately passed away, and the courage of these officers will be remembered forever.

And rewriting of history cannot stand. As we know today, the White House released a web page that described the day as “patriots march to the Capitol” and blamed the Capitol Police, and it doesn't even mention the injuries and the over 100 officers injured.

I remember them in the room protecting the Senators with scratches on their faces.

It was clear that this can never happen again.

Then, as I chaired the Rules Committee, Ranking Member Blunt and I, along with Chair GARY PETERS and Ranking Member Portman from the Homeland Security Committee, immediately launched a bipartisan investigation of what the failures were with security, planning, and response. We had a number of bipartisan hearings that stretched on for just a few months, and then we came out with major recommendations with then-Police Chief Manger, who implemented nearly every single one of them. Hundreds of changes were made.

Never again will police officers who are meant to guard us have worse equipment than people who are trying to invade the Capitol. Never again will they go to a bus and have their gear, their riot gear, locked in the bus. Never again will you hear the haunting words of an officer on the police radio say: “Does anyone have a plan?”

We also had to help protect our democracy against future assaults. I worked on a bipartisan basis to update the antiquated Electoral Count Act in the Senate and helped usher that through, along, again, with Senator Blunt. We worked with the House Members to improve what the insurrectionists thought was some kind of a loophole that they could use to stop the will of the people. That law has now been changed. We worked to get better benefits for our officers, and we worked to change the number of officers to make sure that this wouldn't happen again.

Despite our bipartisan efforts after January 6 to protect this Capitol and our democracy, 5 years later, President Trump and his allies continue, sadly, to spread a false narrative. He has

called January 6 a “day of love.” He has described the prosecutions of people for crimes related to the January 6 attack on the Capitol and on law enforcement as a “grave national injustice.” He has pardoned more than 1,500 criminals.

For this administration, it is the very heroes who defended our Capitol—our democracy—on January 6 whom they now consider a threat. I don't think career Federal prosecutors are terrorists or despicable people, as they have called them. I think they are public servants, and I think they are patriots.

We have seen repeated attacks on access to the ballot box from this administration. We must pass the Freedom to Vote Act, which would guarantee access to the ballot. As we mark the somber fifth anniversary of January 6, we know that democracy only held then because of those who defended the peaceful transfer of power. Those are the people whom we honor today: the Republican Senators who were willing to uphold that vote even though the candidate they supported did not win; the Republican Senators who actually, in this Chamber, spoke out and condemned the coup; the officers who protected us that day from something much worse than the fight that people experienced; and those who ended up dying and those who were injured. Those are the ones whom we honor today, not the insurrectionists.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.

MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. THUNE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate be in a period of morning business, with Senators permitted to speak therein for up to 10 minutes each.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ARMS SALES NOTIFICATION

Mr. RISCH. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification, the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant information is still available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the notifications that have been received. If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such an annex is available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations Committee, room SD-423.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEFENSE SECURITY
COOPERATION AGENCY,
Washington, DC.

Hon. MIKE JOHNSON,
Speaker, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b)(5)(C) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), as amended, we are forwarding Transmittal No. 25-10. This notification relates to enhancements or upgrades from the level of sensitivity of technology or capability described in the Section 36(b)(1) AECA certification 21-17 of May 10, 2021.

Sincerely,

MICHAEL F. MILLER,
Director.

Enclosure.

DEFENSE SECURITY
COOPERATION AGENCY,
Washington, DC.

Hon. JAMES E. RISCH,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b)(5)(C) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), as amended, we are forwarding Transmittal No. 25-10. This notification relates to enhancements or upgrades from the level of sensitivity of technology or capability described in the Section 36(b)(1) AECA certification 21-17 of May 10, 2021.

Sincerely,

MICHAEL F. MILLER,
Director.

Enclosure.

DEFENSE SECURITY
COOPERATION AGENCY,
Washington, DC.

Hon. BRIAN MAST,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b)(5)(C) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), as amended, we are forwarding Transmittal No. 25-10. This notification relates to enhancements or upgrades from the level of sensitivity of technology or capability described in the Section 36(b)(1) AECA certification 21-17 of May 10, 2021.

Sincerely,

MICHAEL F. MILLER,
Director.

Enclosure.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 25-10

Report of Enhancement or Upgrade of Sensitivity of Technology or Capability (Sec. 36(b)(5)(C), AECA)

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of Canada.

(ii) Sec. 36(b)(1), AECA Transmittal No.: 21-17; Date: May 10, 2021; Implementing Agency: Navy.

(iii) Description: On May 10, 2021, Congress was notified by congressional certification transmittal number 21-17 of the possible sale, under Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, of four (4) Shipsets of the AEGIS Combat System (ACS); one (1) AEGIS Combat System Computer Program; four (4) Shipsets of AN/SPY-7 Solid State Radar Components; four (4) Shipsets of Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC); and three (3) Shipsets of the MK 41 Vertical Launch System. Also included were Mode 5/S capable Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) equipment; early ACS development activities for the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) Project to include U.S. Government and contractor representative engineering activities supporting design, integration, testing, technical documentation, modeling, and train-

ing; hardware to support development and testing in U.S. facilities; software; documentation (including combat system capabilities and limitations); training devices and services; technical support; and other related elements of logistical and program support. The estimated total cost was \$1.7 billion. Major Defense Equipment (MDE) constituted \$0.7 billion of this total.

On August 10, 2022, Congress was notified by congressional certification transmittal number 0L-22 of the inclusion of the following MDE items: four (4) shipsets of Global Positioning System Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Service (GPNTS). The estimated total value of the MDE items was \$8 million, but did not cause an increase in the total estimated program cost. The estimated total case value remained \$1.7 billion with MDE remaining \$0.7 billion of this total.

On October 4, 2024, Congress was notified by congressional certification transmittal number 24-0L of the inclusion of the following MDE items: four (4) of AN/WSN-12 Inertial Navigation System (INS); two (2) Tactical Tomahawk Weapon Control System (TTWCS); five (5) Multifunction Information Distribution System Joint Tactical Radio Systems (MIDS JTRS) (4 installed, 1 test asset); four (4) MIDS On Ship Modernized (MOS Mod); two (2) Command and Control Processor (C2P); and four (4) AN/SLQ-32(v)6 Electronic Warfare System (EWS). The following non-MDE items was also included: Global Command and Control System—Maritime (GCCS—Ms), AN/WSN-7 INS; and MK-331 Torpedo Setting Panel (TSPs). The estimated total case value was \$2.6 billion. MDE remained as \$0.7 billion of this total.

This transmittal notifies the inclusion of the following MDE items: four (4) Next Generation Surface Search Radars; four (4) Rolling Airframe Missile Guided Missile Launcher Systems; four (4) Shipboard Panoramic Electro-Optic Infrared (SPEIR) systems; three (3) MK-45 5-inch gun mounts; and five (5) command and control processors. The following non-MDE items will also be included: MK-34 Gun Weapon Systems. The estimated total value of the new items is \$1.3 billion. The estimated total cost of the new MDE items will increase by \$500 million to a revised \$1.2 billion. The estimated total cost of the new non-MDE items will increase by \$800 million to a revised \$2.7 billion. The estimated total case value will increase by \$1.3 billion to a revised \$3.9 billion.

(iv) Significance: This MDE was not included in the previous notification. The inclusion of this MDE represents an increase in capability over what was previously notified. The proposed articles and services will increase Canada's capability to meet current and future threats by incorporating tactical components integrated in the Aegis Combat System and currently fielding in the U.S. Navy.

(v) Justification: This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States by helping to improve the military capability of Canada, a NATO Ally that is an important force for ensuring political stability and economic progress, and a contributor to military, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations around the world.

(vi) This capability will protect Canada by enabling it to neutralize and destroy adversary threats, improving Canada's contribution to collective hemispheric defense and to defense and deterrence in Europe, as directed by NATO's defense plans. Canada will have no difficulty absorbing these articles and services into its armed forces.

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:

Next Generation Surface Search Radar (NGSSR) is the U.S. Navy's multi-mission navigation, surface search and periscope de-

tection radar replacing multiple legacy surface radar systems.

Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) MK-31 Guided Missile Weapon System, including the Guided Missile Launcher System (GMLS), supports all variants of the RAM all-up-round for launch support and integration to multiple combat system configurations, providing terminal shipboard air defense on surface combatants.

Shipboard Panoramic Electro-Optic Infrared (SPEIR) is an electro-optic/infrared (EO/IR) system on surface ships that provides persistent detection and tracking of a wide variety of air and surface targets in support of multi-mission surface ship operations and defense.

The MK-45 gun mount is a fully automatic gun firing a 5-inch shell. It is the U.S. Navy's primary anti-surface gunnery capability also used for anti-air warfare as part of layered defense. It is controlled by the MK-160 Gun Computing System (GCS).

The command and control processor is a shipboard system that provides real-time control and management of Tactical Digital Information Links (TADILs) through interfaces with the host combat system and tactical data link terminals. TADILs include Link-16, Link-22, Satellite TADIL J, and Joint Range Extension.

The MK-34 Gun Weapon System is comprised of the MK-45 gun mount, MK-160 GCS, and MK-20 EO/IR gun sight system (EOSS). The system supports anti-air and antisurface warfare and Naval Gunfire Support through the use of 5-inch rounds and integration to the combat system.

The Sensitivity of Technology Statement contained in the original notification applies to additional items mentioned.

The highest level of classification of defense articles, components, and services included in this potential sale is SECRET.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: December 23, 2025.

ARMS SALES NOTIFICATION

Mr. RISCH. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification, the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant information is still available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the notifications that have been received. If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such an annex is available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations Committee, room SD-423.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEFENSE SECURITY
COOPERATION AGENCY,
Washington, DC.

Hon. JAMES E. RISCH,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b)(5)(A) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), as amended, we are forwarding Transmittal No.