

and helium supplies that we need—that the world needs—flow through the Strait of Hormuz.

You know, in 1973, we had a big oil disruption that involved only 7 percent of oil supplies, but it created a global economic shock that reverberated for 10 years. This one could even be worse. Iran can keep the Strait closed as long as they have access to just enough drones or enough small boats loaded with explosives that keep international shippers, who are fearful of losing cargo and crew, from risking passage.

The costs to American families and businesses from the closing of the Strait from this asymmetric warfare are staggering. Across the country, gas prices at the pump are up at least a dollar. The average American family will pay an additional \$2,000 this year in gas. As a country, we are paying an additional \$2 billion every day—\$2 billion—for the war premium that we have to pay at the pump.

In Vermont and across the country, our farmers are paying up to 35 to 40 percent more for fertilizer. More than a third of global fertilizer supplies have to come through the strait. Just ahead of spring planting season, farms are facing additional tens of thousands of dollars to do business.

Vermont families are also paying a war premium to heat their homes. Heating oil prices are surging from around a little over \$3 a gallon to over \$4.70 a gallon. An average family is going to be facing a \$1,000 additional expense to maintain heat in their homes.

As the Presiding Officer knows, the Pentagon's costs are absolutely staggering. The war is costing at least \$2 billion a day. The Pentagon has told Congress that the first 6 days cost \$11.3 billion, not including many other undisclosed things. The Pentagon, we are told, is going to be requesting a \$200 billion supplemental. That, by the way, is triple the cost of all U.S. weapons that were sent to Ukraine. We are spending \$15 million apiece for THAAD interceptors to shoot down Iranian missiles. We are spending \$4 million apiece for Patriot interceptors that are shooting down Shahed drones that cost \$20,000.

More than 1,300 civilians have already been killed, including over 100 girls by a U.S. strike that went wrong. More than 1,000 have been killed in Lebanon, where Israel, under Netanyahu, is inflicting a relentless attack. That includes more than 100 children.

We have had losses, too, in the United States of brave servicemembers who responded to the call of duty, and I want to acknowledge their service and their loss: MAJ Jeffrey O'Brien, CPT Cody Khork, CW3 Robert Marzan, SFC Noah Tietjens, SFC Nicole Amor, SGT Declan Coady, SGT Benjamin Pennington, Maj. John Klinner, Capt. Ariana Savino, Capt. Seth Koval, Capt. Curtis Angst, TSgt Ashley Pruitt, and TSgt Tyler Simmons.

I also want to pay respects and acknowledge the exemplary service of the Vermont Air National Guard's 158th Fighter Wing. Their critical skills were requested by name and unit. Their unique mission means they are often the first ones in. Vermonters are very proud of the Green Mountain Boys, and we pray for their safe return home.

One of the great accomplishments of this American democracy for the past 250 years—a legacy the Presiding Officer and I are both proud of—is that the strong military we have serves under elected civilian leadership. Citizens volunteer to serve, accepting that they will be deployed at the will of the Commander in Chief and that they will bravely face all the perils required to defend our freedom.

The citizens who serve in the military have accepted their responsibility. The U.S. Senate should do the same—accept our responsibility. Under the Constitution, it is the elected leadership, including the U.S. Senate, that has the responsibility to carefully consider when and whether to commit our citizens to the obligations of war.

Our country is now very deep into this war—the biggest in a generation. Yet the U.S. Senate has not held a single hearing, has not had a single debate, and has not demanded a full account from the Executive as to the war in Iran.

Now we understand the administration is preparing a \$200 billion supplemental funding request for a war that has not even been explained, much less authorized. I will oppose this funding. I will oppose sleepwalking into a forever war. I will oppose funding a war wherein the President has presented no stated objectives or a coherent plan to achieve them. I will oppose funding a war wherein the President has proposed no way to pay for it other than to pile up more debt for our children and grandchildren.

The question before us: Does the United States end this war or do we escalate it?

I oppose a war and funding a war that will make our country less safe and our citizens economically more vulnerable.

This is at the heart of our sworn obligation to uphold the Constitution and fight for the interest of our constituents, of all Americans. This war makes us less safe, less prosperous. This war must end.

I yield the floor.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. McCORMICK). The clerk will call the roll.

The senior assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mrs. MOODY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

RESOLUTIONS SUBMITTED TODAY

Mrs. MOODY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate

now proceed to the en bloc consideration of the following resolutions, which are at the desk, S. Res. 652 and S. Res. 653.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to proceeding to the measures, en bloc?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the resolutions en bloc.

Mrs. MOODY. I now ask unanimous consent that the resolutions be agreed to; the preambles be agreed to; and that the motions to reconsider be considered made and laid upon the table, all en bloc.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The resolutions were agreed to.

The preambles were agreed to.

(The resolutions, with their preambles, are printed in today's RECORD under "Submitted Resolutions.")

ORDERS FOR FRIDAY, MARCH 20, 2026

Mrs. MOODY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it stand adjourned until 12 noon on Friday, March 20; that following the prayer and pledge, the Journal of proceedings be approved to date, the morning hour be deemed expired, the time for the two leaders be reserved for their use later in the day, morning business be closed, and the Senate resume the House message with respect to S. 1383.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mrs. MOODY. Mr. President, for the information of my colleagues, we expect to vote on reconsideration of cloture on the motion to proceed to DHS appropriations at approximately 1 p.m. tomorrow.

ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT

Mrs. MOODY. If there is no further business to come before the Senate, I ask that it stand adjourned under the previous order, following the remarks of Senators LEE, BALDWIN, and KIM.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

MORNING BUSINESS

NOTICE TO SUSPEND RULES

Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, in accordance with rule V of the Standing Rules of the Senate, I hereby provide notice that I intend to move to suspend the operation of rule XXV, paragraph (n)(1) to permit the Committee on Rules and Administration to consider the following motion with respect to the message to accompany S. 1383:

Motion to refer with instructions: That the Message to accompany S. 1383 be referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration with instructions that the Committee considers legislation that funds the Department of Homeland Security, except for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and U.S.

Customs and Border Protection, through fiscal year 2026.

ARMS SALES NOTIFICATION

Mr. RISCH. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification, the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant information is still available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the notifications that have been received. If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such an annex is available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations Committee, room SD-423.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, DC.

TRANSMITTAL OF A DETERMINATION TO CONGRESS

Please find enclosed a Determination and accompanying documentation from the Department of State.

Title of DETERMINATION: Determination under Section 36(b)(1) and 36(c)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act.

Background: Consistent with section 36(b)(1) and 36(c)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, the Department of State wishes to inform you that the Secretary has exercised his delegated authority, as described in the enclosed Memorandum of Justification, to authorize the immediate transfer and licensing of U.S.-origin defense articles to the UAE, Kuwait, and Jordan.

Recipients:

Speaker of the House
President of the Senate
Chairman, SFRC and Ranking Minority Member
Chairman, HFAC and Ranking Minority Member

Sincerely,

PAUL D. GUAGLIANONE,
Senior Bureau Official,
Bureau of Legislative Affairs.

Enclosure.

Memorandum of Justification for Emergency Arms Transfers to the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Jordan, and Licensing Under Section 36(b)(1) and 36(c)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act

On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched a broad and joint operation against the Iranian regime to remove the existential threat it poses to the United States, Israel, the Middle East, and the world. This historic operation is a defining point in the region's military operations and the region's cooperation with the United States in a fight against a destabilizing regime.

Despite the combined successes of Operation Midnight Hammer and Operation Rising Lion to cripple Iran's ability to project power and terror in 2025, the Iranian regime has not abandoned its plans. In the eight months since the Twelve-Day War, the regime has restored damaged nuclear infrastructure, accelerated missile production,

and continued to finance, train, and arm its proxies throughout the Middle East, while at the same time combatting its internal civil crisis and large-scale protests with excessive and deadly force. The combination of accelerated reconstruction of nuclear infrastructure, its ballistic missile stockpile, and its continued circumvention of sanctions created a new reality in the Iranian arena. These trends led to the decision to launch Operation Epic Fury, with the aim of halting the regime's attempts to reconstitute its instruments of power.

The UAE, Kuwait, and Jordan all have sustained and continue to experience hundreds of direct and ongoing ballistic missile and drone strikes since the start of Operation Epic Fury, and they have suffered civilian or military fatalities. In the UAE, Iran has targeted Al Dahfra Air Base, U.S. diplomatic facilities, Emirati airports, ports, and oil infrastructure. In Kuwait, Iran has launched attacks against Embassy Kuwait, Camp Buehring, airport fuel tanks, and government buildings, killing at least seven U.S. service members. In Jordan, Iran has conducted strikes against Muwaffaq Salti Air Base, one of CENTCOM's premier operating bases, the Joint Training Center, and Tower 22, on the Syrian border.

All three countries have demonstrated strong collaboration with CENTCOM to not only protect each country's sovereignty and citizens but also to protect U.S. citizens, U.S. servicemen and women, and U.S. assets in country. The UAE has successfully intercepted most attacks using U.S.-provided layered air defense systems, including Patriot and THAAD. Kuwait has similarly deployed its Patriot air defense system, intercepting over 150 ballistic missiles and hundreds of drone attacks. Jordan has deployed the Royal Jordanian Air Force F-16 fleet to interdict hundreds of Iranian projectiles to protect both its own, as well as Israel's air space.

All three countries are essential defense and security partners, and the United States is committed to ensuring our partners have the means to defend themselves. The departments of State and War are coordinating with the UAE, Kuwait, and Jordan to meet their military requirements and ensure their needs are met to defend their territory and citizens, as well as Americans living, working, and traveling in the region.

Given the scale and scope of the ongoing regional conflict, it is in the U.S. national security interest to swiftly provide the UAE, Kuwait, and Jordan with the systems they require to defend themselves and to reinforce deterrence against other regional threats. The immediacy of the challenge at hand requires overcoming the statutory 30-day Congressional notification timeline to expedite transfers to Jordan, Kuwait, and the UAE.

For the reasons cited above, an emergency exists requiring immediate provision and licensing of these defense articles to the UAE, Kuwait, and Jordan, furthering the national security interest of the United States. These transfers, through foreign military sales and direct commercial sales, will provide needed defense capabilities to the UAE, Kuwait, and Jordan as soon as possible. The Secretary of State, therefore, has certified an emergency exists under sections 36(b)(1) and 36(c)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. 2776, thereby waiving the Congressional review requirement of these provisions.

TRANSMITTAL NO. RSAT 26-49

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of the United Arab Emirates.
(ii) Total Estimated Value:

Major Defense Equipment* \$1.05 billion.

Other \$0.17 billion.

Total \$1.22 billion.

Funding Source: National Funds.

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:

Major Defense Equipment (MDE):

Four hundred (400) AIM-120C-7 or AIM-120C-8 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMs).

Eight (8) AIM-120C-8 AMRAAM guidance sections.

Non-MDE:

The following non-MDE items will also be included: AMRAAM control sections, storage containers, and support equipment; spare parts, consumables and accessories, and repair and return support; classified and unclassified software; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

(iv) Military Department: Air Force (AE-D-YAI).

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: AE-D-YAC.

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None known at this time.

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: March 19, 2026.

* As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

United Arab Emirates—Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles

(U) The Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has requested to buy four hundred (400) AIM-120C-7 or AIM-120C-8 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMs); and eight (8) AIM-120C-8 AMRAAM guidance sections. The following non-major defense equipment items will also be included: AMRAAM control sections, storage containers, and support equipment; spare parts, consumables and accessories, and repair and return support; classified and unclassified software; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is \$1.22 billion.

(U) This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States by improving the security of a major defense partner. The UAE is a force for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East.

(U) The proposed sale will improve UAE's capability to meet current and future threats by ensuring it has modern and capable air-to-air munitions. This sale will further advance the high level of UAE Air Force interoperability with U.S. Joint Forces and other regional and forces. The UAE will have no difficulty absorbing these articles and services into its armed forces.

(U) The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

(U) The principal contractor will be RTX Corporation, located in Arlington, VA. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

(U) Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to UAE.

(U) There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 26-49

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act

Annex Item No. vii

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:

1. The AIM-120C-7/C-8 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) is a supersonic, air launched, aerial intercept, guided missile featuring digital technology and micro-miniature solid-state electronics. AMRAAM capabilities include look-down/shoot-down, multiple launches against multiple targets, resistance to electronic countermeasures, and interception of high and low flying and maneuvering targets. The AIM-120C-8 is a form, fit, and function refresh of the AIM-120C-7 and is the next generation to be produced. This potential sale will include AMRAAM guidance and control sections, spares, and containers.

2. The highest level of classification of defense articles, components, and services included in this potential sale is SECRET.

3. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the information could be used to develop countermeasures that might reduce system effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or advanced capabilities.

4. A determination has been made that the United Arab Emirates can provide substantially the same degree of protection for the sensitive technology being released as the U.S. Government. This proposed sale is necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined in the Policy Justification.

5. All defense articles and services listed in this transmittal have been authorized for release and export to the Government of the United Arab Emirates.

TRANSMITTAL NO. RSAT 25-01

Report of Enhancement or Upgrade of Sensitivity of Technology or Capability (Sec. 36(B)(5)(C), AECA)

(i) (U) Prospective Purchaser: Government of the United Arab Emirates.

(ii) (U) Sec. 36(b)(1), AECA Transmittal No.: 19-37; Date: May 3, 2019; Implementing Agency: Army; Funding Source: National Funds.

(iii) (U) Description: On May 3, 2019, Congress was notified by congressional certification transmittal number 19-37, of the possible sale, under Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, of up to four hundred fifty-two (452) PATRIOT Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) Missiles Segment Enhancement (MSE). Also included were tools and test equipment; support equipment; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; spare and repair parts; facility design; U.S. Government and contractor technical, engineering, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics, sustainment, and program support. The estimated total value was \$2.728 billion, which included \$0.028 billion for non-Major Defense Equipment (MDE) items. MDE constituted \$2.7 billion of this total.

(U) On September 28, 2021, Congress was notified by congressional certification transmittal number 21-0C, of the inclusion of an additional five hundred ten (510) Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) Missiles Segment Enhanced (MSE) (included 10 fly-to-buy missiles). The following non-MDE items were also included: tools and test equipment, support equipment, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, spare and repair parts, facility design, U.S. Government and con-

tractor technical, engineering, and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics, sustainment and program support. The estimated total value of the new items was \$3.172 billion. This value included \$2.728 billion in MDE value and \$0.444 billion in non-MDE value that was added to the previously notified estimated total value of \$2.728 billion. The revised estimated total value was \$5.90 billion. MDE constituted \$5.428 billion of this total.

(U) This transmittal notifies an increase in value, due to recent cost increases. There are no additional MDE or non-MDE items being reported with this notification. The previously notified estimated non-MDE value of \$444 million will increase by \$28 million to a revised \$472 million. The estimated MDE value will increase by \$5.532 billion to a revised \$10.96 billion. The estimated total value will increase by \$5.56 billion to a revised \$11.46 billion.

(iv) (U) Significance: Recent cost increases have brought about the need to add value to the previous notification. The proposed sale will support the United Arab Emirates' ability to maintain a reserve stock of PAC-3 MSE missiles, to ensure adequate capability to defend their homeland from regional threats.

(v) (U) Justification: This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of an important ally which has been, and continues to be, a force for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East. This sale is consistent with U.S. initiatives to provide key allies in the region with modern systems that will enhance interoperability with U.S. forces and increase security.

(vi) (U) Date Report Delivered to Congress: March 19, 2026.

TRANSMITTAL NO. RSAT 25-70

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

(i) (U) Prospective Purchaser: Government of the United Arab Emirates

(ii) (U) Total Estimated Value:

Major Defense Equipment* \$0.95 billion.

Other \$1.15 billion.

Total \$2.10 billion.

Funding Source: National Funds.

(iii) (U) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase: The Government of United Arab Emirates has requested to buy ten (10) Fixed Site-Low, Slow, Small Unmanned Aircraft System Integrated Defeat System (FS-LIDS), Systems of Systems to include:

Major Defense Equipment (MDE):

Two hundred forty (240) Coyote Block 2 All-Up-Rounds.

Non-Major Defense Equipment:

The following non-MDE items will also be included: Ku Band Multi-Function Radio Frequency System (KuMRFS) radars; Coyote launcher systems (4-pack launcher); Electro Optical Infrared (EO/IR) cameras; AN/PYQ-10 Simple Key Loaders; Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control (FAAD C2) systems; support and test equipment; integration and test support; spare and repair parts; communications equipment; software delivery and support; facilities and construction support; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; studies and surveys; maintenance services; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

(iv) (U) Military Department: Army (AE-B-ZEF).

(v) (U) Prior Related Cases, if any: None.

(vi) (U) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None known at this time.

(vii) (U) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex.

(viii) (U) Date Report Delivered to Congress: March 19, 2026.

*As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

(U) United Arab Emirates—Fixed Site-Low, Slow, Small Unmanned Aircraft Integrated Defeat System

(U) The Government of the United Arab Emirates has requested to buy ten (10) Fixed Site-Low, Slow, Small Unmanned Aircraft Integrated Defeat System (FS-LIDS) System of Systems, to include: two hundred forty (240) Coyote Block 2 All-Up-Rounds; Ku Band Multi-Function Radio Frequency System (KuMRFS) radars; Coyote launcher systems (4-pack launcher); Electro Optical Infrared (EO/IR) Cameras; AN/PYQ-10 Simple Key Loaders; Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control (FAAD C2) systems; support and test equipment; integration and test support; spare and repair parts; communications equipment; software delivery and support; facilities and construction support; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; studies and surveys; maintenance services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is \$2.10 billion.

(U) This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a major defense partner. The UAE is a force for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East.

(U) The proposed sale will improve the United Arab Emirates' ability to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity to meet its national defense requirements. The United Arab Emirates will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment and services into its armed forces.

(U) The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

(U) The principal contractors will be RTX Corporation, located in Tewksbury, MA; Northrop Grumman, located in Huntsville, AL; and SRC Corporation, located in Syracuse, NY. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

(U) Implementation of this proposed sale will require the temporary assignment of four U.S. Government and eight U.S. contractor representatives to the UAE for a duration of five years to support fielding, training, and sustainment activities.

(U) There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 25-70

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act

Annex Item No. vii

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:

6. (U) The Fixed Site-Low, Slow, Small Unmanned Aircraft Integrated Defeat System (FS-LIDS) is a Counter Unmanned Aircraft System of Systems capable of detecting and defeating evolving and proliferating unmanned aircraft system threats through both kinetic and electromagnetic warfare means.

7. (U) The Ku Band Multifunction Radio Frequency System (KuMURFS) is a multifunction radar. The radar is capable of providing simultaneous C-UAS and Counter-Rocket, Artillery and Mortar (C-RAM) Air Surveillance and effector support missions. It provides three-dimensional target location to provide situational awareness for command-and-control systems and guidance used by the Block-2 Interceptor.

8. (U) The Coyote Launcher is a rail launching kinetic defeat system that deploys interceptors from an A-size sonobuoy tube or Common Launch Tube. The launch system is designed for distributed system setup ensuring maximum base and critical site protection.

9. (U) The Coyote Interceptor is a high speed, highly maneuverable, semi-active guided airframe with a proximity blast fragmentation warhead. It provides a kinetic defeat capability with a proximity blast fragmentation warhead against Counter Unmanned Aircraft threats. It contains an Electronic Safe and Arming Device (ESAD) fuze, providing extensive environmental safety features including terminal air arming and re-attack to increase probability of kill.

10. (U) The Electro-Optical/Infra-Red (EO/IR) camera used to identify Unmanned Aircraft System tracks through enhanced visual identification. It provides secondary location verification, identification and classification of the Unmanned Aircraft Systems and ground stations. The camera contains plug-and-flight, open architecture, is mission configurable, and offers a day and night surveillance system.

11. (U) The AN/PYQ-10 (C) Simple Key Loader (SKL) is a ruggedized, portable, handheld fill device used for securely receiving, storing, and transferring electronic key material and data between compatible end cryptographic units (ECU) and communications equipment. It supports both the DS-101 and DS-102 interfaces, as well as the Crypto Ignition Key and is compatible with existing ECUs.

12. (U) The Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control (FAAD C2) is a command-and-control station that provides engagement operations, aircraft avoidance and fratricide prevention. FAAD C2 enables Air Defense mission command system integration and Tactical Data Link interoperability with Link 16. FAAD C2 is the integration point for a single operator to receive detection alerts and information from connected peripherals like radar, radio frequency detector antennas and external data feeds, activate mitigation techniques that include kinetic and non-kinetic options and provides situational awareness, alerts, and battlefield dissemination as directed. FAAD C2 supports integration of multiple weapon systems, to include the High Energy Laser Weapon System (HELWS) being purchased by the United Arab Emirates via Direct Commercial Sales (DCS). As requested, the scope of this proposed sale will be limited to only the integration of the DCS HELWS component by which the FAAD C2 operator tracks incoming CUAS threats and issues commands to the HELWS operator station to then initiate engagements.

13. (U) The Air and Missile Defense Workstation (AMDWS) is the force operations software that provides planning and situational awareness capabilities for air-defense sensor/weapon emplacement; projects Airspace Control Measures (ACM) to create a near-real time, three-dimensional Single Integrated Air Picture (SIAP); and connects air-defense systems to facilitate Joint and Multinational interoperability.

14. (U) The highest level of classification of defense articles, components, and services included in this potential sale is SECRET.

15. (U) if a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the information could be used to develop countermeasures that might reduce system effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or advanced capabilities.

16. (U) A determination has been made that the United Arab Emirates can provide substantially the same degree of protection for the sensitive technology being released as the U.S. Government. This proposed sale is necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined in the Policy Justification.

17. (U) All defense articles and services listed in this transmittal have been authorized for release and export to the Government of United Arab Emirates.

TRANSMITTAL NO. RSAT 25-1N

Report of Enhancement or Upgrade of Sensitivity of Technology or Capability (Sec. 36(b)(5)(c), AECA)

(i) (U) Prospective Purchaser: Government of the United Arab Emirates.

(ii) (U) Sec. 36(b)(1), AECA Transmittal No.: 15-51; Date: November 4, 2015; Implementing Agency: Air Force.

Funding Source: National Funds.

(iii) (U) Description: On November 4, 2015, Congress was notified by congressional certification transmittal number 15-51 of the possible sale, under Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, of three thousand two hundred and fifty (3,250) GBU-31V1 (KMU-556 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) kits); three thousand two hundred and fifty (3,250) MK-84/BLU-117 bombs; seven hundred and fifty (750) GBU-31V3 (KMU-557 JDAM kits); seven hundred and fifty (750) BLU-109 bombs; one thousand (1,000) GBU-12 Paveway II Laser Guided bomb kits; one thousand and two (1,002) MK-82/BLU-111 bombs; four thousand two hundred and fifty (4,250) FMU-152 fuzes; two hundred and sixteen (216) GBU-24 tail kits (BSU-84); non-Major Defense Equipment (MDE) related munitions items (fuzes and bomb components), sustainment, and support. The estimated total cost was \$380 million, and the estimated total MDE cost was \$365 million.

(U) On August 25, 2022, Congress was notified by congressional certification transmittal number 20-0M of the inclusion of the following additional MDE items and support items: eight-hundred (800) GBU-56V1 Laser Joint Direct Attack Munitions (LJDAM) (consisting of eight-hundred (800) KMU-556 tail kits; eight-hundred (800) DSU-40 Laser Sensors, and eight-hundred (800) MK-84 bombs); two-hundred (200) GBU-56V3 Laser JDAMs (consisting of two-hundred (200) KMU-557 tail kits; two-hundred (200) DSU-42 Laser Sensors, and two-hundred (200) BLU-109 bombs; three-thousand (3,000) FMU-139 fuzes; and associated munitions support items. The total cost of the new MDE articles was \$69 million, and did not result in a net increase in the total cost of MDE. The total case value remained \$380 million.

(U) This transmittal notifies the inclusion of the following MDE items: up to two thousand seven hundred fifty (2,750) KMU-572 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) tail kits. The following non-MDE items will also be included: cartridges, chaffs, and flares; DSU-38 Laser Sensors; FMU-139 fuzes; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total value of the new items and services is \$345 million. The estimated non-MDE value will increase by \$94 million to a revised \$109 million. The estimated MDE value will increase by \$251 million to a revised \$616 million. The estimated total case value will increase by \$345 million to a revised \$725 million.

(iv) (U) Significance: This notification is being provided because the additional MDE and non-MDE items represent an increase in capability over what was previously notified. The proposed sale increases UAE's ability to achieve more exact targeting over a wide range of conditions and greater interoperability with the U.S. Air Force.

(v) (U) Justification: This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States by helping to improve the security of an important regional partner. The UAE continues to be a vital U.S. partner for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East.

(vi) (U) Sensitivity of Technology: The Sensitivity of Technology Statement contained in the original notification applies to items reported here.

(U) The highest level of classification of defense articles, components, and services included in this potential sale is SECRET.

(vii) (U) Date Report Delivered to Congress: March 19, 2026.

TRANSMITTAL NO. RSAT 26-41

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of the United Arab Emirates.

(ii) Total Estimated Value:

Major Defense Equipment * \$3.5 billion.

Other \$1.0 billion.

Total \$4.5 billion.

Funding Source: National Funds.

(ii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:

Major Defense Equipment (MDE):

One (1) Long-range discrimination radar integrated with Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD).

Twelve (12) Sentinel A4 uplinkers.

Two (2) THAAD C3 Fire Control and Communications (TFCC) tactical operations stations.

Two (2) THAAD C3 TFCC launch and control stations.

Non-Major Defense Equipment:

(U) The following non-MDE items will also be included: array faces; subarray suites; active elements; synthesizer cabinets; local oscillator distribution cabinets; environmental control unit cabinets; power conversion cabinets; energy storage cabinets; radar processor group cabinets; mission processor group cabinets; display consoles; auxiliary cooling group 500-ton chillers; five years of sustainment support; construction; training; publications and technical data; encryptors; communications and communications security equipment; U.S. Government and contractor technical assistance; spares; training devices; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

(iv) Military Department: Missile Defense Agency (AE-I-UBF).

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: None.

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None known at this time.

Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: March 19, 2026.

*As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

United Arab Emirates—Long-Range Discrimination Radar with Terminal High Altitude Area Defense Integration

(U) The Government of the United Arab Emirates has requested to buy one (1) long-range discrimination radar integrated with Terminal High Altitude Area Defense

(THAAD); twelve (12) Sentinel A4 uplinkers; two (2) THAAD C3 Fire Control and Communications (TFCC) tactical operations stations; and two (2) THAAD C3 TFCC launch and control stations. The following non-major defense equipment items will also be included: array faces; subarray suites; active elements; synthesizer cabinets; local oscillator distribution cabinets; environmental control unit cabinets; power conversion cabinets; energy storage cabinets; radar processor group cabinets; mission processor group cabinets; display consoles; auxiliary cooling group 500-ton chillers; five years of sustainment support; construction; training; publications and technical data; encryptors; communications and communications security equipment; U.S. Government and contractor technical assistance; spares; training devices; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is \$4.5 billion.

(U) This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States by helping to improve the security of an important regional partner. The United Arab Emirates continues to be a vital U.S. partner for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East.

(U) This proposed sale will improve the United Arab Emirate's capability to meet current and future threats in the region by expanding the defended area to 360 degrees which benefits the U.S. and its partners. The United Arab Emirates will have no difficulty absorbing these articles and services into its armed forces.

(U) The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

(U) The principal contractor will be Lockheed Martin Corporation, located in Moorestown, NJ, and Huntsville, AL. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

(U) Implementation of this proposed sale will require the assignment of four (4) additional U.S. Government and ten (10) contractor representatives to the United Arab Emirates for a duration of three (3) years to support the construction, integration, and delivery phases of the program.

(U) There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 26-41

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act

Annex Item No. vii

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:

18. (U) The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system is the first weapon system with both endo and exo-atmospheric capability developed specifically to defend against ballistic missiles. The higher altitude and theater wide protection offered by THAAD provides more protection of larger areas than lower-tier systems alone. THAAD is designed to defend against short, medium, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. The THAAD system consists of four major components: fire control/communications, radar, launchers, and interceptors.

19. (U) The long-range discrimination radar (LRDR) is a software defined scalable, modular, and extensible family of radars that include ground-based, transportable, and ship-based variants. The LRDR-Middle East (ME) is a ground-based variant of the U.S. To address the entire United Arab Emirates threat set, LRDR-ME will contain software technology from the U.S. variants as well as LRDR software technology.

20. (U) The Sentinel A4 is a medium-range air defense active electronically scanned array radar developed to track airborne systems and artillery/mortar threats. It is a U.S. Army program of record, currently in low-rate initial production for nineteen units. The Sentinel array will need to be fully populated with transmit/receive modules to provide link margin throughout the entire THAAD kinematic envelope.

21. (U) In the LRDR-THAAD integrated weapon system, there is a need to provide the THAAD interceptor with updates during flyout. Sentinel A4, a mobile, rotating radar, will be used as an X-band uplinker for the THAAD interceptors. This solution will provide in-flight target updates to the interceptor and receive downlinks for interceptor status. Each additional launch site (remote or co-located) will have a dedicated Sentinel to provide dedicated communications with an interceptor from that launch site.

22. (U) The highest level of classification of defense articles, components, and services included in this potential sale is SECRET.

23. (U) If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the information could be used to develop countermeasures that might reduce system effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or advanced capabilities.

24. (U) A determination has been made that the United Arab Emirates can provide substantially the same degree of protection for the sensitive technology being released as the U.S. Government. This proposed sale is necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined in the Policy Justification.

25. (U) All defense articles and services listed in this transmittal have been authorized for release and export to the Government of the United Arab Emirates.

TRANSMITTAL NO. RSAT 26-46

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of the United Arab Emirates.

(ii) Total Estimated Value:
Major Defense Equipment* \$361 million.

Other \$283 million.

Total \$644 million.

Funding Source: National Funds.

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:

Major Defense Equipment (MDE):

Three (3) GBU-39/B inert practice bombs.

One thousand five hundred (1,500) GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bombs Increment I.

Nine hundred (900) KMU-556 Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) guidance sets.

Three hundred (300) KMU-557 JDAM guidance sets.

Non-MDE:

(U) The following non-MDE items will also be included: GBU-39 tactical training rounds; FMU-139 fuze systems; DSU-42 and DSU-40 laser illuminated target detectors; ground support system for Link 16; AN/PYQ-10 Simple Key Loaders; KG-250 Link Encryptors; precision navigation; Joint Mission Planning System with unique planning components and software; aircraft maintenance support equipment; spare and repair parts, consumables and accessories, and repair and return support; weapons and weapons support equipment; test equipment; training aids, devices, and spare parts; classified and unclassified software and software support; classified and unclassified publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; transportation support; aerial refueling; U.S. Government and

contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

(iv) Military Department: Air Force (AE-D-QAQ; AE-D-YAH); Navy (AE-P-LAQ).

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: AE-D-SAA; AE-D-AAD; AE-D-AAF; AE-D-QAA; AE-D-QAJ; AE-D-YAC; AE-D-YAF; AE-D-YAB.

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None known at this time.

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: March 19, 2026.

*As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

United Arab Emirates—F-16 Upgrades

(U) The Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has requested to buy three (3) GBU-39/B inert practice bombs; one thousand five hundred (1,500) GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bombs Increment I; nine hundred (900) KMU-556 Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) guidance sets; and three hundred (300) KMU-557 JDAM guidance sets. The following non-major defense equipment items will also be included: GBU-39 tactical training rounds; FMU-139 fuze systems; DSU-42 and DSU-40 laser illuminated target detectors; ground support system for Link 16; AN/PYQ-10 Simple Key Loaders; KG-250 Link Encryptors; precision navigation; Joint Mission Planning System with unique planning components and software; aircraft maintenance support equipment; spare and repair parts, consumables and accessories, and repair and return support; weapons and weapons support equipment; test equipment; training aids, devices, and spare parts; classified and unclassified software and software support; classified and unclassified publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; transportation support; aerial refueling; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is \$644 million.

(U) This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States by improving the security of a major defense partner. The UAE is a force for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East.

(U) The proposed sale will improve the UAE's ability to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity to meet its national defense requirements. The UAE will have no difficulty absorbing these articles and services into its armed forces. (U) The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

(U) The principal contractor will be Lockheed Martin, located in Greenville, SC. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

(U) Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to UAE.

(U) There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 26-46

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act

Annex Item No. vii

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:

26. The GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bomb Increment I (SDB-I) all-up-round is a 250-lb Global Positioning System/Inertial Navigation System (GPS/INS) aided small autonomous, day or night, adverse weather, conventional, air-to-ground precision glide weapon able to strike fixed and stationary relocatable non-hardened targets from standoff ranges. The SDB system employs a smart carriage capable of carrying four 250-lb class guided air-to-surface munitions. They are capable of destroying high-priority fixed and stationary targets from Air Force fighters and bombers in internal bays or on external hard-points. The SDB increases aircraft loadout, decreases the logistical footprint, decreases collateral damage, and improves aircraft sortie generation times. This potential sale includes GBU-39/B inert practice bombs, and GBU-39/B inert tactical training rounds.

27. The Joint Direct-Attack Munition (JDAM) consist of a bomb body paired with a warhead specific tail kit containing a GPS/INS guidance capability that converts unguided free-fall bombs into accurate, adverse weather "smart" munitions. The JDAM weapon can be delivered from modest standoff ranges at high or low altitudes against a variety of land and surface targets during the day or night. The JDAM can receive target coordinates via preplanned mission data from the delivery aircraft, by on-board aircraft sensors (i.e., forward-looking-infrared, radar, etc.) during captive carry, or from a third-party source via manual or automated aircrew cockpit entry.

28. The AN/APQ-10 Simple Key Loader is a handheld fill device for securely receiving, storing, and transferring data between cryptographic and communications equipment.

29. The KG-250 are high-security, network encryptor.

30. The Joint Mission Planning System is a multi-platform personal computer based mission planning system.

31. The highest level of classification of defense articles, components, and services included in this potential sale is SECRET.

32. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the information could be used to develop countermeasures that might reduce system effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or advanced capabilities.

33. A determination has been made that the United Arab Emirates can provide substantially the same degree of protection for the sensitive technology being released as the U.S. Government. This proposed sale is necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined in the Policy Justification.

All defense articles and services listed in this transmittal have been authorized for release and export to the Government of the United Arab Emirates.

TRANSMITTAL NO. RSAT 26-0R

Report of Enhancement or Upgrade of Sensitivity of Technology or Capability (Sec. 36(b)(5)(C), AECA)

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of the United Arab Emirates.

(ii) Sec. 36(b)(1), AECA Transmittal No.: 24-118; Date: May 12, 2025; Implementing Agency: Army.

Funding Source: National Funds.

(iii) (U) Description: On May 12, 2025, Congress was notified by congressional certification transmittal number 24-118 of the possible sale under Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, of six (6) CH-47F Block II Chinook helicopters with air-to-air refuel probe capability and extended range fuel tanks; sixteen (16) T-55-GA-714A engines (12

installed, 4 spares); fourteen (14) embedded Global Positioning System (GPS)/Inertial Navigation System (INS) (EGI) devices with M-Code (12 installed, 2 spares); eight (8) AN/AAR-57 Common Missile Warning Systems (CMWS) (6 installed, 2 spares); twenty (20) AN/ARC-231A communications security (COMSEC) radios (18 installed, 2 spares); and twenty (20) M-240 machine guns (18 installed, 2 spares). The following items were also included: CMWS classified software; AN/APR-39A radar warning receivers; AN/AVR-2B laser detecting sets; AN/ARC-220 high frequency radios; KY-100M COMSEC terminals; aircraft survivability equipment (including impulse cartridges for cable cutters and aircraft cartridges); AN/ARN-147 Very High Frequency Omni Directional Radio Range/Instrument Landing System (VOR/ILS) receivers; WESCAM MX-15HDI electro-optical/infrared imaging systems; AN/ARN-153 Tactical Airborne Navigation System (TACAN) radios; AN/APN-209 radar altimeters; AN/APX-123A Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) transponders; KIV-77 COMSEC IFF cryptographic appliques; AN/PYQ-10 Simple Key Loaders; services to support the mission equipment; hardware and services required to implement partner-unique modifications; Fast Rope Insertion/Extraction Systems (FRIES); Internal Extended Range Fuel Systems (ERFS); inflight refueling capability; firefighting equipment; ballistic armor protection systems; air worthiness support; spare and repair parts; communications equipment; personnel training and training equipment; site surveys; tool and test equipment; ground support equipment; repair and return; publications and technical documentation; Quality Assurance Team (QAT); U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total value was \$1.32 billion. Major defense equipment (MDE) constituted \$0.65 billion of this total.

(U) This transmittal notifies the inclusion of the following MDE items: two (2) CH-47 Block II aircraft with air-to-air refuel probe capability and extended range fuel tanks; six (6) T55-GA-714A engines; four (4) AN/AAR-57 CMWS; eight (8) ARC-231A, RT-1987 COMSEC radios; six (6) embedded GPS/INS (EAGLE-M); and six (6) M240H machine guns. The following non-MDE items will also be included: CMWS classified software update; AVR-2B laser detecting sets; aircraft survivability equipment; AN/APX-119; WESCAM MX-15HDI; ARN-147 VOR/ILS receivers; ARN-153 TACAN radios; APN-209 receiver transmitters; APN-209 indicators; AN/ARC-220 high frequency radios; KIV-77 COMSEC IFF cryptographic appliques; AN/PYQ-10 simple key loaders; FliteScene license; Improved Data Modem-401; Infrared Suppression System; FRIES; ERFS; firefighting equipment; ballistic armor protection system; air worthiness support; spare and repair parts; communications equipment; personnel training and training equipment; site surveys; tool and test equipment; ground support equipment; repair and return services; publications and technical documentation; QAT; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total value of the new items is \$1.40 billion. The estimated MDE value will increase by \$1.0 billion to a revised \$1.65 billion. The estimated non-MDE value will increase by \$0.40 billion to a revised \$1.07 billion. The estimated total case value will increase by \$1.40 billion to a revised \$2.72 billion. MDE constitutes \$1.65 billion of this total.

(iv) (U) Significance: This notification accounts for requested additional MDE and non-MDE items not included in the original

notification. The inclusion of this MDE and non-MDE represents an increase in capability over what was previously notified. These items will improve the United Arab Emirates's ability to address current and future threats by extending flight operation ranges, enabling capabilities for search and rescue, disaster relief, humanitarian support, and counterterrorism operations.

(v) (U) Justification: This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States by helping to improve the security of an important regional partner. The United Arab Emirates continues to be a vital U.S. partner for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East.

(vi) Sensitivity of Technology:

The Sensitivity of Technology Statement contained in the original notification applies to the additional items reported here.

The highest level of classification of defense articles, components, and services included in this potential sale is SECRET.

(vii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: March 19, 2026.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TRANSMITTAL
NO. DDTC 24-116

Certification of Proposed Issuance of an Export License Pursuant to Section 36(c) of the Arms Export Control Act

(1) Foreign Country or International Organization to Which Export Will Be Made: UAE.

(2) Dollar Value of the Proposed Export:

(a) Current Notification Value: \$36,943,245.

(b) Total Value: \$370,852,711.

(3) Description of the Transaction:

(a) Current license application: Tenaya Corporation proposes a technical assistance agreement with General Atomics Global Ltd. in UAE to transfer defense articles, defense services, and technical data to support delivery and operation of the Predator XP Unmanned Aircraft System for end-use by the UAE Armed Forces. Other signatories to the agreement are identified in Attachment 1. This amendment request increases the value, adds a signatory, and adds Jordan as a transfer territory.

(b) Total scope: This ongoing program was previously notified under DDTC 13-114 for \$219,768,480 on February 06, 2015. This ongoing program was re-notified under DDTC 19-048 for \$278,439,466 on August 13, 2020, and was again re-notified under DDTC 22-059 for \$333,909,466 on November 15, 2023.

(c) A discussion on regional security balance was forwarded under a separate cover on 11/14/2022.

(4) Offset Arrangement: The expected obligation is 60% of the contract value. The specifics of the offset program execution are undetermined and will be defined in later negotiations and may include both direct and indirect offsets.

(5) Authorized Sales Territory: Not applicable.

(6) Date Certification Delivered to Congress: March 19, 2026.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TRANSMITTAL
NO. DDTC 26-005

Certification of Proposed Issuance of an Export License Pursuant to Section 36(c) of the Arms Export Control Act

(1) Foreign Country or International Organization to Which Export Will Be Made: Canada, Israel, Turkey, UAE, UK.

(2) Dollar Value of the Proposed Export:

(c) Current Notification Value: \$0.

(d) Total Value: \$121,500,000.

(3) Description of the Transaction:

(d) Current license application: L3Harris Technologies, Inc. proposes to amend a technical assistance agreement with Calidus Aerospace, LLC in the UAE to transfer defense articles, defense services, and technical

data to support the design, development, sustainment, and integration of the Mission Management System (MMS) for the B-250 and B-350 light attack aircraft for end-use by the Armed Forces of the UAE. Other signatories to the agreement are identified in Attachment 1. This amendment request adds Turkey as a territory, seven foreign signatories, and extends the term of the agreement.

(e) Total scope: This ongoing program was previously notified under DDTC 22-024 for \$121,500,000 on April 6, 2023.

(f) A discussion on regional security balance was forwarded under a separate cover on 07/22/2022.

(4) Offset Arrangement: Yes. The value and nature of the offsets (e.g., direct or indirect) remain under negotiation.

(5) Authorized Sales Territory: Not applicable.

(6) Date Certification Delivered to Congress: March 19, 2026.

NOTE: This report, although unclassified, is derived from information submitted to the Department of State by the applicant, which is subject to the confidentiality requirements of section 38(e) of the Arms Export Control Act. Disclosure of an applicant's prices and customers could result in competitive injury.

TRANSMITTAL NO. RSAT 26-34

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of Kuwait.

(ii) Total Estimated Value:
Major Defense Equipment * \$5.5 billion.
Other \$2.5 billion.
Total \$8.0 billion.
Funding Source: National Funds.

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:

Major Defense Equipment (MDE):
Up to eight (8) Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensors (LTAMDS) radars.
Five (5) Large Tactical Power Systems.
Eight (8) frequency converters (1 per tactical site and 1 per central maintenance facility; 2 spares).

Non-MDE:

(U) The following non-MDE items will also be included: identification, friend or foe KIV-77 encryptor; AN/PYQ-10 simple key loaders; ancillary devices to support controlled cryptographic items; LTAMDS emulators (simulators); heavy expanded mobility tactical truck M983A4 light equipment transporter modified high temp kit; battery maintenance center (BMC) shelters; sets tools and test equipment; small repair parts trailer (SRPT); prime mover—BMC shelters/SRPT; fielding and follow-on support field service representative (FSR); prime mover FSR support; technical assistance field team; spares; publications; personnel training and training equipment; software development; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

(iv) Military Department: Army (KU-B-UZH).

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: None.

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None known at this time.

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: March 19, 2026.

* As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Kuwait—Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor Radars

(U) The Government of Kuwait has requested to buy up to eight (8) Lower Tier Air

and Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS) radars; five (5) Large Tactical Power Systems; and eight (8) frequency converters (1 per tactical site and 1 per central maintenance facility; 2 spares). The following non-major defense equipment items will also be included: identification, friend or foe KIV-77 encryptor; AN/PYQ-10 simple key loaders; ancillary devices to support controlled cryptographic items; LTAMDS emulators (simulators); heavy expanded mobility tactical truck M983A4 light equipment transporter modified high temp kit; battery maintenance center (BMC) shelters; sets tools and test equipment; small repair parts trailer (SRPT); prime mover—BMC shelters/SRPT; fielding and follow-on support field service representative (FSR); prime mover FSR support; technical assistance field team; spares; publications; personnel training and training equipment; software development; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is \$8 billion.

(U) This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States by improving the security of a major non-NATO ally that has been an important force for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East.

(U) The proposed sale will improve Kuwait's capability to meet current and future threats by providing advanced air defense detection as part of procurement of the LTAMDS radar system and thereby enhancing its air defense capability. This enhanced capability will protect Kuwait and local allied land forces and will significantly improve Kuwait's contribution to Integrated Air Missile Defense. Kuwait will have no difficulty absorbing these articles and services into its armed forces.

(U) The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

(U) The principal contractor will be RTX Corporation, located in Arlington, VA. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

(U) Implementation of this proposed sale will require the assignment of twelve (12) U.S. Government and twelve (12) contractor representatives to Kuwait for a duration up to twenty (20) years to support maintenance and sustain operations.

(U) There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 26-34

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act

Annex Item No. vii

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:

34. (U) The Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS) radar is a system designed to counter advanced threats such as hypersonic, drones, and cruise missiles. Featuring a 360-degree surveillance capability with three antenna arrays (one in front and two in back), the system is intended to replace the Patriot radar and integrate into the U.S. Army's Integrated Air and Missile Defense System.

35. (U) The Large Tactical Power System is a military program providing tactical electric power for the Department of War, featuring dual 500 kW generators in both skid-mounted and trailer-mounted configuration. These systems are designed for a large-scale power need in tactical environments, aiming to increase mission endurance, reach, and survivability.

36. (U) The frequency converters change the frequency of an alternating current (AC) to a different frequency, either higher or lower, for applications such as controlling motor speed or running equipment designed for a different power standard. It works by first converting the incoming AC power to direct current (DC), then using an inverter to convert the DC back into AC at the desired frequency and voltage.

37. (U) The identification, friend or foe KIV-77 encryptors is a combat identification system designed for command and control. It uses a transponder that listens to an interrogation signal and sends a response that identifies the broadcaster.

38. (U) The AN/PYQ-10 simple key loader is an advanced secure cryptographic device, enabling safe distribution and storage of communication security keys.

39. (U) The Global Positioning System Precision Positioning Service Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (GPS PPS SAASM) is embedded within the LTAMDS radar. The GPS PPS SAASM is a secure, encrypted navigation system providing users with highly accurate position, navigation, and timing data.

40. (U) The highest level of classification of defense articles, components, and services included in this potential sale is SECRET.

41. (U) If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the information could be used to develop countermeasures that might reduce system effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or advanced capabilities.

42. (U) A determination has been made that Kuwait can provide substantially the same degree of protection for the sensitive technology being released as the U.S. Government. This proposed sale is necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined in the Policy Justification.

43. (U) All defense articles and services listed in this transmittal have been authorized for release and export to the Government of Kuwait.

TRANSMITTAL NO. RSAT 26-38

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of Jordan.

(ii) Total Estimated Value:
Major Defense Equipment * \$0.
Other \$70.5 million.
Total \$70.5 million.
Funding Source: Foreign Military Financing.

(iii) (U) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase: Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case JO-D-QDA was below congressional notification threshold at \$49.1 million (\$0 in major defense equipment (MDE)) and included spare parts, consumables and accessories, and repair and return support; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The Government of Jordan has requested that the case be amended to include aircraft and munitions support and support equipment; minor modifications and maintenance support; and other related elements of logistics and program support. This amendment will cause the case to exceed the notification threshold, and thus notification of the entire program is required. The above notification requirements are combined as follows:

Major Defense Equipment (MDE):
None.

Non-Major Defense Equipment:

The following non-MDE items will be included: aircraft and munitions support and support equipment; spare parts, consumables and accessories, and repair and return support; minor modifications and maintenance support; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

(iv) Military Department: Air Force (JO-D-QDA).

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: JO-D-QBQ; JO-D-QDG.

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None known at this time.

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: None.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: March 19, 2026.

* As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Government of Jordan—Aircraft Repair, Return, and Spares

(U) The Government of Jordan has requested to buy aircraft and munitions support and support equipment; minor modifications and maintenance support; and other related elements of logistics and program support that will be added to a previously implemented case whose value was under the congressional notification threshold. The original Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case, valued at \$49.1 million (\$0 in major defense equipment), included spare parts, consumables and accessories, and repair and return support; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is \$70.5 million.

(U) This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States by helping to improve the security of a Major Non-NATO Ally that is an important force for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East.

(U) The proposed sale will improve Jordan's capability to meet current and future threats by leveraging these spare parts and repairs to maintain the operational readiness of its F-16, C-130, and F-5 aircraft, ensuring its ability to effectively patrol its borders, respond to regional crises, and support CENTCOM's security objectives in the region. Sustaining these critical platforms allows Jordan to remain a reliable partner in countering terrorism and promoting regional stability, key components of both Jordanian national defense and broader CENTCOM priorities. Jordan will have no difficulty absorbing these articles and services into its armed forces.

(U) The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

(U) The principal contractor will be S&K Aerospace, LLC, located in Warner Robbins, GA. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

(U) Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to Jordan.

(U) There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

REMEMBERING ALVERTA HARGIS

• Mr. SCHMITT. Mr. President, I rise today to honor the remarkable life and legacy of the late Alverta G. Harvey Hargis. Beginning her life in 1908, she had the opportunity to come of age during the closing days of the American pioneer era. Born in a covered wagon in Nebraska and spending the first few years of her life growing up in the type of iconic sod house that defined that era of our Nation's history, the challenges of growing up on the frontier provided her with valuable life lessons and helped equip her with a resilience that would guide her and her family through the hardships of the 20th century.

During the Second World War, Mrs. Hargis played a key role in protecting America's freedom by serving at defense plants in Detroit, MI, ensuring that our selfless servicemen were equipped to defend our great republic and liberate our brothers and sisters in Europe. In 2020, she was among the great American women awarded the Congressional Gold Medal for supporting our nation as Rosie the Riveters by Congress and President Trump. At this year's Cherry Blossom Festival, Representative ALFORD will be posthumously presenting her with this honor. After the war, her extraordinary talent for quilting and baking became so iconic in southwest Missouri that, to this day, the Grand Champion Apple Pie Prize at the annual Apple Festival in Seymour, MO, is named in her honor, and each year, a fundraiser honoring her legacy is held during the Missouri Cherry Blossom Festival.

Throughout her life, Mrs. Hargis remained a committed woman of God and devoted herself to her family, raising 6 children and becoming the proud grandmother to over 80 grandchildren and great-grandchildren. As the United States reaches its 250th anniversary, Mrs. Alverta Hargis' remarkable life serves as a perfect example of the spirit of committed service, sacrifice, and faith that have made our country great. I am proud to join her family and Representative ALFORD in recognizing her remarkable life and legacy and am happy that she called the Show-Me State home.●

TRIBUTE TO DEANNA CHATMAN

• Mr. SCHMITT. Mr. President, I rise today to honor the lifesaving work of Deanna Chatman, who serves as a postal carrier in St. Louis. Following the late November snow in 2025, the U.S. Postal Service determined that St. Louis carriers did not have to drive if road conditions were unsafe. Despite this, Ms. Chatman felt drawn to go to work as normal. Partway through her shift, Ms. Chatman encountered a senior citizen who had fallen and was trapped outside in the snow for 3 hours. Upon discovering the urgency of her

situation, Ms. Chatman quickly called 911 and waited with the lady until first responders arrived, then completed the remainder of her delivery route as normal. Thanks to Ms. Chatman's choice to trust her instincts and act with purpose, the senior citizen was rescued and was released from the hospital in just a few days, and her family credits Deanna for her survival.

Ms. Deanna Chatman is truly a Champion of Missouri. She is a perfect example of what a civil servant can and should be, going above and beyond to help others. While she delivered mail on her usual route, she also delivered hope to a Missouri family. I am sincerely grateful for her dedication, not only to her work, but her extraordinary devotion to our fellow Missourians.●

TRIBUTE TO DARCI CURTIS

• Mr. SCHMITT. Mr. President, I rise today to recognize Ms. Darci Curtis, a heroic pharmacy technician with the 509th Medical Group. After leaving work one day in July of 2025, Ms. Curtis witnessed a hit-and-run auto accident resulting in one of the vehicles going airborne and quickly pulled over to check on those in the damaged car. She called for an ambulance, but before first responders arrived, the vehicle's engine began smoking and threatened to catch fire. Suspecting a gas leak due to previous experience, Darci and one of her coworkers helped the injured passenger escape from the damaged car and communicated with the passenger's family until the paramedics arrived. Thanks to her quick thinking and ability to act with purpose, the victim was able to make it to the hospital and survive a terrible accident.

Ms. Darci Curtis is truly a Champion of Missouri, as much for her heroic actions last July as for her dedicated service to the troops and military families at Whiteman Air Force Base. Her devotion to protecting our fellow Missourians is nothing short of remarkable. She truly embodies the spirit of service that makes our nation truly special.●

TRIBUTE TO KURT JORDAN

• Mr. SCHMITT. Mr. President, I rise today to recognize the work of Kurt Jordan, who has found a unique way to volunteer his time and serve the great State of Missouri. After retiring as vice president of sales for Sherwin-Williams, Mr. Jordan and his father learned of the dilapidated conditions at Greenwich Cemetery north of St. Joseph and felt called to act. Over the last 7 years, Mr. Jordan has restored hundreds of gravestones across the Show-Me State, contributing both his personal time and money to restore multiple rundown cemeteries, with projects ranging from cleaning and restoring fractured headstones to developing a modern QR code system to help interested visitors learn more about