

NOT VOTING—10

Jayapal	Mace	Titus
Johnson (SD)	Norman	Turner (OH)
Joyce (OH)	Pressley	
Kean	Roy	

□ 1815

So the resolution was agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Stated for:

Ms. TITUS. Mr. Speaker, I was absent from the floor and missed Roll Call No. 206. Had I been present, I would have voted YEA on Roll Call No. 206, on agreeing to the resolution providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 2913) to authorize support for Ukraine, and for other purposes.

UKRAINE SUPPORT ACT

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. SIMPSON). Pursuant to House Resolution 518, the House will proceed to the immediate consideration of the bill (H.R. 2913) to authorize support for Ukraine, and for other purposes, which the Clerk will report by title.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 518, the bill is considered read.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 2913

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the “Ukraine Support Act”.

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

TITLE I—DIPLOMACY AND SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE

Sec. 101. Affirming support for Ukraine.

Sec. 102. Reaffirming the importance of NATO.

Sec. 103. Condemning the kidnapping of Ukrainian children.

Sec. 104. Support for Ukraine under title II of the BUILD Act of 2018.

Sec. 105. Vessel war risk insurance.

Sec. 106. Insurance for Ukraine Initiative.

Sec. 107. Codification of a Special Coordinator for Ukrainian Reconstruction.

Sec. 108. Support for Radio Free Europe.

Sec. 109. Authorizing programs to counter and combat Russian disinformation activities.

Sec. 110. Establishment of Ukraine Reconstruction Trust Fund.

Sec. 111. United States-European Nuclear Energy Cooperation.

TITLE II—SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Sec. 201. Lend-lease authority.

Sec. 202. Direct loans and foreign military financing.

Sec. 203. Support for Baltic countries.

Sec. 204. Extension of Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative.

Sec. 205. Report on allied and partner military contributions.

Sec. 206. Report on United States-Ukraine intelligence support and cooperation.

TITLE III—SANCTIONS AND EXPORT CONTROLS

Sec. 301. Sanctions trigger determination.

Sec. 302. Imposition of sanctions with respect to Russian financial institutions.

Sec. 303. Impositions of sanctions with respect to Russian oil and mining industry.

Sec. 304. Imposition of sanctions on certain persons affiliated with or supporting the Government of the Russian Federation.

Sec. 305. Crime tunnel sanctions.

Sec. 306. Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant sanctions.

Sec. 307. Rosatom sanctions.

Sec. 308. Imposition of price cap vessel sanctions.

Sec. 309. SWIFT sanctions.

Sec. 310. Russian sovereign debt sanctions.

Sec. 311. Imposition of sanctions on Russia-North Korea cooperation.

Sec. 312. Sanctions for kidnapping Ukrainian children.

Sec. 313. Imposition of dual-use export controls.

Sec. 314. Duties on the Russian Federation.

Sec. 315. Ending Russian oil import loophole.

Sec. 316. Taxing capital gains on Russian sovereign assets.

Sec. 317. Sanctions described.

Sec. 318. Implementation; regulations; penalties.

Sec. 319. Exceptions; waiver.

Sec. 320. Termination.

Sec. 321. Congressional review of Russia sanctions.

Sec. 322. Definitions.

TITLE I—DIPLOMACY AND SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE**SEC. 101. AFFIRMING SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE.**

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) On February 24, 2022, the Russian Federation launched an unprovoked and brutal full-scale invasion of Ukraine, violating Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, subjecting the nation to acts of aggression that have threatened its independence and security.

(2) For three years, the people of Ukraine have demonstrated extraordinary resilience, courage, and determination in the face of relentless attacks on their homes, communities, sovereignty, and fundamental freedoms.

(3) Since the beginning of the invasion, Russia has engaged in widespread and systematic war crimes, including—

(A) deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure, including residential buildings, schools, hospitals, and evacuation corridors;

(B) the forced deportation and kidnapping of at least 19,000 Ukrainian children to Russian-controlled territories in an attempt to erase Ukrainian identity;

(C) the destruction of Ukraine’s agricultural and energy infrastructure to create humanitarian crises and disrupt global food supply chains; and

(D) the use of torture, extrajudicial killings, and mass graves in occupied Ukrainian territories, as documented by the United Nations, the International Criminal Court, and leading human rights organizations.

(4) Despite these atrocities, the people of Ukraine remain unyielding, demonstrating that their spirit and commitment to self-determination cannot be extinguished.

(5) The Russian Federation, despite its overwhelming use of force, has suffered catastrophic military losses, with estimates exceeding 800,000 casualties, illustrating that President Vladimir Putin’s war of conquest has become both a strategic failure and a humanitarian disaster for Russia.

(6) Ukraine, despite facing an adversary with a far larger population, army, and mili-

tary arsenal, continues to fight courageously for its sovereignty, demonstrating its resilience and determination.

(7) Russia’s war has destabilized global security, undermining the principles of sovereignty and nonaggression and emboldening authoritarian regimes seeking to redraw international borders by force.

(8) The United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union, and allied nations have demonstrated historic unity in their support for Ukraine, reaffirming their commitment to upholding international law, territorial integrity, and democratic values.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States—

(1) recognizes that discussions surrounding the future of Ukraine must include Ukraine;

(2) condemns in the strongest possible terms the Russian Federation’s ongoing war crimes, its targeted destruction of Ukrainian society, and its blatant violations of international law;

(3) reaffirms its commitment to the people of Ukraine and the principles of sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity within internationally recognized borders;

(4) urges the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Russian forces from Ukrainian territory, including Crimea and the Donbas, and affirms that any negotiations must be based on Ukraine’s sovereignty, not dictated by Russian ultimatums;

(5) demands international institutions take decisive action to ensure the safe return of at least 19,000 kidnapped Ukrainian children, recognizing that their forced deportation is a war crime and an act of genocide under international law;

(6) supports the continued prosecution of Vladimir Putin and Russian political and military leaders for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, reinforcing that those who orchestrate such atrocities must be held accountable before the world; and

(7) stresses that any sustainable peace deal must be built with Ukraine and our European allies at the table.

SEC. 102. REAFFIRMING THE IMPORTANCE OF NATO.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) The United States and its democratic allies and partners face unprecedented international challenges and evolving threats to global security.

(2) The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was founded on April 4, 1949, to counter Soviet expansion, prevent further world wars in Europe, and strengthen transatlantic security, and is built on the democratic principles of freedom, security, and national sovereignty.

(3) Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty underpins the principle of “collective defense” and has served as a guiding value of United States foreign policy for over 75 years.

(4) The United States commitment to Article 5 enhances deterrence against adversaries such as Russia, China, and Iran that seek to spread their malign influence.

(5) The unity of NATO allies strengthens collective security and the stability of democratic states.

(6) NATO serves as a bulwark against the proliferation of malign influence, technologies, and destabilizing operations by adversaries.

(7) Authoritarian regimes such as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea have increased collaboration in political, economic, and security sectors to undermine democratic principles.

(8) In the only invocation of Article 5, NATO allies provided military and intelligence support to the United States following the September 11, 2001, attacks, and many NATO allies incurred significant casualties in Afghanistan.

(9) NATO has remained steadfast in its support for Ukraine, with member countries providing military and non-security assistance, strengthening Ukraine's defense capabilities, and imposing costs on Russia for its illegal invasion.

(10) Finland and Sweden made the sovereign decision to accede to NATO following Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

(11) NATO continues to address systemic challenges posed by China to Euro-Atlantic interests and security.

(12) NATO member states have strengthened their defense and cyber capabilities, including through the Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) program.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States reaffirms its full and unwavering commitment to NATO;

(2) NATO remains vital to United States national security interests and the United States remains fully committed to defending its allies under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty;

(3) NATO's open door policy is essential to European security, and every sovereign state has the right to determine its security arrangements, including Ukraine;

(4) the United States remembers and honors the thousands of NATO coalition soldiers who sacrificed their lives following the invocation of Article 5 after the September 11, 2001, attacks;

(5) all NATO allies should dedicate at least 2 percent of their gross domestic product to national defense or establish concrete plans to meet their 2 percent obligations by the Washington Summit; and

(6) NATO allies must continue cooperation in advanced defense technologies, counterintelligence, and cybersecurity programs to counter evolving threats from adversaries such as Russia, China, and Iran.

SEC. 103. CONDEMNING THE KIDNAPPING OF UKRAINIAN CHILDREN.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) On January 12, 1951, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (commonly known as the "Genocide Convention") entered into force. The Russian Federation is a party to the Convention and is therefore bound by its obligations.

(2) On February 24, 2022, the Russian Federation escalated its 8-year occupation of sovereign Ukrainian territory by launching a full-scale, unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.

(3) Russian armed forces have committed widespread and systematic atrocities against Ukrainian civilians, including the targeting of civilian infrastructure and protected sites.

(4) On March 9, 2022, Russian forces attacked a maternity hospital in Mariupol, Ukraine, resulting in the deaths of 5 individuals and injuries to 17 others, in violation of international humanitarian law.

(5) On March 22, 2022, the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that the Russian military had illegally abducted and forcibly transferred 2,389 Ukrainian children from temporarily occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation.

(6) On June 2, 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that an estimated 200,000 Ukrainian children had been forcibly transferred to Russia.

(7) Article II(e) of the Genocide Convention defines "forcibly transferring children of the

group to another group" as an act of genocide.

(8) Maria Lvova-Belova, Children's Rights Commissioner for the President of Russia, publicly admitted to overseeing the abduction and forced transfer of Ukrainian children and their adoption by Russian families.

(9) Ukrainian authorities have stated that many abducted children have living family members in Ukraine but have been separated due to Russia's renewed invasion.

(10) On June 16, 2022, Russian authorities announced that children born in occupied Ukrainian territories after the February 24, 2022, invasion would automatically be deemed Russian citizens, contributing to the erasure of Ukrainian identity.

(11) On June 22, 2022, the United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner verified that at least 320 children had been killed as a result of Russia's renewed invasion of Ukraine.

(12) On July 11, 2022, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres ordered an investigation into the deaths and injuries of Ukrainian children in the context of the conflict.

(13) On July 13, 2022, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken called on the Russian Federation to "immediately halt its systemic filtration operations in Ukraine", which have resulted in the disappearance, detention, or forcible deportation of between 900,000 and 1,600,000 Ukrainians, including approximately 260,000 children.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the abduction and forcible transfer of children and facilitation of illegal adoptions of Ukrainian children by the Russian Federation is contrary to Russia's obligations under the Genocide Convention and constitute acts of genocide;

(2) the Russian Federation is deliberately seeking to wipe out a generation of Ukrainian children, thereby crippling Ukraine's ability to nurture the next generation of Ukrainian citizens and leaders and to rebuild their country after Russia's unprovoked war, with the purpose of demolishing Ukraine's unique language, culture, history, and identity;

(3) the Russian Federation's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has significantly increased the risks of children being exposed to human trafficking and exploitation, child labor, gender-based violence, hunger, injury, trauma, deprivation of education and shelter, and death; and

(4) the Government of the Russian Federation, under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, bears full responsibility for the wrongful and illegal abduction and forcible transfer of children from Ukraine, and Congress condemns these actions in the strongest terms.

SEC. 104. SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE UNDER TITLE II OF THE BUILD ACT OF 2018.

Section 1412(c) of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9612(c)) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (1), by inserting "in Ukraine and" after "the provision of support under title II"; and

(2) in paragraph (2)—

(A) by striking "The Corporation" and inserting the following:

"(A) IN GENERAL.—The Corporation";

(B) by striking "(A) the President" and inserting the following:

"(i) the President";

(C) by striking "(B) such support" and inserting the following:

"(ii) such support"; and

(D) by adding at the end the following:

"(B) NON-APPLICABILITY TO UKRAINE.—The provisions of subparagraph (A) shall not apply with respect to Ukraine."

SEC. 105. VESSEL WAR RISK INSURANCE.

(a) ELIGIBILITY.—Notwithstanding section 53902 of title 46, United States Code, for the period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act, and ending 5 years after such date, a covered vessel shall be deemed to be eligible for insurance or reinsurance under chapter 539 of title 46, United States Code, if such vessel is engaged in transportation in waterborne commerce importing cargo to, or exporting cargo from, Ukraine.

(b) EXPANSION OF CARGO.—Subparagraphs (B) through (D) of section 53903(a)(3) of title 46, United States Code, shall not apply to cargo imported or exported to or from Ukraine.

(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) COVERED VESSEL.—The term "covered vessel" means a vessel that is owned by a citizen of—

(A) a member country of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;

(B) Ukraine; or

(C) any other country the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, determines, in the interest of national security, shall be considered eligible for insurance or reinsurance under chapter 539 of title 46, United States Code.

(2) OWNED BY A CITIZEN.—The term "owned by a citizen" means ownership by an entity that is considered to be a citizen of a country in the same manner as an entity is deemed to be a citizen of the United States under section 50501 of title 46, United States Code.

SEC. 106. INSURANCE FOR UKRAINE INITIATIVE.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established in the Department of State an entity to be known as the "Insurance for Ukraine Initiative".

(b) OBJECTIVES.—The objectives of the Insurance for Ukraine Initiative are the following:

(1) Bolster confidence in Ukraine's eventual economic recovery from Russia's full-scale invasion through the provision of war risk insurance.

(2) Encourage European allies and partners to finance and invest in Ukraine's economic recovery, including through the provision of war risk insurance.

(3) Promote closer economic integration between Ukraine and other countries in Europe as well as the United States and further Ukraine's accession to the European Union.

(4) Coordinate dialogue and fora for extensive outreach with private sector insurance companies relating to the provision of war risk insurance to Ukraine.

(5) Work with Ukraine, international organizations, and Middle Eastern and African allies and partners to ensure the bountiful and affordable shipment of grain and other food commodities from Ukraine.

(c) REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following 3 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes assessments of—

(1) progress towards the achievement of each of the objectives set forth in subsection (b); and

(2) legislative proposals that would further the objectives set forth in subsection (b).

(d) DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL SUPPORT.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall seek to provide diplomatic and political support to countries that provide or provide support for war risk insurance for Ukraine, including by using the diplomatic and political influence and expertise of the Department of State to build the capacity of such countries.

(e) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term

“appropriate congressional committees” means—

- (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
- (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

SEC. 107. CODIFICATION OF A SPECIAL COORDINATOR FOR UKRAINIAN RECONSTRUCTION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—There is established within the Department of State a Special Coordinator for Ukrainian Reconstruction.

(b) SELECTION.—The Special Coordinator shall be chosen by the Secretary of State and shall report directly to the Secretary.

(c) QUALIFICATIONS.—The Special Coordinator shall be an individual with—

- (1) private sector experience; and
- (2) knowledge of Ukraine and foreign policy pertaining thereto.

(d) DUTIES.—The Special Coordinator shall assist in—

- (1) harnessing the tools of different agencies of the United States Government to promote the reconstruction of Ukraine;
- (2) coordinate cooperation amongst different agencies and bureaus of the United States Government to aid the recovery of Ukraine following its war to protect its sovereignty; and
- (3) work with the United States Development Finance Corporation to mobilize private capital for the reconstruction of Ukraine.

SEC. 108. SUPPORT FOR RADIO FREE EUROPE.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty shall be immediately restored to its full capacity and operational position prior to Executive order attempting to shutter the agency;

(2) Radio Free Europe provides reliable, uncensored, and accessible news and reporting in Ukraine and other countries where media freedom is restricted;

(3) Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty is one of the most critical sources of unrestricted, independent news and reporting for audiences on the periphery of the Russian Federation;

(4) the Government of the Russian Federation has engaged in systematic targeting of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reporters inside the Russian Federation, which has negatively impacted the organization’s ability to provide timely, reliable, and accurate news from inside the country; and

(5) despite pressure from the Government of the Russian Federation, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s audience continues to grow inside the Russian Federation and surrounding countries.

(b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated \$250,000,000 for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty for fiscal year 2026.

(c) AUTHORIZATION OF NEW BUREAUS.—Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty may explore opening new bureaus to help expand its ability to reach audiences on the periphery of the Russian Federation.

(d) INITIATIVES TO BOLSTER RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY BUREAUS AROUND RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S PERIPHERY.—To help expand its reach to Russian-speaking audiences and increase its reach to audiences through digital media, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty should—

- (1) evaluate where Russian disinformation is most deeply pervasive in the Eurasia region;
- (2) develop strategies to better communicate with predominately Russian-speaking regions;
- (3) build on efforts to increase capacity and programming to counter disinformation in real time;

(4) expand Russian language investigative journalism;

(5) improve the technical capacity of the Ukraine bureau; and

(6) continue efforts to increase digital news services.

(e) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes—

(1) recommendations of locations to open new bureaus to help reach new audiences in the broader Eurasia region;

(2) an assessment of current staffing and anticipated staffing needs in order to effectively reach audiences in the broader Eurasia region; and

(3) an assessment of the impact of the Government of the Russian Federation closing down Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty within the Russian Federation.

(f) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

SEC. 109. AUTHORIZING PROGRAMS TO COUNTER AND COMBAT RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION ACTIVITIES.

(a) COUNTERING RUSSIAN INFLUENCE FUND.—The Secretary of State should use funds available for obligation in the Countering Russian Influence Fund—

(1) to prioritize assisting Ukraine to detect and combat disinformation from the Russian Federation and its proxies; and

(2) to assist the Government of Ukraine in developing new defense strategies and technologies.

(b) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a plan for countering and combating disinformation by the Russian Federation and supporting free and independent media in Ukraine that includes—

(A) a plan to assist the Government of Ukraine in combating and responding to malign influence operations of the Russian Federation aimed at inflaming tensions and dividing Ukrainian society;

(B) an assessment of effective efforts and programs to improve media literacy in Ukraine and recommendations for how the United States can assist in supporting and expanding those programs;

(C) a plan to assist the Government of Ukraine improve efforts to detect and remove content originating from Russian troll farms, bots, and other sources aimed at sowing division and disseminating disinformation in Ukraine or targeting Ukrainian audiences;

(D) recommendations to increase support for independent media outlets, including Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty; and

(E) recommendations to increase support for independent media outlets catering to Russian-speaking populations residing in Russian-occupied Crimea, the Donbas region of Ukraine, and throughout Ukraine.

(2) FORM.—The strategy required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex if necessary.

SEC. 110. ESTABLISHMENT OF UKRAINE RECONSTRUCTION TRUST FUND.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Subchapter A of chapter 98 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

“SEC. 9512. UKRAINE RECONSTRUCTION TRUST FUND.

“(a) CREATION OF TRUST FUND.—There is established in the Treasury of the United States a trust fund to be known as the ‘Ukraine Reconstruction Trust Fund’, consisting of such amounts as may be appropriated to such fund as provided in this section.

“(b) TRANSFERS TO TRUST FUND.—There are hereby appropriated to the Ukraine Reconstruction Trust Fund amounts equivalent to the net revenues received in the Treasury from the taxes imposed under section 892A.

“(c) EXPENDITURES FROM TRUST FUND.—Amounts in the Ukraine Reconstruction Trust Fund shall be available, as provided in appropriations Acts, only to the Secretary of State for purposes of—

“(1) reconstruction and rebuilding efforts in Ukraine,

“(2) humanitarian assistance to the people of Ukraine,

“(3) fostering long-term economic growth and private sector development in Ukraine, and

“(4) bolstering transparent and accountable governance of the Ukrainian economy.

“(d) TRUST FUND NOT INTEREST-BEARING.—Section 9602(b) shall not apply to the Ukraine Reconstruction Trust Fund.

“(e) REQUIREMENTS UNDER FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961.—Any assistance made available from amounts in the Ukraine Reconstruction Trust Fund shall be subject to all applicable requirements for the provision of such assistance for the same or similar purpose authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), including requirements under such Act relating to administrative authorities, congressional notifications, and reporting.”

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections for subchapter A of chapter 98 of such Code is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

“Sec. 9512. Ukraine Reconstruction Trust Fund.”

(c) REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 3 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report detailing the use of any funds made available from the Ukrainian Reconstruction Trust Fund.

(2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Finance, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

SEC. 111. UNITED STATES-EUROPEAN NUCLEAR ENERGY COOPERATION.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) On February 24, 2022, the Russian Federation initiated a full-scale invasion of Ukraine which has severely threatened energy security in the United States, Europe, and around the world.

(2) The security of Ukraine’s energy grid has been vital to Ukraine’s success in its defense of its territory and ensuring the Ukrainian government can effectively provide goods and services to Ukrainian citizens.

(3) Ukraine has operated four nuclear power plants with 15 reactors, primarily Russian-designed water-water energetic reactor (VVER) reactors.

(4) Russia, in its war of aggression against Ukraine, has systematically targeted Ukraine's energy infrastructure through heavy shelling and targeted attacks, particularly in the winter months when innocent Ukrainian civilians are most vulnerable.

(5) Since March 2022, Russian forces have illegally occupied the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station, the largest nuclear power plant in Europe, and Russian forces have surrounded the station with landmines, further threatening regional security.

(6) Russian-designed VVER reactors have been built across Europe, including in Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Slovakia, Turkey, and Ukraine.

(7) Russia uses its nuclear power plant designs and fuel services to spread malign influence and threaten United States and European energy security.

(8) As of 2021, Russia owned about 20 percent of the total uranium conversion infrastructure worldwide and in 2020, had the largest uranium enrichment capacity at close to 46 percent.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) in countries seeking or developing a nuclear power industry, the Department of State should prioritize the utilization of products and services from the United States, and then prioritize products and services from Europe and other allied or partner countries, including Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the Republic of Korea when not directly competing with the United States;

(2) the United States and its allies must focus on cooperation, including capacity building and early-stage project support, to expand the nuclear industry in Europe in a way that maintains nonproliferation, security, and safety standards and aligns with international obligations and treaties while combating Russian and Chinese malign influence; and

(3) the United States should continue to pursue the Foundational Infrastructure for Responsible Use of Small Modular Reactor Technology program as a means of helping partner countries meet their clean energy needs with scalable, flexible, secure, and safe nuclear power programs.

(c) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Energy and the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall develop a strategy to strengthen United States-European nuclear energy cooperation and combat Russian malign influence in the nuclear energy sector in Europe.

(d) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required by subsection (c) shall include, at a minimum, the following elements:

(1) An overview and assessment of the Secretary of State's efforts to broaden participation by United States nuclear industry entities in Europe and promote the accessibility and competitiveness of United States, European, and partner technologies and services against Russian and Chinese technologies in Europe.

(2) An overview of different nuclear reactor types that are currently deployed or under regulatory review in Europe, including large light-water reactors, small modular light-water reactors, and non-light-water reactors, and—

(A) what role, if any, each reactor type could have in reducing Russia's influence over European energy supply by 2030, 2035, 2040, 2045, and 2050;

(B) challenges that each reactor type may face with rapid deployment, including costs, market barriers to first-of-a-kind designs, supply chain constraints, and regulatory requirements;

(C) the impacts of each reactor type on maintaining strong nonproliferation standards, including the minimization of weapons-usable nuclear material; and

(D) opportunities for the use of United States, European, and partner technologies and services in the deployment or potential deployment of each reactor type.

(3) An overview of different fuel cycles that are currently deployed or under consideration in Europe, including use of low enriched uranium, including high assay low enriched uranium, and spent fuel reprocessing, along with an analysis of the implications of each fuel cycle on—

(A) reducing and eliminating Russia's market share in Europe for uranium, conversion, enrichment, and reactor fuel between now and 2030;

(B) achieving long-term energy security free of Russian influence; and

(C) maintaining strong nonproliferation standards, including the minimization of weapons-usable material as well as high nuclear safety and security standards.

(4) An overview of nuclear reactor designs and fuel cycle infrastructure that the United States Government is currently funding the development of, and—

(A) the potential, if any, that each of these technologies have to decrease or eliminate Russia's market share in the United States and Europe for nuclear power reactors, uranium mining and milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, deconversion, and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing in the short-, medium-, and long-term;

(B) the impact of these technologies on the minimization of weapons-usable nuclear material, including the use of highly enriched uranium or plutonium fuels; and

(C) an assessment of the use cases for each of these designs and fuel cycles.

(5) An overview of the United States Government's diplomatic engagements regarding the nuclear energy sector in Europe.

(6) A list of countries in Europe with active nuclear power programs, and—

(A) an analysis of each country's nuclear energy policy;

(B) an overview of existing areas of cooperation with regards to nuclear energy between each country and—

(i) the United States;

(ii) other European and friendly countries; and

(iii) adversarial countries including China and Russia;

(C) an overview of potential areas for future cooperation between each country and the United States with regards to nuclear energy; and

(D) a summary of fuel types used in each country's nuclear power programs.

(7) An overview of Russian and Chinese influence in the European nuclear energy sector.

(8) An overview of how the United States Government is working with allies and partners to counter Russian malign influence within the European energy sector to include steps taken to counter Russian influence in the mining and milling, conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication processes as well as in reactor construction.

(9) An overview of how the United States Government balances the urgent strategic need for collaboration with allies and partners on countering Russia's influence on nuclear energy in Europe, with commercial competitiveness issues that may arise between United States companies and compa-

nies in Europe, Canada, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.

(10) An assessment of Rosatom's role in Russia's energy sector, to include an overview of strengths and vulnerabilities of the conglomerate.

(e) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees the strategy required by subsection (c).

(f) FORM.—The strategy required by subsection (c) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex, so long as such annex is provided separately from the unclassified strategy.

(g) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated \$30,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 to support critically needed engagement in Europe consistent with the strategy required by subsection (c) on countering Russian malign influence and with a particular focus on responsible nuclear power program capacity building, early stage nuclear power project support, and countering Russian disinformation campaigns.

(h) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(C) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of the Representatives; and

(D) the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate.

(2) HIGH ASSAY LOW ENRICHED URANIUM.—The term "high assay low enriched uranium" means uranium enriched so that the concentration of the fissile isotope uranium-235 (U-235) is between 5 percent and 20 percent of the mass of uranium.

(3) LOW ENRICHED URANIUM.—The term "low enriched uranium" means fuel in which the weight percent of U-235 in the uranium is less than 20 percent.

TITLE II—SECURITY ASSISTANCE

SEC. 201. LEND-LEASE AUTHORITY.

Section 2 of the Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-Lease Act of 2022 (Public Law 117-118; 136 Stat. 1184) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a)(1), by striking "fiscal years 2022 and 2023" and inserting "fiscal years 2022 through 2028";

(2) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and

(3) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new subsection:

"(c) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after any use of the authority provided by subsection (a), the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to Congress a report that includes—

"(1) a description of the defense articles loaned or leased to the Government of Ukraine, or to the government of an Eastern European country impacted by the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine, under such authority; and

"(2) a strategy and timeline for recovery and return of such defense articles."

SEC. 202. DIRECT LOANS AND FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING.

(a) DIRECT LOANS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Through fiscal year 2026, direct loans under section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act may be made available for Ukraine and North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, notwithstanding section 23(c)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, gross obligations for the principal amounts of which shall not exceed \$8,000,000,000.

(2) OTHER UNOBLIGATED BALANCES.—The unobligated balances of amounts made available by any Act making appropriations for the Department of State, foreign operations, and related programs, under the heading “International Security Assistance—Funds Appropriated to the President—Foreign Military Financing” shall also be made available for the cost of loans and loan guarantees as authorized by this section.

(b) TERMS AND CONDITIONS.—The terms and conditions described in section 2606 of the Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2022 (division N of Public Law 117–103) shall apply to amounts made available by this section in the same manner and to the same extent as amounts made available by such section except that subsection (b) of such section shall be applied by striking “\$4,000,000,000” and inserting “\$8,000,000,000”.

(c) EMERGENCY DESIGNATION.—Amounts repurposed pursuant to this section that were previously designated by the Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to a concurrent resolution on the budget or the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, are designated by the Congress as being for an emergency requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A)(i) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985: *Provided*, That such amounts shall be available only if the President designates such amounts as an emergency requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A)(i).

SEC. 203. SUPPORT FOR BALTIC COUNTRIES.

(a) ASSISTANCE AUTHORIZED.—The Secretary of State shall carry out programs, projects, and activities to build the capacity of the national militaries and border guard forces of Baltic countries, pursuant to the 2024 Bilateral Defense Cooperation Roadmaps for 2024–2028, which provide for the promotion of “defense cooperation in integrated air and missile defense, maritime domain awareness, cyber, irregular warfare, participation in international military operations and exercises, infrastructure development, and training”.

(b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of State, for each of the fiscal years 2026, 2027, and 2028, in addition to amounts already authorized to be appropriated for such purposes to carry out the assistance described in subsection (a)—

(1) \$30,000,000 for Foreign Military Financing grants authorized under section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) for each Baltic country; and

(2) \$4,000,000 for Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related programs, including as authorized under the Foreign Assistance Act (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) for each Baltic country.

(c) BRIEFING.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall brief the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives regarding—

(1) the most pressing security needs of Baltic countries;

(2) a plan for the disbursement of funds so obligated; and

(3) an analysis of European and other allied country support for Baltic countries.

SEC. 204. EXTENSION OF UKRAINE SECURITY ASSISTANCE INITIATIVE.

Section 1250 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92; 129 Stat. 1068) is amended—

(1) in subsection (f), by adding at the end the following:

“(11) For fiscal year 2026, \$300,000,000.

“(12) For fiscal year 2027, \$300,000,000.”; and

(2) in subsection (h), by striking “December 31, 2026” and inserting “December 31, 2027”.

SEC. 205. REPORT ON ALLIED AND PARTNER MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report including—

(1) a detailed description of all military contributions made or planned by allied and partner countries, disaggregated by country, including details of types and quantities of platforms and systems provided;

(2) a description and analysis of military capabilities identified as current Ukrainian operational needs; and

(3) a description of United States efforts to meet identified Ukrainian operational needs through transfers of United States arms and military equipment or through support and facilitation of allied and partner transfer of arms and military equipment.

(b) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex that is submitted separately from the unclassified portion.

(c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

SEC. 206. REPORT ON UNITED STATES-UKRAINE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT AND COOPERATION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date of enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, a report including—

(1) a detailed description of current United States intelligence support and cooperation to and with Ukrainian military and intelligence services;

(2) a description and analysis of the consequences of ceasing such intelligence support and cooperation to Ukraine, including as related to targeting, battlefield effectiveness, early warning capabilities, counterintelligence, and cybersecurity; and

(3) a description of United States efforts and initiatives currently underway or planned to increase Ukrainian intelligence, counterintelligence, and cybersecurity capabilities.

(b) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in classified form.

(c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

TITLE III—SANCTIONS AND EXPORT CONTROLS

SEC. 301. SANCTIONS TRIGGER DETERMINATION.

Not later than 15 days after the date of enactment of this Act, and at minimum every 90 days thereafter, the President shall make a determination as to whether the Russian Federation or any proxy thereof, is engaged in—

(1) conducting a war of aggression against Ukraine; or

(2) refusing to sincerely and actually negotiate a peace agreement with Ukraine; or

(3) acting in violation of a negotiated peace agreement with Ukraine.

SEC. 302. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO RUSSIAN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

(a) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Upon making an affirmative determination under section 301 and not later than 15 days following such a determination, the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 317 with respect to 3 or more of the following financial institutions:

(A) Sberbank.

(B) VTB.

(C) Gazprombank.

(D) VEB.RF.

(E) The Russian Direct Investment Fund.

(F) Credit Bank of Moscow.

(G) Alfa Bank.

(H) Rosselkhozbank.

(I) FC Bank Otkritie.

(J) Promsvyazbank.

(K) Sovcombank.

(L) Transkapitalbank.

(M) The Central Bank of the Russian Federation.

(2) SUBSIDIARIES AND SUCCESSOR ENTITIES.—The President may impose the sanctions described in section 310(a)(1) with respect to any subsidiary of, or successor entity to, a financial institution specified in paragraph (1).

(b) ADDITIONAL RUSSIAN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.—

(1) LIST REQUIRED.—Not later than 30 days after making an affirmative determination under section 301, and every 90 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a list of foreign persons that the President determines—

(A) are significant financial institutions owned or operated by the Government of the Russian Federation; and

(B) should be sanctioned in the interest of United States national security.

(2) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—Upon the submission of each list required by paragraph (1), the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 310(a)(1) with respect to each foreign person identified on the list.

SEC. 303. IMPOSITIONS OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO RUSSIAN OIL AND MINING INDUSTRY.

Upon making an affirmative determination under section 301 and not later than 15 days following such a determination, the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 317 with respect to all Russian companies operating primarily in any of the following sectors:

(1) Oil and gas extraction, refinement, or production.

(2) Coal extraction mining, refinement, or production.

(3) Mineral extraction and processing.

SEC. 304. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS ON CERTAIN PERSONS AFFILIATED WITH OR SUPPORTING THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Upon making an affirmative determination under section 301 and not later than 15 days following such a determination, the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 317 with respect to all individuals listed under subsection (b) or included in the additional lists under subsection (c).

(b) OFFICIALS SPECIFIED.—The officials specified in this subsection are the following:

(1) The President of the Russian Federation.

(2) The Prime Minister of the Russian Federation.

(3) The Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation.

(4) The Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation.

(5) The Minister of Transport of the Russian Federation.

(6) The Minister of Energy of the Russian Federation.

(7) The Minister of Finance of the Russian Federation.

(8) The Minister of Energy and Trade of the Russian Federation.

(9) The Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation.

(10) The Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation.

(11) The Deputy Minister of Transport of the Russian Federation.

(12) The Deputy Energy Minister of the Russian Federation.

(13) The Deputy Finance Minister of the Russian Federation.

(14) The Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation.

(15) The Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

(16) The Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces of the Russian Federation.

(17) The Commander-in-Chief of the Aerospace Forces of the Russian Federation.

(18) The Commander of the Airborne Forces of the Russian Federation.

(19) The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy of the Russian Federation.

(20) The Commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces of the Russian Federation.

(21) The Commander of the Special Operations Forces of the Russian Federation.

(22) The Commander of Logistical Support of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

(C) ADDITIONAL OFFICIALS.—

(1) **LIST REQUIRED.**—Not later than 30 days after making an affirmative determination under section 301 and every 90 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a list of foreign persons that the President determines—

(A) are—

(i) senior officials of any branch of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation leading any of the operations described in section 302; or

(ii) senior officials of the Government of the Russian Federation, including any intelligence agencies or security services of the Russian Federation, with significant roles in planning or implementing such operations; and

(B) with respect to which sanctions should be imposed in the interest of the national security of the United States.

(2) **IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.**—Upon the submission of each list required by paragraph (1), the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 310 with respect to each foreign person on the list.

SEC. 305. CRIMEA TUNNEL SANCTIONS.

(a) **FINDINGS.**—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) In February and March 2014, the Russian Federation invaded the Crimean peninsula and annexed Crimea, internationally recognized as Ukrainian territory.

(2) Following its annexation of Crimea, the Russian Federation constructed the Kerch Strait Bridge to connect the Russian mainland with the Crimean peninsula.

(3) On February 24, 2022, the Government of the Russian Federation, led by Vladimir Putin, launched an unprovoked, full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

(4) The Russian Federation has used Crimea as an integral part of its full scale invasion of Ukraine, including to house Russian troops, store ammunition and weapons, and host the Black Sea Fleet.

(5) In October 2023, it was publicly reported that Russian and Chinese business officials met and exchanged emails to discuss building a tunnel from the Russian mainland to illegally occupied Crimea.

(b) **IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.**—Upon making an affirmative determination under section 301 and not later than 15 days following such a determination, the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 317 with respect to all foreign persons that knowingly participate in the construction, maintenance, or repair of a tunnel or bridge that connects the Russian mainland with the Crimean peninsula.

SEC. 306. ZAPORIZHZHIA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SANCTIONS.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Upon making an affirmative determination under section 301 and not later than 15 days following such a determination, the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 317 with respect to all foreign persons that have endangered the integrity, safety, or undermined Ukrainian operational control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station located in southeastern Ukraine since the Russian Federation launched an unprovoked, full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

(b) **EXCEPTION RELATED TO UKRAINIAN OPERATIONAL CONTROL.**—Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any foreign person seeking to reestablish Ukrainian operational control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station or the surrounding region.

SEC. 307. ROSATOM SANCTIONS.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Upon making an affirmative determination under section 301 and not later than 15 days following such a determination, the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 317 with respect to—

(1) Rosatom;

(2) Rosatom subsidiaries; and

(3) a foreign person that knowingly directly or indirectly engages in any significant transaction for nuclear reactor construction and related services with Rosatom.

(b) **WAIVER.**—The President may waive the application of sanctions for a transaction or transactions with a United States person, a foreign person, or a foreign financial institution (as the case may be) described under this section if—

(1) the President determines that the transaction relates to activities necessary to the production of medical isotopes or industrial isotopes; and

(2) the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that—

(A) domestic medical isotope or industrial isotope production is insufficient to meet United States patient and industry requirements; and

(B) the United States is taking measurable steps to establish medical isotope or industrial isotope supply chains that are not reliant on Rosatom or other Russian source material.

SEC. 308. IMPOSITION OF PRICE CAP VESSEL SANCTIONS.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Upon making an affirmative determination under section 301 and not later than 15 days following such a determination, the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 317 with respect to any foreign vessel that knowingly transports Russian oil in contravention of the Russian oil price cap policy.

(b) **EXCEPTION FOR SAFETY OF VESSELS AND CREW.**—Sanctions under this section shall not apply with respect to a person providing provisions to a vessel otherwise subject to sanctions under this section if such provisions are intended for the safety and care of the crew aboard the vessel, the protection of

human life aboard the vessel, or the maintenance of the vessel to avoid any environmental or other significant damage.

(c) **STRATEGY.**—Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury shall jointly submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a strategy to enhance international compliance with the Russian oil price cap policy.

(d) **MATTERS.**—The strategy under subsection (a) shall include—

(1) an overview of general international compliance with the Russian oil price cap policy;

(2) a list of the countries known to have purchased significant quantities of Russian oil at prices above the price agreed to in the Russian oil price cap policy set forth by the Group of Seven (“G7”) nations;

(3) any known methods used by such countries to avoid detection of their purchases of Russian oil at prices above the price agreed to in the Russian oil price cap policy;

(4) an assessment of possible incentives the United States could provide to countries listed pursuant to paragraph (2) to encourage compliance with the Russian oil price cap policy;

(5) an assessment of whether the imposition of additional sanctions, including possible secondary sanctions, would enhance international compliance with the Russian oil price cap policy;

(6) a description of the views of the government of each country participating in the Russian oil price cap policy regarding whether the price cap under such policy should be lowered or not; and

(7) a description of the United States diplomatic engagement with the government of each country participating in the Russian oil price cap policy regarding the appropriateness of the current cap, including any diplomatic engagement intended to encourage support for the lowering of the price cap.

SEC. 309. SWIFT SANCTIONS.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Upon making an affirmative determination under section 301 and not later than 15 days following such a determination, the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 317 with respect to any global communication financial service that does not cease the provision of financial communication messaging services to any financial institution listed under section 302 of this Act.

(b) **ENABLING OR FACILITATION OF ACCESS TO SPECIALIZED FINANCIAL MESSAGING SERVICES THROUGH INTERMEDIARY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.**—For purposes of this section, enabling or facilitating direct or indirect access to specialized financial messaging services includes doing so by serving as an intermediary financial institution with access to such messaging services.

SEC. 310. RUSSIAN SOVEREIGN DEBT SANCTIONS.

Upon making an affirmative determination under section 302 and not later than 30 days following such a determination, the President shall prohibit all transactions by United States persons involving the sovereign debt of the Government of the Russian Federation issued on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, including governmental bonds.

SEC. 311. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA-NORTH KOREA COOPERATION.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Upon making an affirmative determination under section 301 and not later than 15 days following such a determination, the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 317 with respect to the following:

(1) Any foreign person that is responsible for or facilitates the transfer or sale of arms

or material support from North Korea to be used in Russia's illegal war in Ukraine.

(2) Any foreign person that knowingly, directly or indirectly, imports, exports, or re-exports to, into, or from North Korea any goods services or technology for weapons that may be used by Russian forces or their proxies in Russia's illegal war in Ukraine.

(3) Any foreign financial institution that knowingly facilitates a significant transaction or provides significant financial services for a foreign person described in paragraph (1) or (2).

(4) Any foreign person that engages in a significant transaction related to the transfer or sale of arms or material support with a foreign person described in paragraph (1) or (2) or foreign financial institution described in paragraph (3).

(5) Any foreign person assisting in the logistical supply and movement of North Korean personnel, arms or material support to be used in Russia's illegal war in Ukraine.

(b) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes significant activities by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to support the Russian Federation and its proxies in Russia's illegal war in Ukraine.

(c) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required by this section shall include the following:

(1) The number of North Korean troops that have been sent to fight Ukraine, casualties inflicted on these troops, and the impact on the battlefield of having North Korean military personnel on the frontlines.

(2) The identity and nationality of foreign persons and foreign financial institutions that are subject to sanctions under section 317.

(3) A description of the conduct engaged in by such persons and institutions.

(4) An assessment of the extent to which a foreign government has provided material support to the Government of North Korea or any person acting for or on behalf of that government to conduct significant activities to materially support Russia's illegal war in Ukraine.

(5) A United States strategy to counter North Korea's efforts to conduct significant activities to support Russia's war in Ukraine, that includes efforts to engage foreign governments to halt the capability of the Government of North Korea and persons acting for or on behalf of that government to conduct significant activities supporting Russia's illegal war in Ukraine.

(d) FORM.—The report required by this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 312. SANCTIONS FOR KIDNAPPING UKRAINIAN CHILDREN.

Upon making an affirmative determination under section 301 and not later than 15 days following such a determination, the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 317 with respect to all foreign persons that have directed or in anyway participated in the kidnapping and wrongful patriation of Ukrainian children.

SEC. 313. IMPOSITION OF DUAL-USE EXPORT CONTROLS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Upon making an affirmative determination under section 301, a foreign-produced item shall be subject to the Export Administration Regulations (pursuant to the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801 et seq.)) if the item—

(1) meets—

(A) the product scope requirements described in subsection (b); and

(B) the destination scope requirements described in subsection (c); and

(2) is exported, reexported, or in-country transferred to the Russia Federation from abroad or involves the Government of the Russian Federation.

(b) PRODUCT SCOPE REQUIREMENTS.—A foreign-produced item meets the product scope requirements of this subsection if the item—

(1) is a direct product of United States-origin technology or software subject to the Export Administration Regulations that is specified in a covered Export Control Classification Number; or

(2) is produced by any plant or major component of a plant that is located outside the United States, if the plant or major component of a plant, whether made in the United States or a foreign country, itself is a direct product of United States-origin technology or software subject to the Export Administration Regulations that is specified in a covered Export Control Classification Number.

(c) DESTINATION SCOPE REQUIREMENTS.—A foreign-produced item meets the destination scope requirements of this subsection if there is knowledge that the foreign-produced item is destined to the Russian Federation or will be incorporated into or used in the production or development of any part, component, or equipment subject to the Export Administration Regulations and produced in or destined to the Russian Federation.

(d) LICENSING POLICY.—In carrying out this section, the Secretary of Commerce shall apply a presumption that an export, reexport, release, or in-country transfer of items meets the product scope requirements set forth in subsection (b) and the destination scope requirements set forth in subsection (c).

(e) EXCEPTIONS.—The license requirements set forth in this section shall not apply to—

(1) food, medicine, or medical devices that are—

(A) designated as EAR99; or

(B) not designated under or listed on the Commerce Control List; or

(2) services, software, or hardware (other than services, software, or hardware for end-users owned or controlled by the Government of Iran) that are—

(A) necessarily and ordinarily incident to communications; or

(B) designated as—

(i) EAR99; or

(ii) Export Control Classification Number 5A992.c or 5D992.c, and classified in accordance with section 740.17 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations; and

(C) subject to a general license issued by the Department of Commerce or Department of Treasury.

(f) DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE STRATEGY.—

(1) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Commerce (in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence) shall develop a strategy to prevent the illegal export to Iran by United States persons regarding technologies used or that may be used in the design, development, production, or operational employment of unmanned aircraft systems by Iran, including the following microelectronics:

- (A) Microcontrollers.
- (B) Voltage regulators.
- (C) Digital signal controllers.
- (D) GPS modules.
- (E) Microprocessors.

(2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy under paragraph (1) shall include, at a minimum, the following elements:

(A) A process for the Secretary of Commerce (in coordination with the Secretaries and heads specified in paragraph (1)) to proactively identify—

(i) current and emerging technologies used or that may be used by Iran in the design, development, production, or operational employment of unmanned aircraft systems (including critical components thereof);

(ii) United States manufacturers of such technologies; and

(iii) foreign manufacturers and proliferators of such technologies.

(B) A process for the Secretary of Commerce (in coordination with the Secretaries and heads specified in paragraph (1)) to proactively identify third-party distributors and resellers of the technologies specified in subparagraph (A)(i) that, through the use of intermediaries with no or nominal operations or assets, or through other mechanisms, contrive to circumvent export controls for such items with respect to Iran.

(C) A methodology for the Secretary of Commerce to proactively engage the United States manufacturers identified pursuant to the process under subparagraph (A)(ii), to provide such manufacturers with timely updates to the list of third-party distributors and resellers identified pursuant to the process under subparagraph (B).

(3) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Commerce shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees the strategy under paragraph (1).

(4) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a)(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but portions of the report described in paragraphs (1) and (2) may contain a classified annex, so long as such annex is provided separately from the unclassified report.

(g) DEPARTMENT OF STATE STRATEGY.—

(1) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—The Secretary of State (in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence) shall develop a strategy to prevent the export to Iran of technologies from the United States and allied and partner countries which are used, or may be used, by Iran in the design, development, production, or operational employment of unmanned aircraft systems (including the microelectronics listed in subparagraphs (A) through (F) of subsection (a)(1)).

(2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy under paragraph (1) shall include, at a minimum, the following elements:

(A) A process for the Secretary of State (in consultation with the relevant Secretaries and heads specified in paragraph (1)) to proactively identify foreign manufacturers of the technologies referred to in such paragraph.

(B) A process for the Secretary of State to engage with any ally or partner of the United States regarding technologies which have been incorporated into an unmanned aircraft system produced by Iran, for the purpose of synchronizing the export control regime of such ally or partner with the United States export controls developed by the Secretary of Commerce pursuant to the strategy under subsection (a) with respect to such technology.

(3) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees the strategy under paragraph (1).

(4) FORM.—The report required by subsection (b)(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but portions of the report described in paragraphs (1) and (2) may contain a classified annex, so long as such annex is provided separately from the unclassified report.

(h) REQUIREMENT FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO DEVELOP RANGE OF OPTIONS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense (in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence) shall develop a range of options that may be employed by the Armed Forces of the United States to counter or otherwise deny Iran the ability to acquire technologies used, or that may be used, in the design, development, production, or operational employment of unmanned aircraft systems by Iran, including the following technologies:

- (A) Microcontrollers.
- (B) Voltage regulators.
- (C) Digital signal controllers.
- (D) GPS modules.
- (E) Microprocessors.
- (F) Computer Aided Design (CAD) software.

(G) Computer numerical control machines.

(2) BRIEFING.—Not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees a briefing on the options developed under paragraph (1).

SEC. 314. DUTIES ON THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 15 days after making an affirmative determination under section 301, the President shall, notwithstanding any other provision of law, increase the rate of duty for all goods and services imported into the United States from the Russian Federation to a rate of not less than 500 percent ad valorem.

(b) REPORT.—Not later than 60 days after making an affirmative determination under section 301, the President shall submit to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate, a report indicating the impact of these ad valorem tariffs on exports to the United States.

SEC. 315. ENDING RUSSIAN OIL IMPORT LOOP-HOLE.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Ending Importation of Russian Oil Act (Public Law 117-109; 136 Stat. 1154) is amended—

- (1) by redesignating section 3 as section 4; and
- (2) by inserting after section 2 the following:

“SEC. 3. PROHIBITION ON IMPORTATION OF ENERGY PRODUCTS PRODUCED AT REFINERIES OUTSIDE THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

“All products classified under chapter 27 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule that were produced at any refinery that uses crude oil originating in the Russian Federation shall be banned from importation into the United States.”.

(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—Section 4 of the Ending Importation of Russian Oil Act (Public Law 117-109; 136 Stat. 1154), as redesignated by subsection (a)(1), is amended—

- (1) in subsection (a), by inserting “or 3” after “section 2”; and
- (2) in subsection (c)(1), by inserting “or 3” after “section 2”.

SEC. 316. TAXING CAPITAL GAINS ON RUSSIAN SOVEREIGN ASSETS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 15 days after making an affirmative determination under section 301, notwithstanding any other provision of law, there is hereby imposed for each taxable year on the disqualified income of any specified foreign government a tax equal to 100 percent thereof.

(b) WITHHOLDING.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (or any other provision of law), any person having control, receipt, custody, disposal, or payment of disqualified income with respect to which tax is imposed

under subsection (a) shall deduct and withhold from such income a tax equal to 100 percent thereof.

(2) APPLICATION OF CERTAIN RULES.—For purposes of subchapter B of chapter 3, section 33, and such other provisions as the Secretary may provide, paragraph (1) shall be treated as part of subchapter A of chapter 3.

(c) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this section:

(1) DISQUALIFIED INCOME.—The term “disqualified income” means any interest or dividends payable with respect to assets which are blocked using the authorities provided by section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.

(2) SPECIFIED FOREIGN GOVERNMENT.—The term “specified foreign government” means the foreign governments (within the meaning of section 892 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and the regulations issued thereunder) of Russia and Belarus.

(d) OVERRIDE OF TREATY OBLIGATIONS.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, this section (and the amendments made by this section) shall apply without regard to any treaty obligation of the United States.

(e) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this section shall apply to interest and dividends received after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 317. SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.

The sanctions described in this section are the following:

(1) PROPERTY BLOCKING.—The President shall exercise all of the powers granted by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of the foreign person if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

(2) ALIENS INADMISSIBLE FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—

(A) VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—In the case of an alien, the alien is—

- (i) inadmissible to the United States;
- (ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and
- (iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).

(B) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—The visa or other entry documentation of an alien described in subparagraph (A) shall be revoked, regardless of when such visa or other entry documentation is or was issued.

(ii) IMMEDIATE EFFECT.—A revocation under clause (i) shall—

- (I) take effect immediately; and
- (II) automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the alien’s possession.

(3) LOANS FROM INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.—The President shall direct the United States Executive Director of each international financial institution to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to oppose any loan, loan guarantee, or equity investment from the international financial institution that would directly or indirectly benefit the sanctioned foreign person.

SEC. 318. IMPLEMENTATION; REGULATIONS; PENALTIES.

(a) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may exercise all authorities provided to the President under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this title.

(b) REGULATIONS.—The President shall issue such regulations, licenses, and orders as are necessary to carry out this title.

(c) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this Act or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out this title shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705(b) and 1705(c)).

SEC. 319. EXCEPTIONS; WAIVER.

(a) EXCEPTIONS.—

(1) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.—Sanctions described in section 317(2) shall not apply with respect to the admission of an alien if admitting or paroling the alien into the United States is necessary to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations.

(2) EXCEPTION RELATING TO THE PROVISION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.—Sanctions under this title may not be imposed with respect to transactions or the facilitation of transactions for—

(A) the sale of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices; or

(B) the provision of humanitarian assistance; or

(C) financial transactions relating to humanitarian assistance;

(3) EXCEPTION FOR INTELLIGENCE, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND NATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVITIES.—Sanctions under this title shall not apply to any authorized intelligence, law enforcement, or national security activities of the United States.

(b) NATIONAL SECURITY WAIVER.—The President may waive the imposition of sanctions under this title with respect to a person if the President—

(1) determines that such a waiver is in the extraordinarily vital to the national security of the United States; and

(2) submits to the appropriate committees of Congress a notification of the waiver and the reasons for the waiver no less than 15 days before the use of the waiver.

SEC. 320. TERMINATION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The President may terminate the application of sanctions, export controls, duties, prohibitions, or penalties under this title if the President certifies to Congress that the Russian Federation has ceased conducting a war of aggression against Ukraine or act in violation of a negotiated peace agreement with Ukraine.

(b) REIMPOSITION.—The President shall immediately reimpose all previous terminated sanctions, export controls, duties, prohibitions, and penalties imposed under this title should the Russian Federation restart a war of aggression against Ukraine or act in violation of a negotiated peace agreement with Ukraine.

SEC. 321. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF RUSSIA SANCTIONS.

(a) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS OF PROPOSED ACTION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, before taking any action described in paragraph (2), the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership a report that describes the proposed action and the reasons for that action.

(2) ACTIONS DESCRIBED.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—An action described in this paragraph is—

- (i) an action to terminate the application of any sanction, export control, duty, or prohibition described in subparagraph (B);

(ii) with respect to sanctions, export controls, duties, or prohibitions described in subparagraph (B) imposed by the President with respect to a person, an action to waive the application of those sanctions with respect to that person; or

(iii) a licensing action that significantly alters United States foreign policy with respect to Russia.

(B) SANCTIONS, EXPORT CONTROLS, DUTIES, AND PROHIBITIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions, export controls, duties, and prohibitions described in this subparagraph are sanctions, export controls, duties, and prohibitions with respect to Russia provided for under—

(i) this Act;

(ii) Executive Order 13849 (22 U.S.C. 9521 note; relating to authorizing the implementation of certain sanctions set forth in the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9401 et seq.);

(iii) Executive Order 13883 (22 U.S.C. 5605 note; relating to administration of proliferation sanctions and amendment of Executive Order 12851 (22 U.S.C. 2797 note; relating to the administration of proliferation sanctions, Middle East arms control, and related congressional reporting responsibilities));

(iv) Executive Order 14024 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property with respect to specified harmful foreign activities of the Government of the Russian Federation);

(v) Executive Order 14039 (22 U.S.C. 9526 note; relating to blocking property with respect to certain Russian energy export pipelines);

(vi) Executive Order 14065 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property of certain persons and prohibiting certain transactions with respect to continued Russian efforts to undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine);

(vii) Executive Order 14066 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to prohibiting certain imports and new investments with respect to continued Russian Federation efforts to undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine);

(viii) Executive Order 14068 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to prohibiting certain imports, exports, and new investment with respect to continued Russian Federation aggression);

(ix) Executive Order 14071 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to prohibiting new investment in and certain services to the Russian Federation in response to continued Russian Federation aggression); and

(x) Executive Order 14114 (88 Fed. Reg. 89271; relating to taking additional steps with respect to the Russian Federation's harmful activities).

(3) DESCRIPTION OF TYPE OF ACTION.—Each report submitted under paragraph (1) with respect to an action described in paragraph (2) shall include a description of whether the action—

(A) is not intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with respect to Russia; or

(B) is intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with respect to Russia.

(4) INCLUSION OF ADDITIONAL MATTER.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Each report submitted under paragraph (1) that relates to an action that is intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with respect to Russia shall include a description of—

(i) the significant alteration to United States foreign policy with respect to Russia;

(ii) the anticipated effect of the action on the national security interests of the United States; and

(iii) the policy objectives for which the sanctions affected by the action were initially imposed.

(B) REQUESTS FROM BANKING AND FINANCIAL SERVICES COMMITTEES.—The Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate or the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives may request the submission to the Committee of the matter described in clauses (ii) and (iii) of subparagraph (A) with respect to a report submitted under paragraph (1) that relates to an action that is not intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with respect to Russia.

(5) CONFIDENTIALITY OF PROPRIETARY INFORMATION.—Proprietary information that can be associated with a particular person with respect to an action described in paragraph (2) may be included in a report submitted under paragraph (1) only if the appropriate congressional committees and leadership provide assurances of confidentiality, unless that person otherwise consents in writing to such disclosure.

(6) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Paragraph (2)(A)(iii) shall not be construed to require the submission of a report under paragraph (1) with respect to the routine issuance of a license that does not significantly alter United States foreign policy with respect to Russia.

(b) PERIOD FOR REVIEW BY CONGRESS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—During the period of 30 calendar days beginning on the date on which the President submits a report under subsection (a)(1)—

(A) in the case of a report that relates to an action that is not intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with respect to Russia, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives should, as appropriate, hold hearings and briefings and otherwise obtain information in order to fully review the report; and

(B) in the case of a report that relates to an action that is intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with respect to Russia, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives should, as appropriate, hold hearings and briefings and otherwise obtain information in order to fully review the report.

(2) EXCEPTION.—The period for congressional review under paragraph (1) of a report required to be submitted under subsection (a)(1) shall be 60 calendar days if the report is submitted on or after July 10 and on or before September 7 in any calendar year.

(3) LIMITATION ON ACTIONS DURING INITIAL CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW PERIOD.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, during the period for congressional review provided for under paragraph (1) of a report submitted under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2), including any additional period for such review as applicable under the exception provided in paragraph (2), the President may not take that action unless a joint resolution of approval with respect to that action is enacted in accordance with subsection (c).

(4) LIMITATION ON ACTIONS DURING PRESIDENTIAL CONSIDERATION OF A JOINT RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a joint resolution of disapproval relating to a report submitted under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2) passes both Houses of Congress in accordance with subsection (c), the President may not take that action for a period of 12 calendar days after the date of passage of the joint resolution of disapproval.

(5) LIMITATION ON ACTIONS DURING CONGRESSIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF A JOINT RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a joint resolution of

disapproval relating to a report submitted under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2) passes both Houses of Congress in accordance with subsection (c), and the President vetoes the joint resolution, the President may not take that action for a period of 10 calendar days after the date of the President's veto.

(6) EFFECT OF ENACTMENT OF A JOINT RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a joint resolution of disapproval relating to a report submitted under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2) is enacted in accordance with subsection (c), the President may not take that action.

(c) JOINT RESOLUTIONS OF DISAPPROVAL OR APPROVAL.—

(1) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection:

(A) JOINT RESOLUTION OF APPROVAL.—The term “joint resolution of approval” means only a joint resolution of either House of Congress—

(i) the title of which is as follows: “A joint resolution approving the President's proposal to take an action relating to the application of certain sanctions with respect to Russia.”; and

(ii) the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is the following: “Congress approves of the action relating to the application of sanctions imposed with respect to Russia proposed by the President in the report submitted to Congress under this section of the Ukraine Support Act with the first blank space being filled with the appropriate date and the second blank space being filled with a short description of the proposed action.”.

(B) JOINT RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL.—The term “joint resolution of disapproval” means only a joint resolution of either House of Congress—

(i) the title of which is as follows: “A joint resolution disapproving the President's proposal to take an action relating to the application of certain sanctions with respect to Russia.”; and

(ii) the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is the following: “Congress disapproves of the action relating to the application of sanctions imposed with respect to Russia proposed by the President in the report submitted to Congress under this section of the Ukraine Support Act with the first blank space being filled with the appropriate date and the second blank space being filled with a short description of the proposed action.”.

(2) INTRODUCTION.—During the period of 30 calendar days provided for under subsection (b)(1), including any additional period as applicable under the exception provided in subsection (b)(2), a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval may be introduced—

(A) in the House of Representatives, by the majority leader or the minority leader; and

(B) in the Senate, by the majority leader (or the majority leader's designee) or the minority leader (or the minority leader's designee).

(3) FLOOR CONSIDERATION IN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.—If a committee of the House of Representatives to which a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval has been referred has not reported the joint resolution within 10 calendar days after the date of referral, that committee shall be discharged from further consideration of the joint resolution.

(4) CONSIDERATION IN THE SENATE.—

(A) COMMITTEE REFERRAL.—A joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval introduced in the Senate shall be—

(i) referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate if the joint resolution relates to a report under

subsection (a)(3)(A) that relates to an action that is not intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with respect to Russia; and

(ii) referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate if the joint resolution relates to a report under subsection (a)(3)(B) that relates to an action that is intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with respect to Russia.

(B) REPORTING AND DISCHARGE.—If the committee to which a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval was referred has not reported the joint resolution within 10 calendar days after the date of referral of the joint resolution, that committee shall be discharged from further consideration of the joint resolution and the joint resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar.

(C) PROCEEDING TO CONSIDERATION.—Notwithstanding Rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, it is in order at any time after the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may be, reports a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval to the Senate or has been discharged from consideration of such a joint resolution (even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) to move to proceed to the consideration of the joint resolution, and all points of order against the joint resolution (and against consideration of the joint resolution) are waived. The motion to proceed is not debatable. The motion is not subject to a motion to postpone. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order.

(D) RULINGS OF THE CHAIR ON PROCEDURE.—Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the rules of the Senate, as the case may be, to the procedure relating to a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval shall be decided without debate.

(E) CONSIDERATION OF VETO MESSAGES.—Debate in the Senate of any veto message with respect to a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval, including all debatable motions and appeals in connection with the joint resolution, shall be limited to 10 hours, to be equally divided between, and controlled by, the majority leader and the minority leader or their designees.

(5) RULES RELATING TO SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.—

(A) TREATMENT OF SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION IN HOUSE.—In the House of Representatives, the following procedures shall apply to a joint resolution of approval or a joint resolution of disapproval received from the Senate (unless the House has already passed a joint resolution relating to the same proposed action):

(i) The joint resolution shall be referred to the appropriate committees.

(ii) If a committee to which a joint resolution has been referred has not reported the joint resolution within 2 calendar days after the date of referral, that committee shall be discharged from further consideration of the joint resolution.

(iii) Beginning on the third legislative day after each committee to which a joint resolution has been referred reports the joint resolution to the House or has been discharged from further consideration thereof, it shall be in order to move to proceed to consider the joint resolution in the House of Representatives. All points of order against the motion are waived. Such a motion shall not be in order after the House of Representatives has disposed of a motion to proceed on the joint resolution. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the motion

to its adoption without intervening motion. The motion shall not be debatable. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is disposed of shall not be in order.

(iv) The joint resolution shall be considered as read. All points of order against the joint resolution and against its consideration are waived. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the joint resolution to final passage without intervening motion except 2 hours of debate equally divided and controlled by the sponsor of the joint resolution (or a designee) and an opponent. A motion to reconsider the vote on passage of the joint resolution shall not be in order.

(B) TREATMENT OF HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION IN SENATE.—

(i) RECEIPT BEFORE PASSAGE.—If, before the passage by the Senate of a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval, the Senate receives an identical joint resolution from the House of Representatives, the following procedures shall apply:

(I) That joint resolution shall not be referred to a committee.

(II) With respect to that joint resolution—
(aa) the procedure in the Senate shall be the same as if no joint resolution had been received from the House of Representatives; but

(bb) the vote on passage shall be on the joint resolution from the House of Representatives.

(ii) RECEIPT AFTER PASSAGE.—If, following passage of a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval in the Senate, the Senate receives an identical joint resolution from the House of Representatives, that joint resolution shall be placed on the appropriate Senate calendar.

(iii) NO COMPANION MEASURE.—If a joint resolution of approval or a joint resolution of disapproval is received from the House, and no companion joint resolution has been introduced in the Senate, the Senate procedures under this subsection shall apply to the House joint resolution.

(C) APPLICATION TO REVENUE MEASURES.—The provisions of this paragraph shall not apply in the House of Representatives to a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval that is a revenue measure.

(d) TOLLING.—The requirements of this section may not be tolled by either the House of Representatives or the Senate.

SEC. 322. DEFINITIONS.

In this title:

(1) ADMISSION; ADMITTED; ALIEN.—The terms “admission”, “admitted”, and “alien” have the meanings given those terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).

(2) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives.

(3) FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The term “financial institution” means a financial institution specified in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F), (G), (H), (I), (J), (M), or (Y) of section 5312(a)(2) of title 31, United States Code.

(4) FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The term “foreign financial institution” has the meaning given that term in regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury.

(5) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term “foreign person” means an individual or entity that is not a United States person.

(6) KNOWINGLY.—The term “knowingly” with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a

result, means that a person had actual knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the result.

(7) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term “United States person” means—

(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or

(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.

(8) WAR OF AGGRESSION.—The term “war of aggression” is implicated when any of the following have occurred in the 30 days prior to a sanctions trigger determination—

(A) a ground, amphibious, or airborne assault;

(B) any naval, aerial, or terrestrial blockade;

(C) any drone or missile attack; and

(D) any cyber attack that has any physical repercussion in the sovereign territory of Ukraine.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The bill shall be debatable for 1 hour, equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs or their respective designees.

The gentleman from Florida (Mr. MAST) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. MEEKS) each will control 30 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. MAST).

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include any extraneous material on the resolution under consideration.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, the question before this House is simple: Will we help Ukraine negotiate from a position of strength, or will we help Putin outlast American resolve?

The Ukrainian people, our NATO allies, and the United States national security cannot afford to wait any longer for this body to act against Russia's brutal war in Ukraine.

In the last 17 months, Russia has redoubled its efforts to break the Ukrainian spirit while waging its illegal war, and this body has failed to meet the moment.

Let me be clear: The administration could be doing more right now without waiting for Congress. President Trump promised to end the war on day one. Seventeen months later, this administration has stalled delivery of assistance that Congress has passed.

□ 1820

It has attacked Ukraine, the victim, while providing cover for Putin who continues to stall, delay, and outlast U.S. support.

We all want this war to end. The question is how? Will we abandon

Ukraine and force it into a terrible deal? That is what Vladimir Putin is counting on.

Or will this body live up to the commitments we have made since the start of this war, that we will support the brave Ukrainians fighting for their future, deliver them the weapons that they need to defend themselves, impose costs on the Kremlin for this immoral conflict, and hold Russia accountable for its war crimes?

This war ends when Putin concludes that prolonged conflict will cost Russia more than ending it. That means proving through action, not words, that the United States and our allies will not walk away.

That is exactly what this bill aims to do. It supports Ukraine's reconstruction, fights Russian malign influence, shores up security assistance for our Baltic allies, and provides Ukraine urgently needed foreign military finance loans to purchase the weapons it needs to defend itself against and push back Russian aggression.

Let me remind my colleagues. Nearly every dollar we invest in Ukraine's security assistance is spent where? It is spent right here in these United States of America supporting American workers, supporting American manufacturers, and supporting American communities.

Mr. Speaker, this is not one of those conflicts where there is a gray area. Vladimir Putin is an authoritarian thug who ordered the invasion of Ukraine for his own imperialistic ambitions. He has ordered the kidnapping of Ukrainian children and the murder of innocent civilians. And as the United States' support has wavered, the carnage has only grown. Mr. Speaker, 2025 was the deadliest year for Ukrainian civilians since the war began.

In the largest land war since World War II, we have seen over a million casualties that Putin chose. And if you believe his ambitions will end with Ukraine, you have not been paying attention at all.

History and Putin have told us otherwise. Some colleagues have raised parts of this bill that could be improved as justification for voting against it. Mr. Speaker, this bill should have gone through regular order, but unfortunately, my request to move Russia bills through regular order have been routinely rejected.

Republican leadership has opposed this bill and repeatedly blocked bipartisan efforts to hold Russia accountable. The Ukraine Support Act was introduced some 14 months ago, and we have forced it to the floor by discharge only because that was the only option left to us.

Now, before I finish, I just have some people that I really need to thank. For 14 months, our majority leader emeritus STENY HOYER, he has been absolutely tremendous, working and getting this bill to this point today. He used to be the whip or so. He is no

longer the whip, but he hasn't lost those whip skills on how to whip people and get them together. That is what he has done, and I have got to thank him and have to say and know that his commitment to the Ukrainian people and to our allies is unwavering and unshakeable. I thank STENY HOYER.

Let me also thank Representatives KEATING and KAPTUR and so many other Democrats who have worked tirelessly and been instrumental in this process. Finally, I must thank Representatives BACON, FITZPATRICK, and KILEY for courageously signing the discharge petition. This indeed has been a team effort and something that the Ukrainian people know that in a bipartisan way we support them in what we will do.

So, Mr. Speaker, it is time for us to do what is right: Support Ukraine. Hold Russia accountable. Show the world and show Putin that the United States does not fold to bullies. Putin's belief that bipartisan U.S. support will fade is as much a fantasy as he believes that he could take Kyiv in a week.

That is how we end this war, and I urge all my colleagues to support this legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. HILL) the chairman of the Financial Services Committee.

Mr. HILL of Arkansas. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I thank my colleagues on both sides of the aisle because there are not people on the floor of the House that support Putin. There are not people on the floor of the House tonight that support Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

I rise to speak, however, in opposition to H.R. 2913, the Ukraine Support Act, and explain, in my judgment, the flaws in this bill. I stand here concerned and somewhat sad that I am here because no one has been a more steadfast supporter of Ukraine than I have, in my judgment.

I thank my colleagues on the Democratic side of the aisle and the Republican side of the aisle who have been so passionate.

I have consistently advocated and voted in support of Ukraine. I have consistently advocated for increased sanctions on Russia. My record of supporting Ukraine is strong. I have made two trips to Kyiv and two other trips to the region, all to rally support in rejection of Putin's stand in Ukraine and call for his defeat.

I led the design and successful passage of the REPO Act in this House and in this Congress to convert billions of dollars of Russian foreign assets for use in Ukraine.

Unfortunately, today, we are confronted, as my good friend from New York noted, with a flawed measure.

First, this bill is 14 months old, and therefore, it doesn't recognize all the changes that have happened over the past year. It actually cuts \$100 million

in authorized funding for Ukraine annually. The funding cuts do not reflect what the House agreed to in our bipartisan NDAA.

It does not reflect the commitment that our NATO allies have made and only calls for a 2 percent pledge of their GDP in support of NATO when, in fact, President Trump has gotten our NATO allies to pledge 5 percent of their GDP in defense spending. We would be walking back from our own spending plans here, and we would be walking back from the commitment we have gotten from our European allies.

But the bill has other issues that I am concerned with. It lists "Iran provisions" in the document rather than refer to Russia.

The bill includes poorly written sanctions policy, including duplicative sanctions that are already in place.

It mandates certain sanctions without any link to a strategic goal of what those sanctions would achieve or meaningful behavioral change in Moscow.

It includes sanctions on financial messaging services like SWIFT, which I think are exaggerated, and in my judgment, could cause countries to move to a Chinese messaging system rather than a Western-based system.

□ 1830

So there are others, and that is why I have disappointment today that I am on this House floor in opposition to it.

I agree with my friend from New York, too, that this House should take up a bill that can pass and have bipartisan support to counter Putin and send a message from both Chambers in this Capitol that we reject Putin's invasion of Ukraine and the murderous regime that he leads.

My better alternative is the Financial Services bill passed almost unanimously by ZACH NUNN called the PEACE Act. It would cut off Russian energy revenues, channel billions from Moscow's sovereign assets to Ukraine to defend itself, and it is past time for that bill to be on this House floor. I have urged House leadership to bring the PEACE Act to the floor. I again ask House leadership to bring the PEACE Act to the floor.

This is a well-crafted bill that will hold Putin accountable, hold Russia accountable, and will demonstrate that on a bipartisan, bicameral basis this Congress is for Putin leaving Ukraine, Ukraine having a sovereign nation, and this country having a great new friend on the Continent of Europe.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the esteemed gentleman from the State of Maryland (Mr. HOYER), who is an original cosponsor on this important measure, the former whip, and the majority leader emeritus of the House.

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend, Mr. MEEKS, who is ranking member of this committee. I thank all those who had the courage to stand up and sign this bill. I would say to my friend who just spoke, whom I have

great respect for: Nothing in this bill contradicts the concerns that he raised. They are consistent with the concerns he raised, and, in fact, they present a forward movement on the concerns that he raised.

Mr. Speaker, to paraphrase General Eisenhower, the eyes of the world are upon us. Since Putin launched his perfidious invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the House has taken 12 votes to support the Ukrainians in defense of their freedom, of their sovereignty, and of international law.

Over all 12, an average of 80 percent of this House—80 percent of this House—has voted to hold firm to the principle that Ukraine must win this war and Putin and his war crimes must lose it, 12 bills, an average of 80 percent of the House of Representatives voting for it, and, in addition, that America has a pivotal role in supporting Ukraine.

The last time, however, that we voted on a Ukraine assistance package was April 2024. My friend said he was for Ukraine, but not today. I have heard so many times: I am for Ukraine, but not this bill; yes, I will be with you on Ukraine, but not now.

In 2025, American aid to Ukraine fell by 99 percent. Thankfully, international aid to Ukraine stayed close to 2024 levels because European allies stepped up and delivered a 67 percent surge—not a 2 percent, not a 4 percent, not a 5—67 percent surge in military assistance and a 59 percent rise in humanitarian aid.

Europe is carrying its weight in helping Ukraine.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 1 minute to the gentleman from Maryland.

Mr. HOYER. In the 2 years since we last approved a package, Ukrainians have endured two bitter winters of war.

It is time for us to act. Russian drones have continued to rain terror on civilian neighborhoods. Driven, in part, by their extraordinary advances in drone technology, however, Ukraine is carrying the day.

A generation of young Russians have been sacrificed for Putin's pride. In this moment at the end of my tenure in Congress, I hear echoes from its beginnings when the Cold War was in terminal phase.

Ronald Reagan traveled to Berlin in 1987. Standing in front of the Berlin Wall, just 2 years before it fell, he told of how the Soviets tried to outlast the West during that decade's nuclear-arms surge.

The Soviets had dug their heels in, but Reagan declared the alliance held firm. This is about the alliance holding firm.

Today, we can declare to Vladimir Putin, just as President Reagan did, that our alliance holds firm and that America holds firm. President Reagan had said earlier in 1983 our adversaries "must be made to understand we will never . . ."

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has again expired.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 30 seconds to the gentleman from Maryland.

Mr. HOYER. President Reagan said in 1983 our adversaries "must be made to understand we will never compromise our principles and standards [nor] ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire."

He was talking about the Soviet Union and Russia today.

"To do so would mean abandoning the struggle between right and wrong and good and evil."

Mr. Speaker, this is a moment. This is a moment to choose between right and wrong and good and evil, not tomorrow, but today, tonight. This is a moment to stand with those who are fighting on the front lines for democracy, sovereignty, and international law.

This is a moment for all of us, together, Democrats and Republicans, Americans and our allies, to hold firm.

Let's hold firm and vote "yes" on this bill and send a message to the world and to the Ukrainians.

Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the comments from Mr. HOYER, and I want to touch on them for a moment.

He made the point that military spending from Europe has surged 67 percent and aid from Europe has surged 59 percent. I am exceptionally glad to see that take place.

However, let's make sure that we give credit where credit is due. There is a reason that military spending in Europe didn't surge by 67 percent in 2024 or 2023. There is a reason that aid didn't surge 59 percent in 2022.

President Trump forced Europe to raise the spending. He said that the burden is going to be on you, Europe, to carry your weight.

In addition, he did something. He demanded something from Europe: that they defend their own backyard.

We should all be praising President Trump for getting them to carry the burden of the war going on in the European backyard. I am glad to see them spend it, and I hope they spend 10 times more, but let's give the credit where it is due.

Mr. HOYER. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAST. I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. HOYER). I think that is the pattern, 30 seconds.

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, it is his time, and I appreciate that.

I congratulate—I am not sure I like the way he did it—

Mr. MAST. You are almost there.

Mr. HOYER.—but what he did was get the Europeans to understand they needed to carry their part of the load. I congratulate him for doing that.

However, why they have surged is because they see the proximate, imme-

diated danger caused by Russians' avaricious appetite for more land and empire. That is why they surged, and we ought to stay with them because we also need to be concerned about a leader in Putin who wants to create another empire.

Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, I was happy to yield to the gentleman a few moments, and I absolutely affirm what he said. I agree with what the gentleman said, and I think Secretary Rubio has affirmed this no less. Secretary Rubio said: We are not neutral, a neutral arbiter in the war between Russia and Ukraine. We believe in Ukraine. We want Ukraine to win. We are not neutral in this.

Absolutely, they see the threat. Europe sees the threat, and we are glad that they are now stepping up in a much more substantial way.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. SELF), who is the chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe.

Mr. SELF. Mr. Speaker, I would like to return our attention to this bill.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 2319.

I am not sure we want the eyes of the world on this bill. I would, Mr. Speaker, like to ask my colleagues across the aisle who discharged this bill: Do you want to see an end to this war?

It is increasingly obvious that it will end, and when it ends, it will be through negotiations. If my friends support this bill, then clearly they are not interested in peace because the consequences would tie the hands of this President and could lead to future hostilities that would bleed over into Europe.

As the chairman of the Europe Subcommittee, I cannot tell you, Mr. Speaker, how much I believe that, but they offered no solutions. It went into the spectrum, they have not offered us an AUMF or a declaration of war. At the other end, they choose to support an unserious bill that would constrain the President's ability to negotiate that peace.

Or is this a simple messaging bill against President Trump?

□ 1840

The Ukraine Support Act is filled with mandatory sanctions provisions that would significantly constrain the President in his negotiations with Russia. This includes congressional review requirements, mechanisms that tie the hands of the President rather than afford him the leverage to pursue a settlement agreement.

My colleague across the aisle and the ranking member typically emphasize the importance of diplomacy, dialogue, and development. Yet, by supporting this bill, they are going back on their words. Successful diplomacy requires flexibility, yet this bill provides the opposite.

The Ukraine Support Act is also riddled with problems that my colleague Mr. HILL has already mentioned, problems that call its credibility into question.

It contains provisions that are already addressed elsewhere in law, including redundancies with the fiscal year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act. It includes outdated provisions, cross-referencing errors, and language that does not reflect current policy. Iran? Really?

In one section, the bill extends the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative at \$300 million per year for fiscal years 2026 and 2027, yet Congress has already authorized \$400 million. The legislation would, therefore, authorize a lower amount than current law.

I ask my Democrat colleagues: Do you support cutting assistance to Ukraine in addition to tying the President's hands?

The bill also includes a sense of Congress encouraging NATO allies to spend at least 2 percent of GDP on defense. This has been a magnificent achievement to get to 5 percent, 3.5 percent on defense and 1.5 percent on infrastructure.

Is your intent to reduce the commitment of NATO member nations? They are watching this debate right now, and they are advocating for 2 percent. Regardless of what they say, the bill has 2 percent in it. Vladimir Putin would love you for that, especially after President Trump successfully worked with our allies to raise their commitment to 5 percent.

Mr. Speaker, for this reason and many others, I urge my colleagues to vote "no" on the Ukraine Support Act.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I remind the gentleman that I heard the President of the United States say that Ukraine should give up, basically, because they don't have the cards. He said to Vladimir Putin do what you will. These are words out of the President's office, not mine.

Mr. Speaker, in reference to the bill raised by Chairman HILL, I want the public to know that I fully supported that bill. In fact, I voted for it in committee. I am on the Financial Services Committee also, and the fact that it hasn't hit the floor a year after it was marked up in committee tells you everything that you need to know about Republican leadership's willingness to put bills on the floor that hold Putin accountable. Because if they would put bills on the floor that would hold him accountable, we would not have had to discharge this bill.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. KEATING), the ranking member on the Europe Subcommittee and an original cosponsor of this important measure.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. Speaker, it is important to recognize as we stand here today in the midst of a war with Iran, as the President is trying to secure an agreement that would require them not to pursue nuclear weapons, that the United States already has a commitment in an agreement with the then-third largest nuclear power, Ukraine.

In the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, Ukraine agreed to relinquish all of their nuclear assets and move away from their nuclear ambition in exchange for an agreement with the United States that we would be there, be there to defend them in the case of aggression and actions by another country.

That day has come, and we are going to honor our future agreements. If we do that, we must certainly honor this agreement. We have to look at the agreements we are already committed to.

Russia's illegal aggression has been accompanied by mass killings, kidnapping and displacement of thousands of Ukrainian children, serial rapes by Russian soldiers, and the targeting of innocent civilians.

These are war crimes, and the war crimes alone command our full support for Ukraine's defense. At the same time, Russia's illegal aggression represents a direct threat to our NATO allies, particularly the Baltic States.

Before the full-scale invasion, Russia made their ambitions crystal clear that the Baltic States were a target and that NATO sovereignty was at stake, as well.

It is important to realize that, in Ukraine, we don't share that commitment alone. Europe as a whole has given \$226 billion in assistance. That is 25 percent more than the \$174 billion that the United States has appropriated.

European countries continue to increase support, while the Trump administration lessens American support. However, we know that the future cost of NATO conflicts is far greater in dollars and in lives, and we know we have to support Ukraine to make sure that we are not falling into that greater cost.

Our commitment to Ukraine remains our best defense economically and in terms of our national security as well as for our shared democratic values.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.

Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. FINE).

Mr. FINE. Mr. Speaker, let me start with a simple premise: What Russia did was terrible, and Vladimir Putin is a bad guy. Hopefully, there is no one in this room who disagrees with that, but I also think that when you file a piece of legislation, it comes with an obligation to draft it carefully because laws have meaning. This proposed piece of legislation is incredibly poorly drafted. It contains numerous critical drafting errors.

For example, in section 313, which is related to dual-use export controls for Russia, subsections (e)(2), (f), and (g), the bill starts to mention Iran rather than Russia. It is clear after re-reading it that someone just copied and pasted from another bill that didn't have anything to do with Ukraine or Russia. It was a bill relating to Iran. They just simply forgot to switch the countries.

We deserve better than that as we debate a bill. Some of the sections are outdated, and they would harm U.S. national security.

Section 102(b)(5) urges all NATO allies to dedicate at least 2 percent of their GDP to national defense. As has been said at the June 2025 Hague Summit, they agreed to 5 percent. Why would we pass a bill that says we want you to do 2 percent?

We have NATO allies that ain't so great anymore. I would focus on Spain, for example. Why would we in this room want to pass something where we as a body are saying: No, you don't have to do 5 percent. Two percent would be A-OK.

The worst thing about this bill is that it would actually hurt Ukraine. It wouldn't even help them. Section 204 extends the USAI at \$300 million for each of fiscal years '26 and '27 and moves the program's sunset to December 31, 2027. Under current law, thanks to the FY 2026 NDAA, the \$400 million for fiscal year 2026, and roughly \$800 million across fiscal years 2026 and 2027, extends the program through December.

This bill is not about helping Ukraine. This is not about standing up to Vladimir Putin. This is about engaging in Trump derangement syndrome as President Trump tries to bring this in for a landing.

Mr. Speaker, this bill should be voted down, and frankly, given the drafting errors, we shouldn't even be spending the time talking about it.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Ohio (Ms. KAPTUR), the co-chair of the Congressional Ukraine Caucus.

Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Speaker, I thank the fine ranking member from the State of New York, who has worked so very hard on this for the time this evening, and to all of our colleagues who support H.R. 2913, the Ukraine Support Act.

Mr. Speaker, it is not a partisan bill. Democrats voted for it. Republicans voted for it. Independents voted for it.

In 2014, without provocation, Russian dictator Vladimir Putin first invaded the sovereign nation of Ukraine. Since 2022, he has been killing its people with his full-scale invasion.

Our free world must stand tall against tyrants, not mollycoddle them. Liberty is not negotiable. The war-torn people of Ukraine are not asking us for charity. They are asking for our partnership, along with our closest, time-tested allies in the European Union.

During the last century, in World Wars I and II, over 330,000 American soldiers' lives were sacrificed for liberty, for us. The greatest gift the 20th century bequeathed to us was their victory.

□ 1850

Liberty must not be squandered. It must be reaffirmed. For this Congress, that time is now.

We must not turn our backs on Ukraine's long-suffering people, especially over 20,000 children of Ukraine

maliciously abducted by Russia and being inhumanely reprogrammed on Russian soil. That is a war crime.

Now, Iran, in cahoots with Putin's Russia, makes the drones killing American soldiers in the Middle East. It is Iranian-made suicide drones that Russia launches to murder thousands of Ukrainians in their homes and its soldiers at the front.

Ukraine has come to America's defense with its cutting-edge interceptor drones. Consider their noble commitment. Now, will we come to Ukraine's aid?

The people of Ukraine fully know their fate is intertwined with our own. A "yes" vote sanctions Putin's Russia, that dictatorship. A "yes" vote forestalls further Russian encroachment across the European Union, our time-tested allies. A "yes" vote aids Ukraine.

If we fail to secure liberty's front in Europe, the next strategic reality we will face is defending our interests against an emboldened, nuclear-armed, expansionist Russia at a much, much higher cost.

Mr. Speaker, voting "yes" for liberty is an imperative, first, last, and always.

Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. MACKENZIE).

Mr. MACKENZIE. Mr. Speaker, I thank Chairman MAST for yielding time to speak on our national security and this critically important issue of supporting our partners and allies and deterring our adversaries.

As a member of both the Foreign Affairs Committee and Homeland Security Committee, I have strong opinions on this topic. It is a fact that Russia and its actions continue to threaten American allies, innocent civilians, and the global economy.

This is an issue that demands serious conversations, bipartisan dialogue, and a sincere interest in advancing our Nation's foreign policy interests, including achieving peace in Ukraine.

What we are seeing, though, is that as we are working through this legislative process and trying to find ways where we can reject Russia's unprovoked aggressions and support Ukraine's right to freedom, peace, and self-determination, what we are doing is looking at legislation that is outdated and insufficient to achieve this goal.

Our Nation, since the beginning of this conflict, has supported Ukraine with over \$137 billion in total security assistance. We have also won commitments from our European allies to finally step up their defense contributions.

The goal should now be to achieve a final end to this conflict and secure lasting, honorable peace for the Ukrainian people. This bill falls far short of that.

What we are seeing is that this legislation makes a number of mistakes. First, it cuts funding to the Ukraine

Security Assistance Initiative. This bill states that it would extend security assistance at \$300 million for fiscal years '26 and '27. However, Congress already passed funding in last year's NDAA that funds security assistance at a level of roughly \$800 million across the same fiscal years.

Potentially worse still, the bill calls for NATO allies to dedicate at least 2 percent of their GDP to national defense. As I mentioned, under this administration, we have made the historic achievement of getting our NATO allies to commit to 5 percent. This bill literally moves us backward, and a decrease in NATO defense member spending would be the result.

Second, it also includes outdated and redundant provisions. Sections of this bill attempt to authorize programs like foreign military financing for allies and partners in the region. Again, Congress already passed similar provisions in the NDAA through the Baltic Security Initiative.

Finally, there are a number of drafting errors that are too numerous to state, but again, this outdated approach is not what is needed at this time.

Mr. Speaker, I encourage Members to do the right thing, to come together in a bipartisan way. We can work in an honest fashion and a serious way to get the achievements that we are actually looking for for America's interests and also for our partners and allies around the world.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. BACON).

Mr. BACON. Mr. Speaker, today's vote, are we going to stand with good or are we going to stand with evil? That is what this is about tonight.

Ukraine is a democracy, a free market, and rule of law. It has been invaded by a dictator who throws its enemies off of roofs, poisons his adversaries, and attacked his neighbor, which is four times smaller than Russia.

What is the goal? To eliminate their independence, culture, and people because he wants to control those old borders of his that he has had. We have to stand for the good side tonight.

What does this bill do? It provides \$1.3 billion in direct military aid, \$8 billion in military sales, and tough sanctions on Russia. We should have done this a year ago. We could have done this in a bipartisan way a year ago, but we have not.

This decision is needed now. Russia is bombing Ukrainian cities every night with ballistic missiles and hypersonic missiles. We had better be there to help them, or in the history books, it is going to say the United States failed when it was most needed.

I know this: I want this House to stand on the right side. I want Republicans to stand where Ronald Reagan would be if he were here right now. Ronald Reagan would be voting "yes" tonight. He would be standing up for

Ukraine and opposing Russia. This is our Churchill moment or our Chamberlain moment. By God, I am going to choose Churchill, and this House better choose Churchill tonight.

Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. GROTHMAN).

Mr. GROTHMAN. Mr. Speaker, I think a point has to be made on the vote that is going to take place in the next hour. I am a little bit afraid that people are going to look at that vote and view it as a statement of fact as to where this body stands on Ukraine.

I think something has to be pointed out that I think, unlike other votes—and the gentleman from Maryland has told us there is an average of over 300 people who voted similar to what he was trying to do in the past.

This vote comes before us on a discharge petition. There are flaws that have been pointed out in it. I think the flaws are going to receive greater attention from me because, for certain reasons, bills brought forth on discharge petitions are frowned upon in this institution.

I want everybody to understand that when this bill passes, probably passes with like 250, 260 votes, it doesn't mean that the commitment to Ukraine has dropped that much from the past votes last year to now. It is, I believe, because the bill came to the floor in a discharge petition.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. FITZPATRICK), the co-chair of the Ukraine Caucus.

Mr. FITZPATRICK. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the Ukraine Support Act.

This vote transcends politics. This vote is about freedom. Just days ago, Russia launched over 650 drones and 73 missiles at Ukrainian cities. Families were murdered in their homes, and children were forced into shelters.

Once again, Vladimir Putin showed the world that he has no interest in peace. He is only interested in terror.

Five years into this illegal war, the Ukrainian people are defending their country against Russia's brutal aggression. Against all odds, they have transformed and modernized their military into one of the strongest and most capable fighting forces in Europe. They have pioneered technologies that are changing warfare itself, from advanced drone operations to battlefield innovation that militaries around the world are now studying.

Mr. Speaker, I have stood shoulder to shoulder with Ukrainian soldiers on the front lines during this conflict. I have heard the artillery fire. I have watched young men and women defend their country with extraordinary courage. They remind me of another generation of fighters: the Americans who defended democracy abroad during World War II, our Greatest Generation. They are fighting for their freedom. They are fighting for democracy. They are fighting for global peace and global security.

Mr. Speaker, the Ukrainian people are not asking for Americans to fight this war. They are asking for the tools to defend themselves and for the partnership of a nation that has always stood for liberty.

The Ukraine Support Act strengthens Ukraine's ability to protect civilians; extends lend-lease authority; provides critical military assistance; sanctions Russia's war machine, its shadow fleet, and those responsible for kidnapping innocent Ukrainian children by the tens of thousands; and makes clear that aggression on this planet has consequences.

□ 1900

We must send a clear message not only to Russia but to every dictator watching us tonight around the world: America will not stand by while free nations are attacked.

Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. NUNN).

Mr. NUNN of Iowa. Mr. Speaker, I thank Members on both sides of the aisle.

I understand the passion behind this. As a still-serving combat veteran—and also for the Chairman's combat service—I think we are committed to making sure that aggressors are held accountable.

That is exactly why I authored the bipartisan PEACE Act—targeted sanctions that truly stop the Russian war machine. Peace through strength was mentioned tonight. Peace through the PEACE Act can be delivered. My bill passed the Committee on Financial Services 53-1, with great credit to Mr. MEEKS. This is something we worked on together and both support.

Challengingly, I would offer that the bill before us tonight takes us on a different path. I would be remiss to not say this is a bill more about politics than policy, and I am concerned that it is a tactical error to move forward when it threatens real strategic deterrence of what this body can deliver.

I understand our mutual aim is to hold Russian aggression accountable, but, my friends, this is not the plan. We have a better option, and we have a clear plan before us.

The PEACE Act moved through committee. It earned bipartisan support, and it is ready for consideration now. And, yes, it has been months in the making, but we have held it every single time. Challengingly, the bill before us is now more than a year and a half outdated.

Our bill would cut off foreign financial assistance to Russia, and it includes Chairman HILL's REPO Act, money that would be seized back so that it can go back to help the Ukrainian people and pay for Russia's aggression. It stops the shadow fleet. It ends Russia's illicit oil sales, and it truly does what we want through targeted sanctions that have been approved.

My friends, if we truly want to stand together, let's stop Russia. Let's lead

with a plan that truly restores peace to Europe. This is our greatest strength. Let's enforce the penalties, enact a timeline, incentivize a ceasefire, and let's make sure that peace can be achieved with the PEACE Act.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. KILEY).

Mr. KILEY of California. Mr. Speaker, I provided the decisive signature for the Ukraine Support Act to bring it to the floor for a vote because the time to act is now.

We have all been inspired by the enduring courage and resilience of the Ukrainian people, encouraged by their recent battlefield gains, and horrified by the latest Russian brutality.

Recent events make it all too clear this conflict will continue to cause death and devastation on a tragic scale if the dynamic does not change. We have the power to change the dynamic.

Today, we can provide potentially decisive leverage. We can make it clear that the United States will continue to stand with the Ukrainian people and provide the material support necessary for their self-defense. We can make it equally clear that Russia will pay a severe price for its unprovoked aggression and ongoing violence.

This is what is required for constructive negotiations to end this conflict. This is what is required for peace. This is what is required to vindicate the international norm against wars of conflict, without which the world would revert to an era where bloodshed was a much more common theme in human affairs.

This legislation will protect America's national interests, will support our vital alliances, will uphold our highest values, and will reassert the role of Congress in advancing all of these goals.

I thank Mr. MEEKS for offering this legislation, as well as the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. HOYER), and the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. BACON) for their leadership, their statesmanship in rallying support for it. I encourage all Members to vote "aye."

Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. PELOSI), a woman of courage, who has traveled to Ukraine many times and stands for the Ukrainian people, the distinguished Speaker Emerita NANCY PELOSI.

Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished once and future chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs for his steadfast leadership and determination for the people of Ukraine.

I rise today in strong support of the Ukraine Support Act and thank Leader HOYER for his persistence and his determination to bring this legislation to the floor and, of course, MARCY, who has been our inspiration, MARCY KAPTUR.

The Ukrainian people are not asking us to fight their war. That has been

said. They are asking for tools to defend their sovereignty, their democracy, and their lives.

As President Zelenskyy wrote to Congress just days ago: "We value every human life, and that is exactly why we are seeking a real peace."

But supporting Ukraine is not only about Ukraine. It is about deterring aggression everywhere. It is about standing up to authoritarianism, and it is about reaffirming that the United States does not abandon those who fight for freedom.

Let us also not forget that well over 70 percent of U.S. funding allocated to Ukraine is spent in the United States, a direct investment in our economy, American workers and industries.

While some have been unwilling to stand up to Vladimir Putin, this Congress must. This bipartisan legislation sends a clear and unmistakable message: The American people stand with Ukraine, and we will stand against Russian aggression—Russian aggression which includes kidnapping of tens of thousands of little children, which includes raping of mothers in front of their children and in front of their parents. It is about killing families. Their assaults on civilians are sinful, in my view.

Let us pass this bill to strengthen Ukraine's hand to hasten a just and lasting peace, and to uphold the values that make America a beacon of hope to the world. "Glory to Ukraine"; "Slava Ukraini."

Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. HIMES), the ranking member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, I thank Mr. MEEKS for yielding me the time.

Five days ago, I was in Ukraine, and I saw what so many of us have seen: truly remarkable courage, absolute commitment to fighting for their freedom, innovation like you would not believe, and, interestingly, something I had not seen before in my previous trips to Ukraine, which was the optimism and joy in the face of missiles and destruction that the Ukrainians are winning.

They are winning because they are executing deep strikes into Russia, which have resulted in 30 percent of Russia's refining capacity being eliminated. They are winning because they are retaking territory, and they are winning because they are inflicting a staggering and horrible number of casualties, 30,000 a month, on the Russians.

The Russians are responding to the fact that they are losing by lashing out in desperate fashion, saying diplomats should leave Kyiv, attacking Romania with a drone, because they know they are losing. This is an inflection point.

We could debate for 6 months or 12 months. We have done that before, and the Ukrainians paid with their lives for

that delay, or we could join the fight at the moment that it is being won.

The Ukrainians that I spoke to are the bravest people I have ever seen fighting for their freedom. They want to know one thing. They are wondering whether the people here, in the home of the free and the land of the brave, will be side by side with them. That is all they are wondering. They just want a little help. They don't want our people. They want our technology, and they want to know that we are there with them.

Look around this Chamber. This is the Chamber in which we made the sacrifices to defeat communism. This is the Chamber in which we made the decisions to defeat Nazism. Since 1857, when we have been meeting in this Chamber, we have stood for freedom and liberty. Those who opposed it with butts and conditions, history was not kind to their memory.

□ 1910

Let's do what we have always done and support the brave Ukrainians in their desire for freedom.

Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, I would just remind the ranking member of the Intelligence Committee that he said that we should give Ukraine—they just want a little bit of help. The United States of America, to this moment, is giving them far more than just a little bit of help, and that should not be ignored.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. QUIGLEY), who is the co-chair of the Congressional Ukraine Caucus and who has traveled to that war zone over five times.

Mr. QUIGLEY. Mr. Speaker, I have some questions.

My first question is: If my friends across the aisle don't like this bill, why don't they draft their own? Why did this bill have to be forced on them? Why was it necessary to do a discharge petition? Where was their excitement about doing anything?

My second question is: Why hasn't the President of the United States said who he wants to win this war? He still has not said who he favors.

My next question is: When my friends talk about peace and they say that we need to be flexible, I want to know details. Does that mean we are going to give Putin a reward for raping and pillaging the Ukrainian people and that we are going to reward them with the land that they took in this aggressive nature?

This is the time to make those decisions.

We are now about to celebrate our 250th anniversary of independence, and we are reminded that our Nation was born in defiance of tyranny. Ukraine is fighting that same fight today, and this fight is the same reason we fought the Second World War.

Putin's goal stretches well beyond Ukraine. He seeks to erase a democ-

racy, to replace freedom with fear, and to prove that brute force can triumph over the rule of law.

We cannot allow that to stand.

Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DOGGETT), the original cosponsor on this important measure.

Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Speaker, for over a year, the House Republican leadership has yielded to Donald Trump's peculiar friendship with Vladimir Putin and blocked action on this measure.

Every day that Republicans look the other way, Ukrainians die. Over 55,000 of them have perished. Over 20,000 children have been kidnapped. The war that Trump promised to end in a single day is now in its fifth murderous year.

Trump has continued to send signals to Vladimir Putin that his brutal aggression is okay. He has reduced U.S. direct support for Ukraine by 99 percent. He has withheld even the modest funds that this Congress approved last year. He has removed American troops from Europe, diverted essential defensive weapons that would protect Ukrainians elsewhere, and remained silent while Putin destroyed American businesses in Ukraine and provided intelligence to Iran to target Americans. Most recently, he has indicated to NATO that when Putin creates a further crisis, the U.S. will offer less, if any, help.

As Putin tests the resolve of the civilized world, Trump has shown that he has no resolve. He is too weak to lead and too reckless to be followed.

With my own name on some of the first sanctions legislation that this Congress approved against Russia and with two of the measures that I have authored since then incorporated in this measure, I am glad to see that we finally get some action.

Since March, thanks to Trump's incredible lifting of sanctions, Vladimir Putin is getting about \$200 million a day, including today, in revenue to oil his war machine.

Tonight, let's unite to resist the appeasers and seek a victory for everyone in this world who values self-determination, democracy, and freedom.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. COHEN).

Mr. COHEN. Mr. Speaker, much has been said which I agree with on the Democratic side. This is a fight for supporting a country that is standing up to aggression from Russia; lies from Russia that they weren't going to invade Ukraine when they did it; and people who have killed innocent children, women, and civilians on a regular basis with missile attacks and drone attacks.

We need to stand with democracy, with freedom, and with courage and against authoritarianism and against Putin. I support this resolution, am proud to do it, and thank the Ukrainian people for their sacrifices and their valor.

Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, the camera of history is rolling, and history will show where each Member stands at this time as Ukraine's war rages on. It will show who stood with Ukraine and with democracy and who stood with Vladimir Putin and his evil regime.

Putin believes he can outlast American resolve. I don't believe he can. Today, we have the chance to prove him wrong.

Mr. Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues, Democrats and Republicans alike, to stand with the people of Ukraine and pass this bill.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I am going to just begin with the final comments of the ranking member. He said that it is a chance to prove you stand with Ukraine.

We could do absolutely nothing in this Chamber today, and all of us would still be standing with Ukraine. We have been standing with Ukraine since the onset of this war, which began under President Joe Biden. We have been standing with Ukraine.

A vote for this bill doesn't prove that you are pro-Ukraine. I believe that analysis of this bill proves that you didn't take a look very well about how it does affect citizens of the United States of America.

As Secretary Rubio said and as I mentioned already, we are not a neutral arbiter in the war between Russia and Ukraine. We have sent tens of billions of dollars in security assistance to Ukraine since the start of the war. We continue to share intelligence to this very moment. We continue to send arms. We have levied countless sanctions against Russia that are still in place today.

I could tell you that I personally cheer every single time Ukraine hits a Russian target.

This bill is not about helping Ukraine defeat Russia. This bill is about trying to stop President Trump and trying to tie his hands and limit his ability to negotiate.

President Trump has successfully ended longstanding conflicts around the globe. In just the last 18 months, he has ended the October 7 war between Israel and Hamas; the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which had been a 30-year-long conflict; between Egypt and Ethiopia, a longstanding diplomatic crisis that risked all-out war; between Pakistan and India, who were on the verge of all-out war, which could have turned nuclear if not stopped; war between the DRC and Rwanda; between Kosovo and Serbia; and between Cambodia and Thailand.

President Trump has been working on conflicts successfully across the globe. Those are just some of the successes that he has been able to accomplish in the last 18 months, despite

Democrats really fighting him every step of the way.

I think the reality is that in order to end this war, we have to bring Russia to the table. I think we all know that.

I personally would much rather prefer that our coalition—and it is a strong coalition that includes the United States of America—bring Vladimir Putin to his knees, but as long as Vladimir Putin has nukes, the coalition is not going to do that.

□ 1920

Why? Let's explain it very clearly. The only reason that there is not more being done militarily in response to Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine is because they have nuclear weapons. The only reason that there is not a United States of America bunker buster through the ceiling of the Kremlin is because Russia has nukes. It is the only reason that Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia—take your pick—don't have heavy armor rolling all the way to Siberia: It is because Russia has nukes.

In fact, this is why Iran absolutely should not have a nuclear weapon. This is something that has been apparently forgotten by my colleagues. We do not want to have to negotiate with a terrorist state that proves to be an imminent threat to the United States of America every single day and have them be armed with a nuclear weapon.

That is why I find it so interesting that Democrats want to pull out all the stops against Russia while doing absolutely nothing to stop Iran, which, in the 30 months prior to Epic Fury beginning, attacked the United States of America over 350 times. That, to me, is amazing.

What this bill would do is tie the President's hands. I have mentioned that already. It would prevent him from negotiating an end to the war. The President has tried his best to get my colleagues to read between the lines about how they would be affecting the United States of America domestically by pushing this policy. He laid it out yesterday in his Statement of Administration Policy, which speaks very specifically about the far-reaching provisions, like the sanctions on SWIFT and the imposition of mandatory sanctions without the appropriate waivers for their limits.

To bring this back domestically and what that memo was about in part is this: Sanctions on this bill would be a kill switch on American nuclear power. Under President Trump, we are finally weaning off nuclear fuel, but that does take time. The truth is, Russia has a stronghold on global enriched uranium supplies, and Russian suppliers are intertwined in our nuclear energy supply chain as well as that of Europe's.

Recently, Russia accounted for nearly 30 percent of enriched uranium purchased by United States reactor operators, underscoring both the continued dependence on foreign-controlled enrichment capacity and the need for an

orderly transition to secure domestic supply chains. That number is now lower than it was, thanks to President Trump, but the sanctions in this bill would strain an already vulnerable U.S. nuclear supply chain overnight.

These sanctions don't just impact us here at home, as I mentioned already. They would have devastating consequences to European energy. As Europe realized through oil and gas, they are highly dependent on Russia. They have been working to wean themselves off, which President Trump warned them about in his 45 administration, saying why is the United States of America paying all this time, troops, and treasure to protect Europe through NATO when they are so intertwined with Russia, and they are highly dependent in Europe on Russian enriched uranium.

In addition—this has been mentioned numerous times—the bill is filled with outdated measures and basic errors. To give a few of those examples that have already been mentioned, the bill includes funding for Ukraine security assistance that was already passed as a part of this year's NDAA. In fact, the bill would provide \$100 million less per year than what was passed in the NDAA. That is a pretty important oversight.

It has been mentioned that the bill calls for 2 percent of GDP military spending from NATO. It was already congratulated by some of my colleagues that the President has worked to make sure that NATO spends 5 percent of their GDP in terms of military spending, and he has been wildly successful in making sure that that takes place.

This bill, in my opinion, is an unserious bill to attack President Trump that was crafted basically a year and a half ago, while he was actively engaged in the high-stakes negotiation to end this war since it started.

I do believe that people on both sides of this bill want to help Ukraine, but supporting this bill does not somehow say you are stepping away from Ukraine or that you all of a sudden stand beside them.

Again, we could do nothing here today, and the status quo that we have been supporting Ukraine since the onset of this war would continue. I believe that this is about a cudgel to fight against President Trump and tie his hands, as I have said already.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.

Pursuant to House Resolution 518, the previous question is ordered on the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on passage of the bill.

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the yeas appeared to have it.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 226, nays 195, not voting 9, as follows:

[Roll No. 207]

YEAS—226

Adams	Golden (ME)	Murphy
Aguilar	Goldman (NY)	Nadler
Amo	Gomez	Neal
Ansari	Gonzalez, V.	Neguse
Auchincloss	Goodlander	Newhouse
Bacon	Gottheimer	Norcross
Balint	Gray	Ocasio-Cortez
Barragan	Green, Al (TX)	Olzewski
Beatty	Grijalva	Pallone
Bell	Harder (CA)	Panetta
Bera	Hayes	Pappas
Beyer	Himes	Pelosi
Bishop	Horsford	Perez
Bonamici	Houlihan	Peters
Boyle (PA)	Hoyer	Pettersen
Bresnahan	Hoyle (OR)	Pingree
Brown	Huffman	Pocan
Brownley	Hurd (CO)	Pou
Budzinski	Ivey	Quigley
Bynum	Jackson (IL)	Ramirez
Carbajal	Jacobs	Randall
Carey	Jeffries	Raskin
Carson	Johnson (GA)	Riley (NY)
Carter (LA)	Johnson (TX)	Rivas
Casar	Joyce (OH)	Ross
Case	Kamlager-Dove	Ruiz
Casten	Kaptur	Ryan
Castor (FL)	Keating	Salinas
Castro (TX)	Kelly (IL)	Sánchez
Chu	Kennedy (NY)	Scanlon
Cisneros	Khanna	Schakowsky
Clark (MA)	Kiggans (VA)	Schneider
Clarke (NY)	Kiley (CA)	Scholten
Cleaver	Krishnamoorthi	Schrier
Clyburn	LaLota	Scott (VA)
Cohen	Landsman	Sewell
Conaway	Larsen (WA)	Sherman
Correa	Larson (CT)	Simon
Costa	Latimer	Smith (WA)
Courtney	Lawler	Sorensen
Craig	Lee (NV)	Soto
Crockett	Lee (PA)	Stansbury
Crow	Leger Fernandez	Stanton
Cuellar	Levin	Stevens
Davids (KS)	Liccardo	Strickland
Davis (IL)	Lieu	Subramanyam
Davis (NC)	Lofgren	Suozi
Dean (PA)	Lynch	Sykes
DeGette	Magaziner	Takano
DeLauro	Mannion	Thompson (CA)
DelBene	Matsui	Thompson (PA)
Deluzio	McBath	Titus
DeSaulnier	McBride	Tlaib
Dexter	McCaul	Tokuda
Dingell	McClain Delaney	Tonko
Doggett	McClellan	Torres (CA)
Elfreth	McCollum	Torres (NY)
Escobar	McDonald Rivet	Trahan
Espallat	McGarvey	Tran
Evans (PA)	McGovern	Turner (OH)
Fields	McIver	Underwood
Figures	Meeks	Vargas
Fitzpatrick	Mejia	Vasquez
Fletcher	Menefee	Veasey
Foster	Menendez	Velázquez
Foushee	Meng	Vindman
Frankel, Lois	Mfume	Walkinshaw
Friedman	Miller (OH)	Wasserman
Frost	Min	Schultz
Garamendi	Moore (WI)	Morelle
Garbarino	Morelle	Morrison
Garcia (CA)	Morrison	Moskowitz
Garcia (IL)	Moskowitz	Moulton
Garcia (TX)	Moulton	Mrvan
Gillen	Mrvan	Mullin
Gimenez	Mullin	

NAYS—195

Aderholt	Baird	Begich
Alford	Balderson	Bentz
Allen	Barr	Bergman
Amodei (NV)	Barrett	Bice
Arrington	Baumgartner	Biggs (AZ)
Babin	Bean (FL)	Biggs (SC)

Bilirakis	Hageman	Nehls
Boebert	Hamadeh (AZ)	Nunn (IA)
Bost	Haridopolos	Obernolte
Brecheen	Harrigan	Ogles
Buchanan	Harris (MD)	Omar
Burchett	Harris (NC)	Onder
Burlison	Harshbarger	Owens
Calvert	Hern (OK)	Palmer
Cammack	Higgins (LA)	Patronis
Carter (GA)	Hill (AR)	Perry
Carter (TX)	Hinson	Pfluger
Ciscomani	Houchin	Reschenthaler
Cline	Hudson	Rogers (AL)
Cloud	Huizenga	Rogers (KY)
Clyde	Hunt	Rose
Cole	Issa	Rouzer
Collins	Jack	Roy
Comer	Jackson (TX)	Rulli
Crane	James	Rutherford
Crank	Johnson (LA)	Salazar
Crawford	Jordan	Scallise
Crenshaw	Joyce (PA)	Schmidt
Davidson	Kelly (MS)	Schweikert
De La Cruz	Kelly (PA)	Scott, Austin
DesJarlais	Kennedy (UT)	Self
Diaz-Balart	Kim	Sessions
Donalds	Knott	Shreve
Downing	Kustoff	Simpson
Dunn (FL)	LaHood	Smith (MO)
Edwards	Langworthy	Smith (NE)
Elzey	Latta	Smith (NJ)
Emmer	Lee (FL)	Smucker
Estes	Letlow	Spartz
Evans (CO)	Loudermilk	Staubert
Ezell	Lucas	Stefanik
Fallon	Luna	Steil
Fedorchak	Luttrell	Steube
Feenstra	Mackenzie	Strong
Fine	Malliotakis	Stutzman
Finstad	Maloy	Taylor
Fischbach	Mann	Tenney
Fitzgerald	Massie	Tiffany
Fleischmann	Mast	Timmons
Flood	McClain	Valadao
Fong	McClintock	Van Drew
Fox	McCormick	Van Dуйne
Franklin, Scott	McDowell	Van Epps
Fry	McGuire	Van Orden
Fulcher	Messmer	Wagner
Fuller	Meuser	Walberg
Gill (TX)	Miller (IL)	Weber (TX)
Goldman (TX)	Miller-Meecks	Webster (FL)
Gooden	Mills	Westerman
Gosar	Moolenaar	Wied
Graves	Moore (AL)	Williams (TX)
Griffith	Moore (NC)	Wittman
Grothman	Moore (UT)	Womack
Guest	Moore (WV)	Yakym
Guthrie	Moran	Zinke

NOT VOTING—9

Jayapal	Mace	Pressley
Johnson (SD)	Miller (WV)	Thanedar
Kean	Norman	Thompson (MS)

□ 2008

Messrs. WESTERMAN, WITTMAN, MOORE of North Carolina, MEUSER, and SMITH of Nebraska changed their vote from “yea” to “nay.”

Mr. CLEAVER changed his vote from “nay” to “yea.”

So the bill was passed.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

MOMENT OF SILENCE IN MEMORY OF THE VICTIMS OF THE NIPPON DYNAWAVE PAPER MILL INDUSTRIAL TRAGEDY

(Ms. PEREZ asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Ms. PEREZ. Mr. Speaker, I rise in grief for the 11 men who lost their lives and in hope for those still recovering from injuries suffered at the Nippon Dynawave Paper Mill in Longview, Washington, in the worst industrial tragedy in Washington State history.

As we confront the loss of lives and horrific injuries, God forbid that we shirk from accountability for the current state of affairs or the responsibility You placed on us to improve them. Let us honor the skill and humanity of these men who were each created in Your image.

Forgive our willful ignorance to the hardship and danger that greed, self-interest, and neglect have brought on our brothers and sisters across the Nation. Forgive us for demanding others zealously preserve Your creation while we ourselves abuse it.

Guide the hands caring for the wounded. Grant discernment and wisdom to the investigators and all those seeking answers. Be a comfort and strength to the grieving and lost and those working to rebuild. Instill in us a fearless spirit in serving our people.

Amen.

I ask everyone in the Chamber to join me in a moment of silence.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Will all Members and guests please rise for a moment of silence.

ADJOURNMENT FROM THURSDAY, JUNE 4, 2026, TO MONDAY, JUNE 8, 2026

Mr. SMITH of Nebraska. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that when the House adjourns today, it adjourn to meet at noon on Monday next for morning-hour debate and 2 p.m. for legislative business.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Nebraska?

There was no objection.

□ 2010

HONORING THE LIFE OF KEVIN HAUGH

(Mr. LAWLER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LAWLER. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to honor the life of Pearl River resident Kevin Haugh, a retired FDNY EMS captain, who bravely battled ALS and passed away last Friday.

Kevin dedicated 38 years to FDNY EMS, retiring as captain after a lifetime of service to the State of New York. He was a 9/11 first responder, a member of the National EMS Memorial Service, and a member of The Four Paul Foundation. Throughout his distinguished career, he was not only a hero in the field but a mentor for those who served alongside him.

Kevin was the founding member of the FDNY EMS Pipes and Drums, serving as the lead bass drummer and retiring as the drum major, in which he took great pride in service, tradition, and his Irish heritage.

He was also a Fourth Degree Sir Knight in the Knights of Columbus St. Dominic's Council 5343, a member of The American Legion, Pearl River Elks

Lodge, and the Ancient Order of Hibernians, where he served as their grand marshal in the 2023 Pearl River St. Patrick's Day parade.

Kevin will be deeply missed by his mother, Ann; his son, Michael; and all who knew him. He will be remembered for the life he built through service, dedication, and an unwavering commitment to serving his community. His memory will always be a blessing.

PENNSYLVANIA FARMERS DISASTER DECLARATION

(Ms. DEAN of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend her remarks.)

Ms. DEAN of Pennsylvania. Agriculture is the largest industry in my Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Farmers are stewards of our land. For some, they carry generations of family work. For all, they fulfill our most basic need. Their crops feed us.

When an extreme, unexpected cold front hit at the end of April, it was devastating for many of our crops, especially the fruits, apples, peaches, and pears. Our Commonwealth's specialty crop industry could face staggering losses between \$150 and \$200 million. Losses of this magnitude, especially impossible to prepare for, would be insurmountable to our farmers, especially in our rural communities.

That is why my colleagues and I, alongside Governor Josh Shapiro, urged Agriculture Secretary Brooke Rollins to declare a Secretarial Disaster Declaration, a truly bipartisan effort to bring much-needed relief to our crop growers.

I am grateful that last week, Secretary Rollins signed the declaration for 17 counties, allowing our farmers to secure necessary recovery loans. When our farmers thrive, we all do.

HONORING CENTRE COUNTY JUDGE DAVID GRINE

(Mr. THOMPSON of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. THOMPSON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to remember retired Centre County Judge David Grine, who passed away in May at the age of 81.

From an early age, David dedicated his life to public service, enlisting in the Army following his graduation from State College Area High School, and he later served as a police officer.

A proud Penn State alumnus, David earned a bachelor's degree and later graduated from the Dickinson Law School.

In the late seventies, he served as Centre County District Attorney and was a judge of the Centre County Court of Common Pleas. From 2008 to 2012, he served as president judge and was appointed senior judge status in 2021.

In his final retention vote in 2011, more than 85 percent of Centre County