

Here we are not on day one, not on day two, but on day 400, 500, whatever it is, of this Presidency, and costs aren't any lower today than 2024. In fact, they are higher. It is more for healthcare, more at the supermarkets, and more at the gas pumps.

Unlike previous downturns in our economy, it is not because of an act of terrorism like 9/11, and it is not because of a downturn in the business cycle. No, it is specifically because of the reckless policies of this administration and those who have supported those policies here in Congress.

His reckless trade war has only increased costs. He has doubled down on that policy by now launching a war in Iran that, in just 2 months, has brought gas prices from under \$3 a gallon to now \$4.22 just today and rising, perhaps approaching \$5 a gallon this summer.

What has he done on taxes and healthcare and spending? Their first reconciliation bill last year showered tax breaks by the trillions to mostly the wealthy, and it paid for it on the backs of the healthcare of the American people.

Here we are now in reconciliation 2.0, and what do we find? There is nothing in here about the price of groceries, nothing to lower the price of gas, and nothing on housing, on childcare, or on healthcare. No, we have \$70 billion more for ICE and CBP.

We can do far better. The American people deserve better. Say no to their reckless policies. Vote "no" on this bill.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. ARRINGTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, let me summarize how we got here: Department of Homeland Security immigration agents killed two American citizens in Minneapolis, and Democrats demanded accountability from the Trump administration.

Instead of working with Democrats to enact meaningful reforms—to rein in the agencies that killed Renee Good and Alex Pretti—congressional Republicans shut down the department. Now, Republicans are proposing to end their disastrous DHS shutdown by creating a multi-billion-dollar slush fund without any oversight at all.

We have seen this story before. Last year, when congressional Republicans gave more than \$160 billion to Trump's DHS in the Big, Ugly Bill, then-Secretary Kristi Noem decided she wanted luxury private jets. This time, S. Con. Res. 33 directs the House Homeland Security Committee to spend up to \$70 billion on U.S. Border Patrol, which Republicans say is only supposed to last for the rest of the Trump administration. That would mean for the next three years, Border Patrol's budget would triple. That's in addition to the billions of dollars they receive last summer.

And it gets worse: This budget resolution also directs the Judiciary Committee to spend an additional \$70 billion for ICE. That is double ICE's annual budget per year—on top of the \$75 billion gifted to them by Republicans in the Big, Ugly Bill.

Mr. Speaker, we need to oppose this reckless spending and fight for justice for Renee Good and Alex Pretti and all the folks who have been terrorized by the Trump administration. Vote "no" on S. Con. Res. 333.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.

Pursuant to House Resolution 1224, the previous question is ordered on the concurrent resolution.

The question is on the adoption of the concurrent resolution.

Pursuant to clause 10 of rule XX, the yeas and nays are ordered.

Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this question are postponed.

#### FALLEN SERVICEMEMBERS RELIGIOUS HERITAGE RESTORATION ACT

Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 1224, I call up the bill (S. 1318) to direct the American Battle Monuments Commission to establish a program to identify American-Jewish servicemembers buried in United States military cemeteries overseas under markers that incorrectly represent their religion and heritage, and for other purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 1224, an amendment in the nature of a substitute consisting of text of Rules Committee Print 119-27, modified by the amendment printed in Part C of House Report 119-628, is adopted, and the bill, as amended, is considered read.

The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows:

S. 1318

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

#### SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Foreign Intelligence Accountability Act".

#### SEC. 2. CIVIL LIBERTIES REVIEW OF FBI QUERIES.

(a) REQUIREMENT.—Subsection (f)(3) of section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (D)—  
(A) by redesignating clauses (iv) through (vi) as clauses (v) through (vii), respectively;

(B) by inserting after clause (iii) the following new clause:

"(iv) MONTHLY CIVIL LIBERTIES REVIEW.—A requirement that the Federal Bureau of Investigation, on a monthly basis, provides to the Civil Liberties Protection Officer within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence the written statements regarding each United States person query submitted in the previous month under clause (iii).";

(C) in clause (vi), as so redesignated, by striking "(iv)" and inserting "(v)"; and

(D) by conforming the margin of clause (vii), as so redesignated, to the margin of the other clauses; and

(2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

"(E) CIVIL LIBERTIES REVIEWS AND INVESTIGATIONS.—

"(i) CIVIL LIBERTIES PROTECTION OFFICER.—The Civil Liberties Protection Officer within

the Office of the Director of National Intelligence shall review each written statement regarding a United States person query submitted under subparagraph (D)(iv) to determine whether the query meets the standards required by the procedures adopted under paragraph (1). If the Civil Liberties Protection Officer determines that the query did not meet such standards or there exists possible abuses of civil liberties and privacy, the Civil Liberties Protection Officer shall refer the query to the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.

"(ii) INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall determine whether each query referred under clause (i) constitutes a violation of laws, rules, or regulations or an abuse of authority."

(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended—

(1) in section 103D (50 U.S.C. 3029)—

(A) in subsection (b)—

(i) in paragraph (6), by striking ";" and inserting a semicolon;

(ii) by redesignating paragraph (7) as paragraph (8); and

(iii) by inserting after paragraph (6) the following new paragraph (7):

"(7) review each written statement submitted to the Civil Liberties Protection Officer under section 702(f)(3) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a(f)(3)); and"

(B) in subsection (c), by inserting before the period at the end the following: "; and, based on the reviews specified in paragraph (7) of such subsection, shall make referrals to the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community under section 702(f)(3) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a(f)(3))"; and

(2) in section 103H(g)(3)(A) (50 U.S.C. 3033(g)(3)(A)), by inserting after "and safety" the following: "(including with respect to referrals from the Civil Liberties Protection Officer pursuant to section 702(f)(3) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a(f)(3))".

#### SEC. 3. CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION OF PROHIBITION ON QUERIES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 709 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881h) is amended—

(1) in the heading, by striking "UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE" and inserting "UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE AND OTHER ACTIONS";

(2) in subsection (a)—

(A) by striking "if that person knowingly" and inserting the following: "if that person—

"(1) knowingly";

(B) by striking "party." and inserting "party"; and

(C) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:

"(2) while serving as an employee or officer of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, knowingly and willfully violates the querying procedures adopted under section 702(f)(1)(A) relating to United States person queries; or

"(3) knowingly and willfully falsifies or materially misrepresents complying with the procedures or requirements for querying information acquired under section 702(a)."; and

(3) in subsection (b)—

(A) by striking "offense in this section" and inserting the following: "offense—

"(1) in paragraph (1) of subsection (a)";

(B) by striking "title 18" and inserting "title 18, United States Code";

(C) by striking "both." and inserting "both; and"; and

(D) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(2) in paragraph (2) or (3) of subsection (a), shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both.”.

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS AMENDMENT.—The table of contents at the beginning of such Act is amended by striking the item relating to section 709 and inserting the following new item:

“Sec. 709. Penalties for unauthorized disclosure and other actions.”.

**SEC. 4. REQUIREMENT FOR TARGETING UNITED STATES PERSONS UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978.**

Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(o) FOURTH AMENDMENT REQUIREMENT FOR TARGETING UNITED STATES PERSONS.—

“(1) PROHIBITION ON TARGETING UNITED STATES PERSONS.—In accordance with subsection (b), no officer or employee of the United States Government may intentionally target a United States person for an acquisition under section 702.

“(2) ORDER REQUIREMENTS FOR TARGETING UNITED STATES PERSONS.—In accordance with the other provisions of this Act and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, with respect to a United States person, the United States Government may seek—

“(A) an order authorizing electronic surveillance in accordance with title I;

“(B) an order authorizing a physical search in accordance with title III;

“(C) an order authorizing an acquisition in accordance with section 703, 704, or 705; or

“(D) a warrant issued pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by a court of competent jurisdiction.”.

**SEC. 5. ATTENDANCE PROCEDURES FOR MEMBER ACCESS TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT AND FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT OF REVIEW.**

Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Attorney General shall—

(1) revoke the procedures issued by the Attorney General on or before December 31, 2025, pursuant to section 5(d) of the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act (Public Law 118–49; 50 U.S.C. 1803 note); and

(2) issue new procedures that comply with such section and ensure the access of the Members of Congress and staff specified in such section to any proceeding of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or any proceeding of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review.

**SEC. 6. REQUIREMENT FOR ATTORNEY APPROVAL OF FBI QUERIES USING UNITED STATES PERSON QUERY TERM.**

Section 702(f)(3)(A)(i) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a(f)(3)(A)(i)) is amended by striking “supervisor (or employee of equivalent or greater rank) or”.

**SEC. 7. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE AUDIT OF TARGETING PROCEDURES UNDER SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978.**

(a) AUDIT.—The Comptroller General of the United States shall conduct an audit of the targeting procedures used for acquisitions under section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a), including the technical mechanisms, implementation, and operations used by the Federal Government for targeting capabilities.

(b) REPORT.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the

Comptroller General shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report containing the results of the audit required by subsection (a), including an analysis of whether the targeting procedures as implemented are appropriately limiting targeting under section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a) to non-United States persons located outside of the United States.

**SEC. 8. EXTENSION OF AUTHORITIES OF TITLE VII OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978.**

(a) EXTENSION OF REPEAL DATE OF TITLE VII.—Section 403(b) of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (Public Law 110–261), as most recently amended by Public Law 119–84, is further amended—

(1) in paragraph (1) (50 U.S.C. 1881 note) by striking “April 30, 2026” and inserting “April 30, 2029”; and

(2) in paragraph (2) (18 U.S.C. 2511 note), in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking “April 30, 2026” and inserting “April 30, 2029”.

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this section shall take effect on the earlier of the date of the enactment of this Act or April 29, 2026.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The bill, as amended, shall be debatable for 1 hour, equally divided among and controlled by the chair and the ranking minority member of the Committee on the Judiciary, or their respective designees, and the chair and the ranking minority member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, or their respective designees.

The gentleman from Ohio (Mr. JORDAN), the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. RASKIN), the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. CRAWFORD), and the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. HIMES) each will control 15 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and to insert extraneous material on S. 1318.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?

There was no objection.

Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, it ain't the same FISA. When we were in this Chamber 2 years ago debating a reauthorization of FISA 702, the program was significantly different than it is today.

In 2021, the FBI reported conducting nearly 3 million U.S. person queries. An audit of those queries found that 278,000 times, they did not comply with the rules, didn't follow the rules. FBI agents ran queries on protesters, donors to congressional campaigns, public officials, journalists, colleagues, and even ex-girlfriends.

In response to those abuses, Congress enacted the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act. The House Judiciary Committee, the House Intel-

ligence Committee, all of Congress, put together that law that contained 56 different reforms, things like new training and approval requirements before a U.S. person query could even take place, audit requirements, accountability measures for those who misused the program, and enhanced reporting and transparency requirements such as allowing certain Members of Congress and staff to attend FISA court proceedings.

We are beginning to see the effect of those reforms. In the year after RISAA was passed, the FBI reported conducting 9,089 U.S. person queries. Of those roughly 9,000 queries, just 127 did not comply with the rules.

Think about it: from 278,000 to 127. That is real improvement. That is a different program. Most of those 127 were due to errors like typos, clerical errors.

Due to the improved reporting and transparency required by RISAA, Congress has more insight than ever into the program's operation.

Today, every single U.S. person query conducted by the FBI is audited to ensure compliance with applicable requirements and legal standards. The results of those audits and other information are provided to Congress on an annual, semiannual, and quarterly basis.

The Foreign Intelligence Accountability Act would add to those reforms. The legislation in front of us, for example, adds the Civil Liberties Protection Officer within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence who will conduct a monthly review of FBI U.S. person queries.

I think this is the best thing we put in the reauthorization bill, this 30-day look back on how the queries are going, are they following the rules, and what took place in those actual searches.

Queries that violate the rules would be referred to the inspector general of the intelligence community for further investigation. That is, again, a couple more layers of accountability.

This bill would also impose criminal penalties for those who knowingly conduct improper queries and those who lie about conducting improper queries.

Finally, the bill would require that an FBI attorney, rather than just some other agent or supervisor, approve any U.S. person search before they are conducted.

The 702 program is incredibly important for protecting our national security and advancing our interests abroad.

In light of the progress that has been made and the threats that we face, we think the bill before us today makes sense right now.

That does not mean our job is over. The Judiciary Committee will continue to conduct aggressive oversight of FISA, and we will continue to work on some things that we think can be helpful in the future.

Again, today is not 2024. I urge my colleagues to support the bill, and I reserve the balance of my time.

□ 1600

Mr. RASKIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I urge all of our colleagues, with constitutional patriotism still beating in their hearts after this tortured and demeaning and visibly transactional process we have seen today, to oppose the legislation.

This bill is a 3-year permission slip and blessing for the Trump administration and the next administration to keep abusing the sweeping FISA section 702 surveillance authority to spy on American citizens' private communications and to violate the privacy rights of the people.

I want every Member of this body to be clear on exactly what is in this bill. It has no warrant requirement for queries of U.S. citizens. It has no probable cause requirement. It provides for no judicial oversight of these government queries.

It subjects U.S. citizens to completely unconstitutional standards, avoiding the Fourth Amendment entirely. It is in a parallel universe from the Constitution—or perhaps I should say a perpendicular universe to the Constitution.

The Constitution interposes a judge—a neutral, independent magistrate—between the government and a search of persons and their things. This 3-year blank check to Trump, Patel, and company leaves the executive branch free to conduct these searches with self-reporting and self-policing as the sole protection against their abuse of the section 702 program.

Without any meaningful guardrails, this U.S. person information collected under foreign intelligence standards that have nothing to do with the Fourth Amendment is ripe for abuse. It has been systematically abused to spy on American citizens in the past, and it will be used in exactly the same way by Kash Patel and Todd Blanche in the future if we pass this bill.

Last week, it came to light that FBI Director Kash Patel was unhappy about a New York Times article, which focused on the fact that he had used FBI SWAT teams and jets to chauffeur his girlfriend around the country at taxpayer expense.

What did he do? He didn't decide to change his policy on how he uses the people's resources. Instead, he had his agents query FBI databases for dirt on the reporter.

Was the FISA section 702 program one of the databases he searched? The FBI says no. He just searched every other database at the FBI. We have no idea because they don't have to go to a judge before searching an American citizen's information.

We depend now, in this system, on Kash Patel to be the check and balance against Kash Patel. We only know about the fact that it even happened because a reporter got the information. Otherwise, we wouldn't even have known anything about it.

Let it be a warning to people vigilant about our civil rights and privacy, about what actually goes on.

Even Republicans on the Rules Committee last night were registering their displeasure with these reports.

Look, the FISA section 702 program has been misused and abused under every section. Section 702 authorizes the government to collect information from electronic communication companies in the U.S. about non-U.S. persons who are physically outside the U.S. When the government gets communications to and from these foreign targets, it also incidentally collects large amounts of information about American citizens.

In 2022, the FISC, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, detailed a historical pattern of noncompliant queries at the FBI. Improper searches swept in elected officials, political campaign donors, Black Lives Matter protesters, and many others.

At other agencies, analysts used section 702 to query their own names, the names of their relatives, and even the names of former romantic partners.

Just last month, Federal judges on the FISC issued an opinion to sound the alarm about how the FBI is currently abusing FISA, violating the law and flouting the safeguards Congress imposed 2 years ago to snoop on Americans' private communications. The administration is deliberately keeping this opinion totally classified in a basement SCIF here at the House.

Reforms that we made during the last FISA section 702 reauthorization, which I strongly supported and voted for—unlike my friend Chairman JORDAN—those reforms relied on internal watchdogs and required agencies to track and report the use of section 702 data to spy on Americans.

I strongly supported that reform, but, 1 year and change into the Trump administration, the watchdogs are all but gone. After returning to the White House, President Trump quickly removed the internal watchdogs charged with verifying FBI's representations that the reforms are working; he illegally fired a majority of the members of the independent Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board; and his Department of Justice reassigned other key compliance personnel. The watchdogs have been removed from the scene of the crimes.

The administration repeatedly claims that FBI compliance exceeded 99 percent in 2024 and 2025. Even if those claims are true—and I seriously doubt it—that is an admission that the FBI has illegally accessed the data of thousands of American citizens.

More importantly, these numbers are based on the violations and abuses that Kash Patel and Todd Blanche are willing to identify themselves and self-report. How can we believe these numbers when the administration has returned all the watchdogs to the pound? They are no longer there.

The FISC judges warned us just last month that the FBI is abusing its au-

thorities to spy on Americans, so what makes us think that a 3-year blank check renewal will lead to self-correction?

Proponents of the bill claim that it protects privacy, but asking Kash Patel's FBI to self-report abuses of our civil liberties to Tulsi Gabbard's DNI is like asking Donald Trump to self-report his collection of millions of dollars from foreign governments directly to the U.S. Congress. That is actually the law under Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution, the Foreign Emoluments Clause. Yet, he has never once come to ask for our permission for him to keep a foreign government emolument, whether pocketed through the Trump Hotels, the Trump golf courses, or the other Trump enterprises in crypto coins and scams, and so on.

If you think self-reporting is working well under the foreign government Emoluments Clause, go ahead and vote for self-reporting under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. For me, I am sticking with the Fourth Amendment and the Constitution. Under our Constitution, it is judges, not FBI agents or government lawyers, who must protect our privacy and our civil liberties.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. LOFGREN).

Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to reauthorizing FISA section 702 without meaningful reform.

At a time when the Trump administration is building a sweeping surveillance apparatus, trampling civil rights, and disregarding the rule of law, Congress should be strengthening oversight, not rubberstamping warrantless surveillance.

If the government wants to search an American's private communications, it must get a warrant. That is what the Constitution requires, and it is what the American people demand.

Once again, our Speaker is trying to block debate and deny a vote on a warrant requirement. Instead, we are trying to jam through another extension of warrantless surveillance without meaningful reforms.

I have opposed this abuse under both Republican and Democratic administrations, and I oppose it today.

Congress should reject this bill and take up meaningful reform, including my bipartisan Government Surveillance Reform Act, introduced with Representative DAVIDSON, along with Senator WYDEN and Senator LEE in the other body.

We do not have to choose between national security and constitutional rights. That is a false choice. We can protect the country and protect Americans' constitutional right to privacy. Congress should do both.

Mr. Speaker, oppose this bill so we can get meaningful reform.

Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

□ 1610

Mr. RASKIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New York (Mr. NADLER).

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, FISA section 702 can be a powerful tool against foreign threats, but without significant guardrails against abuse, it is also a massive threat to the privacy and civil liberties of all Americans. That is why I must oppose this legislation.

I have worked for many years, in a bipartisan fashion, to include major reforms to section 702, and I was looking forward to working with my colleagues again to strengthen these protections during this reauthorization.

However, the new provisions in this bill are simply a fig leaf and do not represent real reform. In particular, the supposed new warrant requirement is nothing more than a restatement of current law and completely misses the point of reform.

It is already unlawful to target the communications of Americans under section 702. That is not the problem. The problem is what to do with the massive amounts of U.S. person information that is swept up along with foreign communications.

The intelligence community is not supposed to search this data except under strict protocols. Yet we know that these protocols are violated all the time.

The only solution is to require a probable cause warrant if the government wants to search the 702 database for U.S. person information. That is what this debate is about, and that is the bare minimum demanded by the Fourth Amendment.

The Trump administration's argument appears to be: Trust us. However, that is not good enough for any administration, and especially not for this administration, which has already shown a shocking disregard for Americans' civil liberties.

Mr. Speaker, we should get this right. We should work together, as we have in the past, to strike the right balance between security and liberty. We should put in a probable cause warrant requirement. Until then, vote "no" on this legislation.

Mr. RASKIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Washington (Ms. JAYAPAL).

Ms. JAYAPAL. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to this bill to reauthorize FISA with no reforms. I have long worked on bipartisan reforms that protect the privacy of Americans, and, frankly, I am sad that some of my colleagues across the aisle who were part of that struggle have caved to Donald Trump.

However, the reality is that Americans across the political spectrum out there, outside of Congress, want us to reform FISA so that the government does not spy on them. That has never been more necessary than right now as Donald Trump and Stephen Miller openly use domestic surveillance to suppress our rights.

Trump blacklisted Anthropic for refusing to drop its condition that their AI technology never be used to facilitate domestic mass surveillance targeting Americans. Law enforcement has used Americans' sensitive data to punish women seeking reproductive care, and ICE has deliberately used data to suppress First Amendment activity.

Why is it so hard for the majority to just assure Americans that the FBI will get a damn warrant to access their sensitive data?

Americans don't want to be spied on, and I have been consistent on this, pushing Democratic Presidents and Republican Presidents.

Mr. Speaker, this bill continues to allow the FBI to spy on you and offers zero reforms. Vote "no."

Mr. RASKIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, the key point is this: Under this bill, FBI agents can still collect, search, and review Americans' communications without any review from a judge. It is the heart of the Fourth Amendment, Mr. Speaker, that search warrants have to be based upon probable cause, and you have to go to a judge to get a search warrant before you can invade the private expectations of the people in their places and in their things.

This bill leaves intelligence agencies in charge of policing their own compliance with the law. Asking Kash Patel to self-report his abuses to Tulsi Gabbard does nothing to protect the civil liberties of Americans.

That is not how our Constitution was designed. The whole reason we have the courts involved is to make sure that the executive branch doesn't get to be its own check and balance against itself.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I would just point out that I think one of the reasons they attack Mr. Patel so darned much is because crime is down in the country. He is actually doing his job.

I think another reason they like to attack the Director of the FBI is because he is the guy who uncovered what they were doing 10 years ago when he was a staffer here on the House Intelligence Committee. It was Kash Patel who told us that the dossier, paid for by the Clinton campaign, was a bunch of garbage. Yet that is exactly what Mr. Comey used for the other part of FISA, title 1, to go get a warrant to spy on the other party's campaign.

Maybe that is why they like to attack Director Patel so much. But I think he is bringing down crime in our country, and I applaud him for that.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. RASKIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, Kash Patel has been using government resources to chaf-

feur his girlfriend all over the country. Then when it was learned by the press that he was doing that, there was an article about it.

When he got mad about it, rather than say: Well, yeah, maybe there is a problem using an FBI SWAT team to shepherd my girlfriend around the country. Instead of changing the policy, he decided to go after the reporter and search the databases on the FBI.

This is while we are debating FISA.

If you need any more vivid demonstration, Mr. Speaker, of the danger of allowing law enforcement officials to govern themselves and to regulate whether or not they are violating the Constitution, check that out. We may disagree a lot about this FBI director's record. That is not directly relevant to this point.

Say you trust him, we don't, but we know you haven't trusted other people in the office before, Mr. Speaker. Let's legislate in a way that is consistent with the Constitution of the United States.

In closing, Mr. Speaker, the reason why we have to hold fast to the Constitution is precisely because we are all imperfect beings. I stood strongly for FISA 702 last time without the necessity of a search warrant because of all the reforms that I believed that the Biden administration would engage in, and they basically engaged in them.

Now the Trump administration is in, and President Trump came in and dismantled all of the safeguards we put in and just chased the watchdogs out of the FBI. That is why we must stick very closely to the Constitution, as my good friend, the chairman of the committee, argued the last time we debated this. He has convinced a lot of people that we need to stick to the Constitution. I am sorry we are not on the same side today.

The key point is that we do not trust government officials to regulate themselves. That is why law enforcement officers across the country, FBI, have to go to a judge to get a Fourth Amendment search warrant before they invade somebody's privacy unless there is exigency, unless there is an emergency, and we have accounted for that. We can deal with that problem.

Let's stick with the Constitution.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, FISA, as we all know, is a critical program. It is important for our government to understand what bad guys are planning to do to our citizens and to our Nation and to have this program in place. That is why it is critical we reauthorize it.

We have made major changes over the last several years, not just 2 years ago, but over the last several years. The Judiciary Committee has been involved in the oversight in making sure this program is done the way it should be done and protecting Americans' liberties. There are 56 different reforms

we have put in the last reauthorization bill that, as I said in my opening statement, we know have made a difference.

Today's program is different. It is different. We should reauthorize it because FISA is critical. Today, there is training and checks on the front end before a search can be done of a U.S. person. There is transparency for the whole process in how it all works. There is accountability on the back end if you don't do it right. Mr. Speaker, this bill now says that accountability includes criminal penalties if you don't do it right.

So this is the kind of legislation we need to pass, and we need to pass it soon because they have been shutting down the government, the Department of Homeland Security, for what, 74 days now?

By the way, we do also happen to be in the middle of a military operation in Iran.

Let's get this done.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. MEUSER). The gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. CRAWFORD) and the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. HIMES) each will control 15 minutes.

□ 1620

Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of S. 1318, the Foreign Intelligence Accountability Act. This legislation makes further reforms to section 702, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and reauthorizes the authority for 3 years.

Originally authorized in 2008, section 702 allows the intelligence community to gather foreign intelligence on foreign targets based overseas. Targets of 702 are terrorists, hackers, and spies living abroad. No U.S. citizen anywhere in the world can be targeted under section 702.

I want to be very clear on this point. Section 702 is not a backdoor surveillance tool that allows the government to collect and review an American's emails or other electronic communications. The only U.S. person data collected is if the terrorist, spy, or hacker targeted under 702 is talking to an American or about an American. In that case, only the communications held in the foreign target's accounts are collected.

For the government to collect that American's communications, current law already requires the government to get a warrant under different FISA authorities.

Section 702 is one of our country's most important foreign intelligence authorities.

In 2025, 100 percent of the President's intelligence priorities reported on by the NSA were supported by section 702, and more than one-quarter of all NSA reporting contains 702 information; 90 percent of synthetic drug disruptions enabled by the CIA were supported by

section 702; and 63 percent of the intelligence products in the President's daily brief contained section 702 information.

Reauthorizing FISA 702 is essential. In 2024, Congress reauthorized section 702 through legislation known as RISAA. This legislation included 56 reform measures that restricted FBI U.S. person queries, implemented greater FBI accountability for any noncompliance, mandated greater transparency across the IC and FISC, and included key reforms to address abuses related to traditional FISA like we all witnessed in the FBI's Crossfire Hurricane investigation.

The RISAA reforms resulted in a 94 percent drop in the number of FBI U.S. person queries from 2022 to 2025, 119,300 down to 7,400. At the same time, the FBI's compliance rate increased to 99 percent, equivalent to other IC agencies.

Despite the efforts of FBI Director Patel to implement the reforms and accountability, rebuilding trust will not happen quickly. For that reason, working with Chairman JORDAN and House leadership, I have met with all unique groups across the Republican Conference over the past several months to identify additional key reforms and to develop a consensus product.

The reality is that no reauthorization effort would be likely to be perfect in everyone's eyes, but this bill makes measurable reforms to strengthen accountability and safeguards while maintaining the criticality of the foreign intelligence tool.

Specifically, the bill before us: clarifies that no U.S. person can be a target of 702 collection, and any targeting of a U.S. person requires a warrant; establishes criminal penalties for intentional abuse of FISA 702 queries and any false statements to the FISC; mandates new procedures to allow Members to observe FISC hearings; requires an FBI attorney review all FBI U.S. person queries; orders an independent audit by the Government Accountability Office on 702 targeting procedures; and establishes an outside review and authentication process of all FBI U.S. person queries by mandating the ODNI Civil Liberties Protection Officer review FBI query justifications.

With these important reforms, the bill includes a 3-year reauthorization for FISA 702. The bottom line is that the importance of this tool to U.S. national security cannot be overstated, and for that reason, it is essential for Congress to reauthorize this authority.

On a 24/7 basis, we face the threat of cyberattacks from our adversaries. We have U.S. military personnel and citizens being targeted overseas. We have foreign terrorist organizations recruiting Americans and plotting attacks on the homeland.

FISA 702 is a vital national security authority that enables the intelligence community and military to mitigate and defeat these threats. In fact, if the 702 tool had existed prior to 2001, we

may have been able to prevent September 11 from happening.

I urge all my colleagues to vote "yes" on S. 1318. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I rise in support of S. 1318, the Foreign Intelligence Accountability Act.

I do so with some reluctance because the process that brought us here has been indefensible. Two weeks ago, when we walked off the floor after legislation to reauthorize 702 failed, Democrats made clear there was an open door to negotiate a bipartisan package of real reforms, perhaps one that would even pass on suspension in this Chamber. I have been discussing this issue for months now with the ranking member of the Judiciary Committee, Mr. RASKIN, and it is clear to me that there is a path to a bill that could do more than squeak through and only by attaching unrelated legislation that may not pass the Senate.

However, we are where we are, and I am going to support this legislation because in my decade on the House Intelligence Committee, I have seen countless, countless instances where the intelligence obtained through section 702 quite literally saved lives. Section 702 is the single most important foreign intelligence collection authority we have, and every day it is used by apolitical professionals throughout the IC and apolitical professionals at the FBI to keep Americans safe here and abroad. There is no way to replace the value that section 702 provides, and the loss of this authority would be devastating.

Given the binary choice between reauthorization and expiration, the responsible choice is reauthorization. As President Biden's Intelligence Advisory Board put it: "If Congress fails to reauthorize section 702, history may judge the lapse of section 702 authorities as one of the worst intelligence failures of our time."

As I said at the outset, we should be considering a much broader array of reforms than those in this package. For example, 2 weeks ago, I proposed an amendment to the base bill in the Rules Committee that would have created a judicial process for U.S. person queries conducted by the FBI in the 702 database. I want to be clear that we have seen no evidence—let me say that again, we have seen no evidence that this administration is misusing section 702, but nonetheless, we must remain hypervigilant, given the other abuses that we have seen from this administration.

My amendment to Rules would have required a Federal court approval before the FBI could access the results of a query it conducted involving a U.S. person. I regret that my amendment as well as a range of other ideas from Members on both sides of the aisle were not considered as part of this process.

However, as I said, we now have a binary choice, and the reality is that 2

years ago, Congress, on a bipartisan basis, with the support of more than 70 percent of the Democratic Caucus, passed the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act. That bill 2 years ago contained over 50 major reforms, the bulk of which were intended to address the longstanding and unacceptable issues of compliance at the FBI. Since enactment, the evidence shows that those reforms have been highly successful, with far fewer U.S. person queries conducted and with a compliance rate at the FBI of 99 percent.

It is easy to dismiss those numbers, given the political leadership of the FBI and the DOJ. I don't trust Director Patel any more than my Democratic colleagues do.

On January 6, 5 years ago, I was in this Chamber when it was attacked by the shock troops sent here to stop the peaceful transfer of power. I sat there for half an hour as police officers with guns drawn tried to defend our democracy, so I take a back seat to no one in my concern about the abuses of this administration.

However, the data we have on FISA is based on oversight of the professional and apolitical staff, not Kash Patel, the professional and apolitical staff, who are there at the Department of Justice Office of Intelligence, largely the same group of public servants who performed this work under President Biden, and their findings are validated not just by the Attorney General or Tulsi Gabbard or Kash Patel, but by independent oversight, the DOJ's inspector general, the staff of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court on an annual basis, and the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees of both Chambers.

We are not trusting this administration. We are verifying in all three branches of government. If we saw the slightest hint that these authorities were being abused, I wouldn't be standing here today to support this bill.

The legislation now before the House contains several reform proposals. These proposals are modest and well short of what I would like, but they are meaningful. Most importantly, the legislation requires that all U.S. person queries of the 702 database by FBI be reviewed by ODNI's Civil Liberties and Privacy Officer, and that any improper queries be referred from there to the IG of the intelligence community. This adds yet another layer of oversight of FBI on top of internal oversight, DOJ oversight, which I may not trust, court oversight, which I do trust, and congressional oversight which, yes, I do trust, since I am involved in that. The legislation also adds new criminal penalties for FBI employees who intentionally improperly use section 702.

Finally, the legislation requires that only an FBI attorney can approve a U.S. person query, building on a reform we made in 2024, which required preapproval from either an FBI lawyer

or an FBI supervisor. Now, a lawyer is likely to be compliance focused rather than operations focused the way a supervisor would be, and will be especially careful and cautious before approving a proposed U.S. person query.

□ 1630

These are modest reforms, but they are not nothing. When viewed in combination with the 50-plus reforms of 2024, Congress will have built a substantial oversight structure around 702 to prevent abuse.

Section 702 is not a dragnet. It is not an authority that can be used to surveil Americans. It does not contain any commercially acquired information. It does not use artificial intelligence to analyze collected data. Despite the fact that we have heard this word a lot today, it is not unconstitutional. A Federal court certifies this program every single year.

If this were deemed by the judiciary, the branch of government which determines constitutionality, to be unconstitutional, we might have heard that from the courts at some point in the last 18 years in which they have been certifying this authority.

What it does have is an extremely robust set of oversight guardrails in all three branches of government, and this bill makes those guardrails marginally and modestly stronger. It is without question the most important foreign intelligence tool we have.

Mr. Speaker, for those reasons, despite my frustration with the process that has led us here, I will vote "yes," and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LAHOOD).

Mr. LAHOOD. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of S. 1318, the Foreign Intelligence Accountability Act, and I thank Chairman CRAWFORD for his leadership and steadfast support for reauthorization of FISA 702.

During the last reauthorization in 2024, I and many other Members led the committee's task force on FISA reforms, and I think it is important to clarify what FISA 702 is and what it isn't.

FISA 702 cannot be used to target U.S. persons, period. Under current Federal law, it is illegal to target U.S. persons under this authority. Section 702 only allows for the collection on foreigners located overseas and who are reasonably believed to possess certain types of foreign intelligence information.

Throughout our reform process in 2024, we worked with our Judiciary Committee colleagues and spent over a year working to address unacceptable section 702 abuses by the FBI with the goal of preserving constitutional liberties afforded to all U.S. persons, ensuring events like Crossfire Hurricane never happen again, and holding the FBI accountable.

The last reauthorization, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing

America Act, RISAA, targeted 56 reforms and meaningful changes to the FBI. It is the largest reform to the FBI in a generation. The Department of Justice Inspector General's Office has confirmed today that the FBI has implemented all 56 of these requirements.

These requirements over the last 2 years have worked, by everybody's account, holding the FBI accountable; increasing criminal penalties on agents and analysts, making the FBI more compliant with what they have to do; reforming the FISC, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court; and a number of other reforms that are working.

I strongly believe the unintended consequences of letting FISA 702 expire would result in risking national security and making the United States less safe for American families.

If we just look over the last year here, the strategic strike in Venezuela, the Israeli hostages who were recovered from the tunnels in Hamas, taking out Iran's nuclear capabilities and the success we have had there, the taking out of drug cartel bosses in Mexico, going back to the first administration and what happened with Soleimani and al-Baghdadi, and many other instances that we can't talk about here, all of it derived from FISA 702.

Prior to coming to Congress, I spent time as a Federal prosecutor and the chief terrorism prosecutor in the U.S. Department of Justice. I know firsthand how FISA can be used for the proper prosecution of terrorists and non-U.S. citizens who want to harm America. Putting people in jail who want to hurt America would not happen but for FISA and section 702.

Today, FISA 702 delivers unique foreign intelligence that allows the U.S. Government to better protect U.S. military forces abroad, disrupt malicious hackers targeting U.S. infrastructure like emergency medical services and transportation services, and thwart potential efforts by terrorist groups that may be plotting attacks on our homeland.

Mr. Speaker, the bottom line is that FISA is an indispensable national security tool. We ought to support this bill to protect America and our citizens, and I urge its adoption.

Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to the time remaining.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Connecticut has 8 minutes remaining.

Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. HOYER), the former majority leader of the House of Representatives.

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, when I was majority leader in 2008, Mr. Blunt, who was then in the leadership of the Republican Party, Senator Kit Bond, and Senator Jay Rockefeller, who co-chaired the Intel Committee in the United States Senate, and I worked together in a very difficult context.

That context was that the Bush administration had asked for information

from the telecoms. The telecoms had given them information, and there were really no firewalls as to what that information was.

The four of us worked with the Intelligence Committee of the House to come up with legislation which would solve the problem of making sure that we were secure as a country and that the privacy of our citizens was secure. We think we accomplished that objective.

In fact, the leadership in the Senate voted for it. President Obama, then a Member of the Senate, voted for it. Ms. PELOSI, Mr. CLYBURN, and I voted for it, along with others. The Republicans were overwhelmingly for it.

In September 2012, we did it again. Ms. PELOSI, Mr. HOYER, and Mr. CLYBURN voted for it. We did it again in January 2018, and PELOSI, HOYER, CLYBURN, RYAN, MCCARTHY, and SCALISE all voted for it.

The point I will make is, this has been a bipartisan process with bipartisan Presidential buy-in to the necessity to have this legislation adopted to keep Americans safe while also adopting significant reforms in 2008 and some reforms thereafter to provide for the privacy protections to the American people.

It is a balance, but it is a balance that I think we have achieved. I think we ought to pass this legislation. I urge my colleagues to do so.

Our FISA reauthorization bills are how Congress ensures that our Nation is protected in the first instance against threats from terrorist groups and foreign adversaries. Our intelligence services have the difficult task of catching threats before they materialize and are providing critical information to national security leaders.

As many here will remember, the attacks of September 11, 2001, occurred after our national security agencies failed to identify, track, and coordinate known threats. Twenty-five years later, we have learned these lessons, and we continue to grapple with essential questions about how to balance the needs of our national security with protecting Americans' liberties.

That is an ongoing process, of course, and I know Democrats on the committee, led by Ranking Member HIMES, were diligent in pushing for reforms to section 702 that would make those protections stronger for Americans while still delivering the tools needed. This bill does not include all the reforms.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 30 seconds to the gentleman from Maryland.

Mr. HOYER. None of the bills that we consider have all the things we would like to have in them, but in testimony from Avril Haines, who headed up the DNI under the Biden administration, she believes this is absolutely essential. Other members of the Obama administration and the Biden administration believe this legislation is essential.

I believe this legislation is essential, and I urge my colleagues, having worked on this since 2008, to adopt this legislation and make America as safe as we possibly can.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to the time remaining.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Arkansas has 8 minutes remaining.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. HILL), the distinguished chairman of the Financial Services Committee and member of HPSCI.

Mr. HILL of Arkansas. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman and Mr. HIMES, too, for their joint leadership on this important task that we have before us today.

Mr. Speaker, here on the eve of 25 years since September 11, we come to this House floor to, once again, ensure that we have the tools in place to protect the homeland from foreign attacks.

Section 702 sets out these very specific boundaries and process where the United States Government collects the electronic communications from foreign nationals outside the U.S. It allows the U.S. to collect that intelligence on bad actors to prevent the re-occurrence of 9/11, but there is a lot of misinformation about section 702, Mr. Speaker.

□ 1640

First, it is used to surveil foreign nationals abroad. It is not targeted at Americans.

Secondly, it is not warrantless surveillance. There is a fundamental misunderstanding of this program.

Warrant requirements are created under the Fourth Amendment. They apply inside the United States. This is not a program that operates within the boundaries of the United States. It targets foreign nationals outside of the United States.

This is so important, as demonstrated by Mr. HOYER, that we have clear, active protections on how this program is used to target foreign nationals with those protections to protect Americans' privacy under the Fourth Amendment. This bill is that balance, as described by the gentleman from Connecticut and my colleague from Arkansas.

Mr. Speaker, let's put America's safety first. Let's keep the homeland security paramount. It is critical. Let's support and pass S. 1318. I urge my colleagues to join me in that effort.

Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. RASKIN), my good friend and the ranking member of the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. RASKIN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, yes, it is foreign intelligence, which is why when it comes to U.S. persons—U.S. citizens—the Fourth Amendment has to apply. The gentleman from Maryland (Mr. HOYER),

my distinguished colleague, said that the legislation is bipartisan.

I tell you what else was bipartisan—in fact, unanimous: the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. Everybody got behind that. We are assured that there is reporting, but it is self-reporting. The distinguished ranking member says that it is by nonpolitical staff.

Yes, the nonpolitical staff left over after Kash Patel fired everybody at the FBI who they considered insufficiently loyal to MAGA and to Donald Trump and for those who worked on the January 6 case.

Then, we are told that the courts still can get involved at some point. Well, the courts are telling us right now that the FBI has been secretly breaking the law. Last month, the FISC court found that many of the government's 702 searches violated Federal law. We should be paying close attention to that as we move forward.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. FITZPATRICK), the distinguished chair of the CIA Subcommittee on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

Mr. FITZPATRICK. Mr. Speaker, of all of the debates that we have had on this House floor, I have yet to be so perplexed as I am with this one. There is so much conflation going on between title I, traditional FISA, and title VII, section 702. There is so much conflation over the collection of evidence versus the querying of already lawfully collected data. Everybody in this Chamber has been talking past each other for years on this issue.

The Fourth Amendment applies to the collection of evidence. That has been the case from the very founding of our country. This so-called warrant requirement, Mr. Speaker, what they are asking for is a double warrant requirement. A warrant requirement is on the collection of evidence.

They are seeking to attach a warrant requirement to the querying of already lawfully collected data. That is a secondary warrant requirement, the first time in American history that we would ever be doing such a thing. That would shut down the law enforcement system. You would have to expand the Federal judiciary by a factor of 100 to keep up with that work, and it would put us on pre-9/11 footing. We cannot do that.

By the way, after we passed RISAA—56 reforms, by the way—the 2-year report card is in. There are zero abuses. Even though that is the case, we still went further in this bill before the House today and reaffirmed that the Fourth Amendment protections will always apply to 702 queries, in addition to all of the other reforms.

I cannot, for the life of me, understand what is left to object to on this tool because I can promise you that if we were having this debate a week after 9/11, there wouldn't be a single soul on this floor voting against this bill.

Let us not drop our guard just because we are several decades past 9/11 because we never ever want to see that happen again.

Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I want to take just a minute here to address the question of the Fourth Amendment. Every Member in this Chamber swears an oath to support the Constitution, and it is important in this debate to remember that all of us care profoundly about the Fourth Amendment. I think it is wrong to suggest that the opposite is the case.

I want to draw an analogy for people who may be watching. In the law enforcement context, which is more familiar to most Americans than 702 is, a probable cause Fourth Amendment warrant is required. You have to get from the judge a Fourth Amendment warrant to take, for example, a wiretap on somebody that you suspect of selling fentanyl.

Let's just imagine under my example that Bill Smith is suspected of selling fentanyl, and law enforcement goes in front of a judge and gets a warrant to wiretap Bill Smith.

Now, Bill Smith, as the police listen, is talking to his brother, Joe Smith, and Joe Smith says, I will help you sell that fentanyl.

The police don't need another warrant on Joe Smith. That has been incidentally collected, and no court has ever held that Joe Smith's admission and incidental collection requires the Fourth Amendment for that to be used as evidence in court, which is the argument that the opponents of U.S. person queries are making.

I am not here to say that this is uncontroversial. We have to be obsessed with the protection of Americans' data, but let's not suggest that this is unconstitutional because it has had annual reviews by a Federal court. You might have thought that in 18 years, if a Federal court had thought that this was unconstitutional, they might not have certified. Let us not say that this authority should be subject to a radically different standard than a typical law enforcement warrant would be.

Lastly, I want to make this point. One of the reasons that we are hesitant to rush into a warrant is because many U.S. person queries are not done because we believe that an individual is complicit in a crime. If we hear ISIS talking about JIM HIMES, it is unlikely that I am complicit in terrorism. It is quite likely that I may be a victim, and the FBI and JIM HIMES would like to know that if that is the case.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to how much time is remaining.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Arkansas has 5 minutes remaining.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished

gentleman from Texas (Mr. JACKSON), the chair of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

Mr. JACKSON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is a unique and critical tool that enables our intelligence community to gather vital intelligence, protect our national security, and safeguard Americans from terrorist attacks. No other foreign intelligence authority or any other means of collection can replace the speed and agility of section 702.

If this authority expires, we will substantially degrade U.S. national security and our intelligence officers' ability to identify foreign threats in real time.

Last Congress, House Republicans delivered critical reforms, as we referred to, in section 702—56, in fact—and this bill builds on that progress by strengthening privacy protections for Americans, while ensuring the tool precisely targets foreign persons and only foreign persons who pose a threat to the United States.

As President Trump, Chairman Dan Caine, Director Ratcliffe, and many other national security leaders, including Ranking Member HIMES, have stated, this 3-year extension is essential to protect our homeland, our warfighters, and U.S. personnel stationed abroad, especially in today's volatile global threat environment.

Mr. Speaker, we must pass this bill. If we do not, we will get something from our colleagues in the Senate that will be far, far inferior, and those who truly care about national security in this body on both sides of the aisle who may be contemplating a "no" vote will regret such a vote.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues on both sides to vote for this bill.

Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to how much time is remaining.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Connecticut has 1 minute remaining.

Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentleman from New York (Ms. TENNEY).

Ms. TENNEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of S. 1318, the Foreign Intelligence Accountability Act. This legislation will extend FISA section 702 for another 3 years.

This law is an essential national security tool. You don't need any more evidence. Mr. Speaker, the President of the United States, our Commander in Chief, both of us who hail from New York, understand that FISA section 702 is a vital tool that allows the U.S. to gather intelligence on dangerous foreign adversaries.

After speaking with our military leaders, President Trump recently

commented: Not one said, even tacitly, that they can do without FISA section 702.

President Trump also said that FISA section 702 is one of the reasons we have had such tremendous success on the battlefield as we pursue this war in the Middle East.

Mr. Speaker, I urge all my colleagues to support our military, protect our national security, and vote "yes" on this critically important section.

□ 1650

Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Speaker, I have no further speakers. I am prepared to close, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman of the Intelligence Committee for his friendship and partnership, which I value.

This program is controversial for all the right reasons, and what we are doing here is what we have been doing for almost 20 years, which is finding the balance between an authority that keeps not just us but the world safe and protecting the civil liberties of Americans whose information is incidentally collected just as it is collected when there is a traditional police wiretap.

I wish we had had a more fulsome process. I wish I had been able to work with Ranking Member RASKIN to have a more robust package of safeguards, particularly in the context of an administration that has demonstrated day in and day out their lawlessness, but we are where we are, and it is a binary choice. Allowing this authority to expire, which I think we are close to, is not an option.

Let's acknowledge to each other that this is not an unconstitutional authority but that we have work to do to continue to protect the civil liberties of Americans and move forward passing this bill with an eye toward what we can do in the coming years to make sure this is a better balanced authority.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time. I thank the ranking member, my friend from Connecticut, for his comments.

FISA 702 is a critical foreign intelligence tool. There is no other authority that can replicate the value, speed, and agility of this authority.

Two years ago, Congress enacted 56 reform measures focused on section 702, U.S. person queries and other FISA transparency and accountability measures. These measures have forced meaningful change at the FBI. The bill before us continues the 2024 reforms and includes additional privacy and civil liberty protections and transparency measures.

Before closing, I want to express my appreciation to Chairman JORDAN for

working with me on this effort over the last several months. I thank the members of the House Intelligence Committee, many of whom have spoken today on behalf of this bill, for their oversight on section 702 and other foreign intelligence authorities.

I also thank the fantastic staff in the Office of House Legislative Counsel, especially Philip Bayer, Toby Dorsey, and Tony Sciascia.

I thank the HPSCI majority staff, including Griffin Decker, Ryan Breitenbach, Jonah Shumate, Laura Casulli, and Mandy Bowers.

I thank the Members who dedicated countless hours to the process of hammering this out who attended the meetings, whose input we heard and whose input we value. I thank them, and I urge a “yes” vote on S. 1318.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.

Pursuant to House Resolution 1224, the previous question is ordered on the bill, as amended.

The question is on the third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be read a third time, and was read the third time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XX, this 15-minute vote on passage of S. 1318 will be followed by a 5-minute vote on adoption of S. Con. Res. 33.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 235, nays 191, not voting 4, as follows:

[Roll No. 142]  
YEAS—235

Aderholt	Ciscomani	Fitzpatrick
Aguilar	Cisneros	Fleischmann
Alford	Cline	Flood
Allen	Cloud	Fong
Amodei (NV)	Clyde	Fox
Arrington	Cole	Frankel, Lois
Babin	Collins	Franklin, Scott
Bacon	Comer	Fry
Baird	Conaway	Fuller
Balderson	Crank	Garbarino
Barr	Crawford	Gill (TX)
Baumgartner	Crenshaw	Gillen
Bean (FL)	Cuellar	Gimenez
Begich	Davidson	Golden (ME)
Bentz	Davis (NC)	Goldman (TX)
Bera	De La Cruz	Gonzalez, V.
Bergman	DesJarlais	Gooden
Bice	Diaz-Balart	Gottheimer
Biggs (SC)	Donalds	Graves
Bilirakis	Dunn (FL)	Griffith
Bishop	Edwards	Grithman
Bost	Elizey	Groth
Bresnahan	Emmer	Guthrie
Buchanan	Estes	Hageman
Budzinski	Evans (CO)	Hamadeh (AZ)
Bynum	Ezell	Harder (CA)
Calvert	Fallon	Haridopolos
Cammack	Fedorchak	Harris (NC)
Carey	Feenstra	Harshbarger
Carter (GA)	Fine	Hern (OK)
Carter (TX)	Finstad	Higgins (LA)
Case	Fischbach	Hill (AR)
Castor (FL)	Fitzgerald	Himes

Hinson	Meuser	Simpson
Houchin	Miller (IL)	Smith (MO)
Houlihan	Miller (OH)	Smith (NE)
Hoyer	Miller (WV)	Smith (NJ)
Hudson	Miller-Meeks	Smucker
Huizenga	Mills	Sorensen
Hunt	Moolenaar	Soto
Hurd (CO)	Moore (AL)	Spartz
Issa	Moore (NC)	Staubert
Jack	Moore (UT)	Stefanik
Jackson (TX)	Moore (WV)	Steil
James	Moran	Steube
Johnson (LA)	Moskowitz	Strickland
Johnson (SD)	Mrvan	Strong
Jordan	Murphy	Stutzman
Joyce (OH)	Nehls	Suozzi
Joyce (PA)	Newhouse	Taylor
Kelly (MS)	Norcross	Tenney
Kelly (PA)	Norman	Thompson (PA)
Kiggans (VA)	Numm (IA)	Tiffany
Kiley (CA)	Obernolte	Timmons
Kim	Ogles	Tran
Kustoff	Owens	Turner (OH)
LaHood	Palmer	Valadao
LaLota	Patronis	Van Drew
Landsman	Perez	Van Dуйne
Latta	Peters	Van Epps
Lawler	Pfluger	Van Orden
Lee (FL)	Quigley	Vasquez
Lee (NV)	Reschenthaler	Riley (NY)
Letlow	Rogers (AL)	Rogers (KY)
Lucas	Rouzer	Rutherford
Luttrell	Salazar	Salise
Mackenzie	Scalise	Schmidt
Malliotakis	Schmid	Schneider
Maloy	Schrier	Schweikert
Mann	Scott, Austin	Self
Mast	McDonald Rivet	Sessions
McCaul	McDowell	Sewell
McClain	McGuire	Shreve
McClintock	Messmer	
McCormick		
McDowell		
McGuire		
Messmer		

NAYS—191

Adams	Escobar	Lieu
Amo	Espaillet	Lofgren
Ansari	Evans (PA)	Luna
Auchincloss	Fields	Lynch
Balint	Figures	Mace
Barragan	Fletcher	Magaziner
Barrett	Foster	Mannion
Beatty	Foushee	Massie
Bell	Friedman	Matsui
Beyer	Frost	McBath
Biggs (AZ)	Fulcher	McBride
Boebert	Garamendi	McClain Delaney
Bonamici	Garcia (CA)	McClellan
Boyle (PA)	Garcia (IL)	McCollum
Brecheen	Garcia (TX)	McGarvey
Brown	Goldman (NY)	McGovern
Brownley	Gomez	McIver
Burchett	Goodlander	Meeks
Burlison	Gosar	Mejia
Carbajal	Gray	Menefee
Carson	Green, Al (TX)	Menendez
Carter (LA)	Grijalva	Meng
Casar	Harrigan	Mfume
Casten	Harris (MD)	Min
Castro (TX)	Hayes	Moore (WI)
Chu	Horsford	Morelle
Clark (MA)	Hoyle (OR)	Morrison
Clarke (NY)	Huffman	Moulton
Cleaver	Ivey	Mullin
Clyburn	Jackson (IL)	Nadler
Cohen	Jacobs	Neal
Correa	Jayapal	Neguse
Costa	Jeffries	Ocasio-Cortez
Courtney	Johnson (GA)	Olzewski
Craig	Johnson (TX)	Omar
Crane	Kamlager-Dove	Onder
Crockett	Kaptur	Pallone
Crow	Keating	Panetta
Davids (KS)	Kelly (IL)	Pappas
Davis (IL)	Kennedy (NY)	Pelosi
Dean (PA)	Kennedy (UT)	Perry
DeGette	Khan	Petterson
DeLauro	Knott	Pingree
DelBene	Krishnamoorthi	Pocan
Deluzio	Larsen (WA)	Pou
DeSaulnier	Larson (CT)	Pressly
Dexter	Latimer	Ramirez
Dingell	Lee (PA)	Randall
Doggett	Leger Fernandez	Raskin
Downing	Levin	Rivas
Elfreth	Liccardo	Rose

Ross	Smith (WA)	Tonko
Roy	Stansbury	Torres (CA)
Ruiz	Stanton	Torres (NY)
Rulli	Stevens	Trahan
Ryan	Subramanyam	Underwood
Salinas	Sykes	Vargas
Sanchez	Takano	Velazquez
Scanlon	Thanedar	Vindman
Schakowsky	Thompson (CA)	Walkinshaw
Scholten	Thompson (MS)	Waters
Scott (VA)	Titus	Watson Coleman
Sherman	Tlaib	Williams (GA)
Simon	Tokuda	

NOT VOTING—4

Keane	Loudermilk
Langworthy	Wilson (FL)

□ 1725

Ms. WILLIAMS of Georgia and Mr. DOWNING changed their vote from “yea” to “nay.”

Messrs. SOTO and VICENTE GONZALEZ of Texas, Ms. LOIS FRANKEL of Florida, and Mr. WHITESIDES changed their vote from “nay” to “yea.”

So the bill was passed.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Stated for:

Mr. LANGWORTHY. Mr. Speaker, had I been present, I would have voted YEA on Roll Call No. 142.

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION ON THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2026

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. FONG). Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, the unfinished business is the vote on adoption of the concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 33) setting forth the congressional budget for the United States Government for fiscal year 2026 and setting forth the appropriate budgetary levels for fiscal years 2027 through 2035, on which the yeas and nays were ordered.

The Clerk read the title of the concurrent resolution.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on adoption of the concurrent resolution.

This is a 5-minute vote.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 215, nays 211, “present” 1, not voting 3, as follows:

[Roll No. 143]  
YEAS—215

Aderholt	Bost	Crenshaw
Alford	Brecheen	Davidson
Allen	Bresnahan	De La Cruz
Amodei (NV)	Buchanan	DesJarlais
Arrington	Burchett	Diaz-Balart
Babin	Burlison	Donalds
Bacon	Calvert	Downing
Baird	Cammack	Dunn (FL)
Balderson	Carey	Edwards
Barr	Carter (GA)	Elizey
Barrett	Carter (TX)	Emmer
Baumgartner	Ciscomani	Estes
Bean (FL)	Cline	Evans (CO)
Begich	Cloud	Ezell
Bentz	Clyde	Fallon
Bergman	Cole	Fedorchak
Bice	Collins	Feenstra
Biggs (AZ)	Comer	Fine
Biggs (SC)	Crane	Finstad
Bilirakis	Crank	Fischbach
Boebert	Crawford	Fitzgerald