

There was no objection.

Mr. GILL of Texas. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. WIED).

Mr. WIED. Madam Speaker, I rise today in strong support of this bill to rename the United States Post Office in Waupaca, Wisconsin, in honor of Master Sergeant Melvin O. Handrich, a Waupaca County native, a Medal of Honor recipient, and a hero who served our Nation in both World War II and the Korean war.

In August 1950, Master Sergeant Handrich and his company faced overwhelming enemy forces attempting to overrun their position. Despite intense and sustained fire, he voluntarily moved to an exposed forward post where he directed mortar and artillery fire for 8 hours as enemy soldiers advanced to within 50 feet of his position.

When he saw elements of his company preparing to withdraw, he crossed open, fire-swept ground to rally and reorganize his men, restoring the line and enabling them to continue the fight.

Though severely wounded, he refused evacuation and returned to his forward position to continue directing fire. He remained there until the enemy overran his post, and he was mortally wounded.

When the position was retaken, more than 70 enemy dead were found in the area he had so courageously defended.

Master Sergeant Handrich's extraordinary bravery, leadership, and self-sacrifice reflect the highest traditions of our military and of the State of Wisconsin. Naming this post office in his honor ensures that his legacy will be remembered by future generations to come.

Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this bill.

Mr. SUBRAMANYAM. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Madam Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 5831. I encourage my colleagues to join me in honoring the life of Master Sergeant Handrich by naming the post office in Waupaca, Wisconsin, after him.

Madam Speaker, I urge passage of H.R. 5831, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. GILL of Texas. Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of this bill to honor Master Sergeant Melvin Handrich. I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. GILL) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 5831.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

□ 1630

AIRSPACE LOCATION AND ENHANCED RISK TRANSPARENCY ACT OF 2026

Mr. GRAVES. Madam Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 7613) to require certain aircraft to be equipped with collision mitigation technology, to improve helicopter route safety and separation around airports, to update air traffic control processes and procedures, to address national airspace system safety in Department of Defense activities, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 7613

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the “Airspace Location and Enhanced Risk Transparency Act of 2026” or the “ALERT Act”.

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

Sec. 2. Definitions.

Sec. 3. Findings; sense of Congress.

TITLE I—CIVIL AVIATION MATTERS

Sec. 101. Airborne Collision Avoidance System Xa inhibit altitude.

Sec. 102. Airborne Collision Avoidance System upgrades.

Sec. 103. Airborne collision avoidance systems for rotorcraft.

Sec. 104. Collision prevention systems.

Sec. 105. Prohibition on certain use of ADS-B data.

Sec. 106. Rulemaking accountability.

Sec. 107. Time-on-position limits.

Sec. 108. Controller threat and error management training.

Sec. 109. Controller visual separation training.

Sec. 110. Safety risk assessment tool.

Sec. 111. Operational rates at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport.

Sec. 112. Time-based flow management.

Sec. 113. Air traffic control facility levels.

Sec. 114. Working group to evaluate shared frequency around Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport.

Sec. 115. Anti-blocking technology.

Sec. 116. Task force to identify improvements to air traffic controller conflict alert system.

Sec. 117. Postaccident and postincident drug and alcohol testing.

Sec. 118. Further modifications to Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport area helicopter routes.

Sec. 119. Requiring vertical separation near airports during critical phases of flight.

Sec. 120. Helicopter Route Chart annual review.

Sec. 121. Visual charts.

Sec. 122. Close proximity encounters.

Sec. 123. Notification of close proximity encounters and analysis of data.

Sec. 124. Safety culture and safety management review.

Sec. 125. Documentation of control position combinations.

Sec. 126. Review of miles-in-trail procedures or agreements.

Sec. 127. Closure of Helicopter Route 4.

TITLE II—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MATTERS

Sec. 201. Department of Defense matters relating to aviation safety.

Sec. 202. Repeal of prior provision of law on manned rotary wing aircraft safety.

Sec. 203. Treatment of superseded memorandum of agreement and provision of law.

Sec. 204. Report on communications degradation.

Sec. 205. Annual report on proficiency flights in National Capitol Region.

Sec. 206. Briefing on virtual constructive training.

Sec. 207. Transparency regarding midair collision near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport on January 29, 2025.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) ADS-B IN.—The term “ADS-B In” means technology that receives and processes Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast transmissions that are broadcast in accordance with part 91.225 and 91.227 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, and other aviation advisory information from ground stations, including traffic information service-broadcast (TIS-B) and Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Rebroadcast (ADS-R).

(2) ADMINISTRATOR.—The term “Administrator” means the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration.

(3) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate.

(4) COLLISION PREVENTION TECHNOLOGY.—The term “collision prevention technology” means equipment, or a combination of equipment, that—

(A) has ADS-B In;

(B) uses ADS-B data to provide the pilot and flight crew with situational awareness of surrounding traffic and traffic advisories; and

(C) provides, and is configured to provide, alerting that is audible to the pilot and flight crew.

(5) FAA.—The term “FAA” means the Federal Aviation Administration.

(6) SECRETARY.—The term “Secretary” means the Secretary of Transportation.

SEC. 3. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) On January 29, 2025, about 8:48 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, a Sikorsky UH-60L operated by the United States Army under the callsign PAT25 (Priority Air Transport 25) and an MHJ R/J Aviation (formerly Bombardier) CRJ700 operated by PSA Airlines as American Airlines flight 5342, collided in flight about 0.5 miles southeast of Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA), Arlington, Virginia, and impacted the Potomac River in southwest Washington, D.C.

(2) The 2 pilots, 2 flight attendants, and 60 passengers onboard the airplane and 3 crewmembers onboard the helicopter died.

(3) This tragedy represents the deadliest aviation disaster in the United States since the crash of American Airlines Flight 587 in 2001 and the first fatal major commercial passenger flight accident in the United States since Colgan Air Flight 3407 in 2009.

(4) Passengers aboard Flight 5342 included American citizens from across the country and international travelers, among them championship figure skaters and coaches returning from competition, military servicemembers, and families traveling for personal and professional reasons, each of whom is mourned by loved ones.

(5) Crewmembers aboard Flight 5342 served their passengers with professionalism and dedication and the three United States Army soldiers aboard Priority Air Transport 25 gave their lives in service to this Nation.

(6) Emergency responders from Alexandria City Fire Department, Alexandria Police Department, Ann Arundel Fire Department, Arlington County Fire & Rescue, Arlington County Office of Emergency Management, Arlington Police Department, Baltimore City Fire Department, Baltimore Police, Charles County Fire and Rescue, DC Fire Department & EMS, DC Metropolitan Police Department, Fairfax City Fire & Rescue, Fairfax County Fire & Rescue Department, Federal Aviation Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Maryland Natural Resources Police, Maryland State Police, Metropolitan Police Department, Montgomery County Fire and Rescue, Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority (MWAA) Fire & Rescue, MWAA Police, NCR-Incident Management Team, Office of Chief Medical Examiner of the District of Columbia, Prince George's County Fire & Rescue, Prince William Fire & Rescue, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Navy Supervisor of Salvage and Diving, Virginia Department of Emergency Management, Virginia State Police, and other local, state, and Federal agencies conducted heroic rescue and recovery operations in frigid, dangerous conditions—including near-freezing water temperatures and strong winds—working tirelessly to recover all 67 victims and reunite them with their loved ones.

(7) The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) immediately launched a full investigation and, on March 7, 2025, issued urgent safety recommendations to prohibit operations on Helicopter Route 4 during simultaneous runway operations, which the Department of Transportation and Federal Aviation Administration promptly implemented.

(8) The NTSB held a public meeting on January 27, 2026, where the NTSB determined that the probable cause of the accident was the FAA's placement of a helicopter route in close proximity to a runway approach path; their failure to regularly review and evaluate helicopter routes and available data, and their failure to act on recommendations to mitigate the risk of a midair collision near DCA; as well as the air traffic system's over-reliance on visual separation in order to promote efficient traffic flow without consideration for the limitations of the see-and-avoid concept.

(9) The NTSB determined that the lack of effective pilot-applied visual separation by the helicopter crew, the tower team's loss of situation awareness and degraded performance due to the high workload of the combined helicopter and local control positions and the absence of a risk assessment process to identify and mitigate real-time operational risk factors, and the Army's failure to ensure pilots were aware of the effects of error tolerances on barometric altimeters in their helicopters, were also causal to the collision.

(10) The NTSB further determined that contributing factors included the limitations of the traffic awareness and collision alerting systems on both aircraft, which precluded effective alerting of the impending collision to the flight crews; an unsustainable airport arrival rate, increasing traffic volume with a changing fleet mix, and airline scheduling practices at DCA, which regularly strained the DCA air traffic control tower workforce and degraded safety over time; the Army's lack of a fully implemented safety management system, which should have identified and addressed hazards

associated with altitude exceedances on the Washington, DC, helicopter routes; the FAA's failure across multiple organizations to implement previous NTSB recommendations, including Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast In, and to follow and fully integrate its established safety management system, which should have led to several organizational and operational changes based on previously identified risks that were known to management; and the absence of effective data sharing and analysis among the FAA, aircraft operators, and other relevant organizations.

(11) The NTSB on January 27, 2026, adopted 74 findings and issued 50 safety recommendations to the Department of Transportation, the FAA, the United States Army, the Department of Defense Policy Board on Federal Aviation, the inspector general of the Department of Transportation, and RTCA Program Management Committee to prevent similar accidents in the future.

(12) The families of the victims have demonstrated extraordinary courage and dignity in their grief, and have called for accountability and systemic reform so that no other family will endure such loss.

(13) Congress remains committed to ensuring that the aviation system of the United States achieves the highest possible standard of safety, and that the lessons of this tragedy are fully learned and acted upon.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) Congress mourns the loss of all 67 lives taken in the midair collision near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport on January 29, 2025, and extends its deepest condolences to the families, friends, and communities of all those who perished;

(2) Congress honors the four crew members of American Airlines Flight 5342 who served their passengers with professionalism and dedication;

(3) Congress honors the three United States Army soldiers aboard Priority Air Transport 25, who gave their lives in service to this nation;

(4) Congress honors the passengers of Flight 5342, including the figure skaters and coaches of the United States figure skating community and all other individuals whose lives, achievements, and contributions to their families and communities are irreplaceable;

(5) Congress commends the first responders who worked with valor and dedication under dangerous conditions to conduct rescue and recovery operations in the Potomac River;

(6) Congress affirms its full support for the National Transportation Safety Board, its mission of independent accident investigation, and the integrity of its investigative process, and herein the ALERT Act responds to all of the 50 recommendations to prevent a similar tragedy from reoccurring;

(7) Congress further commits to conducting rigorous oversight to ensure accountability for implementing these safety recommendations and ensuring the systemic failures that contributed to this disaster are fully addressed; and

(8) Congress pledges, on behalf of the American people, that the 67 lives lost on January 29, 2025, will not be forgotten, and that their memory will be honored by this Nation's commitment to an aviation system that is worthy of the trust placed in it by every passenger who boards an aircraft in the United States.

TITLE I—CIVIL AVIATION MATTERS

SEC. 101. AIRBORNE COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEM XA INHIBIT ALTITUDE.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall complete an evaluation

of the hazards and safety benefits of decreasing the traffic advisory and resolution advisory inhibit altitudes in Airborne Collision Avoidance System Xa (hereinafter referred to as "ACAS Xa") to enable improved alerting throughout more of the flight maneuvering envelope of an aircraft than is required under the RTCA minimum operational performance standards for the Airborne Collision Avoidance System (DO-385A, issued June 22, 2023).

(b) CONSULTATION.—In conducting the evaluation under subsection (a), the Administrator shall consult with representatives of the following:

(1) Air carriers operating under part 121 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, including regional air carriers and air carriers with a low-cost or ultra-low-cost business model.

(2) Air carriers operating under part 135 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.

(3) Air carriers operating under part 91 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.

(4) Cargo air carriers.

(5) Transport category aircraft manufacturers.

(6) General aviation aircraft manufactures.

(7) Avionics manufacturers.

(8) Exclusive bargaining representatives of air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code.

(9) Organizations representing certified collective bargaining representatives of airline pilots.

(10) The certified bargaining representative of aviation safety inspectors and engineers for the Federal Aviation Administration.

(11) Aviation safety experts with specific knowledge of human factors or human factors experts with specific knowledge of aviation safety.

(12) Research institutions with relevant aviation safety or human factors subject matter expertise.

(13) The National Transportation Safety Board.

(14) Any other stakeholders the Administrator determines appropriate.

(c) CONSIDERATIONS.—In conducting the evaluation under subsection (a), the Administrator shall consider, at a minimum—

(1) safety benefits to the public, including reductions in the probability of midair and near-midair collisions;

(2) the benefits and risks to the ability of pilots and air traffic controllers to ensure operational safety;

(3) false, misleading, or potentially overlapping alerts or resolution advisories;

(4) technological advances in software logic to limit nuisance or false alerts;

(5) air traffic control procedures and the impact of such procedures on pilots and air traffic controllers during critical phases of flight;

(6) training requirements for pilots and air traffic controllers;

(7) to the greatest extent practicable, human factors, including products by working groups related to human factors in aviation safety;

(8) research and simulations of reduced resolution advisory inhibit altitudes conducted by the National Transportation Safety Board pursuant to Aviation Investigation Report AIR-26-02 adopted on January 27, 2026; and

(9) any other considerations the Administrator determines appropriate.

SEC. 102. AIRBORNE COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEM UPGRADES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 45 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall establish an aviation rulemaking committee (in this section referred to as the "Committee") to review and develop findings and recommendations to require selected aircraft to be equipped and operating with ACAS Xa that is—

(1) integrated and uses both ADS-B In and transponder interrogations, as required under the RTCA minimum operational performance standards for the Airborne Collision Avoidance System (DO-385A, issued June 22, 2023); and

(2) is configured to provide visual and audible alerting to the pilot and flight crew.

(b) COMPOSITION.—The Committee shall consist of members appointed by the Administrator, including representatives of—

(1) air carriers operating under part 121 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, including regional air carriers and air carriers with a low-cost or ultra-low-cost business model;

(2) air carriers operating under part 135 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations;

(3) air carriers operating under subpart K of part 91 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations;

(4) business aviation operators;

(5) cargo air carriers;

(6) air ambulance operators;

(7) transport category aircraft manufacturers;

(8) general aviation aircraft manufacturers;

(9) avionics manufacturers;

(10) supplemental type certificate holders;

(11) modification service providers;

(12) exclusive bargaining representatives of air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code;

(13) the certified bargaining representative of aviation safety inspectors and engineers for the Federal Aviation Administration;

(14) organizations representing certified collective bargaining representatives of airline pilots;

(15) aviation safety experts with specific knowledge of human factors or human factors experts with specific knowledge of aviation safety;

(16) research institutions with relevant aviation safety or human factors subject matter expertise;

(17) a representative from the National Transportation Safety Board with subject matter expertise as an observer; and

(18) any other stakeholders the Administrator determines appropriate.

(c) CONSIDERATIONS.—In developing the findings and recommendations under subsection (a), the Committee shall consider—

(1) the anticipated certification timeline for ACAS Xa equipment given the technical complexity and requisite procedures for approval;

(2) the feasibility of using the Line Replaceable Units of existing collision avoidance systems in such aircraft;

(3) the feasibility of using existing antennas of existing collisions avoidance systems in such aircraft;

(4) the commercial availability of all necessary components associated with integrated ACAS Xa;

(5) actions the Administrator can take to prioritize the certification and installation of integrated ACAS Xa;

(6) related changes that may be required for the operating rules and training necessary for air traffic controllers, pilots, and others;

(7) harmonization of global standards associated with collision avoidance systems; and

(8) any other considerations the Committee or the Administrator determines appropriate.

(d) REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the date of establishment of the Committee, the Committee shall submit to the Administrator and the appropriate committees of Congress a report containing the findings and recommendations of the Committee.

(e) RULEMAKING.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 18 months after the submission of the report under subsection (d) or 32 months after the date of en-

actment of this Act (whichever is earlier), the Administrator shall issue a notice of proposed rulemaking to prohibit persons from operating selected aircraft unless such aircraft are equipped and operating with ACAS Xa that—

(A) is integrated and uses both ADS-B In and transponder interrogations, as required under the RTCA minimum operational performance standards for the Airborne Collision Avoidance System (DO-385A, issued June 22, 2023); and

(B) provides visual and audible alerting to the pilot and flight crew.

(2) CONTENTS.—The notice of proposed rulemaking described in paragraph (1) shall include, at a minimum—

(A) appropriate guidance for certification of ACAS Xa;

(B) a deadline, not to exceed December 31, 2031, for any newly manufactured selected aircraft to be equipped with ACAS Xa that reflects various aircraft types, appropriate maintenance cycles, and required updates to appropriate guidance after certification of ACAS Xa;

(C) a deadline, not to exceed December 31, 2031, for existing selected aircraft to be retrofitted with ACAS Xa that reflects various aircraft types, appropriate maintenance cycles, and required updates to appropriate guidance after certification of ACAS Xa;

(D) if the new minimal operating performance standards promulgated under subsection (f) require an upgrade of software, an upgrade of hardware, or additional training, a deadline for selected aircraft to be upgraded, not to exceed December 31, 2033; and

(E) a process by which the Administrator may extend the deadlines specified in subparagraphs (B) and (C), not to exceed a period of 2 years, provided that the Administrator provides a report to the appropriate committees of Congress within 14 days of taking such action, with the reasons justifying such action and an assurance that safety will not be compromised by the delay.

(3) FINAL RULE.—Not later than 1 year after the issuance of the notice of proposed rulemaking required under paragraph (1)(A), the Administrator shall issue a final rule to carry out the requirements of this section.

(f) MODIFICATION OF MINIMAL OPERATING PERFORMANCE STANDARDS.—Not later than 30 days after the issuance of a final rule under subsection (e), the Administrator shall work with the appropriate standards-setting organization to update the minimal operation standards for ACAS Xa to—

(1) if the evaluation conducted pursuant to section 101 determines that inhibit altitudes can be safely decreased, safely decrease the inhibit altitude in accordance with the results of such evaluation;

(2) update traffic advisory aural alert standards to include clock position, relative altitude, range, and vertical tendency; and

(3) integrate directional traffic symbols into visual displays.

(g) TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.—The Administrator shall provide technical assistance for facilitating equipage across the entire fleet of affected aircraft, including, as appropriate, guidance under part 26 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, to provide support for affected aircraft operators in complying with the requirements of this section.

(h) SELECTED AIRCRAFT DEFINED.—In this section, the term “selected aircraft” means aircraft that are required to be equipped with traffic alert and collision avoidance systems as required in sections 121.356, 135.180, and 91.1045 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.

SEC. 103. AIRBORNE COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEMS FOR ROTORCRAFT.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than December 31, 2026, the Administrator shall take nec-

essary action with the appropriate standards-setting organization to finalize and publish minimum operational performance standards for the collision avoidance system known as “Airborne Collision Avoidance System Xr” (in this section referred to as “ACAS Xr”) that uses both ADS-B In and a second independent source of target aircraft data, such as transponder interrogations.

(b) ACAS XR AVIATION RULEMAKING COMMITTEE.—

(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than 30 days after the date on which the appropriate standards-setting organization publishes minimal operational performance standards for ACAS Xr under subsection (a), or January 31, 2027, (whichever is earlier), the Administrator shall establish an aviation rulemaking committee (in this section referred to as the “Committee”) to review and develop findings and recommendations to require selected rotorcraft and selected powered-lift aircraft be equipped and operating with ACAS Xr that has ADS-B In and is configured to provide visual and audible alerting to the pilot and flight crew.

(2) COMPOSITION.—The Committee shall consist of members appointed by the Administrator, including representatives of—

(A) rotorcraft operating under part 135 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations;

(B) rotorcraft operating under part 91 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations;

(C) rotorcraft manufacturers;

(D) an organization representing rotorcraft operators and pilots;

(E) an organization representing rotorcraft air medical services;

(F) general aviation aircraft manufacturers;

(G) powered-lift aircraft operators and manufacturers;

(H) avionics manufacturers;

(I) supplemental type certificate holders;

(J) modification service providers;

(K) exclusive bargaining representatives of air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code;

(L) the certified bargaining representative of aviation safety inspectors and engineers for the FAA;

(M) aviation safety experts with specific knowledge of human factors or human factors experts with specific knowledge of aviation safety;

(N) a career representative from the National Transportation Safety Board with subject matter expertise as an observer; and

(O) any other stakeholders the Administrator determines appropriate.

(3) CONSIDERATIONS.—In developing the findings and recommendations required under paragraph (1), the Committee shall consider—

(A) any anticipated modifications to the minimum operational performance standards of ACAS Xr that are required by subsection (c)(1)(B);

(B) the anticipated certification timeline for ACAS Xr equipment given the technical complexity and requisite procedures for approval;

(C) a projected deadline for equipping newly manufactured selected rotorcraft and selected powered-lift aircraft with ACAS Xr that considers—

(i) the safety benefits of ACAS Xr;

(ii) the anticipated timeline needed for the FAA to approve the installation of ACAS Xr on various rotorcraft and powered-lift aircraft or for various operations;

(iii) the commercial availability of the necessary components associated with ACAS Xr; and

(iv) the operational and technical considerations associated with installing ACAS Xr on newly manufactured selected rotorcraft and selected powered-lift aircraft;

(D) a projected deadline to retrofit selected rotorcraft and selected powered-lift aircraft with ACAS Xr that considers—

(i) the safety benefits of ACAS Xr;
 (ii) the feasibility of using existing antennas of existing collision prevention systems equipped in selected rotorcraft and selected powered-lift aircraft;

(iii) the feasibility and cost associated with retrofitting selected rotorcraft and selected powered-lift aircraft not equipped with existing collision avoidance systems;

(iv) the commercial availability of the necessary components associated with ACAS Xr; and

(v) the operational and technical considerations associated with retrofitting selected rotorcraft and selected powered-lift aircraft;

(E) actions that the Administrator can take to prioritize the certification and installation of ACAS Xr;

(F) the interaction of ACAS Xr with existing collision prevention technologies;

(G) the efficacy of ACAS Xr in low-altitude and high-density airspace environments;

(H) any available safety data assessing the effectiveness of ACAS Xr in reducing midair collision risk;

(I) related training for air traffic controllers, pilots, and others;

(J) National Transportation Safety Board Aviation Investigation Report AIR-26-02 adopted on January 27, 2026; and

(K) any other considerations the Committee determines appropriate.

(4) REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the establishment of the Committee, the Committee shall submit to the Administrator and the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the findings and the recommendations developed by the Committee under this subsection.

(c) RULEMAKING AND MODIFICATION OF MINIMAL OPERATING PERFORMANCE STANDARDS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 18 months after the submission of the report required under subsection (b)(4), or 24 months after the date of enactment of this Act (whichever is earlier), the Administrator shall—

(A) issue a notice of proposed rulemaking to prohibit persons from operating selected rotorcraft and selected powered-lift aircraft unless such rotorcraft or powered-lift aircraft are equipped and operating with ACAS Xr that uses both ADS-B In and transponder interrogations, as required under the minimum operational performance standards as required under subsection (a); and

(B) take necessary actions with the appropriate standards-setting organization to modify the minimal operational performance standards for ACAS Xr to—

(i) update traffic advisory aural alert standards to include clock position, relative altitude, range and vertical tendency; and

(ii) integrate directional traffic symbols into visual displays.

(2) CONTENTS.—The notice of proposed rulemaking required under paragraph (1)(A) shall include, at a minimum—

(A) appropriate guidance for the certification of ACAS Xr systems;

(B) defined standards for the modifications to such systems described in paragraph (1)(B);

(C) a deadline for any newly manufactured selected rotorcraft and selected powered-lift aircraft to be equipped with ACAS Xr, considering the findings and recommendations developed pursuant to subsection (b);

(D) a deadline for selected rotorcraft and selected powered-lift aircraft to be retrofitted with ACAS Xr, considering the findings and recommendations developed pursuant to subsection (b); and

(E) a deadline for selected rotorcraft and selected powered-lift aircraft to be equipped with collision prevention technology pursuant to section 104, not to exceed December 31, 2031.

(3) FINAL RULE.—Not later than 18 months after the issuance of a notice of proposed rulemaking under paragraph (1)(A), the Administrator shall issue a final rule associated with such proposed rulemaking.

(4) TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.—The Administrator shall provide technical assistance to facilitating equipment across the entire fleet of affected aircraft to provide support for selected rotorcraft operators and selected powered-lift aircraft operators in complying with the requirements of this section.

(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) SELECTED ROTORCRAFT.—The term “selected rotorcraft” means a non-military rotorcraft operating in Class B airspace.

(2) POWERED-LIFT AIRCRAFT.—The term “powered-lift aircraft” has the meaning given the term “powered-lift” in section 1.1 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.

(3) SELECTED POWERED-LIFT AIRCRAFT.—The term “selected powered-lift aircraft” means a non-military powered-lift aircraft operating in Class B airspace.

SEC. 104. COLLISION PREVENTION SYSTEMS.

(a) FINAL RULE.—Not later than 2 years after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall issue a final rule with an effective date not later than December 31, 2031, to require covered aircraft to be equipped and operating with collision prevention technology.

(b) CONSULTATION.—In developing the final rule under subsection (a), the Administrator shall consult with the following:

(1) Air carriers operating under part 135 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.

(2) Air carriers operating under part 121 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.

(3) Air carriers operating under part 91 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.

(4) Organizations representing helicopter aviation operators and pilots.

(5) Organizations representing the general aviation community.

(6) Organizations representing business aviation operators.

(7) Organizations representing experimental aircraft operators.

(8) Transport category aircraft manufacturers.

(9) General aviation aircraft manufacturers.

(10) Rotorcraft manufacturers.

(11) Avionics manufacturers.

(12) Powered-lift aircraft manufacturers.

(13) Supplemental type certificate holders.

(14) Aircraft modification service providers.

(15) Exclusive bargaining representatives of air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code.

(16) Certified bargaining representative of aviation safety inspectors and engineers for the FAA.

(17) Not fewer than 3 organizations representing certified collective bargaining representatives of airline pilots operating under part 121 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.

(18) Aviation safety experts with specific knowledge of human factors or human factors experts with specific knowledge of aviation safety.

(19) The National Transportation Safety Board.

(20) Any other representative the Administrator determines appropriate.

(c) CONSIDERATIONS.—In developing the final rule under subsection (a), the Administrator shall consider—

(1) the safety benefits of collision prevention technologies;

(2) relevant regulations, guidance, and policies for traffic awareness and traffic advisory technology that uses ADS-B In;

(3) ways in which ADS-B In software applications can be used as of the date of enactment of this Act;

(4) software in existence on the date of enactment of this Act, and reasonably projected thereafter, that can predict aircraft movements, display surrounding traffic, and provide visual and audible traffic advisories;

(5) the margin of error and accuracy of software described in paragraph (4);

(6) the safety benefits of software described in paragraph (4) in preventing conflicts with both aircraft and ground vehicles on airport surfaces;

(7) the safety benefits of software described in paragraph (4) in informing pilots or flight crews of operational risks, including encounters with forecasted severe weather using flight information services broadcast (FIS-B);

(8) the effort of the Administrator to modernize the air traffic control system, including timelines, technologies being incorporated, changes to operational rules, and training requirements;

(9) the role of air traffic controllers in ensuring aircraft separation, including the need for additional training to air traffic controllers given the requirements of this section;

(10) the necessity of certification for implementing collision prevention technology based on type of aircraft and operation;

(11) the capacity of the aerospace supply chain to manufacture necessary equipment;

(12) the use of existing air traffic control deviation authorization tools to implement the requirement in subsection (g)(2);

(13) the requirements for the final rule as specified in subsection (d);

(14) if available at the time of consideration, the results of the studies on ADS-B Out equipment and development of low-cost voluntary ADS-B as required by sections 808 and 810 of FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 (Public Law 118-63); and

(15) any other considerations the Administrator determines appropriate.

(d) REQUIREMENTS FOR FINAL RULE.—In issuing the final rule required under subsection (a), the Administrator shall—

(1) establish performance requirements for equipping collision prevention technology that, as determined by the Administrator, are appropriate for the covered aircraft and the operations, including the operating environment;

(2) in establishing the performance requirements described in paragraph (1)—

(A) require such technology be configured to provide visual and audible alerting to the pilot and flight crew;

(B) consider the field of view of the pilots, human factors, and, if applicable, mounting method of such technology, to ensure that such technology can be readily utilized and has minimal risk of unexpected detachment;

(C) consider the reliability and resiliency of alerts in environments where inputs or signals, including GPS, can be jammed or spoofed; and

(D) consider the utilization of existing antenna locations or the placement of new antenna used to receive and, if applicable, transmit, data used in collision prevention technology;

(3) identify existing or issue additional relevant guidance or technical standard orders to carry out the requirements of this section; and

(4) establish an effective date not later than December 31, 2031, for equipping the covered aircraft with technology described in subsection (a) that reflects various aircraft types, appropriate maintenance cycles, and required updates to appropriate guidance for such technology after certification of such technologies.

(e) **EQUIVALENT LEVEL OF SAFETY.**—In issuing the final rule required under this section, the Administrator shall allow for the use of any collision prevention technology (including technology that uses portable ADS-B In receivers or other equipment that displays on an existing or future portable device, electronic flight bag, or panel mounted display) available for use at the time of the effective date established in subsection (d)(4), if the Administrator determines it provides an equivalent level of safety as the requirements of the final rule issued pursuant to subsection (a).

(f) **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.**—The Administrator shall provide technical assistance to facilitating equipment across the entire fleet of affected aircraft to provide support for affected aircraft operators in complying with the requirements of this section.

(g) **COVERED AIRCRAFT DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “covered aircraft”—

(1) means any non-military aircraft, except a selected aircraft as defined in section 102, that is required to be equipped with ADS-B Out under section 91.225 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations; and

(2) excludes aircraft that have a limited category special airworthiness certificate or an experimental airworthiness certificate, provided the pilot of such aircraft is authorized to deviate from the requirements of this section by air traffic control in the same manner ADS-B Out deviations are approved under section 91.225(g) of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.

SEC. 105. PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN USE OF ADS-B DATA.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—

(1) **LIMITATION ON USE OF DATA.**—Data from Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast may not be used by any person, governmental agency, or other entity to identify aircraft for the purpose of obtaining revenue from the owner or operator of such aircraft, without the consent of such owner or operator.

(2) **USE OF DATA BY AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER.**—Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast data may be used to assist air traffic controllers in tracking aircraft and improving air traffic safety and efficiency.

(b) **LIMIT ON USE OF ADS-B DATA.**—Section 46101(c)(1) of title 49, United States Code, is amended by striking “the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration may not” and inserting “neither the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration nor any other Federal, State, local, territorial, or Tribal official may”.

SEC. 106. RULEMAKING ACCOUNTABILITY.

(a) **PUBLIC DASHBOARD.**—The Secretary shall establish, maintain, and make available, on a publicly available website of the Department of Transportation, a dashboard that displays, for the rulemakings required in sections 102, 103, and 104—

(1) dates of publication and links to the minimum operating performance standards referenced by and developed pursuant to such sections;

(2) the date of establishment, membership roster, and tasking memoranda (or similar document) for rulemaking committees established pursuant to such sections;

(3) deadlines and actual dates for the submission for all required rulemaking committee reports to the Administrator or Congress;

(4) publication dates of and a link to any—

(A) advanced notice of proposed rulemakings published pursuant to such sections;

(B) notice of proposed rulemakings published pursuant to such sections; and

(C) revised notice of proposed rulemakings published pursuant to rulemakings described in subparagraphs (A) and (B);

(5) the opening and closing of public comment periods and a link to public comments;

(6) the publication of and a link to any final rule issued pursuant to such sections;

(7) all associated official correspondence with the National Transportation Safety Board regarding related safety recommendations; and

(8) any additional information the Secretary determines will increase transparency without delaying the publication of a final rule.

(b) **CONGRESSIONAL AND FAMILY BRIEFING.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter until the final rules required pursuant to sections 102, 103, and 104 are issued, the Administrator shall brief the appropriate committees of Congress and the families of the victims of the midair collision referenced in National Transportation Safety Board Aviation Investigation Report AIR-26-02 adopted on January 27, 2026 on the progress in issuing such final rules.

(c) **CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT IN CASE OF FAILURE TO MEET DEADLINES.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—If the Administrator fails to meet any rulemaking deadline established in sections 102, 103, and 104, the Administrator shall brief the appropriate committees of Congress in person not later than 4 weeks after the date on which such deadline is not met.

(2) **DEADLINE FOR INITIAL OUTREACH AND COORDINATION.**—Not later than 4 days after the date described in paragraph (1), the Administrator shall begin initial outreach to and coordination with the appropriate committees of Congress to arrange and organize logistics of the briefing required under paragraph (1).

(3) **FORMAT AND TIME OF BRIEFING.**—The briefing required under paragraph (1) shall be in a format and at a time to be determined by the appropriate committees of Congress.

SEC. 107. TIME-ON-POSITION LIMITS.

(a) **TIME-ON-POSITION LIMITS.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator, in coordination with organizations representing air traffic controller managers and supervisors, shall establish time-on-position limits for operations supervisory personnel.

(2) **CONSIDERATIONS.**—In developing the limits described in paragraph (1), the Administrator shall—

(A) evaluate appropriate time-on-position limits for operations supervisory personnel, prioritizing the evaluation of such limits at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport and other air traffic facilities with high volumes of mixed rotorcraft and airplane traffic;

(B) establish such limits for Air Traffic Organization operations supervisory personnel at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport and other air traffic facilities with high volumes of mixed helicopter and airplane traffic;

(C) develop guidance for district and facility-level management to adapt such limits to account for their own staffing and local standard operating procedures;

(D) consider the operational needs and staffing levels of the air traffic facilities described in the previous subparagraphs to ensure effective oversight and monitoring of safety critical operations;

(E) consider air traffic control specialists performing watch supervision in the controller-in-charge position;

(F) consider requirements of FAA Order JO 7210.3EE, titled “Facility Operation and Administration”, issued on February 20, 2025, or

any successor document, and FAA Order JO 7110.65BB, titled “Air Traffic Control”, issued on February 20, 2025, or any successor document;

(G) consider data, reports, and best practices pertaining to human factors; and

(H) consider any other items determined appropriate by the Administrator.

(3) **CONSULTATION.**—The Administrator may consult with the exclusive bargaining representative of air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code.

(b) **RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.**—Nothing in this section shall be construed to interfere with any agreement between a governmental agency and the exclusive bargaining representative of air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code, section 7106(a) of title 5, United States Code, or section 40122 of title 49, United States Code.

(c) **DEFINITIONS.**—In this section:

(1) **CONTROLLER-IN-CHARGE.**—The term “controller-in-charge” means the bargaining unit air traffic control specialist responsible for providing watch supervision for the continuous operation of an air traffic control facility or area in any case in which operations supervisory personnel are not available.

(2) **OPERATIONAL OVERSIGHT.**—The term “operational oversight” means the duty of the individual in charge of the operation to effectively lead and manage the delivery of air traffic services by maintaining intentional engagement, situational awareness, and accountability within the area of supervision.

(3) **OPERATIONS SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL.**—The term “operations supervisory personnel” means managerial personnel responsible for the direct supervision of air traffic control operational personnel.

SEC. 108. CONTROLLER THREAT AND ERROR MANAGEMENT TRAINING.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 9 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall, in coordination with the exclusive bargaining representative of air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code, develop and implement initial, recurrent, and refresher training for air traffic controllers on threat and error management that is instructor-led and scenario-based.

(b) **CONSULTATION.**—In developing the training under subsection (a), the Administrator shall consult with representatives of—

(1) organizations representing air traffic control managers and operations supervisors;

(2) aviation safety experts with specific knowledge of—

(A) human factors and human decision making in realistic operational settings; and

(B) threat and error management best practices and policies; and

(3) a career representative from the National Transportation Safety Board with subject matter expertise as an observer.

(c) **CONSIDERATIONS.**—In developing the training described in subsection (a), the Administrator shall consider, at a minimum—

(1) the findings and recommendations of the National Transportation Safety Board, including as contained in the final aviation investigation report, AIR-26-02, adopted on January 27, 2026, such as—

(A) training controllers to continuously monitor their environment to more quickly and accurately identify threats;

(B) promoting team communication to ensure that communications are clear, timely, and assertive;

(C) emphasizing effective scanning habits;

(D) recognizing patterns in the development of adverse events; and

(E) enhanced decision making under stress by developing habits that balance procedural compliance with problem-solving;

(2) the requirements of—

(A) FAA Order JO 3120.4S, titled “Air Traffic Technical Training”, issued on August 28, 2024;

(B) FAA Order JO 7210.3EE, titled “Facility Operation and Administration”, issued on February 20, 2025;

(C) FAA Order JO 7110.65BB, titled “Air Traffic Control”, issued on February 20, 2025; and

(D) other relevant air traffic control standards, guidance, and policies;

(3) the frequency of the recurrent and refresher training described in subsection (a) and whether frequency should be increased for air traffic controllers in facilities managing high-complexity or high-volume airspace;

(4) data, reports, and peer-reviewed studies on human factors and threat and error management best practices;

(5) the appropriate use of tower simulator systems and other advanced training technologies to supplement the recurrent training described in subsection (a), including the use of data analytics from such systems and technologies to individualize instruction;

(6) the use of data analytics to identify systemic gaps in the recurrent and refresher training described in subsection (a) and to dynamically enhance training curriculum and techniques;

(7) data gathered from aviation safety reporting programs; and

(8) any other item determined appropriate by the Administrator.

(d) IMPLEMENTATION.—Not later than 90 days after the development of the training under subsection (a), the Administrator shall revise the orders of the FAA described in subsection (c)(2), or any successor documents, and any corresponding policy or guidance materials, to reflect the requirements of this section.

(e) BRIEFING TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 1 year after the training requirements under this section and section 109 are established, the Administrator shall brief the appropriate committees of Congress on the implementation of such training and any potential recommendations for improvements.

(f) THREAT AND ERROR MANAGEMENT DEFINED.—In this section, the term “threat and error management” has the meaning described in chapter 6 of the Risk Management Handbook (FAA H-8083-2A) or any successor document.

SEC. 109. CONTROLLER VISUAL SEPARATION TRAINING.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 270 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall, in coordination with the exclusive bargaining representative of air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code, develop and implement initial, recurrent, and refresher training for air traffic controllers on tower-applied and pilot-applied visual separation procedures that is instructor-led and scenario-based.

(b) CONSULTATION.—In developing and implementing the training required under subsection (a), the Administrator shall consult with representatives of—

(1) the certified bargaining representative of aviation safety inspectors and engineers for the FAA;

(2) organizations representing certified collective bargaining representatives of airline pilots;

(3) organizations representing air traffic control managers and supervisors;

(4) organizations representing general aviation pilots; and

(5) aviation safety experts with specific knowledge of—

(A) human factors and human decision making in realistic operational settings; and

(B) tower-applied and pilot-applied visual separation procedures and regulations.

(c) CONSIDERATIONS.—In developing the training under subsection (a), the Administrator shall consider, at a minimum—

(1) the findings and recommendations made by the National Transportation Safety Board, including as contained in the final aviation investigation report, AIR-26-02, adopted on January 27, 2026;

(2) the requirements of—

(A) FAA Order JO 3120.4S, titled “Air Traffic Technical Training”, issued on August 28, 2024;

(B) FAA Order JO 7210.3EE, titled “Facility Operation and Administration”, issued on February 20, 2025;

(C) FAA Order JO 7110.65BB, titled “Air Traffic Control”, issued on February 20, 2025; and

(D) other relevant air traffic control standards, guidance, and policies;

(3) the frequency of the recurrent and refresher training described in subsection (a), including—

(A) whether such frequency should be increased for air traffic controllers in facilities managing high-complexity or high-volume airspace; and

(B) the need for advance training and guidance ahead of any changes to FAA visual separation policies;

(4) the appropriate use of tower simulator systems and other advanced training technologies to supplement the recurrent and refresher training described in subsection (a), including the use of data analytics from such systems and technologies to individualize instruction;

(5) the use of data analytics to identify systemic gaps in the recurrent and refresher training described in subsection (a) and to dynamically enhance training curriculum and techniques;

(6) data gathered from aviation safety reporting programs; and

(7) any other item determined appropriate by the Administrator.

(d) IMPLEMENTATION.—Not later than 90 days after the development of the training under subsection (a), the Administrator shall revise the orders of the FAA described in subparagraph (c)(2), or any successor documents, and any corresponding policy or guidance materials, to reflect the requirements of this section.

SEC. 110. SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT TOOL.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall develop a safety risk assessment tool for use by air traffic controllers, including by supervisory air traffic control personnel, to assist in airspace risk identification, mitigation, and operational decision making.

(b) CONSIDERATIONS.—In carrying out subsection (a), the Administrator shall consider, at a minimum—

(1) the development of a safety risk assessment tool capable of supporting air traffic controllers in—

(A) identifying safety risks;

(B) analyzing the impact of and prioritizing such risks; and

(C) developing strategies to reduce or eliminate such risks in real time;

(2) data, reports, studies, and best practices on threat and error management;

(3) findings and recommendations of the—

(A) National Transportation Safety Board, including as contained in the final aviation investigation report, AIR-26-02, adopted on January 27, 2026;

(B) National Airspace System Safety Review Team as contained in the final report

titled “Discussion and Recommendations to Address Risk in the National Airspace System”, issued on November 15, 2023; and

(C) frontline manager workload study authorized under section 412 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 (Public Law 118-63);

(4) air traffic facility type and staffing level;

(5) risk assessment guidance, policies, and regulations of the Administration in place prior to the date of enactment of this Act;

(6) data gathered from aviation safety reporting programs;

(7) best practices or similar relevant risk assessment tools and methods used by foreign civil aviation authorities;

(8) the feasibility of leveraging commercially available products or technologies that may be utilized to develop such tool;

(9) benefits of incorporating such tool into a Common Automation Platform; and

(10) any other factors determined relevant by the Administrator.

(c) COORDINATION.—In developing the safety risk assessment tool under subsection (a), the Administrator shall coordinate with—

(1) organizations representing air traffic control supervisors and managers;

(2) the exclusive bargaining representative of air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code;

(3) aviation safety experts with specific knowledge of threat and error management;

(4) aviation safety experts with specific knowledge of human factors and human decision making in realistic operational settings;

(5) organizations representing operators of Federal contract towers pursuant to section 47124 of title 49, United States Code; and

(6) any other stakeholders determined relevant by the Administrator.

(d) BRIEFING TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 18 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall brief the appropriate committees of Congress on—

(1) the development of the safety risk assessment tool required under this section and recommendations for implementation;

(2) the progress of implementation described in subsection (e); and

(3) any recommendations to improve the deployment of the safety risk assessment tool.

(e) IMPLEMENTATION.—The Administrator shall deploy the safety risk assessment tool developed under this section at—

(1) the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport air traffic control tower, not later than 1 year after the development of the safety risk assessment tool;

(2) air traffic control facilities with high volumes of mixed rotorcraft and airplane traffic not later than 18 months after the development of the safety risk assessment tool; and

(3) any remaining air traffic control facilities not later than 2 years after the development of the safety risk assessment tool.

(f) THREAT AND ERROR MANAGEMENT DEFINED.—In this section, the term “threat and error management” has the meaning described in chapter 6 of the Risk Management Handbook (FAA H-8083-2A) or any successor document.

SEC. 111. OPERATIONAL RATES AT RONALD REAGAN WASHINGTON NATIONAL AIRPORT.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall initiate an assessment of the aircraft arrival rate at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport.

(b) CONSIDERATIONS.—In conducting the assessment described in subsection (a), the Administrator shall consider—

(1) airspace complexity;

(2) airfield limitations;

- (3) mixed-fleet operations;
- (4) traffic volume;
- (5) air carrier scheduling practices;
- (6) the operational capacity of such airport;
- (7) the current hourly instrument flight rules allocation practice at such airport;
- (8) expertise provided by the Air Traffic Organization; and
- (9) any other considerations the Administrator determines appropriate.

(c) **COMPLETION OF ASSESSMENT.**—Not later than 180 days after the Administrator initiates the assessment under subsection (a), the Administrator shall complete and submit to the appropriate committees of Congress such assessment, including any related findings and recommendations.

(d) **RULEMAKING.**—Not later than 30 days after completing the assessment pursuant to subsection (c), and taking such assessment into account, the Administrator shall initiate a rulemaking proceeding to update subpart K of part 93 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, to require allocated instrument flight rules operations at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport to be prescribed in periods not greater than 30 minutes to ensure such airport does not exceed safe capacity.

(e) **CONSULTATION.**—In conducting the rulemaking required under subsection (d), the Administrator shall consult with the following:

(1) Any air carrier operating under part 121 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, with scheduled operations at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, including regional air carriers and low-cost and ultra-low-cost air carriers.

(2) Air carriers operating under parts 91, including subpart K, and 135 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, authorized to conduct non-scheduled operations at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport.

(3) The exclusive bargaining representatives of air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code.

(4) The Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority.

(5) Other stakeholders the Administrator determines appropriate.

SEC. 112. TIME-BASED FLOW MANAGEMENT.

Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall implement operational use of the time-based flow management system at Potomac Consolidated Terminal Radar Approach Control and associated air traffic control towers.

SEC. 113. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL FACILITY LEVELS.

(a) **REVIEW OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL FACILITY LEVEL CRITERIA.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The Administrator and the exclusive bargaining representative of air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code, (in this section referred to as the “Parties”) may, at their joint election, review and advise, as agreed to, the criteria and procedures used to assess, determine, and validate the facility pay levels of air traffic control facilities.

(2) **CONSIDERATIONS.**—In conducting a review under paragraph (1), the Parties may consider—

(A) the many variables that may affect the difficulty and complexity of air traffic control work, including technological advancements, aviation industry trends, and the modification or extension of air traffic control services;

(B) weights and add-ons used to calculate the traffic count index and other related formulas for air traffic control facilities; and

(C) whether new weights and add-ons should be incorporated into such formulas to more accurately reflect the air traffic den-

sity and complexity of the facility operations.

(b) **REASSESSMENT OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL FACILITY LEVELS.**—

(1) **LIMITATION.**—No changes to facility pay levels due to data source changes may be implemented until negotiations pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement of the Parties and title 49, United States Code, have been completed.

(2) **APPLICATION OF STANDARD.**—Upon completion of a review conducted under subsection (a) and related negotiations pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement of the Parties and title 49, United States Code, the Parties shall apply the standard in accordance with any agreements made pursuant to this section at—

(A) the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport; and

(B) all other air traffic control facilities, prioritizing facilities with high volumes of mixed rotorcraft and airplane traffic.

(c) **RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.**—Nothing in this section may be construed to interfere with any agreement between a governmental agency and the exclusive bargaining representative of air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code, or section 40122 of title 49, United States Code.

SEC. 114. WORKING GROUP TO EVALUATE SHARED FREQUENCY AROUND RONALD REAGAN WASHINGTON NATIONAL AIRPORT.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 3 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall convene a working group (in this section referred to as the “Working Group”) to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the safety benefits and risks of requiring all aircraft to use the same communications frequency during any period in which helicopter and local air traffic control positions are combined in the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport air traffic control tower.

(b) **MEMBERS.**—The Working Group convened under subsection (a) shall be comprised of representatives of—

(1) the exclusive bargaining representatives of air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code;

(2) the organization representing air traffic control operational supervisors and managers;

(3) not fewer than 3 separate organizations representing the certified collective bargaining representatives of pilots operating under part 121 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations;

(4) air medical services;

(5) an organization representing helicopter aviation operators and pilots;

(6) an organization representing business aviation operators and pilots;

(7) air carriers operating under part 121 of title 14, United States Code;

(8) an individual that has expertise in an operational or academic discipline that is relevant to the analysis of human factors in aviation, which may include air carrier operations, line pilot expertise, air traffic control, linguistics, human-machine integration, general aviation operations, and organizational behavior and culture;

(9) the FAA, provided the representative has expertise on flight operations in the area described in subsection (a);

(10) the Department of Defense, provided the representative has expertise on Department of Defense flight operations in the area described in subsection (a);

(11) the Coast Guard, provided the representative has expertise on Coast Guard flight operations in the area described in subsection (a);

(12) the National Transportation Safety Board; and

(13) other organizations or agencies as determined necessary by the Administrator.

(c) **LOCAL OPERATOR PREFERENCE.**—The members described in paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) of subsection (b) shall be, or represent, individuals who operate in the Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area, as defined in subpart V of part 93 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.

(d) **GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES.**—The members described in paragraphs (11), (12), (13), (14), and, in the case of a representative chosen by the Administrator that is from a governmental agency, (15) of subsection (b)—

(1) may not be political appointees; and

(2) shall be nonvoting members of the Working Group.

(e) **DURATION.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Members of the Working Group shall be appointed for the duration of the Working Group.

(2) **LENGTH OF EXISTENCE.**—

(A) **IN GENERAL.**—The Working Group shall have an initial duration of 1 year.

(B) **OPTIONAL EXTENSION.**—The Administrator may extend the duration of the Working Group for an additional period of up to 1 year.

(f) **CONSIDERATIONS.**—In conducting the comprehensive evaluation under subsection (a), the Working Group shall, at minimum, consider—

(1) the benefits or detriments to pilot and air traffic controller situation awareness;

(2) to the greatest extent possible, the human factors that would impact pilot and air traffic controller situation awareness;

(3) to the greatest extent possible, the human factors that would impact pilot and air traffic controllers during critical phases of flight;

(4) existing products by other working groups related to human factors in aviation safety;

(5) pilot training requirements;

(6) air traffic controller training requirements;

(7) if any, technological limitations or challenges that would impede aircraft from using the same communications frequency;

(8) the potential for overlapping, conflicting, and simultaneous communication transmissions, prior to and after any improvements made as a result of the assessment conducted pursuant to section 115;

(9) the potential for misdirected, missed, or stepped on communications if requiring all aircraft to use the same communication frequency;

(10) National Transportation Safety Board recommendations pertaining to miscommunications on crowded frequencies, including relevant recommendations included in the National Transportation Safety Board Aviation Investigation Report AIR-26-02 adopted on January 27, 2026; and

(11) solicited feedback from air carriers operating under part 121 and part 135 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, and general aviation operators under part 91 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.

(g) **REPORT.**—Not later than 6 months after the conclusion of the Working Group, the Working Group shall submit to the Administrator and the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the findings and recommendations resulting from the activities carried out under this section.

(h) **IMPLEMENTATION.**—Not later than 6 months after receiving recommendations outlined in the report under subsection (g), the Administrator shall operationally validate such recommendations and may take such action, as appropriate, to implement such recommendations.

SEC. 115. ANTI-BLOCKING TECHNOLOGY.

(a) **ASSESSMENT.**—Not later than 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the

Administrator shall initiate an assessment on the feasibility, maturity, hazards, and safety benefits of technology that serves to alert air traffic controllers or flight crews to instances of potentially blocked transmissions when simultaneous broadcasting occurs.

(b) **CONSIDERATIONS.**—In conducting the assessment under subsection (a), the Administrator shall, at minimum, consider—

(1) technologies currently in use domestically and internationally that alert an air traffic controller or flight crew to instances in which radio transmissions may have been blocked;

(2) the technical standards written for, and associated with, the use of such technologies identified under paragraph (1);

(3) existing and proposed technologies not in use that could alert an air traffic controller or flight crew to instances in which radio transmissions may have been blocked;

(4) the technical standards that would be needed to implement the technologies identified under paragraph (3);

(5) the potential benefits and enhanced awareness that the adoption of such technologies would provide;

(6) the technological limitations associated with such technologies;

(7) air traffic controller training requirements;

(8) the effort of the FAA to modernize the air traffic control system, including timelines, the incorporation of new technologies, and planned training; and

(9) any benefits and detriments to air traffic controller situational awareness, including availability of information, nuisance alerts, and human factors.

(c) **CONSULTATION.**—In conducting the assessment under subsection (a), the Administrator shall consult with stakeholders or standards organizations, including—

(1) the exclusive bargaining representatives of air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code;

(2) the organization representing air traffic control operational supervisors and managers;

(3) the certified bargaining representative of aviation safety inspectors and engineers for the FAA;

(4) an organization representing manufacturers of air traffic management systems, equipment and technologies;

(5) an organization representing helicopter aviation operators and pilots;

(6) an organization representing general aviation operators and pilots; and

(7) any other organization or agency the Administrator determines appropriate.

(d) **REPORT.**—Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the results of the assessment under subsection (a) that includes—

(1) a list of technologies identified by the Administrator serving the purpose described in subsection (a);

(2) a list of technologies the Administrator proposes that could serve the purpose described in subsection (a);

(3) results of simulations and testing; and

(4) a plan to implement the technologies listed under paragraphs (1) and (2) if the assessment under subsection (a) finds such technology can be safely implemented, including—

(A) the scope of potential upgrades;

(B) predicted costs;

(C) a projected timeline; and

(D) how the potential upgrades to facilities and equipment within the scope of subparagraph (A) would be prioritized.

SEC. 116. TASK FORCE TO IDENTIFY IMPROVEMENTS TO AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER CONFLICT ALERT SYSTEM.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 3 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall convene a task force (in this section referred to as the “Task Force”) to develop a framework detailing the priorities, goals, timeline, and recommendations to implement improvements to the conflict alert system to provide more salient and meaningful alerts to air traffic controllers based on the severity of the conflict triggering the alert.

(b) **MEMBERS.**—The Task Force convened under subsection (a) shall be comprised of representatives of—

(1) the exclusive bargaining representatives of air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code;

(2) the organization representing air traffic control operational supervisors and managers;

(3) the organization representing operators under the Contract Tower Program established under section 47124 of title 49, United States Code;

(4) the certified bargaining representative of aviation safety inspectors and engineers for the FAA;

(5) individuals with expertise in the human factors of alert design and related impacts on human performance;

(6) individuals with expertise in an operational or academic discipline that is relevant to the analysis of human factors in aviation, which may include air carrier operations, line pilot expertise, air traffic control, linguistics, human-machine integration, general aviation operations, and organizational behavior and culture;

(7) the FAA, including the Air Traffic Organization and the Office of Finance and Management, provided such representative has expertise on equipment procurement; and

(8) other organizations or agencies as determined necessary by the Administrator.

(c) **VOTING.**—The members described in paragraphs (3), (6), and, in the case of a representative chosen by the Administrator that is from a governmental agency, (7) of subsection (b) shall be nonvoting members of the Task Force.

(d) **DURATION.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Members of the Task Force shall be appointed for the duration of the Task Force.

(2) **LENGTH OF EXISTENCE.**—

(A) **IN GENERAL.**—The Task Force shall have an initial duration of 1 year.

(B) **OPTIONAL EXTENSION.**—The Administrator may extend the duration of the Task Force for an additional period of up to 6 months.

(e) **CONSIDERATIONS.**—In developing the framework under subsection (a), the Task Force shall, at minimum, consider—

(1) the benefits and detriments to air traffic controller situational awareness, including availability of information, nuisance and false alerts, and human factors;

(2) opportunities and challenges of consolidating numerous systems and underlying data sources into a single display, including through the deployment of the Enterprise-Information Display System;

(3) existing products by other working groups related to human factors in aviation safety;

(4) air traffic controller training requirements;

(5) advances in available technology not being utilized as of the date on which the Task Force is convened;

(6) technological limitations;

(7) National Transportation Safety Board recommendations pertaining to air traffic

controller alerts, distractions, and loss of focus;

(8) the effort of the FAA to modernize the air traffic control system, including timelines, new technologies being incorporated, and planned training; and

(9) solicited feedback from equipment manufacturers and entities involved with the air traffic control modernization effort of the Administrator.

(f) **REPORT.**—Not later than 4 months after the conclusion of the Task Force, the Task Force shall submit to the Administrator and the appropriate committees of Congress a report that includes the framework developed as a result of the activities carried out under subsection (a).

(g) **IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 8 months after receiving the framework outlined in the report under subsection (f), the Administrator shall finalize and submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a plan (in this section referred to as the “Plan”) to implement such framework.

(2) **CONTENTS.**—Such Plan shall include, as appropriate—

(A) specific training requirements for air traffic controllers, as detailed in—

(i) FAA Order JO 3120.4S, titled “Air Traffic Technical Training”, issued on August 28, 2024;

(ii) FAA Order JO 7210.3EE, titled “Facility Operation and Administration”, issued on February 20, 2025; and

(iii) any successor or other relevant documents or guidance; and

(B) a publicly available prioritized list of airports enumerating the order in which they will receive such upgrades.

(3) **TIME LIMIT.**—The Plan may not contain a timeline of implementation that exceeds 2 years.

(h) **IMPLEMENTATION.**—The Administrator shall immediately begin implementing the Plan upon the submission of such Plan under subsection (g)(1) to the appropriate committees of Congress.

(i) **BRIEFINGS TO CONGRESS.**—Not later than 6 months after the submission of the Plan to the appropriate committees of Congress under subsection (g)(1), and every 6 months thereafter until the full implementation of the Plan, the Administrator shall brief the appropriate committees of Congress on the progress of implementation.

SEC. 117. POSTACCIDENT AND POSTINCIDENT DRUG AND ALCOHOL TESTING.

(a) **SENSE OF CONGRESS.**—The Administrator shall abide by DOT Order 3910.1D, titled “Drug and Alcohol-Free Departmental Workplace Program” (or any successor document) to ensure appropriate postaccident and postincident drug and alcohol testing.

(b) **REVISION OF PROCEDURES.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall revise procedures of the Air Traffic Organization to ensure an appropriate on-site supervisor makes each postaccident and postincident drug and alcohol testing determination in a timely manner based on an assessment of such supervisor of whether the event meets testing criteria and which controllers had duties pertaining to the involved aircraft without need to wait for investigation or approval.

(c) **TRAINING.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall incorporate training on the revised postaccident and postincident drug and alcohol testing determination procedure described in subsection (b) for all staff of the Air Traffic Organization who have responsibilities under such procedure.

(2) **REQUIREMENTS.**—The training described under this subsection shall, at a minimum—

(A) be administered during initial training, and annually thereafter; and

(B) include a postlearning knowledge assessment.

(d) REVIEW.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall conduct a review of the ability of each FAA-operated air traffic control facility to routinely accomplish the required postaccident and postincident drug and alcohol testing within the Secretary's specified timeframes of within 2 hours for alcohol testing and within 4 hours for drug testing.

(2) REQUIREMENTS.—The review described under this subsection shall, at a minimum, require each FAA-operated air traffic control facility to conduct a demonstration to establish the time that would be required for urine and breath evidence collection to begin if testing were unexpectedly needed during a time with the lowest routinely anticipated level of resource availability for testing.

(3) REMEDIATION.—After each review under paragraph (1), the Administrator shall work with the Secretary to mitigate identified barriers to timely postaccident and postincident drug and alcohol testing, and to remediate the performance of each facility for which the demonstration under paragraph (2) indicated inability to meet required timeframes for postaccident drug or alcohol testing.

(4) REPORT.—Not later than 3 months after each review under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report detailing the results of the review, including facilities in need of remediation, progress at facilities previously identified for remediation, and planned approaches to remediation.

SEC. 118. FURTHER MODIFICATIONS TO RONALD REAGAN WASHINGTON NATIONAL AIRPORT AREA HELICOPTER ROUTES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall evaluate, via the safety risk management process in accordance with FAA Order JO 8040.4C, titled "Safety Risk Management Policy" (or any successor document), charted helicopter routes in the vicinity of Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport.

(b) REVISIONS TO DECONFLICT TRAFFIC.—Upon the completion of each route evaluation under subsection (a), the Administrator shall immediately, as necessary, revise such route to ensure that the route and routes utilized by fixed-wing aircraft—

(1) are safely deconflicted physically at all times; or

(2) have operating procedures that require positive control from the controller to ensure safe deconfliction during operations.

(c) SAFETY REVIEW REQUIREMENTS.—In carrying out the route revisions required under subsection (b), the Administrator shall conduct a safety risk management review, as necessary, for any helicopter route changes, in accordance with FAA Order 8040.4C, titled "Safety Risk Management Policy" (or any successor document).

(d) REPORT.—Not later than 120 days after the Administrator completes all the evaluations and subsequent route revisions required under this section, the Administrator shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report containing—

(1) the results of the evaluations required under subsection (a);

(2) the route revisions required under subsection (b), including an explanation for such revisions; and

(3) the safety risk management review documentation developed as a result of the review conducted under subsection (c).

SEC. 119. REQUIRING VERTICAL SEPARATION NEAR AIRPORTS DURING CRITICAL PHASES OF FLIGHT.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subsection (b), the Administrator shall ensure that each segment of a helicopter route contains, in the appropriate helicopter route chart, recommended flight altitudes, including altitude ceilings and floors, in a manner consistent with FAA Order JO 7210.3EE, titled "Facility Operation and Administration" (or any successor document).

(b) CONSIDERATION OF VERTICAL SEPARATION IN ROUTE CRITERIA.—Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall amend FAA Order JO 7210.3EE, titled "Facility Operation and Administration" (or any successor document), to add minimum vertical separation requirements to the criteria for the helicopter route chart program.

(c) CHARTING MINIMUM SEPARATION NEAR AIRPORTS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Administrator shall ensure that any helicopter chart that represents an area near an airport clearly conveys to an operator the segments of such helicopter routes in the vicinity of such airport.

(2) CONTENT REQUIREMENTS.—At minimum, each such chart shall clearly convey for each of the segments, the recommended flight altitudes, including altitude ceilings and floors, and any necessary instructions, to convey minimum separation, in accordance with FAA Order JO 7110.65BB, titled "Air Traffic Control" (or any successor document), between—

(A) a helicopter or powered-lift aircraft utilizing such segment; and

(B) a fixed-wing aircraft operating at or near such airport during critical phases of flight.

(d) UPDATE POLICY.—Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall update FAA Order JO 7210.3EE, titled "Facility Operation and Administration" (or any successor document), to account for any additional changes made by this section.

(e) ANNUAL REVIEW.—The Administrator shall ensure that any changes made to Helicopter Route Charts as a result of this section are assessed on an annual basis as part of the annual review described in section 120.

SEC. 120. HELICOPTER ROUTE CHART ANNUAL REVIEW.

(a) CRITERIA REVIEW.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Administrator shall initiate a review of the criteria for annual reviews of helicopter routes as required pursuant to FAA Order JO 7210.3EE, titled "Facility Operation and Administration" (or any successor document).

(2) UPDATE OF CRITERIA.—After each annual criteria review under paragraph (1), the Administrator shall update the criteria based on such review and publish the updated criteria on a publicly available website of the FAA.

(3) CHANGES TO ROUTE REVIEWS.—After any change is made to FAA Order JO 7210.3EE, titled "Facility Operation and Administration" (or any successor document) pursuant to section 119(d), the Administrator shall update the criteria for annual reviews of helicopter routes to reflect such change.

(b) PUBLICATION.—The Administrator shall publish, on a publicly available website of the FAA, the date on which the annual review for each Helicopter Route Chart has been most recently completed, as required pursuant to FAA Order JO 7210.3EE, titled "Facility Operation and Administration" (or any successor document).

(c) REPORT.—Not later than December 31, 2026, and December 31 of each year there-

after, the Administrator shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report containing, at a minimum, the following information:

(1) A summary of changes, if applicable, made to each Helicopter Route Chart, including—

(A) changes, additions, or deletions to designated helicopter routes;

(B) changes in instrument flight rules routes;

(C) additions or deletions of visual checkpoints; and

(D) rationale or safety data to justify any changes described in subparagraphs (A) through (C).

(2) The safety risk management documentation completed in accordance with FAA Order JO 8040.4C, titled "Safety Risk Management Policy" (or any successor document).

(3) A summary of any advanced consultation between the Administrator and impacted helicopter and fixed-wing operators in planning the safety risk management process.

(4) A certification that the designated recommended route altitudes and flight ceilings and floors ensure helicopters maintain minimum separation, in accordance with FAA Order 7110.65BB, titled "Air Traffic Control" (or any successor document), with fixed-wing aircraft operating along airport approach and departure paths.

(d) FAILURE TO SUBMIT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—If the Administrator fails to submit an annual report required under subsection (b) on or before the date on which such report is required to be submitted, the Chief Operating Officer of the Air Traffic Organization shall brief the appropriate committees of Congress in person not later than 4 weeks after such date.

(2) DEADLINE FOR INITIAL OUTREACH AND COORDINATION.—Not later than 4 days after such date, the FAA shall begin initial outreach to and coordination with the appropriate committees of Congress to arrange and organize logistics of the briefing required under paragraph (1).

(3) FORMAT AND TIME OF BRIEFING.—The briefing required under paragraph (1) shall be in a format and at a time to be determined by such committees.

SEC. 121. VISUAL CHARTS.

(a) STUDY.—Not later than 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall initiate a study on incorporating the lateral location and published altitudes of helicopter routes into all instrument and visual approach and departure procedures for airports to provide situation awareness to fixed-wing operators of the risk of helicopter traffic operating in the vicinity of such operators.

(b) CONSULTATION.—In carrying out subsection (a), the Administrator shall consult with relevant stakeholders, including—

(1) air carriers;

(2) an organization representing helicopter operators and pilots;

(3) an organization representing general aviation operators and pilots;

(4) an organization representing business aviation operators and pilots;

(5) an organization representing emergency air medical services;

(6) representatives of the Department of Defense and United States Coast Guard who are not political appointees;

(7) not fewer than 3 separate organizations representing certified collective bargaining representatives of airline pilots operating under part 121 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations;

(8) the certified exclusive bargaining representatives of air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code; and

(9) an individual that has expertise in an operational or academic discipline that is relevant to the analysis of human factors in aviation, including air carrier operations, line pilot expertise, air traffic control, linguistics, human-machine integration, general aviation operations, and organizational behavior and culture.

(c) CONSIDERATIONS.—In carrying out subsection (a), the Administrator shall consider the—

(1) spacing and legibility of information on charts;

(2) workload of flight crews at lower altitudes and during critical phases of flight;

(3) feasibility and decipherability of layered information on digital charts;

(4) current best practices for pilots when landing at or departing from airports with high volume helicopter traffic but that do not have charted helicopter routes; and

(5) human factors involved with approach and departure procedures.

(d) IMPLEMENTATION.—Not later than 1 year after initiating the study under subsection (a), the Administrator shall make any revisions necessary to—

(1) Terminal Procedures Publications to include charted helicopter routes to provide appropriate situational awareness to fixed-wing operators; and

(2) Helicopter Route Charts to include airport approach and departure paths to provide appropriate situational awareness to helicopter operators.

(e) CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING.—If the Administrator makes revisions under subsection (d), the Administrator shall brief the appropriate committees of Congress on such revisions not later than 60 days after making such revisions.

SEC. 122. CLOSE PROXIMITY ENCOUNTERS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall establish a working group to make recommendations on—

(1) an objective definition of close proximity encounters;

(2) associated parameters that can be used to monitor the prevalence of such encounters and identify areas of potential traffic conflict for safety assurance and safety risk management for such encounters; and

(3) making publicly available aggregated information about all such encounters, including date and location.

(b) CONSIDERATIONS.—In carrying out subsection (a), the working group shall consider—

(1) existing airborne separation rules and required loss of airborne separation reporting requirements;

(2) the development of a definition of, and associated parameters for, close proximity encounter events;

(3) data gathered from aviation safety reporting systems and reports, including the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing Program, the Aviation Safety Action Program, the Performance Data Analysis and Reporting System, the Aviation Risk Identification and Assessment (“ARIA”) system, preliminary ARIA reports, the Air Traffic Safety Action Program, the Aviation Safety Reporting System, the Near Midair Collision System, mandatory occurrence reports, and other relevant systems and reports;

(4) National Transportation Safety Board aviation investigation report AIR-26-02, adopted on January 27, 2026;

(5) FAA risk assessment guidance, policies, and regulations in place prior to the date of enactment of this Act;

(6) best practices or similar relevant risk assessment tools and methods used by foreign civil aviation authorities; and

(7) any other factors determined relevant by the working group.

(c) MEMBERSHIP.—The working group shall consist of the following:

(1) APPOINTED MEMBERS.—The following members appointed by the Administrator:

(A) 2 representatives of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration with expertise in safety data.

(B) 5 appropriately qualified representatives of aviation labor organizations (designated by the applicable represented organization), including—

(i) organizations representing certified collective bargaining representatives of airline pilots;

(ii) the exclusive bargaining representatives of FAA air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code;

(iii) organizations representing helicopter operators and pilots, including law enforcement and air ambulance operators; and

(iv) organizations representing general aviation operators and pilots.

(C) Not fewer than 5 independent subject matter experts in safety management systems and safety data who—

(i) have not served as a political appointee in the Administration; and

(ii) have a minimum of 10 years of relevant applied experience.

(D) 2 air carrier employees whose job responsibilities include administration of a safety management system.

(E) 2 individuals representing holders of a certificate issued under part 21 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, whose job responsibilities include administration of a safety management system.

(F) 2 other representatives from the aerospace industry that do not meet the criteria described in subparagraph (D) or (E) and who have expertise in safety assurance or safety risk or whose job responsibilities include administration of a safety management system.

(G) A career representative from the National Transportation Safety Board with subject matter expertise, as a nonvoting member.

(2) ADVISORY MEMBERS.—In addition to the appointed members described in paragraph (1), the working group shall be advised by up to 5 employees of the Administration, at least 3 of whom shall be subject matter experts in implementing safety assurance and safety risk management.

(d) IMPLEMENTATION.—Not later than 30 days after the working group develops recommendations under subsection (a), the Administrator shall make publicly available a report containing the recommendations and describing how the Administrator will implement such recommendations.

SEC. 123. NOTIFICATION OF CLOSE PROXIMITY ENCOUNTERS AND ANALYSIS OF DATA.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator, in accordance with the mandatory occurrence reporting requirements in FAA Order JO 7210.632A, titled “Air Traffic Organization Occurrence Reporting” (or any successor document), FAA Order 8020.11D, titled “Aircraft Accident and Incident Notification, Investigation, and Reporting” (or any successor document), and FAA Advisory Circular AC 90-120, titled “Operational Use of Airborne Collision Avoidance Systems” (or any successor document), shall establish a process to—

(1) notify, with respect to each event, parties involved with—

(A) a near midair collision event;

(B) a traffic collision avoidance system resolution advisory event;

(C) a close proximity encounter, as defined pursuant to section 122; and

(D) any other events, as determined by the Administrator; and

(2) provide deidentified event data to the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing program.

(b) REQUIREMENTS.—In establishing the process under subsection (a), the Administrator shall—

(1) establish a database that tracks the details of events described in subsection (a)(1);

(2) continuously monitor and review such database to identify areas of potential traffic conflict for safety assurance and safety risk management;

(3) ensure timeliness of notifications to the parties described in subsection (a)(1) so that relevant data remains available before meaningful safety analysis, reporting, or corrective action is no longer practicable;

(4) consider informing, with deidentified or aggregated data, other frequent operators of events described in subsection (a)(1); and

(5) consider the practicality and usefulness of notification requirements for—

(A) airport surface loss of separation;

(B) loss of separation with terrain or obstacles;

(C) airborne loss of separation; and

(D) any other close proximity encounters as determined by the Administrator.

(c) CONSULTATION.—In establishing the process under subsection (a), the Administrator shall consult with—

(1) air carriers operating under part 121 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations;

(2) air carriers operating under part 135 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations;

(3) air carriers operating under part 91 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations;

(4) organizations representing helicopter aviation operators and pilots;

(5) organizations representing the general aviation community;

(6) organizations representing business aviation operators;

(7) organizations representing experimental aircraft operators;

(8) organizations representing powered-lift operators;

(9) organizations representing certified collective bargaining representatives of airline pilots;

(10) the certified exclusive bargaining representatives of air traffic controllers of the Administration certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code;

(11) FAA subject matter experts, including aviation safety inspectors; and

(12) other aviation safety experts determined appropriate by the Administrator.

(d) BRIEFING.—Not later than 30 days after establishing the process required under subsection (a), the Administrator shall brief the appropriate committees of Congress on the implementation of this section.

(e) REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after establishing the process required under subsection (a), and annually thereafter, the Administrator shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report containing—

(1) data on number and location of—

(A) near midair collision events;

(B) traffic collision avoidance system resolution advisory events; and

(C) close proximity encounters, as defined pursuant to section 122;

(2) the average time of notification to parties involved in such events;

(3) identified locations of concern or other trends; and

(4) actions taken to mitigate identified risks and reduce such events.

(f) PROTECTION OF DATA.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Data collected in response to subsection (a) shall be used solely for safety assurance and safety risk management.

(2) CONSISTENCY WITH EXISTING SAFETY PROGRAMS.—The Administrator shall ensure consistency with existing voluntary safety programs, including the Aviation Safety Action Program, the Aviation Safety Reporting System, the Air Traffic Safety Action Plan, and flight operational quality assurance programs.

SEC. 124. SAFETY CULTURE AND SAFETY MANAGEMENT REVIEW.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the inspector general of the Department of Transportation shall initiate an audit of the safety culture and the safety management system of the Air Traffic Organization and the Aviation Safety Management Organization.

(b) CONSIDERATIONS.—In conducting the audit under subsection (a), the inspector general shall, at a minimum, evaluate—

(1) the safety management system of the Air Traffic Organization and the Aviation Safety Management Organization, including the functions and data sharing activities of such system at all air traffic control facilities;

(2) whether such system effectively coordinates safety assurance and safety risk management activities with external stakeholders consistent with FAA requirements for operators under section 5.57 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations;

(3) which data analysis, safety assurance, and risk assessment processes failed to identify and mitigate the risk of potential mid-air collisions near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport before January 29, 2025;

(4) the failure of the Air Traffic Organization and the Aviation Safety Management Organization to recognize external compliance verification results as indicators of systemic traffic management, volume, and flow issues at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport for which air traffic controllers were required to compensate to mitigate such issues;

(5) the failure of the Air Traffic Organization and the Aviation Safety Management Organization to conduct annual reviews of helicopter route charts as required by FAA Order JO 7210.3EE, titled “Facility Operation and Administration”;

(6) the failure of the Air Traffic Organization and the Aviation Safety Management Organization to understand and implement post-accident and post-incident drug and alcohol testing as required by Department of Transportation Order 3910.1D, titled “Drug and Alcohol-Free Departmental Workplace Program”;

(7) whether there are fears of retaliation against persons identifying or reporting risks in accordance with the safety management system; and

(8) how the Air Traffic Organization and the Aviation Safety Management Organization have addressed the findings and utilized the Safety Risk Management process in accordance with FAA Order 8040.4C, titled “Safety Risk Management Policy” (or any successor document) in the National Airspace System Helicopter Operations Helicopter Route Analysis of the FAA issued in April 2025.

(c) REPORT OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the inspector general shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the audit conducted under subsection (a).

(2) RECOMMENDATIONS.—The inspector general shall include in the report submitted under paragraph (1)—

(A) recommendations for actions the Secretary should take with respect to the Air Traffic Organization and the Aviation Safety Management Organization to—

(i) strengthen and adhere to the tenets of the safety management system;

(ii) increase transparency in the safety management system process, including by adopting policies that provide assurances to FAA employees that the Air Traffic Organization is addressing any identified safety issues;

(iii) increase data sharing and collaboration with external stakeholders;

(iv) protect against retaliation;

(v) encourage open, nonpunitive communication; and

(vi) foster a just culture across the Air Traffic Organization and the Aviation Safety Management Organization;

(B) recommendations for actions the Secretary may take to ensure adequate oversight over the safety management system of the Air Traffic Organization; and

(C) any other recommendations the inspector general determines appropriate.

(d) RESPONSE TO RECOMMENDATIONS.—Not later than 120 days after submission of the report required under subsection (c)—

(1) the Secretary shall respond to any recommendations in such report that are directed at the Department of Transportation or FAA, respectively; and

(2) the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report describing how the Secretary intends to implement such recommendations.

SEC. 125. DOCUMENTATION OF CONTROL POSITION COMBINATIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall review and revise, as appropriate, procedures regarding the documentation of the combination of air traffic control position responsibilities, including each occurrence in which any air traffic control position is combined with any other position, including a local control position, operations supervisor, or controller-in-charge.

(b) REQUIREMENTS.—In reviewing and revising the procedures described in subsection (a), the Administrator shall—

(1) evaluate procedures and guidance regarding the combination of controller position responsibilities described in subsection (a) that are in effect prior to the date of enactment of this Act;

(2) examine the feasibility of digitizing, or providing an electronic means of, the documentation described in subsection (a);

(3) require the operations supervisor to periodically review documentation of occurrences of combined control position responsibilities described in subsection (a) and report on deviations from the standard operating procedures to the facility air traffic manager;

(4) consider air traffic facility type and staffing level; and

(5) consult with representatives of—

(A) the exclusive bargaining representative of air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code;

(B) organizations representing air traffic control managers and operational supervisors; and

(C) aviation safety experts with specific knowledge in information technology.

(c) BRIEFING TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 1 year after the completion of the review required under subsection (a), the Administrator shall brief the appropriate committees of Congress on implementation of this section.

(d) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section may be construed to interfere with any agreement between a governmental agency and the exclusive bargaining rep-

resentative of air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code or section 7106(a) of title 5, United States Code.

(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) CONTROLLER-IN-CHARGE.—The term “controller-in-charge” means an air traffic control specialist performing duties of a shift supervisor in accordance with—

(A) FAA Order JO 7210.3EE, titled “Facility Operation and Administration”, issued on February 20, 2025; and

(B) FAA Order JO 7110.65BB, titled “Air Traffic Control”, issued on February 20, 2025.

(2) OPERATIONS SUPERVISOR.—The term “operations supervisor” means managerial personnel responsible for the direct supervision of air traffic control operational personnel.

SEC. 126. REVIEW OF MILES-IN-TRAIL PROCEDURES OR AGREEMENTS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall complete a review of the miles-in-trail standards and procedures to determine if such standards provide for a separation of traffic that is appropriate for operational safety.

(b) CONSIDERATIONS.—In conducting the review under subsection (a), the Administrator may consider—

(1) the accuracy of the criteria used to determine the miles-in-trail procedures for air traffic control facilities;

(2) whether additional criteria should be incorporated to more appropriately reflect the traffic volume and operational complexity of air traffic control facilities; and

(3) the findings and recommendations of the National Transportation Safety Board.

(c) STANDARDS UPDATE.—Upon completion of the review conducted under subsection (a), the Administrator shall update the miles-in-trail standards and procedures to ensure such standards and procedures are appropriate for operational safety.

(d) REVIEW OF CERTAIN FACILITIES.—Not later than 90 days after the completion of the review under subsection (a), the Administrator shall initiate a review of the miles-in-trail procedures or agreements at all air traffic control facilities located within Class B or Class C airspace to ensure such procedures or agreements provide for a separation of traffic that is appropriate for operational safety.

(e) CONSULTATION.—In carrying out the review under subsection (d), the Administrator shall consult with, at minimum—

(1) the exclusive bargaining representatives of the air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code;

(2) organizations representing air traffic control managers and operations supervisors;

(3) sponsors and operators of airports with air traffic control facilities described in subsection (d);

(4) organizations representing the certified collective bargaining representatives of pilots operating under part 121 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations; and

(5) air carriers, business aviation, and general aviation operators with operations at airports with air traffic control facilities described in subsection (d).

(f) REPORT.—Not later than 18 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that includes—

(1) a list of air traffic control facilities identified under subsection (d) as having miles-in-trail procedures or agreements that did not provide for a separation of aircraft traffic appropriate for operational safety; and

(2) steps that the Administrator has taken, or plans to take, to modify the miles-in-trail procedures or agreements at each facility listed under paragraph (1) to ensure such procedures or agreements provide for a separation of traffic that is appropriate for operational safety.

SEC. 127. CLOSURE OF HELICOPTER ROUTE 4.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Operations on Helicopter Route 4, as such Route existed on January 29, 2025, on the segment located between Hains Point and the Woodrow Wilson Memorial Bridge in the District of Columbia shall be prohibited.

(b) SEGMENT ELIMINATION.—The segment of Helicopter Route 4 described in subsection (a) shall remain eliminated from helicopter charts.

TITLE II—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MATTERS

SEC. 201. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MATTERS RELATING TO AVIATION SAFETY.

Title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after chapter 157 the following new chapter:

“CHAPTER 158—AVIATION SAFETY

“Sec.

“2655. Definitions.

“2656. Memorandum of agreement.

“2657. Required risk assessment and mitigation for special missions.

“2658. Manned rotary wing aviation safety management system.

“2659. Initial and recurring training on highly congested airspace.

“2660. Flight data monitoring improvements.

“2660a. Barometric altimeters.

“2660b. Transponder maintenance.

“2660c. Notifications and reports on certain near-miss events in National Capital Region.

“2660d. Reports on individuals designated for purposes of special mission exclusion.

“2660e. Rule of construction.

“§ 2655. Definitions

“In this chapter:

“(1) The term ‘ADS-B In’ means technology that receives and processes Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) transmissions that are broadcast in accordance with parts 91.225 and 91.227 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, and other aviation advisory information from ground stations, including Traffic Information Service-Broadcast (TIS-B) and Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Rebroadcast (ADS-R).

“(2) The term ‘ADS-B Out’ has the meaning given such term in part 91.227 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.

“(3) The term ‘air traffic control services’ means services used for the monitoring, directing, control, and guidance of aircraft or flows of aircraft and for the safe conduct of flight, including communications, navigation, and surveillance services and the provision of aeronautical information.

“(4) The term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means the congressional defense committees, the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate.

“(5) The term ‘Class B Mode C veil’ means any location described in part 91.225(d)(2) of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.

“(6) The term ‘collision prevention technology’ means technology that—

“(A) has ADS-B In;

“(B) uses ADS-B data; and

“(C) provides, and is configured to provide, alerting that is audible to the pilot and flight crew.

“(7) The term ‘Department of Defense aircraft’ means any aircraft, either manned or unmanned, that is owned, operated, or controlled by the Department of Defense or operated pursuant to a contract entered into by the Department of Defense.

“(8) The term ‘historical flight data’—

“(A) means data derived from Department of Defense or external sources regarding the actual flights taken by relevant Department of Defense aircraft, such as flight paths, altitudes, and other flight characteristics, that would provide a point of comparison to evaluate planned flights or review prior flights for adherence to published flight routes or flight plans; and

“(B) does not include notional data generated for planning or training purposes.

“(9) The term ‘manned rotary wing aviation safety management system’—

“(A) means training, policies and practices related to rotary wing aviation safety; and

“(B) does not refer to equipment installed or carried on aircraft for flight operations.

“(10) The term ‘National Capital Region’ means—

“(A) the geographic area located within the boundaries of—

“(i) the District of Columbia;

“(ii) Montgomery and Prince Georges Counties in the State of Maryland;

“(iii) Arlington, Fairfax, Loudoun, and Prince William Counties and the City of Alexandria in the Commonwealth of Virginia; and

“(iv) all cities and other units of government within the geographic areas described in clauses (i) through (iii); or

“(B) the geographic area prescribed for such region in the memorandum of agreement required by section 2656 of this title, except that such geographic area may not exceed the boundaries described in clauses (i) through (iv) of subparagraph (A).

“(11) The term ‘sensitive aircraft data’ means—

“(A) Department of Defense aircraft information relating to classified aircraft, aircraft involved in continuity of government operations or nuclear command and control, fighter aircraft, bomber aircraft, special mission aircraft, or unmanned aircraft systems; and

“(B) other information which, if publicly disclosed or aggregated, would reveal the capabilities of Department of Defense aircraft and could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to national security.

“(12) The term ‘special mission’—

“(A) means any mission of the Department of Defense relating to activities which, if publicly disclosed, could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to national security; and

“(B) does not include—

“(i) unclassified flights;

“(ii) flight crew proficiency flights; or

“(iii) the transportation of any Government official other than a head of an executive department (as such term is defined in section 101 of title 5), a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a commander of a combatant command, or any other individual designated by the President for purposes of this paragraph.

“(13) The term ‘special mission aircraft’ means a Department of Defense aircraft performing a special mission, either permanently or temporarily.

“(14) The term ‘unmanned aircraft system’ has the meaning given such term in section 44801 of title 49.

“§ 2656. Memorandum of agreement

“(a) MEMORANDUM REQUIRED.—(1) Not later than September 30, 2026, the Secretary of Transportation and the Secretary of Defense shall enter into, and jointly submit to the

appropriate congressional committees a copy of, a memorandum of agreement that—

“(A) provides that fighter aircraft, bomber aircraft, unmanned aircraft systems, and other special mission aircraft that are not equipped or not yet equipped with collision prevention technologies or ADS-B Out, or successor technologies, will be reasonably accommodated for safe operations in the national airspace system and provided with necessary air traffic control services; and

“(B) establishes policies governing the operation of collision prevention technologies and ADS-B Out, or successor technologies, including proper maintenance and routine verification practices for such systems, on Department of Defense aircraft, consistent with this chapter.

“(2) The Secretary of Transportation and the Secretary of Defense, or the designees thereof, shall consult not less frequently than semiannually on any appropriate updates to the memorandum required by this subsection to reflect safe, effective, and modern air traffic identification, air space management, and related equipment.

“(b) COLLISION AVOIDANCE MATTERS.—(1) The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the memorandum of agreement required by subsection (a) includes, at a minimum—

“(A) a requirement that, beginning on a date agreed to and set forth in such memorandum or the date that is one year after the date of the enactment of this section, whichever occurs first, the Secretary of a military department may not authorize any Department of Defense manned rotary wing aircraft to operate a mission in the National Capital Region unless such aircraft is actively transmitting an ADS-B Out broadcast, or successor technology, unless—

“(i) the Secretary of the military department, in coordination with the Secretary of Transportation, has conducted a safety risk assessment and implemented mitigations, as appropriate, to ensure safety in the National Capital Region; and

“(ii) such aircraft is carrying out a special mission;

“(B) procedures requiring the use of ADS-B Out as the default practice by Department of Defense manned rotary wing aircraft when operating in the national airspace system, unless such use would affect the operational security of Department of Defense aircraft or special missions;

“(C) consistent with section 2660b of this title, procedures for ensuring the correct configuration of ADS-B Out and other transponders, including routine intervals for verifying transponder settings and proper operation;

“(D) operational procedures to allow flight crews to enable ADS-B Out transmission while in flight in the national airspace system, including in response to air traffic or weather conditions; and

“(E) provisions to protect sensitive aircraft data from unnecessary disclosure, including by mitigating risks regarding the inadvertent disclosure of such data or information regarding special missions.

“(2)(A) The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that—

“(i) by not later than 180 days after the date on which the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation submit to the appropriate congressional committees a copy of the memorandum of agreement required by subsection (a), Department of Defense aircraft that are not fighter aircraft, bomber aircraft, unmanned aircraft systems, or other special mission aircraft, are equipped and operating with an integrated system, federated system, or standalone device that displays traffic information to the pilot and flight crew; and

“(ii) by not later than December 31, 2031, such Department of Defense aircraft are equipped and operating with an integrated collision prevention technology system.

“(B) In carrying out subparagraph (A), the Secretary of Defense shall take into consideration—

“(i) any need to protect the technology or systems described in such subparagraph against man-made electronic interference;

“(ii) appropriate mitigations to known security vulnerabilities associated with such technology or systems;

“(iii) appropriate safeguards for sensitive aircraft data, classified material, equipment, or special missions when aircraft described in such subparagraph are equipped and operating with collision prevention technology;

“(iv) updated guidance, tactics, techniques, procedures, or training with respect to electromagnetic emissions related to such technology and systems; and

“(v) placement in flight deck, field of view of pilots, and human factors, to ensure such technology is effective, may be readily used, and has minimal risk of unexpected detachment.

“(3) The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the Secretary of Transportation receives accurate information regarding the configurations recommended by each military department for each relevant aircraft type while such aircraft operate in the national airspace system.

“(4) In implementing the memorandum of agreement required by subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense, or the Secretary of a military department, may exempt from relevant portions of such memorandum an individual aircraft on a case-by-case basis if such Secretary determines that the aircraft—

“(A) is not airworthy, is otherwise unrepairable, or is not reasonably expected to return to service;

“(B) is an aircraft for which depot-level maintenance or a substantial overhaul of avionics-related equipment, including the installation of collision prevention technology, is scheduled to occur prior to December 31, 2030;

“(C) is scheduled to be retired from service prior to September 30, 2028; or

“(D) is an unpowered aircraft not suitable for collision prevention technology due to airframe limitations, including gliders used for pilot instruction.

“(c) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—The Secretary of Defense shall provide to the Secretary of Transportation notification of any aircraft the Secretary of Defense designates as a special mission aircraft operating within the United States (as such term is defined in section 1.1 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations), for purposes of this chapter. Such notification may identify such aircraft by type, model, series, or another means agreed to in the memorandum of agreement required by subsection (a).

“(d) COLLISION PREVENTION TECHNOLOGY EQUIPAGE.—In implementing a memorandum of agreement pursuant to this section or any other provision of law, to protect the operational security of Department of Defense aircraft, the Secretary of Defense shall retain the sole control over the determination of which specific collision prevention technology is appropriate for installation and operation in any such aircraft.

“§ 2657. Required risk assessment and mitigation for special missions

“(a) RISK ASSESSMENT.—The Secretary of each military department, in coordination with the Secretary of Transportation, shall conduct a risk assessment, and recommend and implement, as appropriate, mitigations as a result of such assessment, to ensure safety in the national airspace system for

each type of planned or anticipated special mission of a manned rotary wing aircraft of such military department that would involve operations occurring in whole or in part within a Class B Mode C veil airspace.

“(b) IMPLEMENTATION.—The requirement under subsection (a) shall be carried out in a manner mutually agreed to by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation in the memorandum of agreement required by section 2656 of this title.

“(c) INITIAL REPORT.—(1) Not later than one year after the date on which the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation submit to the appropriate congressional committees a copy of the memorandum of agreement required by section 2656 of this title, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the types of special mission activities assessed, and any mitigation recommended or implemented, pursuant to subsection (a). Such report shall include, for each month during the 12-month period preceding the date of the submission of the report, the actual number of special mission flights flown with ADS-B Out turned off, in whole or in part, within a Class B Mode C veil airspace, disaggregated by special mission activity.

“(2) The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

“(d) SUBSEQUENT REPORT.—(1) Not later than one year after the date of the submission of the report under subsection (c), the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report that includes, for each month during the 12-month period preceding the date of the submission of the report, the actual number of special mission flights that the Secretary of Defense has flown with ADS-B Out turned off, in whole or in part, within a Class B Mode C veil airspace, disaggregated by special mission activity.

“(2) The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

“§ 2658. Manned rotary wing aviation safety management system

“(a) REQUIREMENT.—The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that, by not later than March 1, 2027, the Secretary of each military department has established a robust manned rotary wing aviation safety management system, or updated an existing such system, to provide for—

“(1) responsibilities with respect to such system that are clearly delineated from other occupational safety responsibilities;

“(2) staffing and other resources required for the operation of such system; and

“(3) the implementation of such system in a manner that is functionally integrated with relevant units.

“(b) QUALIFICATION PROTECTIONS.—The Secretary shall ensure that the implementation of a manned rotary wing aviation safety management system required under subsection (a) does not preclude an individual assigned manned rotary wing aviation safety management system duties from maintaining appropriate qualifications, flying hours, professional military education, or other activities required for career advancement on the basis of being assigned such duties.

“(c) AVIATOR SURVEY.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary shall carry out a survey of rotary aircraft flight crews across the Department of Defense to identify operationally relevant and responsive flight safety reporting systems. Such survey shall include the collection of information regarding—

“(1) barriers to the use of such systems perceived by pilots;

“(2) responsive reporting methods for identifying and collecting important safety reporting;

“(3) systems for collecting relevant safety reporting that may be used in conjunction with historical flight data to provide insights that may be used in carrying out section 2660 of this title;

“(4) options for reporting safety incidents, including encounters with civil air traffic operating in the national airspace system, without retaliation, judgment, or undue consequence;

“(5) preserving reports of persistent issues with communications, either incoming or outgoing, with air traffic controllers or other aircraft in controlled airspace; and

“(6) integrating improved flight safety reporting into current operations.

“(d) REPORTS.—Not later than 90 days after the date on which the survey under subsection (c) is completed, and on a semi-annual basis thereafter until December 31, 2031, the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report containing—

“(1) an outline of the funding and personnel resources necessary to implement the requirements under subsection (a), and appropriate findings from the survey under subsection (c), with respect to each military department;

“(2) an outline of the safety functions, practices, training, and reporting required under each manned rotary wing aviation safety management system established or updated under subsection (a);

“(3) an assessment of which military department practices most closely align to the best practicable solutions identified pursuant to the findings from the survey under subsection (c);

“(4) a plan to implement the requirements under subsection (a) and appropriate findings from the survey under subsection (c); and

“(5) a plan to ensure active duty units and National Guard units receive the same benefits from an improved manned rotary wing aviation safety management system.

“(e) COMPTROLLER GENERAL REVIEW.—(1) The Comptroller General of the United States shall conduct a review of the efficacy of the manned rotary wing aviation safety management systems established or updated pursuant to subsection (a). Such review shall include—

“(A) an assessment of the extent to which the Secretary has implemented the requirements under subsection (a);

“(B) an assessment of the extent to which the Secretary has developed an approach to identify and mitigate any risks in implementing subsection (a); and

“(C) any other matters the Comptroller General determines are relevant.

“(2) Not later than September 1, 2027, the Comptroller General shall provide to the congressional defense committees a briefing on the preliminary findings of the review required under paragraph (1). The Comptroller General shall provide to such committees the final results of such review in a mutually agreed upon format and timeframe.

“§ 2659. Initial and recurring training on highly congested airspace

“(a) REQUIRED TRAINING.—The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that, by not later than March 1, 2027, flight crews for Department of Defense manned rotary wing aircraft operating in the national airspace system receive appropriate initial and recurring training regarding fixed-wing operations within Class B Mode C veil airspace routinely encountered in the course of operations from the assigned duty station of the flight crew. Such training shall include training on approach and departure paths, runway configurations, and

the interaction of those traffic flows with published helicopter routes.

“(b) USE OF HISTORICAL FLIGHT DATA.—In developing the training described in subsection (a), the Secretary shall consider historical flight data from Department of Defense manned rotary wing aircraft operating in the associated airspace.

“(c) REPORT.—Not later than March 1, 2027, the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report containing a description of how each military department has implemented the training requirements under subsection (a) and how the Secretary has ensured consistency with respect to such implementation across the military departments.

“§ 2660. Flight data monitoring improvements

“(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the date of enactment of this section, the Secretary of Defense shall develop and implement standards across the military departments to ensure that Department of Defense manned rotary wing aircraft operations in the national airspace system, and associated training, routes, and activities, are informed by accurate recorded flight data to—

- “(1) monitor operational patterns;
- “(2) identify operational safety risks; and
- “(3) support the development and implementation of effective risk controls for missions in the national airspace system.

“(b) DATA USE.—In carrying out subsection (a), the Secretary shall—

- “(1) seek to use—
 - “(A) existing data sets and tools to allow for convenient and expeditious use of such data at the lowest possible level; and
 - “(B) systems that allow for flight data to be evaluated for accuracy on a recurrent basis; and
- “(2) conduct a review, and establish procedures based on the results of such review, to ensure flight data is evaluated for accuracy at an appropriate organizational level and on a recurrent basis.

“(c) IMPLEMENTATION UPDATES.—The Secretary shall provide to the congressional defense committees updates on—

- “(1) the implementation of this section; and
- “(2) the incorporation of the standards developed and data collected pursuant to this section into the manned rotary wing aviation safety management systems required under section 2658 of this title.

“(d) DATA SHARING.—(1) The Secretary of Defense shall—

- “(A) conduct a review across the military departments to identify flight data that may be readily shared with the Secretary of Transportation; and
- “(B) implement a process to share safety data with the Secretary of Transportation.

“(2) To the extent the Secretary of Defense determines necessary, data shared pursuant to paragraph (1) may be de-identified.

“§ 2660a. Barometric altimeters

“(a) MANUALS.—The Secretary of Defense shall promptly update, and maintain, appropriate manuals of the Department of Defense for manned rotary wing aircraft, to provide clear guidance regarding—

- “(1) the expected standard margin of error for barometric altimeters for each class of such aircraft; and
- “(2) the total potential error resulting from additional aircraft equipment with respect to an otherwise airworthy barometric altimeter, including increased position error associated with external stores support system configurations.

“(b) INCORPORATION OF DATA.—In updating the manuals under subsection (a), the Secretary shall incorporate observations derived from external data sources, including histor-

ical flight data monitoring from external sources, to better understand the total potential error of barometric altimeters in various aircraft configurations.

“(c) TRAINING.—Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Secretary updates the manuals under subsection (a), the Secretary shall require appropriate refresher training for the crew of any aircraft subject to such an updated manual.

“§ 2660b. Transponder maintenance

“(a) REQUIRED INTERVALS.—The Secretary of each military department shall establish routine intervals for verifying the correct configuration and function of ADS-B Out transponders, and related equipment, for aircraft of such military department required to use such transponders. Such intervals may not be less frequent than once every 90 days.

“(b) REPORTS.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the submission of the budget of the President under section 1105(a) of title 31 for fiscal years 2028 through 2033, the Secretary of each military department shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report that details the following:

- “(1) Compliance across such military department with respect to the required maintenance intervals established under subsection (a).
- “(2) The total number of instances, disaggregated by military installation, in which an ADS-B Out transponder was not serviced in accordance with the applicable maintenance interval established under subsection (a).
- “(3) Any additional personnel, resources, or equipment required to simplify or otherwise improve maintenance requirements associated with carrying out this section.

“§ 2660c. Notifications and reports on certain near-miss events in National Capital Region

“(a) NOTIFICATIONS.—Not later than one week after the date on which a covered near-miss event occurs, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate a notification of such event.

“(b) ESTABLISHMENT OF ASSOCIATED DEFINITION.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary, in coordination with a working group determined appropriate by the Secretary, shall establish a definition of the term ‘close proximity encounter’ for purposes of this section.

“(c) REPORTS.—Not later than 180 days after the date on which the definition under subsection (b) is established, on a biannual basis thereafter for the following two-year period, and not less frequently than annually thereafter, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate a report containing, with respect to the period covered by the report—

- “(1) an identification of the number of covered near-miss events that occurred during such period;
- “(2) for each such event, an identification of any cause of such event;
- “(3) a description any modification to relevant standard operating procedures or other policies of the Department of Defense issued, or planned to be issued, to address such events; and
- “(4) a description of the status of implementation of any such modification.

“(d) COVERED NEAR-MISS EVENT DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘covered near-miss event’ means a close proximity encounter (as such term is defined pursuant to subsection (b)) that—

- “(1) involves at least one Department of Defense aircraft; and

“(2) occurs in the National Capital Region.

“§ 2660d. Reports on individuals designated for purposes of special mission exclusion

“(a) REPORTS.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this section, and on an annual basis thereafter, the President shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate a report containing, with respect to the preceding year—

- “(1) an identification of any individual designated by the President for purposes of section 2655(12)(B)(iii) of this title; and
- “(2) a description of how often individuals so designated were transported in connection with a mission that, but for such designation, would be considered a special mission.

“(b) FORM.—Each report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

“§ 2660e. Rule of construction

“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to—

- “(1) vest in the Secretary of Defense any authority of the Secretary of Transportation or the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration under title 49 or any other provision of law;
- “(2) vest in the Secretary of Transportation or the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration any authority of the Secretary of Defense under this title or any other provision of law;
- “(3) limit the authority or discretion of the Secretary of Transportation or the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration to operate air traffic control services to ensure the safe minimum separation of aircraft in flight and the efficient use of airspace;

“(4) apply a rule, guidance, plan, carriage requirement, or memorandum established, modified, or reissued pursuant to any other provision of law to any Department of Defense aircraft except through a process established in the memorandum of agreement required by section 2656 of this title; or

“(5) require a Department of Defense aircraft to compromise operational security during a combat operation.”

SEC. 202. REPEAL OF PRIOR PROVISION OF LAW ON MANNED ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT SAFETY.

Section 2654 of title 10, United States Code, is repealed.

SEC. 203. TREATMENT OF SUPERSEDED MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT AND PROVISION OF LAW.

Effective on the date on which the memorandum of agreement required by section 2656 of title 10, United States Code, as added by section 201 of this title, is submitted to the congressional defense committees, the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate, the following shall have no further force or effect:

(1) Section 1046 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115-232; 49 U.S.C. 40101 note).

(2) The memorandum of agreement between the Department of Defense and the Federal Aviation Administration entered into on May 10, 2024.

SEC. 204. REPORT ON COMMUNICATIONS DEGRADATION.

(a) REPORT.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report containing—

- (1) an assessment on the degradation of radio transmission or reception between Department of Defense aircraft and air traffic controllers or other aircraft operating in the national airspace system;

(2) an identification of factors that may contribute to such degradation; and

(3) an assessment of potential actions to remediate such degradation.

(b) PLAN.—Not later than 90 days after the date on which the Secretary submits to the congressional defense committees a copy of the memorandum under section 2656 of title 10, United States Code, as added by section 201 of this title, the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees a plan to leverage major avionics upgrades or depot-level maintenance associated with the installation or provision of collision prevention technology to upgrade communications systems in Department of Defense aircraft (particularly with respect to manned rotary wing aircraft), for the purpose of improving the clarity and reliability of transmissions to and from such aircraft.

(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section, the terms “collision prevention technology” and “Department of Defense aircraft” have the meanings given such terms in section 2655 of title 10, United States Code, as added by section 201 of this title.

SEC. 205. ANNUAL REPORT ON PROFICIENCY FLIGHTS IN NATIONAL CAPITOL REGION.

(a) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for each of the two subsequent years, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report on the number of Department of Defense proficiency flights that occurred in the National Capitol Region during the 12-month period preceding the date of the submission of the report.

(b) NATIONAL CAPITOL REGION.—In this section, the term “National Capitol Region” has the meaning given such term in section 2655(10) of title 10, United States Code, as added by section 201.

SEC. 206. BRIEFING ON VIRTUAL CONSTRUCTIVE TRAINING.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall provide to the congressional defense committees (as such term is defined in section 101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code) a briefing on the feasibility of using virtual constructive training to optimize the amount of in-air training used by the Armed Forces.

SEC. 207. TRANSPARENCY REGARDING MIDAIR COLLISION NEAR RONALD REAGAN WASHINGTON NATIONAL AIRPORT ON JANUARY 29, 2025.

(a) SUBMISSIONS TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Army shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate—

(1) a copy of the command investigation of the midair collision that occurred near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport on January 29, 2025, with redactions limited to those necessary to protect the privacy of the flight crew involved; and

(2) an implementation plan for the recommendations contained therein.

(b) INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE ARMY ASSESSMENT.—

(1) ASSESSMENT.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Army shall commence an assessment of the sufficiency of the recommendations and implementation plan specified in subsection (a)(2).

(2) REPORT.—Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Army shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate a report containing—

(A) the results of the assessment under paragraph (1); and

(B) any additional recommendations by the Inspector General relating to the matters so assessed, as applicable.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. GRAVES) and the gentleman from Washington (Mr. LARSEN) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Missouri.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. GRAVES. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material into the RECORD on H.R. 7613.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Missouri?

There was no objection.

Mr. GRAVES. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Madam Speaker, on January 29, 2025, tragedy struck just a few miles from where we stand today, when an Army Black Hawk helicopter collided with American Airlines Flight 5342 as it approached Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport. Sixty-seven people lost their lives that night, all of the passengers and all of the crew on both aircraft.

Accidents of this magnitude demand careful, deliberate, and thoughtful consideration. Aviation incidents are rarely the result of a single failure. They are usually complex, with multiple contributing factors. Therefore, it is essential that we understand all the facts before legislating.

That is why we have the National Transportation Safety Board. Their job is to conduct an independent investigation, leaving no stone unturned, establish findings, determine the probable cause and contributing factors, and issue evidence-based safety recommendations.

If we act without that complete picture, we risk misdiagnosis and Congress missing the mark. After the NTSB issued its final report on February 17, I joined Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Ranking Member RICK LARSEN, Armed Services Committee Chairman MIKE ROGERS, and Ranking Member ADAM SMITH to introduce the ALERT Act.

This is a bipartisan and comprehensive aviation safety reform bill. It addresses the probable cause, the contributing factors, and the NTSB's safety recommendations. In fact, the NTSB has stated that the bill that we are considering today addresses all 50 of the board's recommendations.

At its core, this legislation is about making our aviation system safer in a practical, straightforward, and meaningful way. It requires airliners to upgrade their collision avoidance technology by 2031 to a more advanced system, a system that is integrated, using ADS-B In, and that provides aural alerts with nearby traffic's clock position, relative altitude, range, and

vertical tendency, and incorporates directional traffic symbols on visual displays.

For other aircraft required to have ADS-B Out, the bill requires ADS-B In-based collision prevention technology by 2031.

Further, the bill permanently closes the route being flown by the helicopter in this accident, helicopter route 4 along on the Potomac River, and updates helicopter route design requirements. This was what the NTSB identified as the root cause of this tragedy.

It also takes a hard look at the FAA's safety culture by requiring an independent audit by the Inspector General.

In addition, the legislation improves how data is collected and shared within and between the FAA and the Pentagon, so we can identify risks earlier and act on them.

We did not put this bill together in a vacuum. We worked closely with the NTSB, with stakeholders, and with the victims' families to make sure we got this right.

To those families, especially those who are here with us today: I know this has not been an easy process by any stretch of the imagination, but your strong advocacy for safety is why we continue to push for America to still remain the gold standard in aviation.

This bill now has 87 cosponsors. Both the T&I and Armed Services Committees marked up their respective titles, and each passed those titles unanimously, a strong, bipartisan signal that Congress is united and serious about strengthening aviation safety. H.R. 7613, as amended, that we are considering on the floor today combines the work of both committees.

At its core, this is about doing our job: ensuring our aviation system is as safe as it can possibly be and taking meaningful steps to help prevent a tragedy like this from ever happening again.

Madam Speaker, I urge support for the ALERT Act, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. LARSEN of Washington. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Madam Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 7613, the Airspace Location and Enhanced Risk Transparency Act, or the ALERT Act, as amended, bipartisan legislation introduced by T&I Committee Chair SAM GRAVES, House Armed Services Committee Chair MIKE ROGERS, Ranking Member ADAM SMITH of the Armed Services Committee, and myself, as the ranking member of the T&I Committee.

This bill responds to all the probable causes of the tragic midair collision near Washington National Airport, DCA, on January 29, 2025.

On that evening, American Airlines Flight 5342 arriving to DCA from Wichita, Kansas, and an Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter flying a routine training mission collided above the Potomac River, resulting in 67 tragic

deaths, representing the deadliest U.S. aviation accident since 2001.

To the families and loved ones of those lost in this tragedy: You certainly have my deepest condolences. What you have gone through is unimaginable, and you have my sincere gratitude for your advocacy. Your tireless efforts to effect real change and improve aviation safety have made this bill better.

I also thank the chair of the NTSB, Chair Jennifer Homendy, her investigators, and the staff for their diligent work to uncover the cause and contributing factors of this accident, as well as their valuable input as our committee developed and refined this legislation.

After the accident, the NTSB was on the scene and initiated its thorough investigation into determining the probable cause, identifying factors and findings, and issuing recommendations to the appropriate Federal agencies.

The NTSB published its final report in February that contained the probable cause of the collision, its findings, and 50 new safety recommendations directed to the Department of Transportation and the Department of Defense. Today, we are considering legislation that responds to all the NTSB's safety recommendations.

The ALERT Act has been bipartisan from its inception and is the result of productive, good-faith collaboration between the T&I and Armed Services Committees and the impacted agencies. Since the D.C. midair tragedy involved both the FAA and the DOD, the solution has to involve both committees to make lasting changes.

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This bill we are considering today—as I like to call it, the ALERT Act version 7.0—looks vastly different from the legislation introduced in February, version 1.0.

It incorporates feedback from the families of the victims, the NTSB, and other stakeholders who have helped make the ALERT Act a truly comprehensive safety bill that works to address all 50 NTSB safety recommendations.

The legislation contains a sense of Congress and 23 provisions requiring the FAA and the DOT to act on safety recommendations issued in the NTSB's final report.

These provisions require ADS-B In and collision prevention technology on virtually all aircraft, enhance air traffic control training and traffic management procedures, modernize ATC facilities and technology, address deficiencies in DOT and FAA's safety culture, and strengthen the safety of the national airspace system and safety in the airspace around DCA.

A key provision of the ALERT Act is its equipage requirement for collision prevention technologies, including what we call ADS-B In.

The important thing to know about ADS-B In is it is only one part of a col-

lision prevention equation in the ALERT Act. While useful, ADS-B In must be paired with the right system in the cockpit—the right displays, the right audible alarms, the right software—to effectively increase a pilot's situational awareness.

As a result, the ALERT Act not only requires ADS-B In but also requires each aircraft to have collision prevention technology. For all mainline air carriers, this ADS-B In enabled ACAS Xa is what we call the next-generation collision avoidance system.

For everyone else who is currently required to have ADS-B Out, they will be required to have any of the ADS-B In-enabled collision prevention technologies that also meet a strict set of minimum requirements.

These ADS-B In capabilities, fed into the right collision prevention technologies, provide pilots with an unprecedented level of situational awareness and will increase the safety of the airspace across the country.

The time to act is now. House passage of the ALERT Act is the next step in delivering on Congress' safety commitment to the flying public and addressing all 50 NTSB recommendations.

Moreover, passage of the ALERT Act in the House will allow us to begin critical discussions with the Senate on a final legislative response to the DCA midair tragedy.

I urge all my colleagues to support the ALERT Act, as amended. I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GRAVES. Madam Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. ROGERS), the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.

Mr. ROGERS of Alabama. Madam Speaker, I thank the chairman for yielding.

Madam Speaker, I rise in strong support of the ALERT Act. This is critically needed legislation that will go a long way to improve aviation safety.

Last year's midair collision between an Army helicopter and a passenger jet on approach to Reagan National should have never happened.

The NTSB completed their investigation earlier this year, and their report included 13 recommendations to the Army and the Pentagon to ensure another tragedy like this doesn't happen again. Title II of the ALERT Act carries out all 13 of those recommendations.

In fact, the NTSB states that this bill not only meets their recommendations but in most cases exceeds them. For instance, the NTSB made several recommendations to the Army to improve its training and safety management system. The ALERT Act requires all military services to make these safety modifications, not just the Army.

The ALERT Act also addresses concerns raised by the Department of War with the bill as it passed the Senate. The bill before us ensures our bombers, fighters, and other classified aircraft

can continue to execute their critical national security missions without revealing their location to our enemies.

We ultimately got a product that improves aviation safety without undermining our national security. This is a strong bipartisan bill that passed the Armed Services Committee by a vote of 53-0.

I thank the NTSB and the Pentagon for working with us throughout this process. I also thank Chairman GRAVES and Ranking Members LARSEN and SMITH, as well as our staff on both committees for their hard work.

Finally, I express my deepest condolences to the families, friends, and loved ones of those who lost their lives in this terrible accident. I thank the PAT 25 and the Flight 5342 families for their tireless efforts to ensure a tragedy like this never occurs again.

Mr. LARSEN of Washington. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. CARSON).

Mr. CARSON. Madam Speaker, I thank Chairman GRAVES, my friend Ranking Member LARSEN, and the wonderful staff for their leadership and their partnership, which has allowed our committee to mark up our bill, the ALERT Act, and bring it to the floor today.

The Transportation and Infrastructure Committee worked together in a bipartisan way with our Armed Services Committee colleagues to collaborate and produce a comprehensive bill that addresses and implements all of NTSB's 50 recommendations in the DCA collision report, not just a few.

The terrible midair collision at DCA on January 29 last year still haunts all of us. I also want to take a moment to recognize the family members who lost their loved ones. I continue to mourn the loss of the 67 people who died that day, including Asra Hussain from Carmel, Indiana.

Family members have turned their pain into great power and advocacy, and they have helped us to keep working on a bill that is comprehensive and will make long overdue changes to improve safety.

Today's bill will save lives, and it addresses all of NTSB's recommendations to fix problems that have been ignored for far too long. It requires ADS-B In and collision prevention technology with a hard deadline. It enhances air traffic control training and procedures, including time-on position limits. It modernizes ATC facilities and technology. It addresses deficiencies in the safety cultures at DOT, FAA, and DOD. It strengthens the traffic management and safety of the national airspace and the DCA area, including assessing volume, aircraft arrival rates, and regular review of helicopter routes in the area.

Madam Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues to join us in passing this remarkable bill that we have all worked so hard to improve and to bring to a vote. I would also like to thank the Subcommittee on Aviation staff, both Democratic and Republican, for their

hard work, late nights, and long week-ends to help us bring this to the floor today. Let's pass this bill.

Mr. GRAVES. Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. BARRETT).

Mr. BARRETT. Madam Speaker, I thank the chairman and the ranking member, as well.

I rise today in support of the ALERT Act, the bill before us today. This bill will strengthen aviation safety and includes key provisions from several of my bills focused on the ADS-B signaling system, technology that could have prevented the deadly collision between the commercial airline flight and a military helicopter over the Potomac River last January, which claimed the lives of 67 individuals.

This tragedy was a breakdown across multiple different systems. For example, the commercial aircraft was transmitting ADS-B Out, signaling their position to other aircraft, but it lacked ADS-B In, the ability to see what was going on around them. The helicopter, the Army Black Hawk, had ADS-B In but was not transmitting ADS-B Out to alert others of their position. The American Airlines flight had TCAS, the collision avoidance system that sends an alert to pilots in the cockpit, but the helicopter did not.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. GRAVES. Madam Speaker, I yield an additional 10 seconds to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. BARRETT. Madam Speaker, I am grateful to Chairman GRAVES and Chairman ROGERS, as well as the entire Armed Services Committee and Transportation and Infrastructure Committee for addressing these gaps, including provisions from my Safety in Shared Skies Act, Military ADS-B Out Loophole Act, and Next-Gen Collision Avoidance Assistance Act.

We are making real progress with these provisions today to improve safety and accountability across the airspace. I urge my colleagues to support this legislation, and we give our prayers to the families.

Mr. LARSEN of Washington. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Oregon (Ms. HOYLE).

Ms. HOYLE of Oregon. Madam Speaker, I rise in support of the ALERT Act, and I thank Chairman GRAVES, Ranking Member LARSEN, Air Line Pilots Association, International, the Association of Flight Attendants, Jennifer Homendy and the NTSB staff, T&I members, and mostly the families who put such passion and advocacy into getting this bill right.

It was not easy, but it is so very important that we made progress to align the bill with the NTSB's recommendation. Again, I just acknowledge that without the family members advocating on behalf of the loved ones they lost on January 29, we wouldn't be here today.

□ 1650

They should not have to keep coming back into this room. They should not

have to listen to Member after Member say what everyone knows, that this was preventable.

The NTSB found that the ADS-B In system could have provided up to 59 seconds of warning. That is what makes it so hard to hear that the Board has been ambiguous about this. It has been recommending this kind of requirement for years, 17 times since 2006.

The requirements here should be clear: ensure all aircraft equipped with ADS-B Out carry ADS-B In with cockpit display of traffic information, and ensure that happens on a firm, enforceable timeline without any carve-outs. We should write that into law and not leave it to some later process, delay, or direction.

Members on both sides of the aisle recognize we have a duty to all Americans to put aside our differences and keep them safe. That means the House and Senate need to work together to enact the strongest possible safety requirements. This bill is an important step, and I want to acknowledge how hard everyone worked to get here. Again, it wasn't easy, and everyone worked to get us to where we are.

Madam Speaker, we owe it to every victim, every family, and the American people to finish that work so these families don't have to keep coming back.

Mr. GRAVES. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. OBERNOLTE).

Mr. OBERNOLTE. Madam Speaker, I rise in strong support of the ALERT Act. The collision last year at DCA was a terrible tragedy, and like most aviation tragedies, it was 100 percent preventable.

The NTSB earlier this year released a comprehensive report analyzing the accident. What it discovered, like most aviation accidents, is that there was a whole chain of events that occurred. Any one of those links could have been interrupted and prevented the accident.

The NTSB made a number of different recommendations on what can be done to improve the situation, and this bill implements those recommendations. This is far beyond just the paths that helicopters and aircraft take, which need to be separated. It goes to things like the staffing of air traffic control towers, the technology behind collision avoidance systems, military training routes and the ways that those are communicated, and a host of different things that, implemented together, will ensure that these types of accidents do not happen in the future.

Madam Speaker, I am so proud to be a cosponsor of this bill. I thank my friend and fellow pilot, Chairman GRAVES, for his tireless advocacy in seeing this through to fruition. I urge my colleagues to support this bill.

Mr. LARSEN of Washington. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. BEYER).

Mr. BEYER. Madam Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 7613, the ALERT Act. I thank the committees of jurisdiction for their tireless work on this bill and for adopting significant feedback from the stakeholders, including the families of Flight 5342 and the National Transportation Safety Board.

I extend a personal thank-you to Ranking Member LARSEN for his collaboration and support. He and his team have been wonderful to work with through a difficult process.

This bill provides a meaningful and comprehensive response to last year's January 29 collision at the National Airport, which tragically took 67 lives. We must do everything we can to keep this tragedy from happening again.

This bill would implement all 50 recommendations from the NTSB's final report on the collision. It would reevaluate the arrival rate at National Airport, which is too high. It would establish a time-based flow management system to make our air traffic controllers' workload more manageable.

This bill would reevaluate our air traffic control tower facility level to hopefully bring more resources and staffing to the tower.

This bill would improve our helicopter route charts and aims to put guardrails on military helicopter flights in this very congested region.

This bill is an incredible step forward for National Airport, for our region, and for our country, and I hope to see it passed this evening.

However, the ALERT Act is not perfect. It includes ADS-B carve-outs for some general aviation aircraft, and there are still concerns about military helicopter flights in this region not being adequately addressed.

The families of Flight 5342 still have legitimate concerns and put out a statement today on their hopes for improvements to the bill in the Senate before it becomes law, which I support.

I am disappointed to see the ROTOR Act, which had strong ADS-B requirements, fail on the House floor earlier this year.

Madam Speaker, our goal is to adopt the strongest aviation requirements possible. I firmly believe that the ALERT Act accomplishes much of this goal, but that we can and should make this bill stronger.

I look forward to voting in support of the ALERT Act today, as I did with the ROTOR Act earlier this year, with the understanding that more work is needed.

Madam Speaker, as this bill advances, I urge my colleagues in the committees of jurisdiction to make improvements, to close any loopholes, and to prioritize safety for all over the convenience of a few. I thank the committee leaders for their work on this bill.

Mr. GRAVES. Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. BRESNAHAN).

Mr. BRESNAHAN. Madam Speaker, I rise today encouraged by the progress

we are making in delivering an aviation safety package that makes our skies safer.

I appreciate the hard work we did as a committee to get this bill to the floor today. After what I anticipate will be a strong bipartisan passage on the floor this evening, we must continue working with our Senate counterparts to create a final package.

This is an opportunity that we cannot afford to miss because it is not just about policy being at stake. It is people's lives.

I strongly believe that any final bill we send to the President's desk must include requirements for ADS-B In. As a pilot myself, I rely on ADS-B every time I fly. It helps me see traffic, avoid conflicts, and, frankly, helps keep me alive.

ADS-B provides real-time situational awareness, giving pilots visual and audible alerts about nearby aircraft and their position, speed, direction, and altitude. That early warning allows pilots to take action and prevent a collision. This is not new technology. It is widely available and already being used to train the next generation of pilots.

Madam Speaker, we also have to remember why we are here today. The families across the country, including those impacted by Flight 5342 and the tragedy, are counting on us to do everything we can to prevent something like this from ever happening again. We owe it to them and to the American people to pass a bill that delivers the highest level of safety possible while flying.

Mr. LARSEN of Washington. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. SUBRAMANYAM).

Mr. SUBRAMANYAM. Madam Speaker, I rise in support of the ALERT Act as well. I am proud to be a cosponsor of this bill.

A big reason why we are here is that, on January 29, 2025, a U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopter and American Airlines Flight 5342 collided in midair outside of DCA. Sixty-seven lives were lost, many of them parents and children from my community in Virginia.

After the crash, many of us said that we would do all we can do to prevent such a tragedy from ever happening again. The ALERT Act is part of the solution.

The bill addresses all 50 of the safety recommendations by the NTSB following their investigation into this crash. We need to address them all because it wasn't just one issue that led to this tragedy. It was a combination of systemic problems that made our national airspace unsafe.

I want to stress that there is more work to do. First, we must ensure there are no delays in implementing collision-prevention technology for every type of aircraft. We must also ensure that exemptions from new safety equipment requirements are granted only when absolutely necessary.

Finally, the ROTOR Act is a part of the solution, too. It passed the Senate resoundingly and has the support of families, and it even went through this body, where the majority supported it.

We must restore trust in our airspace and make sure nothing like this ever happens again.

Madam Speaker, I really want to thank the families and loved ones of Flight 5342. Without their advocacy and persistence, neither the ALERT Act nor the ROTOR Act would have made it this far. I look forward to continuing our work with them.

Madam Speaker, I thank the ranking member as well as the committee for all of their hard work on this bill. I ask my colleagues to join me in supporting this bill.

Mr. GRAVES. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. MANN).

□ 1700

Mr. MANN. Madam Speaker, I rise today in strong support of the ALERT Act, which I am proud to cosponsor.

For Kansans, this bill is deeply personal.

On January 29, 2025, the world stood in disbelief as we watched tragedy unfold over the Potomac River in the collision between American Airlines Flight 5342 out of Wichita and the U.S. Army helicopter. Kansans will never forget the lives lost, the families forever changed, or the grief felt across Wichita and communities across our State.

What happened on that day demands a serious and thoughtful response from Congress to ensure that this tragedy is never repeated. We owe it to the families and to every American who steps onto a plane to make sure our national airspace is as safe as it possibly can be.

That is exactly why we must pass the ALERT Act.

This is the most significant, comprehensive reform to aviation safety in years. It reflects serious, bipartisan work to strengthen our aviation system, improve accountability, and ensure safety remains the top priority in our airspace, which is demonstrated by the fact that the legislation passed out of both the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee and the Armed Services Committee unanimously.

The ALERT Act addresses all 50 safety recommendations from the NTSB and takes meaningful steps to improve transparency, coordination, training, and oversight. It strengthens pilot and air traffic control awareness through modern technology, requires advanced collision avoidance systems on aircrafts, improves helicopter route safety, and enhances air traffic control procedures.

Meaningful, lasting improvements to the safety of our airspace require Congress to work closely with victims' families, the aviation industry, and the administration, and the ALERT Act does just that. Congress must enact solutions to address the root causes that stand the test of time.

Kansas is home to the Air Capital of the World, and aviation is not just part of our economy. It is part of who we are. We will never forget what happened on January 29, and I am committed to ensuring that it will never happen again.

Mr. LARSEN of Washington. Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, we must do everything that we can to prevent another midair collision and to improve aviation safety. That is why I support H.R. 7613, as amended, and urge my colleagues to do the same.

Madam Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. GRAVES. Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, in closing, I thank Ranking Member LARSEN, Chairman ROGERS, and Ranking Member SMITH for their work on this critical piece of aviation safety legislation.

I also thank the staff on both the T&I and Armed Services Committees that worked tirelessly on this bill to make sure that we got it right. Specifically, I thank my front office staff, T&I Majority Staff Director Nick Christensen; Deputy Staff Director Abby Wenk; General Counsel Meghan Holland, as well as my subcommittee staff, former Aviation Subcommittee Staff Director Julie Devine, who has departed Congress after a decade of service; and Joseph Schmoll, Will Moore, and Archie Miller.

We needed to get this right. The American people and the flying public count on us to ensure that the National Airspace System, or the NAS, is the safest system in the world. I am proud to say that NTSB has confirmed that the ALERT Act, as amended, addresses all 50 recommendations issued by the National Transportation Safety Board.

On the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, aviation safety remains our highest priority, and this bill upholds that commitment. We will continue to work with our colleagues in the Senate and ensure that we are sending a comprehensive safety bill to the President, and anything short of that would be a disservice to the flying public. I ask my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to come together and support this critical piece of safety legislation.

Madam Speaker, I urge support of the bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. GRAVES) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 7613, as amended.

The question was taken.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds being in the affirmative, the yeas have it.

Mr. GRAVES. Madam Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this motion will be postponed.

RECESS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 12(a) of rule I, the Chair declares the House in recess until approximately 6:30 p.m. today.

Accordingly (at 5 o'clock and 4 minutes p.m.), the House stood in recess.

□ 1830

AFTER RECESS

The recess having expired, the House was called to order by the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. NEWHOUSE) at 6 o'clock and 30 minutes p.m.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Proceedings will resume on questions previously postponed.

Votes will be taken in the following order:

Motions to suspend the rules and pass:

- H.R. 1011; and
- H.R. 7613.

The first electronic vote will be conducted as a 15-minute vote. Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XX, the remaining electronic vote will be conducted as a 5-minute vote.

EMERGENCY CONSERVATION PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 2025

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, the unfinished business is the vote on the motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 1011) to amend the Agricultural Credit Act of 1978 to remove barriers to agricultural producers in accessing funds to carry out emergency measures under the emergency conservation program, and for other purposes on which the yeas and nays were ordered.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. THOMPSON) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 395, nays 10, not voting 26, as follows:

[Roll No. 109]

YEAS—395

Adams	Baird	Bera
Aderholt	Balderson	Bergman
Aguilar	Balint	Beyer
Alford	Barr	Bice
Allen	Barragán	Biggs (AZ)
Amo	Barrett	Biggs (SC)
Amodoi (NV)	Baumgartner	Bilirakis
Ansari	Bean (FL)	Bishop
Auchincloss	Begich	Boehert
Babin	Bell	Bonamici
Bacon	Bentz	Bost

Boyle (PA)	Gill (TX)	McBride
Brecheen	Gillen	McClain
Bresnahan	Jimenez	McClain Delaney
Brown	Golden (ME)	McClellan
Brownley	Goldman (TX)	McClintock
Budzinski	Gomez	McCollum
Carson	Gonzalez, V.	McCormick
Calvert	Gooden	McDonald Rivet
Cammack	Goodlander	McDowell
Carbajal	Gosar	McGarvey
Carey	Gottheimer	McGovern
Carter	Graves	McGuire
Carter (GA)	Green, Al (TX)	McIver
Carter (LA)	Griffith	Meeks
Carter (TX)	Grijalva	Menefee
Case	Guest	Menendez
Casten	Guthrie	Meng
Castor (FL)	Hageman	Messmer
Castro (TX)	Hamadeh (AZ)	Meuser
Cherfilus-	Harder (CA)	Miller (IL)
McCormick	Haridopolos	Miller (OH)
Chu	Harrigan	Miller (WV)
Ciscomani	Harris (MD)	Miller-Meeks
Cisneros	Harris (NC)	Mills
Clark (MA)	Hayes	Min
Clarke (NY)	Hern (OK)	Moolenaar
Cleaver	Hill (AR)	Moore (NC)
Cline	Himes	Moore (UT)
Cloud	Hinson	Moore (WI)
Clyburn	Horsford	Moore (WV)
Clyde	Houchin	Moran
Cohen	Houlahan	Morelle
Cole	Hoyer	Morrison
Collins	Hoyle (OR)	Moskowitz
Conaway	Hudson	Moulton
Correa	Huffman	Mrvan
Costa	Huizenga	Mullin
Courtney	Hunt	Murphy
Craig	Hurd (CO)	Nadler
Crane	Issa	Neal
Crank	Ivey	Neguse
Crenshaw	Jack	Nehls
Crockett	Jackson (IL)	Newhouse
Crow	Jackson (TX)	Norcross
Cuellar	Jacobs	Nunn (IA)
Davids (KS)	James	Obermoite
Davis (IL)	Jayapal	Ocasio-Cortez
Davis (NC)	Jeffries	Ogles
De La Cruz	Johnson (GA)	Olzewski
Dean (PA)	Johnson (LA)	Omar
DeGette	Johnson (TX)	Onder
DeLauro	Jordan	Owens
DelBene	Joyce (OH)	Pallone
Deluzio	Joyce (PA)	Palmer
DeSaulnier	Kamlager-Dove	Panetta
Dexter	Kaptur	Pappas
Diaz-Balart	Keating	Patronis
Dingell	Kelly (IL)	Pelosi
Doggett	Kelly (MS)	Perez
Donalds	Kelly (PA)	Peters
Downing	Kennedy (NY)	Pfluger
Dunn (FL)	Kennedy (UT)	Pingree
Edwards	Khanna	Pocan
Elfreth	Kiggans (VA)	Pou
Ellzey	Kiley (CA)	Pressley
Emmer	Kim	Quigley
Escobar	Knott	Ramirez
Españat	Krishnamoorthi	Randall
Estes	Kustoff	Raskin
Evans (CO)	LaHood	Reschenthaler
Evans (PA)	LaLota	Riley (NY)
Ezell	Landsman	Rivas
Fallon	Langworthy	Rogers (AL)
Fedorchak	Larsen (WA)	Rogers (KY)
Feenstra	Larson (CT)	Ross
Fields	Latimer	Rouzer
Figures	Latta	Ruiz
Fine	Lawler	Rulli
Finstad	Lee (FL)	Rutherford
Fischbach	Lee (NV)	Ryan
Fitzgerald	Lee (PA)	Salazar
Fitzpatrick	Leger Fernandez	Salinas
Fleischmann	Letlow	Sánchez
Flood	Levin	Scalise
Fong	Liccardo	Scanlon
Foster	Lieu	Schakowsky
Foushee	Lofgren	Schmidt
Foxx	Loudermilk	Schneider
Frankel, Lois	Lucas	Schrier
Franklin, Scott	Luna	Schweikert
Friedman	Luttrell	Scott (VA)
Frost	Lynch	Scott, Austin
Fry	Mackenzie	Scott, David
Fulcher	Magaziner	Sessions
Garamendi	Malliotakis	Sewell
Garbarino	Maloy	Sherman
Garcia (CA)	Mann	Shreve
García (IL)	Mast	Simon
Garcia (TX)	Matsui	Simpson

Smith (MO)	Thompson (CA)	Vindman
Smith (NE)	Thompson (MS)	Wagner
Smith (NJ)	Thompson (PA)	Walberg
Smith (WA)	Tiffany	Walkinshaw
Smucker	Timmons	Wasserman
Sorensen	Titus	Schultz
Soto	Tlaib	Waters
Stansbury	Tokuda	Watson Coleman
Stanton	Tonko	Weber (TX)
Stauber	Torres (CA)	Webster (FL)
Stefanik	Torres (NY)	Westerman
Steil	Trahan	Whitesides
Steube	Tran	Wied
Stevens	Turner (OH)	Williams (GA)
Strickland	Underwood	Williams (TX)
Strong	Valadao	Wilson (FL)
Stutzman	Van Drew	Wilson (SC)
Subramanyam	Van Duyne	Wittman
Suozy	Van Epps	Womack
Sykes	Van Orden	Yakym
Takano	Vasquez	Zinke
Taylor	Veasey	
Tenney	Velázquez	

NAYS—10

Arrington	Harshbarger	Roy
Burchett	Massie	Spartz
Burlison	Norman	
Grothman	Perry	

NOT VOTING—26

Beatty	Gonzales, Tony	Mfume
Buchanan	Gray	Moore (AL)
Casar	Higgins (LA)	Petterson
Comer	Johnson (SD)	Rose
Crawford	Kean	Scholten
Davidson	Mace	Self
DesJarlais	Mannion	Thanedar
Fletcher	McBath	Vargas
Goldman (NY)	McCaul	

□ 1859

Messrs. NORMAN, GROTHMAN, and BURCHETT changed their vote from “yea” to “nay.”

So (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill was passed.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE CLERK OF THE HOUSE

The SPEAKER laid before the House the following communication from the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

OFFICE OF THE CLERK,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, DC, April 9, 2026.

Hon. MIKE JOHNSON,
Speaker, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a letter received from Mr. J. Blake Evans, Elections Director, with the Georgia Office of the Secretary of State indicating that, according to the unofficial results for the Special General Election held on April 7, 2026, the Honorable Clay Fuller was elected Representative to Congress for the Fourteenth Congressional District of Georgia.

With best wishes, I am,

Sincerely,
KEVIN F. MCCUMBER,
Clerk.

Enclosure.

STATE OF GEORGIA,
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE,
Atlanta, GA, April 9, 2026.

Hon. KEVIN F. MCCUMBER,
Clerk, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. MCCUMBER: This is to advise you that the unofficial results of the Special Runoff Election held on Tuesday, April 7,