

In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant information is still available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the notifications that have been received. If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such an annex is available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations Committee, room SD-423.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEFENSE SECURITY
COOPERATION AGENCY,
Washington, DC.

Hon. MIKE JOHNSON,
Speaker of the House,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 25-95, concerning the Navy's proposed Letter(s) of Offer and Acceptance to the Government of the United Kingdom for defense articles and services estimated to cost \$200 million. We will issue a news release to notify the public of this proposed sale upon delivery of this letter to your office.

Sincerely,

MARY BETH MORGAN,
(for Michael F. Miller, Director).

Enclosures.

DEFENSE SECURITY
COOPERATION AGENCY,
Washington, DC.

Hon. JAMES E. RISCH,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

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Enclosures.

DEFENSE SECURITY
COOPERATION AGENCY,
Washington, DC.

Hon. BRIAN MAST,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 25-95, concerning the Navy's proposed Letter(s) of Offer and Acceptance to the Government of the United Kingdom for defense articles and services estimated to cost \$200 million. We will issue a news release to notify the public of this proposed sale upon delivery of this letter to your office.

Sincerely,

MARY BETH MORGAN,
(for Michael F. Miller, Director).

Enclosures.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 25-95

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of the United Kingdom.

(ii) Total Estimated Value:

Major Defense Equipment* \$75 million.

Other \$125 million.

Total \$200 million.

(iii) Description and Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase: Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case UK-P-LYN was below the congressional notification threshold at \$41.02 million (\$14.63 million in MDE) and included two (2) Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Navy Multiband Terminals (NMT), as well as non-MDE KGV-136R COMSEC devices and other communications equipment. The Government of the United Kingdom has requested that the case be amended to include an additional six (6) AEHF NMTs. This amendment will cause the case to exceed the notification threshold, and thus notification of the entire program is required. The above notification requirements are combined as follows:

Major Defense Equipment (MDE):

Eight (8) Advanced Extremely High Frequency Navy Multiband Terminals.

Non-Major Defense Equipment: The following non-MDE items will also be included: KGV-136R communications security devices; communications equipment; submarine high data rate masts; ancillary equipment; containers; integration and test support; spare and repair parts; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

(iv) Military Department: Navy (UK-P-LYN).

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: None.

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None known at this time.

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: November 24, 2025.

*As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

United Kingdom—Navy Multiband Terminals

The Government of the United Kingdom has requested to buy an additional six (6) Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Navy Multiband Terminals (NMT) that will be added to a previously implemented case whose value was under the congressional notification threshold. The original Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case, valued at \$41.02 million (\$14.63 million in MDE), included two (2) AEHF NMTs. This notification is for a combined total of eight (8) AEHF NMTs. The following non-MDE items will also be included: KGV-136R communications security devices; communications equipment; submarine high data rate masts; ancillary equipment; containers; integration and test support; spare and repair parts; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is \$200 million.

This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States by improving the security of a key NATO Ally that is an important force for political stability and economic progress in Europe.

The proposed sale will improve the United Kingdom's capability to meet current and future threats by ensuring communications interoperability. The United Kingdom will have no difficulty absorbing these articles and services into its armed forces. The UK Royal Navy will install the NMT system aboard Dreadnought submarines to enable

AEHF satellite communications to Royal Navy and Minister of Defence shore sites, ships, and submarines in a non-contested threat environment.

The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The principal contractor will be RTX Corporation, located in Arlington, VA. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to the United Kingdom.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

TRANSMITTAL NO 25-95

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act

Annex Item No. vii

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:

1. The Advanced Extremely High Frequency Navy Multiband Terminal (AEHF NMT) is the next generation of maritime military satellite communications (SATCOM) terminal for the Navy and its coalition partners. The Navy uses it for accessing protected and survivable SATCOM over the AEHF SATCOM constellation. In addition, NMT provides access to wideband communications through the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) and Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) constellations. The NMT is interoperable with the current and legacy service SATCOM terminals, including the family of advanced beyond-line-of-sight terminals, secure mobile anti-jam reliable tactical terminals, and follow-on terminals. The NMT provides communications interoperability for at-sea assets in non-contested threat environments. The system includes AEHF communications security KGV-136R National Security Agency Type 1 releasable controlled cryptographic items, enabling secure anti-jam communications.

2. The highest level of classification of defense articles, components, and services included in this potential sale is SECRET.

3. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the information could be used to develop countermeasures that might reduce system effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or advanced capabilities.

4. A determination has been made that the United Kingdom can provide substantially the same degree of protection for the sensitive technology being released as the U.S. Government. This sale is necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined in the Policy Justification.

5. All defense articles and services listed in this transmittal have been authorized for release and export to the Government of the United Kingdom.

PALESTINE

Mr. WELCH. Mr. President, for those of us who have long supported U.S. diplomatic leadership in pursuit of a secure, democratic Israel alongside a demilitarized, independent Palestinian state, the protection of due process and the rule of law has central importance.

Equal access to justice is essential for lasting peace in the Middle East. Today, I voice a concern shared by many of my colleagues: the incarceration, prosecution, and punishment of Palestinian children in the Israeli military justice system.

As a former public defender and member of the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on the Constitution, which has jurisdiction over human rights, I have a perspective on the way justice systems should treat children. To put it categorically, civilians, and especially children, should not be prosecuted in military courts. It is analogous to how I feel about child soldiers; children should not be recruited or allowed to serve in the armed forces.

The reasons should be obvious. Civilians are, by definition, noncombatants. Military justice systems lack independence and routinely fall short in providing the fundamental protections of due process and a fair trial that exist in the civilian justice system and which are rooted in international law.

Israel, however, automatically and systematically prosecutes Palestinian civilians in the West Bank in Israeli military courts under Israeli military law. These courts lack impartiality and transparency, as military court judges and military court prosecutors are active or reserve duty officers in the Israeli military and subject to the chain of command.

To make the process even less credible, in the West Bank Israeli military law only applies to the Palestinian population, while Israeli citizens have the benefit of the protections of Israeli civil law and courts. This double standard is glaringly inconsistent with the principle of equal justice that is foundational to a democracy.

According to numerous credible reports, Palestinian children are frequently arrested in their homes by heavily armed Israeli soldiers. They are bound, blindfolded, and often beaten in military vehicles during transport before arriving at an Israeli police station for interrogation, which is often located in an Israeli settlement. They are routinely interrogated alone without the presence of a family member or attorney and often threatened with physical violence if they don't confess.

Nearly half of the approximately 350 Palestinian children currently detained by Israel are in administrative detention. Most have not been formally charged or brought to trial. When they are charged in military courts, they are overwhelmingly accused of throwing rocks. Rarely are they accused of causing injury or significant property damage. Generally, there is no evidence-gathering process by Israeli authorities for children who are charged in the military courts, so the crux of the case is the child's confession or a signature on a document in Hebrew they don't understand. There can also be an affidavit from an arresting soldier or intelligence officer or an in-

criminating statement made against the child by another child who was also arrested and accused in connection with the same alleged incident.

Only a small percentage of Palestinian children in the military courts are released on bail. Custodial pre-trial—and often pre-charge—detention is the norm. Almost all prosecutions of children in military courts are resolved with plea agreements, which are the fastest way for a Palestinian child to be released from detention. Entering a not guilty plea is rare, and contesting a charge in the military courts means legal proceedings can be long and drawn out. To put it bluntly, punishment, not justice, is the goal of the military courts. The system is stacked unfairly against the child defendant, whose family is not even allowed to be present during court hearings, so irrespective of the facts or the reliability of the confession, pleading guilty in return for the shortest time in jail—which can still mean weeks or months or even years—is the norm.

I think of Mohammed Ibrahim, a Palestinian American who was detained for nearly 10 months after being arrested at the age of 15 in his home at 3 in the morning by heavily armed Israeli soldiers. He described being bound and beaten while being transported and threatened while being interrogated without the presence of a family member or an attorney. U.S. Embassy officials who visited him most recently in November described obvious deterioration in his mental and physical condition.

Mohammed's case fits the pattern, except that he is an American citizen. Putting aside that his confession may have been coerced, even if everything he was accused of—throwing stones that caused no harm—were true, it is unconscionable that he was abused and detained for months. He was deprived of adequate food and reportedly lost a third of his body weight. Senator VAN HOLLEN, I, and other Members of Congress repeatedly raised concerns about him, and thankfully, on Thanksgiving Day, he was released. It is now the Israeli Government's obligation to hold accountable the soldiers who beat him and the jailers who mistreated him.

Israeli authorities have defended this inherently flawed and discriminatory system as a necessary response to an ongoing state of hostilities. There are at least three problems with that argument:

First, these are children. Children do not belong in military detention or military courts, and the fact that they are caught in the middle of a decades-long conflict doesn't change that. A child does not become an armed combatant deserving of prosecution and punishment in the military justice system because of throwing a stone that causes no injury. Yet that is the reality for Palestinian children in the West Bank.

Second, administrative detention, compounded by physical and psycho-

logical abuse and humiliation of Palestinian detainees and the lack of due process that is endemic in the military justice system, have long-lasting impacts on a child. They have difficulty re-entering and continuing school, face increased restriction on freedom of movement, disruptions to family life, behavior and mental health issues, and it fuels resentment and hatred.

And third, Israeli settlers routinely and increasingly engage in provocations, threats, and violence—sometimes deadly violence—against Palestinians with impunity. These attacks and gratuitous destruction and theft of Palestinian property are often observed and tolerated by IDF soldiers. This too fuels hatred and more violence.

Absent a legitimate claim of self-defense, violence is wrong no matter who engages in it. But the incarceration, prosecution, and punishment of Palestinian children by Israeli military prosecutors and judges should stop. It is a flagrant violation of international law. It perpetuates an indefensible double standard of tiers of justice based on ethnicity, religion, and nationality. And by fomenting hatred, it makes Israel less secure.

Finally, it should stop because it reflects badly on the United States. The Israel Defense Forces are a major recipient of U.S. aid, and the United States should not explicitly or implicitly condone a flawed system of justice that systematically abuses and violates the rights of Palestinian children.

COMMEMORATING THE VISIT OF ECUMENICAL PATRIARCH BARTHOLOMEW

Ms. CORTEZ MASTO. Mr. President, I rise today to recognize the visit of His All-Holiness Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew to the United States. As the spiritual head of the world's second-largest Christian Church, he is a significant figure for Orthodox Christians worldwide, including many within Nevada's nearly 10,000-strong Greek-American community. His visit is especially meaningful to that community and to all who look to him for guidance.

As he has done during previous visits, His All-Holiness met with the President in the Oval Office and with congressional leaders here at the Capitol, meetings that reflect the long-standing respect between our Nation and the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Congress has also acknowledged his leadership in the past, awarding him the Congressional Gold Medal in 1997.

Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew is the 270th Ecumenical Patriarch and the 269th direct successor of the Apostle Andrew. From Istanbul, he has spent decades building relationships across faiths, promoting what he calls "a dialogue of loving truth," and reminding the world that "War in the name of religion is war against religion."

I also want to note that during this visit, he received the Templeton Prize