

when they will be released, if they will ever be released.

According to the Post article, Secretary of State Rubio told Bukele that the migrant prisoners would remain there for a year “or until a determination concerning their long-term disposition is made.” No end in sight. It is a very chilling statement.

The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the White House Press Secretary repeatedly referred to these migrants as “the worst of the worst” terrorists and criminals. These are folks who were here legally, following the rules.

Multiple investigations have determined that many of the migrants sent to CECOT in El Salvador literally have never been charged, let alone convicted of anything. The administration’s own lawyers have acknowledged this.

According to the Washington Post report, U.S. officials have refused to provide the names of those who were sent to CECOT. So our government has picked up people, spirited them away to El Salvador, and won’t even disclose the identity of the people who were arrested and deported.

The Washington Post asked three El Salvadoran officials for the identities of deportees who were sent there but received absolutely no response. That is why lawyers and journalists have described CECOT as a Kafkaesque dungeon. Once someone is led in chains through those iron gates, he is as good as disappeared forever.

One person the Trump administration disappeared to El Salvador was Andry Hernandez. He is a 31-year-old makeup artist. He left Venezuela to escape persecution, partly because of his sexual orientation, for which he was persecuted, and his political views, for which he was persecuted.

Andry opposed the Maduro regime. He did not cross the border illegally. He went to Mexico. He obtained an appointment—according to the rules—for an asylum interview. He had an interview, and he was found to have a credible fear of persecution. So he did everything right. Now we see photographs of Andry in CECOT, and they are gut-wrenching. He cries for his mother as guards slap him and forcibly shave his head. He yells out:

I’m not a gang member. I’m gay. I’m a stylist.

The photos also show our government’s alleged evidence for sending Andry to CECOT: tattoos of crowns, which are a symbol of a religious festival for Three Kings Day and have nothing to do with any gang-related activity.

The Trump administration officials have openly praised El Salvador’s President Bukele for receiving these migrants. He is a man who proudly calls himself a dictator—and he is. His rubberstamp legislature and the judiciary caved in to him and allowed him to circumvent their own constitution and run for a second term. Then he imposed a state of emergency, empowering him

to arrest and imprison anyone without charge—indeinitely.

The Trump administration officials have no qualms about paying millions of dollars to President Bukele to jail these migrants, who include folks who were here in this country legally.

The Washington Post article describes the Trump administration scrambling to arrest hundreds of people like Andry, often at their places of employment. And President Trump is then having them secretly and quickly often deported to El Salvador before the courts can even provide a hearing.

Amid these rampant violations of fundamental due process, the administration continues to just dis the Federal courts. And according to a Justice Department spokesperson, “Activist judges do not have jurisdiction to seize control of the President’s authority to conduct foreign policy, remove dangerous illegal aliens from our country, and keep Americans safe.”

This has nothing to do with that. It has to do with the rule of law and the role of the judiciary in our frame of government.

Multiple judges, by the way, appointed by Republicans and Democrats, including President Trump, have ruled against the administration’s efforts to forcibly deport people without any hearing whatsoever. And, by the way, how does forcibly disappearing somebody like Andry Hernandez Romero make us more safe?

Just last week, a Federal judge appointed by President Trump blocked the administration from summarily removing migrants in South Texas under a bogus assertion of the application of the Alien Enemies Act. This should not be happening in this country, and it shouldn’t be happening in El Salvador. It should not happen in Libya. It should not happen anywhere.

Laws matter. Due process matters. Justice matters. How we treat other human beings says more about us than it says about them.

It was Nelson Mandela who said:

No one truly knows a nation until one has been inside its jails. A nation should not be judged by how it treats its highest citizens, but the lowest ones.

The Trump administration has made a clear decision to disrespect our laws, to disregard the rights of citizens and individuals who are entitled to due process, and to do it in a way that is cruel and disrespectful of the United States and its commitment to freedom and the rule of law.

Our Supreme Court has ruled that all people, including migrants, are entitled to due process, to an opportunity to rebut allegations against them before being deported. The Trump administration attack is not just on the rights of these individuals, but it really goes to the core of principles and practices established in law that are the foundation of our democracy. And it threatens, therefore, the rights and privileges of all American citizens.

I stand here on behalf of Vermonters who are appalled by this action. I stand

here as a Member of the U.S. Senate who believes it is my responsibility, in the face of these Trump actions, to stand up for the rights of people to have a hearing, to have a right to be brought before a magistrate or a judge, and not be deported without any due process whatsoever. This is important to our commitment as Members of the U.S. Senate to preserve the traditions of the Constitution, the rule of law, and the rights of individuals and the freedom that has been the blessing of our liberty since the founding of our country.

(The remarks of Mr. WELCH pertaining to the introduction of S. Res. 224 are printed in today’s RECORD under “Submitted Resolutions.”)

Mr. WELCH. I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wyoming.

LEGISLATIVE SESSION

MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. LUMMIS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate resume legislative session and be in a period of morning business, with Senators permitted to speak therein for up to 10 minutes each.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ARMS SALES NOTIFICATION

Mr. RISCH. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification, the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

In keeping with the committee’s intention to see that relevant information is still available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the notifications that have been received. If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such an annex is available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations Committee, room SD-423.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEFENSE SECURITY
COOPERATION AGENCY,
Washington, DC.

Hon. JAMES E. RISCH,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b)(5)(C) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), as amended, we are forwarding Transmittal No. 24-0Q. This transmittal notifies a cost increase in excess of the total value previously described in the Section 36(b)(1) AECA certification 19-60 of April 23, 2020.

Sincerely,

MICHAEL F. MILLER,
Director.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 24-0Q

Report of Enhancement or Upgrade of Sensitivity of Technology or Capability (Sec. 36(b)(5)(C), AECA)

(i) Purchaser: Government of the United Arab Emirates.

(ii) Sec. 36(b)(1), AECA Transmittal No.: 19-60j, Date: April 23, 2020; Implementing Agency: Army.

Funding Source: National Funds.

(iii) Description: On April 23, 2020, Congress was notified by congressional certification transmittal number 19-60 of the possible sale, under Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, of the Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for a Foreign Military Sales Order (FMSO) II to provide funds for blanket order requisitions under a Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Agreement (CLSSA) for common spares/repair parts to support the United Arab Emirates' fleet of AH-64 Apache, UH-60 Black Hawk, and CH-47 Chinook aircraft, additional support, and other related elements of logistics and program support. The total estimated value was \$150 million. There was no Major Defense Equipment (MDE) associated with this sale.

This transmittal notifies an extension of the previously notified Foreign Military Sales Order (FMSO) II for blanket order requisitions under a Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Agreement (CLSSA) for common spares/repair parts to support the United Arab Emirates' fleet of AH-64 Apache, UH-60 Black Hawk, and CH-47 Chinook aircraft, additional support, and other related elements of logistics and program support. There is no MDE being reported with this notification and, as such, the total MDE value remains \$0. The total estimated value of the newly extended, non-MDE articles and services is \$300 million; resulting in an increase in both the estimated non-MDE and overall total case value to \$450 million.

(iv) Significance: The proposed sale will contribute to the UAE's ability to effectively integrate with U.S.-led coalitions and operate independently in support of U.S. interests and the security of U.S. forces in-theater and is consistent with U.S. bilateral and multilateral defense plans in the CENTCOM region.

(v) Justification: This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of an important partner in the region. This sale is consistent with U.S. initiatives to provide key partners in the region with modern systems that will enhance interoperability with U.S. forces and increase security.

(vi) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 12, 2025.

ARMS SALES NOTIFICATION

Mr. RISCH. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification, the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant information is still available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the notifications

that have been received. If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such an annex is available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations Committee, room SD-423.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEFENSE SECURITY
COOPERATION AGENCY,
Washington, DC.

Hon. JAMES E. RISCH,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 24-118, concerning the Army's proposed Letter(s) of Offer and Acceptance to the Government of the United Arab Emirates for defense articles and services estimated to cost \$1.32 billion. We will issue a news release to notify the public of this proposed sale upon delivery of this letter to your office.

Sincerely,

MICHAEL F. MILLER,
Director.

Enclosures.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 24-118

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of United Arab Emirates.

(ii) Total Estimated Value:
Major Defense Equipment (MDE)* 0.65 billion.

Other \$0.67 billion.

Total \$1.32 billion.

Funding Source: National Funds.

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:

Major Defense Equipment (MDE):

Six (6) CH-47F Block II Chinook helicopters with air-to-air refuel probe capability and extended range fuel tanks.

Sixteen (16) T-55-GA-714A engines (12 installed, 4 spares).

Fourteen (14) Embedded Global Positioning System (GPS)/Inertial Navigation System (INS) (EGD devices with M-Code (12 installed, 2 spares).

Eight (8) AN/AAR-57 Common Missile Warning Systems (CMWS) (6 installed, 2 spares).

Twenty (20) AN/ARC-231A communications security (COMSEC) radios (18 installed, 2 spares).

Twenty (20) M-240 machine guns (18 installed, 2 spares).

Non-Major Defense Equipment: The following non-MDE items will also be included: Common Missile Warning System (CMWS) classified software; AN/APR-39A radar warning receivers; AN/AVR-2B Laser Detecting Sets (LDS); AN/ARC-220 high frequency (HF) radios; KY-100M CONISEC terminals; aircraft survivability equipment (including impulse cartridges for cable cutters and aircraft cartridges); AN/ARN-147 Very High Frequency (VHF) Omni Directional Radio Range/Instrument Landing System (VOR/ILS) receivers; WESCAM MX-15Hdi electro-optical/infrared imaging systems; AN/ARN-153 Tactical Airborne Navigation System (TACAN) radios; AN/APN-209 radar altimeters; AN/APX-123A identification friend or foe (IFF) transponders; KIV-77 COMSEC IFF cryptographic appliques; AN/PYQ-10 Simple Key Loaders; services to support the mission equipment; hardware and services required to implement partner-unique modifications; Fast Rope Insertion/Extraction Systems (FRIES); Internal Extended Range Fuel Sys-

tems (ERFS); in-flight refueling capability; firefighting equipment; ballistic armor protection systems; air worthiness support; spare and repair parts; communications equipment; personnel training and training equipment; site surveys; tool and test equipment; ground support equipment; repair and return; publications and technical documentation; Quality Assurance Team (QAT); U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

(iv) Military Department: Army (AE-B-ZAR)

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: None
(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None known at this time.

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 12, 2025.

*As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

United Arab Emirates—CH-47F Chinook Helicopters

The Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has requested to buy six (6) CH-47F Block II Chinook Helicopters with air-to-air refuel probe capability and extended range fuel tanks; sixteen (16) T-55-GA-714A engines, (12 installed, 4 spares); fourteen (14) Embedded Global Positioning System (GPS)/Inertial Navigation System (INS) (EGI) devices with M-Code (12 installed, 2 spares); eight (8) AN/AAR-57 Common Missile Warning Systems (CMWS) (6 installed, 2 spares); twenty (20) AN/ARC-231A communications security (COMSEC) radios (18 installed, 2 spares); and twenty (20) M-240 machine guns (18 installed, 2 spares). The following non-MDE items will also be included: Common Missile Warning System (CMWS) classified software; AN/APR-39A radar warning receivers; AN/AVR-2B Laser Detecting Sets (LDS); AN/ARC-220 high frequency (HF) radios; KY-100M COMSEC terminals; aircraft survivability equipment (including impulse cartridges for cable cutters and aircraft cartridges); AN/ARN-147 Very High Frequency (VHF) Omni Directional Radio Range/Instrument Landing System (VOR/ILS) receivers; WESCAM MX-15Hdi electro-optical/infrared imaging systems; AN/ARN-153 Tactical Airborne Navigation System (TACAN) radios; AN/APN-209 radar altimeters; AN/APX-123A identification friend or foe (IFF) transponders; KIV-77 COMSEC IFF cryptographic appliques; AN/PYQ-10 Simple Key Loaders; services to support the mission equipment; hardware and services required to implement partner-unique modifications; Fast Rope Insertion/Extraction Systems (FRIES); Internal Extended Range Fuel Systems (ERFS); inflight refueling capability; firefighting equipment; ballistic armor protection systems; air worthiness support; spare and repair parts; communications equipment; personnel training and training equipment; site surveys; tool and test equipment; ground support equipment; repair and return; publications and technical documentation; Quality Assurance Team (QAT); U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is \$1.32 billion.

This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of an important regional partner. The United Arab Emirates is a vital U.S. partner for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East.