

Our bipartisan bill would allow States to use up to 5 percent of their community mental health services block grant funding for prevention and early intervention activities. The community mental health services block grant, MHBG, administered by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, is currently limited to funding services for those with severe, diagnosed mental illnesses.

The bill would also require the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, HHS, to provide reports to Congress detailing States' efforts to promote early intervention. HHS would report to Congress every 2 years regarding States' efforts to promote early intervention, including comprehensive information on activities undertaken and outcomes achieved.

Over 20 percent of youth have reported seriously considering suicide in the previous year, with 18 percent having developed a suicide plan, which is one of the most significant risk factors that precipitates an actual attempt. Over 40 percent of teens reported persistent feelings of sadness or hopelessness, with a shocking 57 percent of girls reporting this. These statistics regarding suicidality and hopelessness are considerably poorer than ten years ago. The evidence is clear: There is a youth mental health crisis, and it is getting worse. Yet many of these youth in distress do not yet have a diagnosed mental health condition, meaning that MHBG funds can't be used to help them and prevent their symptoms from worsening.

Research shows that intervening early with people who are experiencing mental health challenges can help prevent those challenges from turning more serious—and more costly to treat.

States should have the flexibility to use up to 5 percent of mental health block grant funds for prevention and early intervention activities if they so choose. Without this adjustment, the mental health block grant is missing a valuable opportunity to intervene early and save lives.

I would like to thank Senators TILLIS, KAINE, and MURKOWSKI for co-leading this legislation, and I look forward to working with my colleagues to enact this bill as soon as possible.

Mr. BARRASSO (for himself, Mr. CRAPO, Mr. LANKFORD, Mr. CASIDY, Mr. DAINES, Mrs. BLACKBURN, Mr. RICKETTS, Mr. RISCH, and Ms. LUMMIS):

S. 796. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to repeal the corporate alternative minimum tax; to the Committee on Finance.

Mr. BARRASSO. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S. 796

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Book Minimum Tax Repeal Act".

SEC. 2. REPEAL OF CORPORATE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 55 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended—

(1) in subsection (a)—

(A) by striking "There" and inserting "In the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation, there", and

(B) by striking "plus, in the case of an applicable corporation, the tax imposed by section 59A" in paragraph (2), and

(2) by striking subsection (b) and inserting the following:

"(b) TENTATIVE MINIMUM TAX.—

"(1) AMOUNT OF TENTATIVE MINIMUM TAX.—

"(A) IN GENERAL.—The tentative minimum tax for the taxable year is the sum of—

"(i) 26 percent of so much of the taxable excess as does not exceed \$175,000, plus

"(ii) 28 percent of so much of the taxable excess as exceeds \$175,000.

The amount determined under the preceding sentence shall be reduced by the alternative minimum tax foreign tax credit for the taxable year.

"(B) TAXABLE EXCESS.—For purposes of this subsection, the term 'taxable excess' means so much of the alternative minimum taxable income for the taxable year as exceeds the exemption amount.

"(C) MARRIED INDIVIDUAL FILING SEPARATE RETURN.—In the case of a married individual filing a separate return, subparagraph (A) shall be applied by substituting 50 percent of the dollar amount otherwise applicable under clause (i) and clause (ii) thereof. For purposes of the preceding sentence, marital status shall be determined under section 7703.

"(2) ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAXABLE INCOME.—The term 'alternative minimum taxable income' means the taxable income of the taxpayer for the taxable year—

"(A) determined with the adjustments provided in section 56 and section 58, and

"(B) increased by the amount of the items of tax preference described in section 57.

If a taxpayer is subject to the regular tax, such taxpayer shall be subject to the tax imposed by this section (and, if the regular tax is determined by reference to an amount other than taxable income, such amount shall be treated as the taxable income of such taxpayer for purposes of the preceding sentence)."

(b) APPLICATION TO GENERAL BUSINESS CREDIT.—Section 38(c)(6)(E) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended to read as follows:

"(E) CORPORATIONS.—In the case of a corporation, this subsection shall be applied by treating the corporation as having a tentative minimum tax of zero."

(c) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—

(1) Section 11(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by striking "the taxes imposed by subsection (a) and section 55" and inserting "the tax imposed by subsection (a)".

(2) Section 12 of such Code is amended by striking paragraph (5).

(3) Section 53 of such Code is amended by striking subsection (e).

(4) Part VI of subchapter A of chapter 1 of such Code is amended by striking section 56A (and the item related to such section in the table of sections for such part).

(5) Section 59 of such Code is amended by striking subsections (k) and (l).

(6) Section 860E(a)(4) of such Code is amended by striking "section 55(b)(1)(D)" and inserting "section 55(b)(2)".

(7) Section 882(a)(1) of such Code is amended by "55".

(8) Section 897(a)(2)(A)(i) of such Code is amended by striking "section 55(b)(1)(D)" and inserting "section 55(b)(2)".

(9) Section 6425(c)(1)(A) of such Code is amended by striking clause (ii) and by redesignating clause (iii) as clause (ii).

(10) Section 6655(e)(2) of such Code is amended by striking "adjusted financial statement income (as defined in section 56A)" each place it appears in subparagraphs (A)(i) and (B)(i).

(11) Section 6655(g)(1)(A) of such Code is amended by striking clause (ii) and by redesignating clauses (iii) and (iv) as clauses (ii) and (iii), respectively.

(d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this section shall apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2024.

By Mr. DURBIN (for himself, Mr. WELCH and Mr. SCHIFF):

S. 804. To terminate authorizations for the use of military force and declarations of war no later than 10 years after the enactment of such authorizations or declarations; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S. 804

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Accountability for Endless Wars Act of 2025".

SEC. 2. TERMINATION OF AUTHORIZATIONS FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND DECLARATIONS OF WAR.

(a) FUTURE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND DECLARATIONS OF WAR.—Any authorization for the use of military force or declaration of war enacted into law after the date of the enactment of this Act shall terminate on the date that is 10 years after the date of the enactment of such authorization or declaration.

(b) EXISTING AUTHORIZATIONS FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND DECLARATIONS OF WAR.—Any authorization for the use of military force or declaration of war enacted before the date of the enactment of this Act shall terminate on the date that is 6 months after the date of such enactment.

SUBMITTED RESOLUTIONS

SENATE RESOLUTION 101—AFFIRMING THE THREATS TO WORLD STABILITY FROM A NUCLEAR WEAPONS-CAPABLE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

Mr. GRAHAM (for himself, Mr. FETTERMAN, and Mrs. BRITT) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

S. RES. 101

Whereas numerous officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran have repeatedly made statements against the United States, Israel, and their allies and partners, including—

(1) the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who stated—

(A) “As long as America continues its wickedness, interference, and savagery, the Iranian nation will not abandon ‘Death to America.’”;

(B) “The Zionist regime is a deadly, cancerous growth and a detriment to this region. It will undoubtedly be uprooted and destroyed”;

(C) “We will definitely do everything necessary to prepare the Iranian nation for confronting the Arrogant Powers, whether militarily, in terms of armament, or politically. Our officials are already working on this”;

(D) “The United States of America and the Zionist regime will definitely receive a crushing response for what they do against Iran and the Resistance Front”;

(2) an adviser to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kamal Kharrazi, who stated, “We have no decision to build a nuclear bomb but should Iran’s existence be threatened, there will be no choice but to change our military doctrine”;

(3) former foreign ministry spokesperson of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Nasser Kanani, who stated, “This action of the three European countries [France, Germany and the United Kingdom] is the continuation of the hostile policy of the West and economic terrorism against the people of Iran, which will face the appropriate and proportionate action of the Islamic Republic of Iran”;

Whereas the Islamic Republic of Iran is directly responsible for the death and injury of United States servicemembers, including—

(1) between 2005 and 2011, when the Quds Force, a branch of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, provided explosively formed penetrators to Iranian-backed fighters in Iraq and killed 195 United States troops and wounded nearly another 900 United States troops;

(2) since the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel, where Iranian-backed proxies have attacked United States troops in the region more than 170 times; and

(3) on January 28, 2024, when an Iranian-backed proxy launched a drone that killed 3 United States troops and wounded nearly another 40 United States troops stationed at Tower 22 in Jordan;

Whereas the United States Government has reported—

(1) “Iran’s annual financial backing to Hizballah — which in recent years has been estimated at \$700 million — accounts for the overwhelming majority of [Hizballah’s] annual budget”;

(2) “ Hamas has received funding, weapons, and training from Iran”;

(3) “Iran also provides up to \$100 million annually in combined support to Palestinian terrorist groups, including Hamas”;

Whereas the Islamic Republic of Iran’s support to the Houthis, including through the provision of ballistic and cruise missiles and unmanned weapons systems, has allowed the Houthis to carry out attacks against United States partners;

Whereas, since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has engaged in acts of international terrorism and continuously threatened the United States, Israel, and their partners and allies;

Whereas, on January 19, 1984, the United States designated the Islamic Republic of Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism for repeatedly providing support for acts of international terrorism;

Whereas, on April 11, 2006, the Islamic Republic of Iran announced that it had enriched uranium for the first time to a level close to 3.5 percent at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant in Natanz, Iran;

Whereas, on December 23, 2006, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1737 (2006), which imposed sanctions with respect to the Islamic Republic of Iran for its failure to suspend enrichment activities;

Whereas the United Nations Security Council subsequently adopted Resolutions 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), and 1929 (2010), all of which targeted the nuclear program of, and imposed additional sanctions with respect to, the Islamic Republic of Iran;

Whereas, on February 3, 2009, the Islamic Republic of Iran announced that it had launched its first satellite, which raised concern over the applicability of the satellite to the ballistic missile program;

Whereas, in September 2009, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France revealed the existence of the clandestine Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant in the Islamic Republic of Iran, years after construction started on the plant;

Whereas, on January 28, 2017, the Islamic Republic of Iran conducted a test of a medium-range ballistic missile, which traveled an estimated 600 miles and provides the Islamic Republic of Iran the capability to threaten United States military installations in the Middle East;

Whereas, in 2018, Israel seized a significant portion of the nuclear archive of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which contained tens of thousands of files and compact discs relating to past efforts at nuclear weapon design, development, and manufacturing by the Islamic Republic of Iran;

Whereas, on September 27, 2018, Israel revealed the existence of a secret warehouse housing radioactive material in the Turqez Abad district in Tehran, and an inspection of the warehouse by the International Atomic Energy Agency (referred to in this preamble as the “IAEA”) detected radioactive particles, which the Government of Iran failed to adequately explain;

Whereas, on June 19, 2020, the IAEA adopted Resolution GOV/2020/34, which expressed “serious concern . . . that Iran has not provided access to the Agency under the Additional Protocol to two locations”;

Whereas, on April 17, 2021, the IAEA verified that the Islamic Republic of Iran had begun to enrich uranium to 60 percent purity;

Whereas, on August 14, 2021, the former President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hassan Rouhani, stated, “Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization can enrich uranium by 20 percent and 60 percent and if . . . our reactors need it, it can enrich uranium to 90 percent purity”;

Whereas, on April 17, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran confirmed the relocation of a production facility for advanced centrifuges from an aboveground facility at Karaj, Iran, to the fortified underground Natanz Enrichment Complex;

Whereas, on April 19, 2022, the Department of State released a report stating there are “serious concerns” about “possible undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran”;

Whereas, on May 30, 2022, the IAEA reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran had achieved a stockpile of 43.3 kilograms (95.5 pounds) of 60 percent highly enriched uranium, roughly enough material for a nuclear weapon;

Whereas, on June 8, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran turned off surveillance cameras installed by the IAEA to monitor uranium enrichment activities at nuclear sites in the country;

Whereas, on July 14, 2022, in The Jerusalem U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration, which was signed between President Biden and Israel, the United States stressed its commitment “never to allow

Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon, and that [the United States] is prepared to use all elements of its national power to ensure that outcome”;

Whereas, on July 27, 2022, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Mohammad Eslami, announced that the Islamic Republic of Iran is building a new nuclear reactor at the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center, which will be one of the largest nuclear facilities in Iran;

Whereas, on December 2, 2022, IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi stated, “Iran informed us they were tripling . . . their capacity to enrich uranium at 60 percent, which is very close to military level, which is 90 percent”;

Whereas, on January 25, 2023, Director General Grossi stated, “One thing is true: [the Islamic Republic of Iran has] amassed enough nuclear material for several nuclear weapons”;

Whereas, on February 27, 2023, the IAEA reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran had enriched uranium to 83.7 percent, which is just short of the 90 percent threshold for weapons-grade fissile material;

Whereas, on September 4, 2023, an IAEA report estimated the total uranium stockpile of the Islamic Republic of Iran to be 3795.5 kilograms (8367.65 pounds) and that the Islamic Republic of Iran has enough fissile material, that if further enriched, would be sufficient to produce several nuclear weapons;

Whereas, on October 18, 2023, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) lapsed and many proliferation-related penalties and restrictions were lifted, allowing the Islamic Republic of Iran to test or transfer ballistic missiles, which may contribute to the further development of a nuclear weapon delivery system;

Whereas, on December 28, 2023, the governments of the United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom jointly declared, “The production of high-enriched uranium by Iran has no credible civilian justification. These decisions demonstrate Iran’s lack of good will towards de-escalation and represent reckless behavior in a tense regional context . . . Iran must fully cooperate with the IAEA to enable it to provide assurances that its nuclear program is exclusively peaceful.”;

Whereas, on February 27, 2024, a spokesperson for the Department of State stated, “We remain seriously concerned about Iran’s continued expansion of its nuclear program in ways that have no credible civilian purpose, including its continued production of highly enriched uranium”;

Whereas, on June 3, 2024, Director General Grossi stated, “Many countries have said if Iran gets nuclear weapons, they will do the same. Adding nuclear weapons to the cauldron of the Middle East is a very bad idea.”;

Whereas, on June 5, 2024, by a vote of 20 to 2, the United States joined other nations in formally censuring the Islamic Republic of Iran for advances in their nuclear program and failure to cooperate with the IAEA;

Whereas, on June 18, 2024, it was reported that intelligence agencies of the United States and Israel were looking into information that the Islamic Republic of Iran may have developed a computer model that could be used for research and development of nuclear weapons;

Whereas, on July 23, 2024, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence published an assessment, in accordance with Iran Nuclear Weapons Capability and Terrorism Monitoring Act of 2022 (22 U.S.C. 8701 note; Public Law 117-263), which stated, “Iran continues to increase the size of its uranium stockpile, increase its enrichment capacity,

and develop, manufacture, and operate advanced centrifuges. Tehran has the infrastructure and experience to quickly produce weapons-grade uranium, at multiple facilities”;

Whereas, on November 28, 2024, the Islamic Republic of Iran informed the IAEA that it planned to start enriching uranium with thousands of advanced centrifuges at its Fordow and Natanz plants, while also installing more uranium-enriching centrifuges at those locations;

Whereas, on December 5, 2024, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence published another assessment, in accordance with Iran Nuclear Weapons Capability and Terrorism Monitoring Act of 2022 (22 U.S.C. 8701 note; Public Law 117-263), which stated—

(1) “Iran’s 20-percent and 60-percent enriched uranium stockpiles are far greater than needed for what it claims it will use the uranium for and Iran could produce more than a dozen nuclear weapons if its total uranium stockpile were further enriched”;

(2) “Iran probably will consider installing or operating more advanced centrifuges, further increasing its enriched uranium stockpile, enriching uranium up to 90 percent, or threatening to withdraw from the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons”;

Whereas, on December 9, 2024, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom released a joint statement that—

(1) condemns “Iran’s latest steps . . . to expand its nuclear programme to significantly increase the rate of production of uranium enriched up to 60 percent”;

(2) expresses extreme concern “to learn that Iran has increased the number of centrifuges in use and started preparations to install additional enrichment infrastructure”;

(3) “strongly urge[s] Iran to reverse these steps, and to immediately halt its nuclear escalation”;

Whereas, on February 26, 2025, the IAEA reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran had increased its total stockpile of 60 percent highly enriched uranium to 274.8 kilograms (605.83 pounds), which, if further enriched, would be sufficient to produce 6 nuclear weapons: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Senate—

(1) affirms that the Islamic Republic of Iran’s continued pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability is—

(A) a credible threat to the United States; and

(B) an existential threat to Israel and other allies and partners in the Middle East;

(2) asserts all options should be considered to address the nuclear threat the Islamic Republic of Iran poses to the United States, Israel, and our allies and partners;

(3) demands the Islamic Republic of Iran to immediately cease engaging in any and all activities that threaten the national security interests of the United States, Israel, and our allies and partners, including—

(A) enriching uranium;

(B) developing or possessing delivery vehicles capable of carrying nuclear warheads; and

(C) developing or possessing a nuclear warhead.

SEC. 2. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

Nothing in this resolution may be construed to authorize the use of military force or the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities.

SENATE RESOLUTION 102—TO RECOGNIZE AND CELEBRATE THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE DENVER INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

Mr. BENNET (for himself and Mr. HICKENLOOPER) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.

S. RES. 102

Resolved, That the Senate recognizes and celebrates February 28th, 2025, as the 30th anniversary of the Denver International Airport.

SENATE RESOLUTION 103—CONDEMNING THE REJECTION BY THE UNITED STATES OF A UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION CONDEMNING THE ILLEGAL INVASION OF UKRAINE BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Mr. GALLEGO (for himself, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. PADILLA, Mr. BENNET, and Mr. SCHIFF) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

S. RES. 103

Whereas the Russian Federation first invaded Ukraine illegally in 2014 and further expanded that illegal invasion in 2022: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Senate condemns the rejection by the United States of United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/ES-11/L.10 (2025), titled “Advancing a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine”, condemning the illegal invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation.

SENATE RESOLUTION 104—DESIGNATING FEBRUARY 27, 2025, AS “RARE DISEASE DAY”

Mr. BARRASSO (for himself, Mr. BLUMENTHAL, Ms. KLOBUCHAR, Mr. MARSHALL, Mr. SCOTT of South Carolina, Mr. WICKER, and Mr. BOOKER) submitted the following resolution; which was considered and agreed to:

S. RES. 104

Whereas a rare disease or disorder is a disease or disorder that affects a small number of patients;

Whereas, in the United States, a rare disease or disorder is defined as affecting fewer than 200,000 individuals;

Whereas, as of the date of adoption of this resolution, more than 30,000,000 individuals in the United States are living with at least 1 of the more than 10,000 known rare diseases or disorders;

Whereas children with rare diseases or disorders account for a significant portion of the population affected by rare diseases or disorders in the United States;

Whereas many rare diseases and disorders are serious and life-threatening;

Whereas 2025 marks the 42nd anniversary of the enactment of the Orphan Drug Act (Public Law 97-414; 96 Stat. 2049), a landmark law enabling tremendous advances in the research and treatment of rare diseases and disorders;

Whereas programs such as the Accelerating Rare Disease Cures Program of the Food and Drug Administration (referred to in this preamble as the “FDA”) aim to drive scientific and regulatory innovation and en-

agement to accelerate the availability of treatments for patients with rare diseases;

Whereas 26 of the 50 novel drugs approved by the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research of the FDA in 2024—

(1) were approved to prevent, diagnose, or treat a rare disease or condition; and

(2) received an orphan-drug designation;

Whereas, although the FDA has approved more than 882 drugs and biological products with 1,300 orphan indications as of the date of adoption of this resolution, approximately 95 percent of rare diseases still do not have a treatment approved by the FDA for their condition;

Whereas financing life-altering and life-saving treatments can be challenging for individuals with a rare disease or disorder and their families;

Whereas individuals with rare diseases or disorders can experience difficulty in obtaining accurate diagnoses and finding physicians or treatment centers with expertise in their rare disease or disorder;

Whereas the National Institutes of Health support innovative research on the treatment of rare diseases and disorders;

Whereas Rare Disease Day is observed each year on the last day of February; and

Whereas Rare Disease Day is a global event that was first observed in the United States on February 28, 2009: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Senate—

(1) designates February 27, 2025, as “Rare Disease Day”;

(2) recognizes the importance of, with respect to rare diseases and disorders—

(A) improving awareness;

(B) encouraging accurate and early diagnosis; and

(C) supporting national and global research efforts to develop effective treatments, diagnostics, and cures.

AUTHORITY FOR COMMITTEES TO MEET

Mr. THUNE. Mr. President, I have nine requests for committees to meet during today’s session of the Senate. They have the approval of the Majority and Minority Leaders.

Pursuant to rule XXVI, paragraph 5(a), of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the following committees are authorized to meet during today’s session of the Senate:

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The Committee on Armed Services is authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Thursday, February 27, 2025, at 9:30 a.m., to conduct a hearing on a nomination.

COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS

The Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs is authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Thursday, February 27, 2025, at 10 a.m., to conduct a hearing on nominations.

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

The committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation is authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Thursday, February 27, 2025, at 10 a.m., to conduct an executive session.