

maybe they are taken on a trip somewhere, but they miss out on the enjoyment of work. They miss out on being like their siblings in which they are able to work today and some, to a degree, support themselves.

I think it is just tragic when this is done and they are deprived of the freedom to work. I will encourage all of my colleagues to track down 14(c) employers in their district and see how meaningful it is for these people with differing abilities to be able to work and to be able to earn their own money.

It is not just an economic decision, it is a social decision, as well. One of the things that scares parents or guardians who are dealing with people in this situation is: What is going to happen to them when the parents are gone? Are they going to have any friends? Are they going to have any social structure?

Moreover, even more than people in other jobs, the social structure provided by people and employers that use 14(c) certificates does provide these folks with friends. We all to a certain extent socialize with the people we work with, but especially for these people, it is important to have friends outside their immediate family.

When you begin to shut down these employers, Mr. Speaker, you are depriving these people of the friendships that they will form in employers who give 14(c).

First of all, I beg my colleagues—we all like to get reelected—I beg my colleagues to tour facilities with 14(c) certificates, and see how happy the people are who work there. See how important both economically as well as socially it is for these folks to have the freedom to work in these facilities. I hope Congress stands up to the freedom haters who want to deny these folks the ability to work in a little bit different setting that they want to do.

There are three issues that I ask Congress to take up and consider. I want Congress to pass whatever legislation is necessary to make sure we always protect the 14(c) certificates. I ask Congress to take up raising the amount of money a senior can make before we take away their Social Security, both for the good of the overall economy, as well as the financial and social health and social assistance of our senior citizens.

Finally, I ask Congress to do something to make sure these out-of-control, lack of commonsense psychologists, psychiatrists are not able to give puberty blockers or surgeries on people under the age of 21.

As I said, we should ban it, even above that age. I have certainly sat and heard people talk about how they regret their surgeries. It seems in our society when it comes down to drinking and when it comes down to smoking, age 21 is the limit in which we allow people to do more. If any of my colleagues would want to introduce an amendment to age 25, our forefathers didn't feel we were qualified to be Con-

gressmen until we were age 25, I would be happy to go for an age 25 limit, as well. I would like to be debating that in conference next week.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

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**EXPLANATORY STATEMENT ON
THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION
ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2026,
SUBMITTED BY MR. CRAWFORD,
CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE PER-
MANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE**

The following is the Explanatory Statement to accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (“the Act”), which has been included as Division F of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026. The Explanatory Statement reflects the result of negotiations between the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (together, “the Committees”). The Explanatory Statement shall have the same effect with respect to the implementation of the Act as if it were a joint explanatory statement of a conference committee.

The classified nature of U.S. Intelligence activities prevents the Committees from publicly disclosing many details concerning their final decisions regarding funding levels and policy direction. Therefore, the Committees have prepared a classified annex—referred to here and within the annex itself as “the Agreement”—that contains a classified Schedule of Authorizations and describes in detail the scope and intent of the Committees’ actions.

The Agreement authorizes the Intelligence Community to obligate and expend funds as requested in the President’s budget and as modified by the classified Schedule of Authorizations, subject to applicable reprogramming procedures.

The classified Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated into the Act pursuant to Section 6102 of the Act. It has the status of law. The Agreement supplements and adds detail to clarify the authorization levels found in the Act and in the classified Schedule of Authorizations.

This Explanatory Statement incorporates by reference, and the Executive Branch shall comply with, all direction contained in the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report to accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (S. Rept. 119-51) and in the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Report to accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (H. Rept. 119-389). The Agreement supersedes all classified direction in the classified annexes to accompany S. Rept. 119-51 and H. Rept. 119-389 related to programs and activities authorized by the Schedule of Authorizations.

The Executive Branch is further directed as follows:

Counterintelligence Support for Department of the Treasury Networks and Systems

The Committees direct that the head of the Office of Counterintelligence of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury shall implement policies and procedures that ensure counterintelligence support to all entities of the Department of the Treasury responsible for safeguarding networks and systems and for coordinating between counterintelligence threat mitigation activities and cyber network and system defense efforts. The Committees further direct that, not later than

270 days after the date of enactment of the Act, the head of the Office of Counterintelligence shall submit a report to the Committees on the status of the implementation of such policies.

Report on Director’s Initiatives Group

The Committees direct that, not later than 30 days after the date of enactment of the Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the Committees a briefing on personnel matters of the Director’s Initiatives Group, which shall include: (1) a list of personnel of such group, from the date of the creation of the group; and (2) funding sources for personnel of such group.

Report on Secure Mobile Communications Systems Used To Transmit Classified Information

The Committees direct that, not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of the Act, each Intelligence Community program head shall submit to the Committees a report on the secure mobile communications systems used for transmission of classified information (excluding systems used for purposes of clandestine or covert communications) and available to employees and officers of the Intelligence Community. The report should include the following information: (1) the name, description, and date of purchase or development of each system; (2) the number of employees using each system; (3) the cost of development and operations of each system; (4) a list of the capabilities and the level of classification of each system; (5) identification of any existing service agreements with other elements of the Intelligence Community for use of a system; and (6) identification, description, and deployment timeline of any secure mobile communications systems that are in development. For purposes of this report, the term “mobile communications systems” means any portable wireless telecommunications equipment utilized for the transmission or reception of classified information.

Ukraine Lessons Learned Working Group

Section 6413 of the Fiscal Year 2025 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 118-159) required the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense to jointly establish a working group to identify and share lessons learned from the Ukraine conflict in order to strengthen United States national security. Despite the critical importance of this mandate, the Committees note with concern that the working group has not been established and that the Intelligence Community has been unresponsive to repeated congressional inquiries on this matter.

The Committees recognize that various efforts are underway across the Executive Branch that may support the objectives envisioned for the working group. However, the Committees underscore the importance of adhering to statutory requirements and ensuring that lessons from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are systematically identified, coordinated, and applied.

Accordingly, the Committees direct the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense to stand up the Ukraine Lessons Learned Working Group, in compliance with the law, not later than 30 days after the date of enactment of the Act, and to provide a joint briefing to the Committees on the status, scope, and initial findings of the working group not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of the Act.

Department of State Information Technology Management

The Committees continue to be concerned with the management of the Department of State’s information technology networks and believe the existing management structure for the networks may no longer meet

the requirements to support a global diplomatic presence. The Committees therefore direct the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, in coordination with any other bureau or office the Assistant Secretary determines appropriate, to explore optimized reorganization of management of the entirety of the Department's information technology networks and to provide a briefing to the Committees, not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of the Act, on potential concepts of realignment.

Artificial Intelligence Development and Usage by Intelligence Community

Section 6602 of the Act requires the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community to identify commonly used artificial intelligence systems or functions that have the greatest potential for re-use without significant modification by Intelligence Community elements. The Committees direct that, in identifying such systems, the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community shall, in addition to coordinating with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, coordinate with such officials of the Department of Defense, as identified by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, for any systems used by an Intelligence Community element of the Department of Defense.

Section 6602 also requires the head of each Intelligence Community element to track and evaluate the performance of procured and element-developed artificial intelligence. The Committees are of the view that tracking and evaluating should at a minimum include—

1. Documenting, to the extent information is readily available, the provenance of data used to train, fine-tune, or operate the artificial intelligence system, such as included in industry standard Model Cards to the extent practicable.

2. Conducting ongoing testing and evaluation on artificial intelligence system performance, the effectiveness of vendor artificial intelligence offerings, and associated risk management measures, including by testing in real-world conditions.

3. The stipulation of conditions for retraining or decommissioning artificial intelligence capabilities.

4. Requiring sufficient post-award monitoring and evaluation for effectiveness of the artificial intelligence system in achieving documented mission outcomes, where appropriate in the context of the product or service acquired.

Study on Threats Posed by Unmanned Aerial Systems At or Near the Land and Maritime Borders of the United States

The Committees are concerned that hundreds of encounters with unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) are annually recorded at or near the land and maritime borders of the United States, which present a vulnerability in national security. With the proliferation of affordable drones, a wide range of groups, including malign actors, have sought to make use of this capability. It is critical that the U.S. Government has full situational awareness of the threats these systems pose to U.S. military personnel, other Federal personnel, and civilians.

The Committees therefore direct that, not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of the Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Undersecretary for Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security and the heads of any other elements of the Intelligence Community the Director considers appropriate, shall submit to the Committees a study on the threat posed by UAS at or near the land and maritime borders of the United States.

The study shall include the following:

1. An identification of the malign actors operating UAS at or near the borders, including malign actors who cross such borders.

2. The information collected by operators of UAS at or near the borders, and a description of how such data is used by malign actors.

3. The tactics, techniques, and procedures used by malign actors operating UAS at or near the borders, including how such actors acquire, modify, and utilize UAS to conduct malicious activities, including attacks, surveillance, conveyance of contraband, and other forms of threats.

4. A description of how a threat is identified and assessed at or near the borders, including a description of the capabilities of the United States Government to detect and identify UAS operated by, or on behalf of, malign actors.

5. The adequacy of United States technology used to detect, identify, track, monitor, and mitigate threats posed by UAS operated by malign actors at or near the borders.

6. The guidance, policies, and procedures that address the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of persons who lawfully operate UAS at or near the borders.

7. Current authorities of the United States Government to counter the use of UAS by malign actors at or near the borders, including an accounting of the delineated responsibilities of Federal agencies to counter, contain, trace, or defeat unmanned aircraft systems at or near the borders.

Counterintelligence Threats to United States Civil and Commercial Space Interests

The Committees are concerned with counterintelligence threats to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and commercial spaceports. Therefore, the Committees direct that, not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of the Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), shall submit to the Committees an assessment of the counterintelligence vulnerabilities of NASA, if any.

The assessment shall include the following:

1. An assessment of the vulnerability of the security practices and facilities of NASA to efforts by nation-state and non-nation-state actors to acquire United States space technology.

2. An assessment of the counterintelligence threat posed to NASA centers by nationals of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China.

3. Recommendations for how NASA can mitigate any counterintelligence gaps identified under paragraphs (1) and (2).

4. A description of efforts by NASA to respond to the efforts of nation-state and non-nation-state actors to illicitly acquire United States satellites and related items as described in reports submitted by the Director of National Intelligence pursuant to section 1261 (e) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (P.L. 112-239), along with an evaluation of the effectiveness of these efforts.

Further, the Committees direct that, not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of the Act the head of the Counterintelligence Division of the FBI, in coordination with the head of the Office of Private Sector of the FBI, and in coordination with the Office of Commercial Space Transportation within the Department of Transportation, shall develop an assessment of the counterintelligence risks, if any, to commercial spaceports and distribute the assessment to each FBI field office in an area of responsibility which includes a federally-licensed

commercial spaceport and the leadership of each federally-licensed commercial spaceport, in coordination with the Office of Commercial Space Transportation.

Protection of Classified Information Related to Budget Functions

The Committees remain concerned with protecting classified information used in the Intelligence Community's budget-related activities. Therefore, the Committees direct that, not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of the Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, shall submit to the Committees a study, with a classified annex, outlining the feasibility of and cost associated with the department or agency of (1) the Secretary of Treasury; (2) the Director of the Office of Management and Budget; (3) each head of an element of the Intelligence Community; or (4) any other head of a department or agency of the Federal Government carrying out a function specified below, using secure systems that meet the requirements to protect classified information, including with respect to the location at which the system is located or accessed, to carry out any of the following activities:

1. Formulating, developing, and submitting the budget of the department or agency (including the budget justification materials submitted to Congress) under the National Intelligence Program;

2. Apportioning, allotting, and issuing warrants for the disbursement of, and obligating and expending funds under the National Intelligence Program; and

3. Carrying out Federal financial management service functions or related activities of the Intelligence Community.

Evaluation of Training Data Pertaining to Artificial Intelligence Systems

It is the sense of the Committees that the Intelligence Community should seek to evaluate training data, methods of labeling data, and model weights pertaining to artificial intelligence systems being considered for use, procurement, or adoption by an element of the Intelligence Community to enable such element to make informed decisions regarding the fitness and reliability of the system and that each element of the Intelligence Community should, to the greatest extent practicable, avoid use of any publicly available artificial intelligence model found to contain information on United States persons that has been obtained unlawfully by the vendor of the model.

Annual Survey of Analytic Objectivity Among Officers and Employees of Elements of the Intelligence Community

Section 6305 requires the head of certain elements of the Intelligence Community to conduct a survey of analytic objectivity among officers and employees of such element who are involved in the production of intelligence products. The Committees direct the head of each element to submit to the Committees a report on the findings of the most recently completed survey.

Plan To Enhance Intelligence Community Counternarcotics Collaboration with Mexico

Section 6717 requires each element of the Intelligence Community, not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of the Act, to submit to the Director of National Intelligence a report on that element's relationship with the Government of Mexico, if any, as it relates to counternarcotics collaboration, coordination, and cooperation, including a strategy to enhance such cooperation and recommendations regarding the resources required to effectively implement that strategy. The Committees direct each

element head to simultaneously submit to the Committees the same report submitted to the Director, along with any recommendations or requests for changes in authorities or resources to effectuate the element's strategy.

Efforts by Director of Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence at Department of Energy to Mitigate Counterintelligence Risks

The Committees are concerned by the counterintelligence risks posed by Department of Energy employees' travel to certain countries. Therefore, the Committees direct the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence at the Department of Energy to develop and implement mechanisms for all personnel of the Department to (1) report to the Office any personal or official travel to a "country of risk," as defined by section 6432 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (P.L. 118-159), or to any other country the Director considers appropriate prior to beginning such travel; (2) at the request of personnel of the Office, receive briefings with respect to travel to such country prior to beginning such travel; and (3) at the request of personnel of the Office, participate in debriefings after travel to such country.

Notification of Material Changes to Policies or Procedures Governing Terrorist Watchlist and Transnational Organized Crime Watchlist

Section 6522 requires the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to submit to the appropriate congressional committees notice of any material change to a policy or procedure relating to the terrorist watchlist or the transnational organized crime watchlist within 30 days of the date on which the material change takes effect. This section separately requires the Director, within 30 days of a request by an appropriate congressional committee, to submit to that committee all watchlisting guidance in effect as of the date of the request that applies to or governs the use of the terrorist watchlist or the transnational organized crime watchlist. The Committees emphasize that the term "material change to a policy or procedure relating to the terrorist watchlist or the transnational organized crime watchlist" includes any change to the watchlisting guidance itself.

National Security Harm Prevented by Prepublication Review

The Committees direct the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research to each submit to the Committees, not later than April 30, 2026, a report that describes the five items most harmful to United States national security identified within the last five years by such element during prepublication review, as determined by the head of such element or their designee.

Reforms to Inactive Security Clearances

Section 6310 of the Act directs the Director of National Intelligence to review and evaluate whether former Intelligence Community personnel who departed federal service within the past five years and previously held a security clearance could retain access to classified information if they continue to meet applicable standards. The section also requires the Director to assess the feasibility and advisability of applying continuous vetting to inactive clearances and to report the findings to the appropriate congressional committees within 120 days of the date of enactment of the Act. Section 1626 of the Fiscal Year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act contains a similar requirement for the

Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, to review the feasibility and advisability of extending the period during which former Department of Defense personnel may maintain an inactive security clearance. The Committees strongly support these complementary efforts and direct the Director of National Intelligence and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security to closely coordinate their reviews to ensure consistency, share findings as appropriate, and avoid duplication.

SENATE ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED

The Speaker announced his signature to enrolled bills of the Senate of the following titles:

S. 356.—An act to extend the Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act of 2000.

S. 2283.—An act to designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 201 West Oklahoma Avenue in Guthrie, Oklahoma, as the "Oscar J. Upham Post Office".

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. GROTHMAN. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 1 o'clock and 18 minutes p.m.), under its previous order, the House adjourned until Monday next, December 15, 2025, at noon, for morning-hour debate.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS,
ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

EC-2368. A letter from the Manager, Legal Litigation and Support, AGC-010, FAA, Department of Transportation, transmitting the Department's final rule — Standard Instrument Approach Procedures, and Takeoff Minimums and Obstacle Departure Procedures; Miscellaneous Amendments [Docket No.: 31637; Amdt. No.: 4194] (RIN: 2120-AA65) received December 5, 2025, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); Public Law 104-121, Sec. 251; (110 Stat. 868); to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.

EC-2369. A letter from the Manager, Legal Litigation and Support, AGC-010, FAA, Department of Transportation, transmitting the Department's final rule — Standard Instrument Approach Procedures, and Takeoff Minimums and Obstacle Departure Procedures; Miscellaneous Amendments [Docket No.: 31636; Amdt. No.: 4193] received December 5, 2025, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); Public Law 104-121, Sec. 251; (110 Stat. 868); to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.

EC-2370. A letter from the Manager, Legal Litigation and Support, AGC-010, FAA, Department of Transportation, transmitting the Department's final rule — Airworthiness Directives; Airbus SAS Airplanes [Docket No.: FAA-2025-0912; Project Identifier MCAI-2024-00571-T; Amendment 39-23178; AD 2025-22-01] (RIN: 2120-AA64) received December 5, 2025, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); Public Law 104-121, Sec. 251; (110 Stat. 868); to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.

EC-2371. A letter from the Manager, Legal Litigation and Support, AGC-010, FAA, De-

partment of Transportation, transmitting the Department's final rule — Airworthiness Directives; Textron Aviation Inc. Airplanes [Docket No.: FAA-2025-3424; Project Identifier AD-2025-01362-A; Amendment 39-23164; AD 2025-20-11] (RIN: 2120-AA64) received December 5, 2025, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); Public Law 104-121, Sec. 251; (110 Stat. 868); to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.

EC-2372. A letter from the Manager, Legal Litigation and Support, AGC-010, FAA, Department of Transportation, transmitting the Department's final rule — Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes [Docket No.: FAA-2025-4002; Project Identifier AD-2025-01671-T; Amendment 39-23193; AD 2025-23-51] (RIN: 2120-AA64) received December 5, 2025, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); Public Law 104-121, Sec. 251; (110 Stat. 868); to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.

EC-2373. A letter from the Manager, Legal Litigation and Support, AGC-010, FAA, Department of Transportation, transmitting the Department's final rule — Airworthiness Directives; MHI R/J Aviation ULC (Type Certificate Previously Held by Bombardier, Inc.) Airplanes [Docket No.: FAA-2025-3995; Project Identifier MCAI-2025-01653-T; Amendment 39-23180; AD 2025-22-02] (RIN: 2120-AA64) received December 5, 2025, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); Public Law 104-121, Sec. 251; (110 Stat. 868); to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.

EC-2374. A letter from the Manager, Legal Litigation and Support, AGC-010, FAA, Department of Transportation, transmitting the Department's final rule — Airworthiness Directives; Polskie Zakłady Lotnicze Sp. z o.o. Airplanes [Docket No.: FAA-2025-3994; Project Identifier MCAI-2025-01607-A; Amendment 39-23179; AD 2025-21-51] (RIN: 2120-AA64) received December 5, 2025, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); Public Law 104-121, Sec. 251; (110 Stat. 868); to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.

EC-2375. A letter from the Manager, Legal Litigation and Support, AGC-010, FAA, Department of Transportation, transmitting the Department's final rule — IFR Altitudes; Miscellaneous Amendments [Docket No.: 31633; Amdt. No.: 588] (RIN: 2120-AA63) received December 5, 2025, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); Public Law 104-121, Sec. 251; (110 Stat. 868); to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.

EC-2376. A letter from the Manager, Legal Litigation and Support, AGC-010, FAA, Department of Transportation, transmitting the Department's final rule — Standard Instrument Approach Procedures, and Takeoff Minimums and Obstacle Departure Procedures; Miscellaneous Amendments [Docket No.: 31632; Amdt. No.: 4190] (RIN: 2120-AA65) received December 5, 2025, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); Public Law 104-121, Sec. 251; (110 Stat. 868); to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.

EC-2377. A letter from the Manager, Legal Litigation and Support, AGC-010, FAA, Department of Transportation, transmitting the Department's final rule — Standard Instrument Approach Procedures, and Takeoff Minimums and Obstacle Departure Procedures; Miscellaneous Amendments [Docket No.: 31631; Amdt. No.: 4189] (RIN: 2120-AA65) received December 5, 2025, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); Public Law 104-121, Sec. 251; (110 Stat. 868); to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.

EC-2378. A letter from the Manager, Legal Litigation and Support, AGC-010, FAA, Department of Transportation, transmitting the Department's final rule — Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Helicopters [Docket No.: FAA-2025-3431; Project Identifier MCAI-2025-01291-R; Amendment 39-23170; AD 2025-20-17]