

basic laboratory research to applied field work. However, with the creation of OCED, these activities were placed in a new office, separating critical expertise and adding an unnecessary layer of bureaucracy.

At the same time, the infrastructure bill and the Inflation Reduction Act appropriated over \$27 billion to OCED to fund these projects.

This combination of organizational restructuring and a large influx of funding should raise concerns for every lawmaker of this institution, considering DOE's past mismanagement of demonstration projects.

Since its inception, OCED has been slow to award funding and has struggled to identify unique capabilities not already addressed by the applied energy offices. Congress lacks adequate safeguards and the capacity to conduct rigorous oversight over OCED and its demonstration projects.

For example, when the Science, Space, and Technology Committee sought more information on DOE's decision to waive the cost-share requirement for a multimillion-dollar project, the Department was not obliged to document or justify its rationale. Requiring DOE to submit semiannual reports will provide Congress with crucial tools to protect taxpayer dollars, hold OCED accountable, and ensure that projects are based on merit rather than crony favoritism.

Mr. Speaker, I thank Representative CAREY for his continued leadership on this issue despite no longer even sitting on the Science, Space, and Technology Committee. I also thank Representative RILEY for his work in advancing this bill forward.

Mr. Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues to support this legislation, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SUBRAMANYAM. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Clean Energy Demonstration Transparency Act, as well.

The bipartisan Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, as mentioned, established a first-of-its-kind Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, and this new office was tasked with coordinating the Department of Energy's large-scale clean energy technology development. This office is now managing more than \$25 billion in funding to help scale emerging energy technologies that will help us tackle our most pressing climate challenges and achieve net-zero emissions as quickly as possible.

Last October, one of the initiatives supported by the office awarded \$1.1 million to a Virginia company, Roanoke Cement Company. They are working on a project for the use of clays to minimize the use of carbon-intensive components in cement production. This project has the potential to decrease carbon intensity of cement production by around 83 percent. Cement production is responsible for 2 percent of en-

ergy-related CO₂ emissions in the United States, so an 83 percent reduction in cement carbon intensity is very valuable.

This bipartisan bill authorizes simple and streamlined reporting requirements on the activities of the office, and it is a great transparency bill.

Mr. Speaker, I encourage my colleagues to support this bill, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. BABIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. CAREY).

Mr. CAREY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 1453, the Clean Energy Demonstration Transparency Act of 2025.

I introduced this commonsense, bipartisan legislation last Congress, which passed the House by voice vote. With more than \$25 billion in Federal funding from the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, the Inflation Reduction Act, and annual appropriations, the Department of Energy's Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations aims to support first-of-a-kind commercial-scale demonstrations and deploy them at viable and market-ready levels.

My bill requires semiannual reports to Congress on the status of these clean energy demonstration activities. With these reports, Congress can oversee these projects and ensure that taxpayer money is spent wisely and effectively.

Amid unprecedented Federal spending and soaring national debt, it is essential that we pass this legislation to avoid more Federal Government waste.

Overall, H.R. 1453 is a good government bill that improves accountability and transparency for the benefit of the American taxpayers. I thank Representative RILEY for being a great partner on this legislation, and I urge my colleagues to support it.

Mr. SUBRAMANYAM. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time to close.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. CAREY) as well as the gentleman from New York (Mr. RILEY) for their work on this bill.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote "yes" on H.R. 1453, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. BABIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time to close.

Mr. Speaker, one of our key responsibilities in Congress is to manage taxpayer dollars wisely. I don't take that job lightly. I want to see DOE and all of our vital Federal research agencies succeed in developing revolutionary next-generation technologies.

At the same time, we need to monitor the progress of these projects well before their costs balloon to multibillions of dollars and strain research budgets.

H.R. 1453 allows us to do precisely that. It enhances transparency between DOE and Congress, giving both parties the necessary information and insights into the successes of Federal dem-

onstration projects to foster further achievements.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. CAREY) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. RILEY), his cosponsor, for leading this bill.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this legislation, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. BABIN) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 1453.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

STRATEGIC PORTS REPORTING ACT

Mr. HUIZENGA. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 1701) to require the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State to monitor efforts by the People's Republic of China to build or buy strategic foreign ports, and for other purposes.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 1701

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Strategic Ports Reporting Act".

SEC. 2. MAPPING AND STRATEGY REQUIRED.

(a) MAPPING OF GLOBAL PORTS.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall—

(1) develop an updated, global mapping of foreign and domestic ports identified to be of importance to the United States, because of a capability to provide military, diplomatic, economic, or resource exploration superiority; and

(2) identify any efforts by the Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) or other PRC entities to build, buy, or otherwise control, directly or indirectly, such ports.

(b) SUBMISSION OF MAP.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit the mapping developed pursuant to subsection (a) to the appropriate congressional committees. Such submission shall be in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 3. DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STUDY AND REPORT ON STRATEGIC PORTS.

(a) STUDY REQUIRED.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall conduct a study of—

(1) strategic ports;

(2) the reasons such ports are of interest to the United States;

(3) the activities and plans of the Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) to expand its control over strategic ports outside of the People's Republic of China;

(4) the public and private actors, such as China Ocean Shipping Company, that are executing and supporting the activities and plans of the Government of the PRC to expand its control over strategic ports outside of the PRC;

(5) the activities and plans of the Government of the PRC to expand its control over

maritime logistics by promoting products, such as LOGINK, and setting industry standards outside the PRC;

(6) how the control by the Government of the PRC over strategic ports outside of the PRC could harm the national security or economic interests of the United States and allies and partners of the United States; and

(7) measures the United States Government could take to ensure open access and security for strategic ports and offer alternatives to PRC investments or stakes in strategic ports.

(b) CONDUCT OF STUDY.—The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense may enter into an arrangement with a federally funded research and development center under which the center shall conduct the study required under subsection (a).

(c) REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the findings of the study conducted under subsection (a).

(2) ELEMENTS.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall include—

(A) a detailed list of all known strategic ports operated, controlled, or owned, directly or indirectly, by the PRC or by a foreign person of the PRC, and an assessment of the national security and economic interests relevant to each such port;

(B) a detailed list of all known strategic ports operated, controlled, or owned, directly or indirectly, by the United States or United States persons and an assessment of the national security and economic interests relevant to each such port;

(C) an assessment of vulnerabilities of—

(i) ports operated, controlled, or owned, directly or indirectly, by the United States; and

(ii) strategic ports;

(D) an analysis of the activities and actions of the Government of the PRC to gain control or ownership over strategic ports, including promoting products, such as LOGINK, and setting industry standards;

(E) an assessment of how the Government of the PRC plans to expand its control over strategic ports outside of the PRC;

(F) a suggested strategy, developed in consultation with the heads of the relevant United States Government offices, that suggests courses of action to secure trusted investment and ownership of strategic ports and maritime infrastructure, protect such ports and infrastructure from PRC control, and ensure open access and security for such ports, that includes—

(i) a list of relevant existing authorities that can be used to carry out the strategy;

(ii) a list of any additional authorities necessary to carry out the strategy;

(iii) an assessment of products owned by the Government of the PRC or by an entity headquartered in the PRC that are used in connection with strategic ports or maritime infrastructure;

(iv) an assessment of the costs to—

(I) secure such trusted investment and ownership;

(II) replace products owned by the Government of the PRC or an entity headquartered in the PRC that are used in connection with such ports; and

(III) enhance transparency around the negative impacts of PRC control over strategic ports; and

(v) a list of funding sources to secure trusted investment and ownership of strategic ports, which shall include—

(I) an identification of private funding sources; and

(II) an identification of public funding sources, including loans, loan guarantees, and tax incentives; and

(G) a suggested strategy for Federal agencies to maintain an up-to-date list of strategic ports.

(H) an assessment of any national security threat posed by such investments or activities to United States diplomatic and defense personnel and facilities in the vicinity of such ports, including through cyber threats, electronically enabled espionage, or other means.

(3) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

(2) The term “relevant United States Government offices” means—

(A) the Unified Combatant Commands;

(B) the Office of the Secretary of Defense;

(C) the Office of the Secretary of State;

(D) the United States International Development Finance Corporation;

(E) the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; and

(F) the Maritime Administration of the Department of Transportation.

(3) The term “strategic port” means an international port or waterway that the heads of the relevant United States Government offices determine is critical to the national security or economic prosperity of the United States.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. TAYLOR). Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. HUIZENGA) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. MEEKS) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. HUIZENGA. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on this measure.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?

There was no objection.

Mr. HUIZENGA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of my bill, H.R. 1701, the Strategic Ports Reporting Act, introduced alongside Representatives ROB WITTMAN, JAKE AUCHINCLOSS, and JOHNNY OLSZEWSKI, and cosponsored by a bipartisan group of colleagues.

□ 1545

Mr. Speaker, this bill is simple, yet it is very necessary to expose the risks, the threats, and the vulnerabilities presented by overt Chinese-controlled global ports.

Specifically, the Strategic Ports Reporting Act requires the State Department, in coordination with the Defense Department, to develop a global mapping of foreign and domestic ports of strategic importance to the United States due to their capacity of providing military, diplomatic, economic, or resource exploration superiority. In other words, these are ports that are most important to the interests of the United States, both domestically and abroad.

Additionally, this bill requires a study analyzing the activities and plans of the PRC to expand its web of control over global strategic ports, while recognizing the U.S. national security and economic implications for such ownership.

China's malign influence abroad continues to reach new corners of the global economy. Emerging from the Belt and Road Initiative, Chinese President Xi Jinping's companion initiative, known as the Maritime Silk Road, ratifies a dominating stake in various countries by making critical investment in their strategic ports, some of which exist right here in the United States.

Something that should resonate with all of our constituencies, as we saw during the COVID-19 pandemic, is that vulnerabilities in supply chains have a significant, real-world effect on our supply, on pricing, and access to essential goods.

Moreover, the likelihood of the PRC leveraging its port infrastructure to exert economic leverage in the future remains a significant challenge to the United States and our allies.

While many of these investments and port projects are portrayed as commercial relationships, the PRC's global reach is cause for concern, given that many of these ports pose significant dual-use military risks. The fact remains that Chinese investments in strategic ports offer the CCP a launchpad to engage in a campaign of modern-day espionage.

Let's look at a couple of examples, Mr. Speaker. In the Western Hemisphere, the PRC opened its crown jewel, a gateway connecting South America to Asia in Chancay, Peru. This multibillion-dollar, deepwater megaport is owned by a Chinese state-owned entity, COSCO Shipping, which has ties to the People's Liberation Army.

Additionally, Chinese-tied entities manage ports at both ends of the Panama Canal. Here, the CCP coordinates private companies in pursuit of its communist agendas and wields the power to garner more political influence in a volatile region.

I commend President Trump and his administration for its leadership and persistence to work with the Panamanians and BlackRock to change this reality.

In the United States, two Chinese-owned entities, COSCO Shipping and China Merchants Group, a major participant and proponent in China BRI,

controls significant portions of the Ports of Long Beach, Seattle, Los Angeles, Houston, and Miami.

The opportunity we created, exposing our critical infrastructure to cybersecurity risks, foreign intelligence threats, and supply chain vulnerabilities, cannot be understated in my opinion.

Outside of our hemisphere, China casts a wide geostrategic footprint of malign influence at other critical chokepoints, including a multitude of Chinese-financed, developed, or managed ports across Africa. These ambitions provide access to critical minerals, naval launchpads, and consequential state power projections.

Additionally, the deep-sea port in the city of Anaklia on Georgia's Black Sea coast recently granted the tender for construction to a Chinese consortium sanctioned by the U.S. in 2020 for promoting militarization in the South China Sea. The strategic location of this port in the Middle Corridor, the trade route between China and Europe, would make this a crucial project for President Xi.

Unfortunately, I believe many of these projects are just another example of emerging economies lured in by China's debt-trap diplomacy.

To combat these efforts, the heads of relevant U.S. Government agencies must work collaboratively and creatively to ensure open access and security for strategic ports and offer alternatives to PRC investments in these ports. The Strategic Ports Reporting Act helps accomplish that goal.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, May 19, 2025.

Hon. BRIAN MAST,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN MAST: I write concerning H.R. 1701, the Strategic Ports Reporting Act, introduced by Representative Huizenga. As a result of your having consulted with us on provisions within H.R. 1701 that fall within the Rule X jurisdiction of the Committee on Armed Services, I agree to forego any further consideration of this resolution so that it may proceed expeditiously to the House floor for consideration.

The Committee on Armed Services takes this action with our mutual understanding that by foregoing consideration of H.R. 1701 at this time, we do not waive any jurisdiction over subject matter contained in this or similar legislation and that our committee will be appropriately consulted and involved as this resolution or similar legislation moves forward so that we may address any remaining issues in our jurisdiction.

Finally, I ask that a copy of our exchange of letters on this matter be included by House Committee on Foreign Affairs in the *Congressional Record* during floor consideration, to memorialize our understanding. Thank you for the cooperative spirit in which you have worked regarding this matter and others between our respective committees.

Sincerely,

MICHAEL D. ROGERS,
Chairman, House Committee on Armed
Services.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC, May 19, 2025.

Hon. MIKE ROGERS,

Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Thank you for consulting with the Committee on Foreign Affairs and agreeing to be discharged from further consideration of H.R. 1701, Strategic Ports Reporting Act, so that the measure may proceed expeditiously to the House floor.

I agree that your forgoing farther action on this measure does not in any way diminish or alter the jurisdiction of your committee or prejudice its jurisdictional prerogatives on this measure or similar legislation in the future. I would support your effort to seek appointments of any appropriate number of conferees from your committee to any House-Senate conference of this legislation.

I will submit the exchange of letters to be published in the *Congressional Record*. I appreciate your cooperation regarding this legislation and look forward to continuing to work together on matters of shared jurisdiction during this Congress.

Sincerely,

BRIAN J. MAST,

Chairman, House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 1701. When President Xi started the Belt and Road Initiative and the Maritime Silk Road Initiative, Beijing embarked on a coordinated state mandate to finance, acquire, access, enhance, and build ports around the world.

Today, the PRC is actively engaged in 115 port projects in at least 68 countries with more than \$65 billion invested or promised. At least 89 port projects have characteristics that could support military applications. With the largest Navy in the world, the PRC's ambitions are clear. It seeks global basing locations for an aspirational blue water Navy.

Representative HUIZENG's Strategic Ports Reporting Act will allow us to better track Beijing's attempts to grow its global maritime influence through its investments in foreign ports.

The United States Government needs ready access to all available information about the nature, extent, and intent of the PRC's involvement in port projects and maritime infrastructure around the world. We need a strategy to drive diplomatic, development, and defense engagements to mitigate threats from the PRC's activities at critical ports.

While several think tanks and research groups already map and report on PRC port activities, this bill's reporting requirements can shed light on the impact of these ports on U.S. interests and national security.

It is critical that the United States Government continue to monitor the nature, the extent, and the intent of the PRC's involvement in port projects and maritime infrastructure around the world and analyze the impact on U.S. strategic interests and on our partners and allies.

Mr. Speaker, I encourage all of my colleagues to join in supporting this measure.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. OLSZEWSKI).

Mr. OLSZEWSKI. Mr. Speaker, I thank the ranking member, and I thank my colleague, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. HUIZENG), for his leadership on this bipartisan and bicameral bill. I am proud to join his efforts and co-lead on legislation that will help safeguard our ports and boost our economy.

I have seen firsthand how critical our ports are to our national security, to our economic strength, and to the resilience of our supply chains. In my home State of Maryland, the Port of Baltimore is an anchor. It provides more than 15,000 direct jobs, supports another 140,000 connected jobs and services, and it is a critical gateway for commerce.

It is one of the largest ports in the country for automobiles and ranks in the top 10 nationally for total cargo. The Port of Baltimore, like so many ports across the country, is an economic lifeline for our communities.

Today, however, these lifelines face a growing challenge. Namely, China is aggressively expanding its influence over strategic ports around the world. China is building, buying, and controlling maritime infrastructure critical to U.S. interests.

They now control or have stakes in critical ports across Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and the Americas, providing Beijing with unprecedented leverage over key maritime chokepoints and global trade routes.

In the Western Hemisphere alone, Chinese companies have established ownership or operational control in ports spanning seven countries, including major terminals here in the U.S.

Last year, the House select committee on China and the House Homeland Security Committee conducted a joint investigation into the operation of ZPMC at U.S. ports. ZPMC is a Chinese state-owned company and the world's largest manufacturer of cranes.

At the Port of Baltimore, the FBI discovered intelligence-gathering equipment on board a vessel delivering ZPMC cranes to the Port of Baltimore. This allows China not only to advance its own economic interests but also to potentially disrupt shipping access and gather intelligence on U.S. military movements.

The Strategic Ports Reporting Act is a necessary and timely response to this threat. It is not just about commercial competition. It is about transparency, preparedness, and safeguarding our national security so we can continue to project power, protect our economy, and secure our supply chains.

This is a bipartisan and common-sense step to protect the American people. I urge my colleagues to support this bill and send a clear message. The U.S. will not cede control of our critical infrastructure to our adversaries.

Mr. HUIZENG. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the bipartisan involvement of

the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. OLSZEWSKI).

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, the United States needs a strategy to effectively mitigate threats from the PRC's growing maritime influence through its investments in foreign ports.

The report required under this bill will shine a light on the nature, the extent, and the intent of Beijing's involvement in port projects and maritime infrastructure around the world and will inform efforts by the United States Government to analyze the impact of these ports on U.S. interests and our national security.

Mr. Speaker, I hope that all of my colleagues will join me in support of this bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. HUIZENGA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague, Mr. WITTMAN, on my side of the aisle. I especially thank those on the other side of the aisle, Mr. OLSZEWSKI and Mr. AUCHINCLOSS, and my good friend, the ranking member, Mr. MEEKS, for working through this.

Mr. Speaker, peace through strength is a theme of the United States that we have had for a long time, and it is something that is imperative right now. Without stalwart diplomacy from the United States and its allies and economic partners, Communist China's global reach will only mature, sowing instability and insecurity and, frankly, as I talked about, some economic challenges abroad.

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the fact that the gentleman was talking a little bit about the private sector. I welcome and appreciate their involvement and their attempts to track and to analyze what is going on.

These other attempts at offering that strategy and the mapping of the critical assets oftentimes lack up-to-date information and do not take into account the warfighter perspectives that President Trump's DOD brings nor do they really use the lens of the U.S. national priorities.

Mr. Speaker, that is why I believe that this legislation is so important. The Strategic Ports Reporting Act was deliberated and negotiated within the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and a bipartisan consensus on the text was reached. That is where we are today.

It remains imperative that the U.S. use all of its tools available to thwart malign Chinese influence and protect America's national security, our economic interests, and even our warfighters. That time is now, and I urge my colleagues to support this bill.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. HUIZENGA) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 1701.

The question was taken.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.

Mr. HUIZENGA. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this question will be postponed.

The point of no quorum is considered withdrawn.

□ 1600

STRENGTHENING THE QUAD ACT

Mr. HUIZENGA. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 1263) to require a strategy for bolstering engagement and cooperation between the United States, Australia, India, and Japan and to seek to establish a Quad Inter-Parliamentary Working Group to facilitate closer cooperation on shared interests and values.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 1263

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Strengthening the Quad Act".

SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) as a Pacific power, the United States should continue to strengthen joint cooperation between the United States, Australia, India, and Japan (commonly referred to as the "Quadrilateral Dialogue" or "Quad" and referred to as such in this Act) to enhance and implement a shared vision to meet regional challenges and to promote a free, open, inclusive, resilient, and healthy Indo-Pacific, that is characterized by respect for democratic norms, rule of law, and market-driven economic growth, and is free from undue influence and coercion;

(2) the United States should expand dialogue and cooperation through the Quad with a range of partners to support peace and prosperity, the rule of law, freedom of navigation and overflight, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and democratic resilience in the Indo-Pacific;

(3) the pledge from the first-ever Quad leaders meeting on March 12, 2021, to address shared challenges, including in public health, cyberspace, critical technologies, counterterrorism, quality infrastructure investment, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, as well as maritime domains, laid the foundation for critical cooperation among Quad countries;

(4) the Quad countries, working through institutions, including the United States International Development Finance Corporation, the Japan International Cooperation Agency, and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, and through partnerships with multilateral development banks such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, should finance development and infrastructure projects in the Indo-Pacific region that are competitive, transparent, and sustainable;

(5) President Biden's decision to elevate the Quad to the leader level was critical to

bolstering cooperation, and all 4 countries should work to ensure that the Quad Leaders' Summit continues to take place regularly;

(6) the ambitious framework for ongoing cooperation laid out by the 4 leaders at the fifth convening of the Quad Leaders' Summit in Hiroshima on May 20, 2023, should continue;

(7) Secretary of State Marco Rubio hosted the Quad Foreign Ministers in Washington, DC on January 21, 2025—his first day in office—underscoring the continued importance of cooperation between the 4 democracies; and

(8) the formation of a Quad Inter-Parliamentary Working Group will—

(A) sustain and deepen engagement between senior officials of the Quad countries on a full spectrum of issues; and

(B) be modeled on the successful and longstanding bilateral inter-parliamentary groups between the United States and Mexico, Canada, and the United Kingdom, as well as other formal and informal parliamentary exchanges.

SEC. 3. STRATEGY.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy for bolstering engagement and cooperation with the Quad.

(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy required by subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) A description of how the United States intends to demonstrate democratic leadership in the Indo-Pacific through quadrilateral engagement with Australia, India, and Japan on shared interests and common challenges.

(2) A summary of—

(A) current and past Quad initiatives across the whole of the United States Government, including to promote broad based and inclusive economic growth and investment, and to advance technology cooperation, energy innovation, climate mitigation and adaptation, physical and digital infrastructure development, education, disaster management, resilient supply chains including in critical minerals, and global health security;

(B) proposals agreed to by all Quad countries since January 2021 to deepen existing security cooperation, intelligence sharing, economic partnerships, and multilateral coordination; and

(C) initiatives and agreements undertaken jointly with Quad countries, in addition to other like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific, on areas of shared interest since January 2021.

(3) A description of the diplomatic and bureaucratic barriers and obstacles to implementing and expanding existing streams of Quad cooperation.

(4) A list of recommendations on how Congress could assist in addressing the barriers described in paragraph (3), as well as—

(A) any new authorities needed to strengthen United States leadership in and contribution to existing and proposed Quad initiatives and programs; and

(B) additional resources needed to scale up and expand successful Quad initiatives and programs.

(c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.