

United States remains committed to its Euro-Atlantic aspirations and provides a framework for appropriate cooperation with the Georgian Government in light of worrying democratic backsliding in the country.

I thank my colleagues again for their steadfast support and leadership on this issue in support of Georgia's ambitions to join NATO and the EU, and I hope my colleagues will join me and support this bill.

Madam Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. MAST. Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, I firmly believe that every country in the world should choose the United States of America as their first partner and our allies over dictatorships like Russia and China. It is essential that these countries walk the walk.

American largesse will not be taken advantage of by those who accuse the United States of being part of a global war party or the global deep state.

Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this measure and stand with the people of Georgia and an America-first foreign policy, and I yield back the balance of my time.

□ 1545

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. MAST) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 36.

The question was taken.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.

Mr. MAST. Madam Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this motion will be postponed.

ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE PREVENTION ACT

Mr. MAST. Madam Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 1486) to impose sanctions with respect to economic or industrial espionage by foreign adversarial companies, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 1486

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Economic Espionage Prevention Act".

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) On March 14, 2024, the Department of State notified Congress of the following:

(A) People's Republic of China exports of semiconductors to Russia have increased substantially since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

(B) In the second half of 2023, China exported between \$25,000,000 and \$50,000,000 in

additional semiconductors to Russia every month relative to pre-invasion levels.

(C) During the same period, China also exported between \$50,000,000 and \$100,000,000 in additional exports to Russia every month to known transshipment hubs.

(D) These exports include both Chinese and United States-branded semiconductors (integrated circuits), according to analysis of commercially available trade data by the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce, and are almost certainly supporting Russia's military capabilities based on Ukrainian analysis of recovered Russian weapons.

(E) Because of the prevalence of United States manufacturing equipment in global semiconductor supply chains, nearly all chips produced worldwide, including in the People's Republic of China, are subject to United States export controls if destined for Russia or Belarus.

(F) All advanced semiconductors described on the Commerce Control List have been subject to a license requirement if destined to an entity in Russia since its further invasion of Ukraine.

(2) On April 3, 2024, Deputy Secretary of State, Kurt Campbell, said "I think we have assessed, over the course of the last couple of months that Russia has almost completely reconstituted militarily. And after the initial setbacks on the battlefield delivered to them by a brave and hearty group in Ukraine, with the support of China in particular, dual use capabilities and a variety of other efforts, industrial and commercial, Russia has retooled and now poses a threat to Ukraine . . . But not just to Ukraine, its new found capabilities pose a longer term challenge to stability in Europe and threatens NATO allies."

SEC. 3. REPORT.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of relevant Federal departments and agencies, as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, a written report that contains the following:

(1) An analysis and description of the extent to which any foreign person who is a citizen of the People's Republic of China or an entity organized under the laws of the People's Republic of China, or any foreign person or entity controlled by or operating at the direction of the Government of the People's Republic of China—

(A) is knowingly a material source of critical components necessary for the manufacture of weapons, vehicles, and other military equipment by the defense industrial base of the Russian Federation;

(B) has knowingly delivered critical components to or entered into any agreement relating to the sale or delivery of critical components with any entity operating in the defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation;

(C) has knowingly delivered critical components to or entered into any agreement relating to the sale or delivery of critical components with any country or entity with which the defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of Russian Federation are cooperating in support of Russia's war against Ukraine; or

(D) has knowingly delivered critical components to or entered into any agreement relating to the sale or delivery of critical components with a foreign person that knowingly and directly provides these components to the defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation.

(2) The extent to which—

(A) any foreign person that is a citizen of the People's Republic of China or an entity

organized under the laws of the People's Republic of China has knowingly engaged, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, in transactions with a person that is part of, or operates on behalf of, the defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation;

(B) any foreign person identified pursuant to subparagraph (A) has engaged in transactions which would constitute a significant transaction with persons that have been sanctioned for being part of, or operating on behalf of, the defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation; or

(C) any foreign person identified pursuant to subparagraph (A) has been subjected to sanctions imposed pursuant to sections 231 and 235 of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9525 and 9529).

(b) FORM AND AVAILABILITY.—

(1) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(2) AVAILABILITY.—The unclassified portion of the report required by subsection (a) may also be made available to the public.

SEC. 4. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO ECONOMIC OR INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE BY FOREIGN ADVERSARY ENTITIES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—On and after the date that is 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President (a) may impose the sanctions described in subsection (c) against any of the foreign persons described in subsection (b).

(b) FOREIGN PERSONS DESCRIBED.—A foreign person is described in this subsection if the President determines on or after the date of the enactment of this Act that the person is a foreign adversary entity that knowingly engages in—

(1) economic or industrial espionage with respect to trade secrets or proprietary information owned by United States persons;

(2) the provision of material support or services to a foreign adversaries' military, intelligence, or other national security entities; or

(3) the violation of United States export control laws.

(c) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions that may be imposed with respect to a foreign person under subsection (b) are the following:

(1) PROPERTY BLOCKING.—The exercise of all powers granted to the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in property and interests in property of the foreign person if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

(2) INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—

(A) VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—An alien described in subsection (b) is—

(i) inadmissible to the United States;

(ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and

(iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).

(B) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—An alien described in subsection (b) is subject to revocation of any visa or other entry documentation regardless of when the visa or other entry documentation is or was issued.

(ii) IMMEDIATE EFFECT.—A revocation under clause (i) shall take effect immediately and automatically cancel any other

valid visa or entry documentation that is in the alien's possession.

(d) EXCEPTIONS.—

(1) EXCEPTION FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.—Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any activity subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any authorized intelligence activities of the United States.

(2) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.—Sanctions under subsection (c)(2) shall not apply with respect to the admission of an alien if admitting or paroling the alien into the United States is necessary to permit the United States to comply with—

(A) the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States; or

(B) other applicable international obligations.

(3) EXCEPTION TO CARRY OUT OR ASSIST LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES.—Sanctions under subsection (c)(2) shall not apply with respect to an alien if admitting or paroling the alien into the United States is necessary to carry out or assist law enforcement activity in the United States.

(e) WAIVER.—The President may waive the application of sanctions under this section with respect to a foreign person for renewable periods of not more than 180 days each if the President determines and submits to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains a determination of the President that such a waiver is in the national security interests of the United States.

(f) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.—

(1) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may exercise the authorities provided to the President under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to the extent necessary to carry out this section.

(2) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of subsection (a) or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out that subsection shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of that section.

(3) PROCEDURES AND GUIDELINES FOR SANCTIONS.—The President shall establish procedures and guidelines for the implementation and enforcement of sanctions imposed under this section.

(4) ANNUAL REPORT.—

(A) Unless the exception in subparagraph (B) applies, not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and for each of the 5 years thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on any notable developments regarding economic or industrial espionage activities by foreign persons.

(B) The President shall not be required to submit the annual report described by subparagraph (A) if the President has imposed sanctions as authorized under this section within the previous calendar year.

(g) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—For purposes of this section, a transaction shall not be construed to include participation in an international standards-setting body or the activities of such a body.

SEC. 5. IMPORTATION OF GOODS EXCEPTION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The authorities and requirements to impose sanctions under this Act shall not include the authority or a re-

quirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods.

(b) GOOD DEFINED.—In this section, the term “good” means any article, natural or manmade substance, material, supply, or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment, and excluding technical data.

SEC. 6. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

(2) ECONOMIC OR INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE.—The term “economic or industrial espionage” has the meaning given that term in section 1637(d) of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015.

(3) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term “foreign person” means any person that is not a United States person.

(4) KNOWINGLY.—The term “knowingly”, with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result, means that a person has actual knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the result.

(5) OWN, PROPRIETARY INFORMATION, AND TRADE SECRET.—The terms “own”, “proprietary information”, and “trade secret” have the meanings given those terms in section 1637(d) of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (50 U.S.C. 1708(d)).

(6) PERSON.—The term “person” means an individual or entity.

(7) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term “United States person” means—

(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or

(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.

(8) FOREIGN ADVERSARY.—The term “foreign adversary” means the countries listed in section 7.4 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. MAST) and the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. OLSZEWSKI) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. MAST. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on this measure.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

Mr. MAST. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Madam Speaker, I rise in support for H.R. 1486, the Economic Espionage Prevention Act, introduced by my colleague from Georgia (Mr. MCCORMICK).

The Chinese Communist Party is working to undermine America's interests around the world and is the global supplier of America's adversaries.

As President Trump and his administration are working tirelessly to fi-

nally bring an end to the war in Ukraine, the CCP continues to stoke global chaos by providing massive amounts of industrial and economic support to Russia.

In fact, our State Department assessed that in the second half of 2023 alone, China supported the transfer of nearly \$300 million worth of semiconductors to Russia, including for use in missiles and drones.

The CCP's actions are blatant violations of U.S. export controls and detrimental to our ongoing peace efforts. China's economic and industrial support for Russia is a critical lifeline for the Russian military.

This is why it is critical that Congress pass the Economic Espionage Prevention Act. This bill would provide important sanction authorities for cutting off the CCP's illegal and industrial supply chains to America's adversaries. Enhancing U.S. export control enforcement with economic sanctions will help shut down China's massive support for Russia's defense industrial base.

This bill also enhances Congress' visibility into this illicit supply chain by requiring the State Department to issue a report identifying these individuals and entities that are supporting the Russian defense industrial base.

The CCP is relentlessly undermining President Trump's efforts to bring an end to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The Chinese companies illegally supplying Russia in violation of U.S. export controls must be subjected to the full weight of our sanctions regime. The bill ensures that the CCP and the world understand that supplying America's adversaries comes with a very severe cost.

Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this important bill, and I reserve the balance of my time.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,

Washington, DC, May 1, 2025.

Hon. BRIAN MAST,

Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,

House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN MAST: I write regarding H.R. 1486, the Economic Espionage Prevention Act. Provisions of this bill fall within the Judiciary Committee's Rule X jurisdiction, and I appreciate that you consulted with us on those provisions. The Judiciary Committee agrees that it shall be discharged from further consideration of the bill so that it may proceed expeditiously to the House floor.

The Committee takes this action with the understanding that forgoing further consideration of this measure does not in any way alter the Committee's jurisdiction or waive any future jurisdictional claim over these provisions or their subject matter. We also reserve the right to seek appointment of an appropriate number of conferees in the event of a conference with the Senate involving this measure or similar legislation.

I ask that you please insert this letter in the Congressional Record during consideration of H.R. 1486 on the House floor. I appreciate the cooperative manner in which our committees have worked on this matter, and I look forward to working collaboratively in

the future on matters of shared jurisdiction. Thank you for your attention to this matter. Sincerely,

JIM JORDAN,
Chairman.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC, May 1, 2025.

Hon. JIM JORDAN,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN JORDAN: Thank you for consulting with the Committee on Foreign Affairs and agreeing to be discharged from further consideration of H.R. 1486, the Economic Espionage Prevention Act, so that the measure may proceed expeditiously to the House floor.

I agree that your forgoing further action on this measure does not in any way diminish or alter the jurisdiction of your committee or prejudice its jurisdictional prerogatives on this measure or similar legislation in the future. I would support your effort to seek appointments of any appropriate number of conferees from your committee to any House-Senate conference of this legislation.

I will submit the exchange of letters to be published in the Congressional Record. I appreciate your cooperation regarding this legislation and look forward to continuing to work together on matters of shared jurisdiction during this Congress.

Sincerely,
BRIAN J. MAST,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. OLSZEWSKI. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Madam Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 1486. This is legislation that authorizes sanctions against any person or entity that provides material support for Russia's military and industrial defense base.

We know that Russia uses missiles, drones, planes, and rocket launchers to wreak havoc on Ukrainian cities and citizens. They do this to overthrow the government, to end democracy in Ukraine, and to seize Ukrainian territory to reconstitute a new Soviet Union, or at least a Soviet-like sphere of influence.

Ukrainians have bravely stood up to this unprovoked, unlawful aggression. The Ukrainian military has bravely fought back against the much larger Russian military and has repelled this invasion for years. The United States and its partners and allies have been critical to the defense of Ukraine, and Congress has been instrumental in the support we have provided.

As Russia continues to suffer heavy losses and economic hardship from waging this illegal invasion, it has turned to China and even Iran and North Korea for support. We absolutely should be bolstering sanctions not just on Russia's warmongering but also on its enablers.

China has played a crucial role in supporting Russia. Though they have not provided overt military support, they are continuing to provide dual-use goods, like industrial tools and semiconductors.

At a minimum, given its tendencies to appease Russia rather than pressure it, the Trump administration must

maintain the current posture of deterrence with the existing tools it already has. The better approach is for this administration to also use the additional tools offered by this legislation to deter further PRC shipments of dual-use goods to Russia.

Madam Speaker, I appreciate Representative MCCORMICK and Chairman MAST for negotiating further changes to this bill last week. I appreciate the bipartisan spirit that went into this legislation and for the work that both Ranking Member MEEKS and his team have done on this legislation.

Madam Speaker, I encourage my colleagues to join in supporting this measure, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MAST. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. MCCORMICK), the sponsor of this legislation.

Mr. MCCORMICK. Madam Speaker, I thank Chairman MAST and the minority party for supporting this bill.

Since illegally invading Ukraine, the Russian Federation has become reliant on the People's Republic of China for its supply of semiconductors and other critical dual-use technologies. The State Department notified Congress last year that the PRC exports of semiconductors significantly increased in 2023 compared to pre-invasion levels.

These semiconductors are critical key aspects to the Russian war effort, including economic and electronic warfare, command and control, and targeting. These components allow Russia to terrorize Ukrainian civilians with ballistic missile strikes, as well.

The prevalence of U.S. manufacturing equipment in global semiconductor production means nearly all are subject to U.S. export controls if destined for Russia or Belarus.

My bill seeks to reduce Russia's access to these semiconductors by authorizing sanctions on any foreign adversaries that materially support Russia's military and intelligence services, violate U.S. export laws, and steal U.S. intellectual property.

It further requires a report on whether China is providing significant support to Russia's military and updates existing law to provide greater flexibility to pursue sanctions against China and other foreign adversaries if they violate these export controls.

The PRC may publicly claim that they do not provide material support to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but their continued supply of dual-use technology clearly shows otherwise.

Cutting off the supply of semiconductors will seriously hamper the Russian war effort and show the world that we will not allow our adversaries to work together to destroy sovereign nations and undermine the international system.

Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 1486.

Mr. OLSZEWSKI. Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time for the purpose of closing.

Madam Speaker, H.R. 1486 will authorize sanctions on any person or entity that supports Russia's military and defense industrial base. Russia expected to take Kyiv in a matter of days, but it has now been years as brave Ukrainians continue to defend their country and their sovereignty against Russia's illegal invasion.

Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague, Representative MCCORMICK, and others for their work on this, as Russia has now had to turn to other nations for material support to continue that invasion, which is why Congress must not only continue our support of Ukraine but also authorize sanctions on those enabling Russia's war.

This is an important bill, and I am proud to support it. I hope we can put forward other legislation like this, including a few bills sponsored by Ranking Member MEEKS that have passed with bipartisan support in the past.

Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this legislation, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. MAST. Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, in closing, I again thank Representative MCCORMICK for his bill, as well as Select Committee on the CCP Chairman MOOLENAAR and Representatives BAUMGARTNER and LAWLER for their work to bring this bill to the floor to ensure that we finally end China's support for Russia's defense industrial base.

It is a great piece of legislation, and I urge all Members to support H.R. 1486.

Madam Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. MAST) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 1486, as amended.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

FALUN GONG PROTECTION ACT

Mr. MAST. Madam Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 1540) to provide for the imposition of sanctions with respect to forced organ harvesting within the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 1540

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Falun Gong Protection Act".

SEC. 2. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

It is the policy of the United States to—
(1) avoid any cooperation with the PRC in the organ transplantation field while the Chinese Communist Party remains in power;