

legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and to include extraneous material on this measure.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of my colleague, Mrs. WAGNER, and in support of the Taiwan Assurance Implementation Act. This bill reaffirms and strengthens the United States' commitment to Taiwan, one of our most important democratic partners in the Indo-Pacific.

Taiwan is under growing pressure from an increasingly aggressive Chinese Communist Party. Xi Jinping has made no secret of his intentions. Folding Taiwan into the People's Republic of China is central to his vision of national rejuvenation. He has made it clear he is willing to use force to make that happen.

The warning signs are in plain view. China is ramping up aerial incursions, conducting illegal exercises that simulate a blockade around Taiwan, threatening sanctions against Taiwanese industries, and relentlessly targeting Taipei with economic and political intimidation.

If we are serious about countering the CCP's ambition to displace the United States as a global leader, then we have to act with clarity and conviction. That starts with standing firm alongside Taiwan. We need to deepen our economic security and diplomatic cooperation with Taiwan and do so transparently and without apology.

Unfortunately, under the Biden administration, the State Department too often handcuffed U.S.-Taiwan engagement by clinging to outdated, self-imposed restrictions and bureaucratic red tape, weakening a vital partnership at a time when unity and strength are urgently needed. That is unacceptable.

The Taiwan Assurance Act passed with bipartisan support in 2020, but the stakes are even higher today. That is why this bill updates and strengthens the original law, ensuring that U.S. policy toward Taiwan reflects today's strategic reality, not yesterday's hesitations.

By removing self-imposed limitations on how we engage with Taiwan, we send a clear message to Beijing: The United States stands with free nations, and we will not be bullied into silence.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this important legislation, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. OLSZEWSKI. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I rise in support of H.R. 1512. In the 118th Congress, this body came together to overwhelmingly pass this bipartisan measure from Representatives Wagner, Connolly, and Lieu 404-7, and I see no reason why today's vote should be any less supportive.

It is critical that the United States shows unwavering support for our

friend Taiwan in the face of the PRC's persistent use of economic, political, and military coercion against it.

Just last month, the PRC conducted large-scale drills in the waters and airspace around Taiwan in a dangerous and destabilizing show of force. I heard these concerns reinforced recently during a congressional visit to the Pacific countries.

Under such tense circumstances, we must work to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait by bolstering deterrence and redoubling our commitment to the U.S. One China policy.

While providing Taiwan with the weapons to defend itself, we must also strengthen our unofficial relationship with Taiwan in the cultural and economic space and build resilience in Taiwan against PRC gray zone tactics.

Since 1979, in order to build a bilateral relationship with China, our government has maintained internal executive department guidelines to limit official interactions with Taiwan consistent with our One China policy. This bill simply directs the executive to report the guidelines to Congress every 5 years so that Congress is aware of them.

Mr. Speaker, I encourage my colleagues to join in supporting this measure, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MAST. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentlewoman from Missouri (Mrs. WAGNER), the sponsor of this legislation.

Mrs. WAGNER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of my bill, H.R. 1512, the Taiwan Assurance Implementation Act.

Mr. Speaker, it is undeniable that the People's Republic of China is the single gravest threat to our national security. It is undeniable that China has increased its destabilizing military activities in the Pacific. It is undeniable that China has its sights set on the full-scale invasion of Taiwan.

The United States must not waver in our deterrence of this threat and our support for this nation.

Just last month, the commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command testified to Congress that China escalated military pressure against Taiwan by 300 percent last year. Commander Paparo explicitly warned that these "aggressive maneuvers around Taiwan are not just exercises. They are dress rehearsals for forced unification."

It is imperative that the full weight of the United States stands firmly and publicly against these provocations.

For decades, our Nation employed a strategy of opacity, restricting our formal engagement with Taiwan to avoid upsetting or insulting the Chinese Communist Party.

In 2020, this body enacted the Taiwan Assurance Act, and the first Trump administration moved decisively to implement this new policy by declaring all self-imposed restrictions null and void.

Unfortunately, the Biden administration waffled and rolled back many of these diplomatic standards. Under my legislation, all administrations, now and into the future, will be required to periodically update these regulations, specifically with the goal of deepening and expanding U.S.-Taiwan relations.

We must stand shoulder to shoulder with our partners in the Pacific to deter the Chinese threat. I am proud to say that enacting this legislation, the Taiwan Assurance Implementation Act, will be a decisive step forward to ensuring peace through strength.

Mr. Speaker, I close by acknowledging my close friend and co-lead of this legislation, Congressman GERRY CONNOLLY, for his work on this legislation. Congressman CONNOLLY is a respected voice of authority on this issue and a tireless champion for the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. It has been an absolute honor to work with the Congressman on this legislation and so many other issues.

Mr. Speaker, GERRY and his entire family remain in our prayers.

Mr. OLSZEWSKI. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time for the purpose of closing.

Mr. Speaker, Taiwan is a friend and a fellow democracy that we should continue to engage with warmth and respect.

The United States needs a Taiwan policy that works for us and Taiwan while upholding our longstanding One China policy, which has kept Taiwan safe for over four decades.

Madam Speaker, I hope my colleagues will join me and support this bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. MAST. Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, Taiwan is not just a partner. It is a front line for democracy, and how we treat our friends in times of pressure defines our credibility around the globe.

If we are serious about countering the CCP, we have to pass this piece of legislation.

Madam Speaker, I urge all Members to vote for H.R. 1512, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mrs. KIM). The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. MAST) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 1512, as amended.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

□ 1530

MOBILIZING AND ENHANCING GEORGIA'S OPTIONS FOR BUILDING ACCOUNTABILITY, RESILIENCE, AND INDEPENDENCE ACT

Mr. MAST. Madam Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill

(H.R. 36) to counter the influence of the Chinese Communist Party, the Iranian Regime, and the Russian Federation in the nation of Georgia.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 36

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Mobilizing and Enhancing Georgia’s Options for Building Accountability, Resilience, and Independence Act” or the “MEGOBARI Act”.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;

(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(D) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(2) **NATO.**—The term “NATO” means the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

(3) **SECRETARY.**—The term “Secretary” means the Secretary of State.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the progress made by the people of Georgia in forging an innovative and productive society since the country’s independence from the Soviet Union should be applauded;

(2) the consolidation of democracy in Georgia is critical for regional stability and United States national interests;

(3) Georgia has seen significant democratic backsliding in recent years, as evidenced by numerous independent assessments and measures;

(4) the current Georgian government is increasingly hostile towards independent domestic civil society and its chief Euro-Atlantic partners while increasingly embracing enhanced ties with the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China, and other anti-Western authoritarian regimes;

(5) the United States has an interest in protecting and securing democracy in Georgia; and

(6) the Secretary should suspend the United States-Georgia Strategic Partnership Commission, established through the United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership on January 9, 2009, until after the Government of Georgia takes measures—

(A) to represent the democratic wishes of the citizens of Georgia; and

(B) to uphold its constitutional obligation to advance the country towards membership in the European Union and NATO.

SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to support the constitutionally stated aspirations of Georgia to become a member of the European Union and NATO, which is made clear under Article 78 of the Constitution of Georgia and is supported by the overwhelming majority of the citizens of Georgia;

(2) to continue supporting the capacity of the Government of Georgia to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity from further Russian aggression or encroachment within its internationally recognized borders;

(3) to call on all political parties and elected Members of the Parliament of Georgia to continue working on addressing the reform plan outlined by the European Commission

to resume Georgia’s recently granted candidate status through an inclusive and transparent consultation process that involves opposition parties and civil society organizations, which the people of Georgia have freely elected to pursue;

(4) to reevaluate its relationship with the Government of Georgia and review all forms of foreign and security assistance made available to the Government if it takes the required steps—

(A) to reorient itself toward its European Union accession agenda; and

(B) to advance policy or legislation reflecting the express wishes of the Georgian people;

(5) to emphasize the importance of contributing to international efforts—

(A) to combat Russian aggression, including through sanctions on trade with Russia and the implementation and enforcement of worldwide sanctions on Russia; and

(B) to reduce, rather than increase, trade ties between Georgia and Russia;

(6) to continue supporting the ongoing development of democratic values in Georgia, including free and fair elections, freedom of association, an independent and accountable judiciary, an independent media, public-sector transparency and accountability, the rule of law, countering malign influence, and anti-corruption efforts and to impose swift consequences on individuals who are directly responsible for leading or have directly and knowingly engaged in leading actions of policies that significantly undermine those standards;

(7) to continue to support the Georgian people and civil society organizations that reflect the aspirations of the Georgian people for democracy and a future with the people of Europe;

(8) to continue supporting the right of the Georgian people to freely engage in peaceful protest, determine their future, and make independent and sovereign choices on foreign and security policy, including regarding Georgia’s relationship with other countries and international organizations, without interference, intimidation, or coercion by other countries or those acting on their behalf;

(9) to call on all political parties, elected Members of the Parliament of Georgia, and officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia to respect the freedoms of peaceful assembly, association, and expression, including for the press, and the rule of law, and encourage a vibrant and inclusive civil society;

(10) to call on the Government of Georgia to release all persons detained or imprisoned on politically motivated grounds and drop any pending charges against them;

(11) to call on the Government of Georgia to thoroughly investigate all allegations emerging from the recent national elections, which took place on October 2024, make a determination whether the elections should be judged as illegitimate and hold those responsible for interference in the elections; and

(12) to continue impressing upon the Government of Georgia that the United States is committed to sustaining and deepening bilateral relations and supporting Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations.

SEC. 5. REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS.

(a) **REPORT ON RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE ASSETS IN GEORGIA.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a classified report, prepared consistent with the protection of sources and methods, examining

the penetration of Russian intelligence elements and their assets in Georgia, that includes an annex examining Chinese influence and the potential intersection of Russian-Chinese cooperation in Georgia.

(2) **APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.**—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

(b) **5-YEAR UNITED STATES STRATEGY FOR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH GEORGIA.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a detailed strategy that—

(A) outlines specific objectives for enhancing bilateral ties which reflect the current domestic political environment in Georgia;

(B) includes a determination of the tools, resources, and funding that should be available to achieve the objectives outlined pursuant to paragraph (1) and an assessment whether Georgia should remain the second-highest recipient of United States funding in the Europe and Eurasia region;

(C) includes a determination of the extent to which the United States should continue to invest in its partnership with Georgia;

(D) includes a plan for how the United States can continue to support civil society and independent media organizations in Georgia; and

(E) includes a determination whether the Government of Georgia remains committed to expanding trade ties with the United States and Europe and whether the United States Government should continue to invest in Georgian projects.

(2) **FORM.**—The report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, with a classified annex.

SEC. 6. SANCTIONS.

(a) **DEFINITIONS.**—In this section:

(1) **ADMISSION; ADMITTED; ALIEN.**—The terms “admission”, “admitted”, and “alien” have the meanings given such terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).

(2) **APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.**—The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(B) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate;

(C) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate;

(D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;

(E) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives; and

(F) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives.

(3) **FOREIGN PERSON.**—The term “foreign person” means any individual or entity that is not a United States person.

(4) **IMMEDIATE FAMILY MEMBERS.**—The term “immediate family members” has the meaning given the term “immediate relatives” in section 201(b)(2)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1201(b)(2)(A)(i)).

(5) **KNOWINGLY.**—The term “knowingly”, with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a

result, means that a person has actual knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the result.

(6) **UNITED STATES PERSON.**—The term “United States person” means—

(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States;

(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity; or

(C) any person within the United States.

(b) **INADMISSIBILITY OF OFFICIALS OF GOVERNMENT OF GEORGIA AND CERTAIN OTHER INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN BLOCKING EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall determine whether each of the following foreign persons has knowingly engaged in significant acts of corruption, or acts of violence or intimidation in relation to the blocking of Euro-Atlantic integration in Georgia:

(A) Any individual who, on or after January 1, 2014, has served as a member of the Parliament of the Government of Georgia or as a current or former senior official of a Georgian political party.

(B) Any individual who is serving as an official in a leadership position working on behalf of the Government of Georgia, including law enforcement, intelligence, judicial, or local or municipal government.

(C) An immediate family member of an official described in subparagraph (A) or a person described in subparagraph (B) who benefitted from the conduct of such official or person.

(2) **SANCTIONS.**—The President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (d)(2) with respect to each foreign person with respect to which the President has made an affirmative decision under paragraph (1).

(3) **BRIEFING.**—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall brief the appropriate committees of Congress with respect to—

(A) any foreign person with respect to which the President has made an affirmative determination under paragraph (1); and

(B) the specific facts that justify each such affirmative determination.

(4) **WAIVER.**—The President may waive imposition of sanctions under this subsection on a case-by-case basis if the President determines and reports to the appropriate committees of Congress that—

(A) such waiver would serve national security interests; or

(B) the circumstances which caused the individual to be ineligible have sufficiently changed.

(c) **IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO UNDERMINING PEACE, SECURITY, STABILITY, SOVEREIGNTY OR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF GEORGIA.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The President may impose the sanctions described in subsection (d)(1) and shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (d)(2) with respect to each foreign person the President determines, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act—

(A) is responsible for, complicit in, or has directly or indirectly engaged in, or attempted to engage in, actions or policies, including ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing acts that are intended to undermine the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Georgia;

(B) is or has been a leader or official of an entity that has, or whose members have, engaged in any activity described in subparagraph (A); or

(C) is an immediate family member of a person subject to sanctions for conduct de-

scribed in subparagraph (A) or (B) and benefitted from the conduct of such person.

(2) **BRIEF AND WRITTEN NOTIFICATION.**—Not later than 10 days after imposing sanctions on a foreign person or persons pursuant to this subsection, the President shall brief and provide written notification to the appropriate committees of Congress regarding the imposition of such sanctions, which shall describe—

(A) the foreign person or persons subject to the imposition of such sanctions;

(B) the activity justifying the imposition of such sanctions; and

(C) the specific sanctions imposed on such foreign person or persons.

(3) **WAIVER.**—The President may waive the application of sanctions under this subsection with respect to a foreign person for renewable periods not to exceed 180 days if, not later than 15 days before the date on which such waiver is to take effect, the President submits to the appropriate committees of Congress a written determination and justification that the waiver is in the national security interests of the United States.

(d) **SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.**—The sanctions described in this subsection are the following with respect to a foreign person described in subsection (b) or (c), as applicable:

(1) **BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.**—Notwithstanding the requirements under section 202 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701), the President shall exercise all authorities granted under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in property and interests in property of the foreign person if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

(2) **INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.**—

(A) **VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.**—A foreign person that is an alien shall be—

(i) inadmissible to the United States;

(ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and

(iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).

(B) **CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.**—The foreign person shall be subject to the following:

(i) Revocation of any visa or other entry documentation regardless of when the visa or other entry documentation is or was issued.

(ii) A revocation under clause (i) shall take effect immediately and automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the foreign person's possession.

(e) **IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.**—

(1) **IMPLEMENTATION.**—The President may exercise all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this section.

(2) **PENALTIES.**—A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of subsection (d)(2)(A) or any regulation, license, or order issued under that subsection shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of that section.

(3) **RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.**—Nothing in this Act, or any amendment made by this Act, may be construed to limit the authority of the President to designate or sanction persons pursuant to an applicable Executive

order or otherwise pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).

(f) **RULEMAKING.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall prescribe such regulations as are necessary for the implementation of this section.

(2) **NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS.**—Not later than 10 days before prescribing regulations pursuant to paragraph (1), the President shall notify the appropriate committees of Congress of the proposed regulations and the provisions of this section that the regulations are implementing.

(g) **SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO BROADER CORRUPTION IN GEORGIA.**—

(1) **DETERMINATION.**—The President shall determine whether there are foreign persons who, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, have engaged in significant corruption in Georgia or acts that are intended to undermine the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Georgia for the purposes of potential imposition of sanctions pursuant to powers granted to the President under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).

(2) **REPORT.**—

(A) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress that—

(i) identifies all foreign persons the President has determined, pursuant to this subsection, have engaged in significant corruption in Georgia or committed acts that are intended to undermine the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Georgia;

(ii) the dates on which sanctions were imposed; and

(iii) the reasons for imposing such sanctions.

(B) **FORM.**—The report required under subparagraph (A) shall be provided in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(h) **TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS.**—Any sanctions imposed on a foreign person pursuant to this section shall terminate on the earlier of—

(1) the date on which the President certifies to the appropriate committees of Congress that the foreign person is no longer engaging in the activities that led to the imposition of such sanction; or

(2) the sunset date described in section 7.

(i) **EXCEPTIONS.**—

(1) **DEFINITIONS.**—In this section:

(A) **AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY.**—The term “agricultural commodity” has the meaning given such term in section 102 of the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602).

(B) **GOOD.**—The term “good” means any article, natural or man-made substance, material, supply, or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment and excluding technical data.

(C) **MEDICAL DEVICE.**—The term “medical device” has the meaning given the term “device” in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).

(D) **MEDICINE.**—The term “medicine” has the meaning given the term “drug” in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).

(2) **EXCEPTIONS.**—

(A) **EXCEPTION RELATING TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.**—Sanctions under this section shall not apply to—

(i) any activity subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.); or

(ii) any authorized intelligence activities of the United States.

(B) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.—Sanctions under this section shall not apply with respect to a foreign person if admitting or paroling the person into the United States is necessary to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations.

(C) HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.—Sanctions under this section shall not apply to—

(i) the conduct or facilitation of a transaction for the provision of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, medical devices, or humanitarian assistance, or for humanitarian purposes; or

(ii) transactions that are necessary for, or related to, the activities described in paragraph (1).

(J) EXCEPTION RELATING TO IMPORTATION OF GOODS.—The requirement to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property under this section shall not include the authority or a requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods.

SEC. 7. ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE WITH RESPECT TO GEORGIA.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Upon submission to Congress of the certification described in subsection (c)—

(1) the Secretary of State, in consultation with other heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, should seek to further enhance people-to-people contacts and academic exchanges between the United States and Georgia; and

(2) the President, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, should maintain, and as appropriate, expand military co-operation with Georgia, including by providing further security and defense equipment ideally suited for territorial defense against Russian aggression and related training, maintenance, and operations support elements.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that, after the submission of the certification described in subsection (c) should the Georgian government take steps to re-align itself with its Euro-Atlantic agenda, including significant changes to the foreign influence law, the President should take steps to improve the bilateral relationship between the United States and Georgia, including actions to bolster Georgia's ability to deter threats from Russia and other malign actors.

(c) CERTIFICATION DESCRIBED.—The certification described in this subsection is a certification submitted to Congress by the President that Georgia has shown significant and sustained progress towards reinvigorating its democracy and advancing its Euro-Atlantic integration.

SEC. 8. SUNSET.

This Act shall cease to have any force or effect beginning on the date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. MAST) and the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. OLSZEWSKI) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. MAST. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on this measure.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

Mr. MAST. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Madam Speaker, the Republic of Georgia was once a prime contender for NATO and an ally of the United States, especially following Russia's 2008 invasion. The United States benefited from military and intelligence cooperation, and the Georgian people are well known for their pro-American sentiment.

Unfortunately, our bilateral relationship with Georgia has been eroded by the ruling Georgian Dream party's moves that mimic Russia's authoritarian tactics, as well as their rapprochement with China and Iran.

The opportunities provided by a pro-Western, democratic Georgia are manifest. Georgia's strategic location on the Black Sea makes it a pivotal nation for trade through the Middle Corridor to Central Asia and can be a counterbalance to Iranian and Russian influence in the region.

I support this bipartisan bill introduced by Mr. WILSON because it takes an America-first approach to the Republic of Georgia. This bill will impose sanctions on regime officials for their roles in undermining Georgia's sovereignty and pro-Western trajectory, as well as review our bilateral relationship, including assistance programs, and require a report that spotlights Russian intelligence actions in Georgia.

However, this bill also provides Georgia with an alternative. Once the President certifies that Georgia has returned to its pro-Western trajectory, it promises enhanced people-to-people ties, military cooperation, and encourages an improved bilateral relationship.

The United States should reward partners for good behavior. This bill is not an attack on the Georgian people. It seeks to support them by punishing rogue officials who are taking them further away from the United States.

The House Committee on Foreign Affairs favorably marked up a version of this bill during the last Congress, where it passed with a strong majority, and I expect it will receive similar support today.

Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this pragmatic approach to foreign policy and support this measure, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. OLSZEWSKI. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Madam Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 36, a bipartisan bill designed to make sure that the United States remains committed to Georgia's Euro-Atlantic and democratic aspirations.

I thank my friend, the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. WILSON), for his tireless efforts on this topic, in addition to his fervent work to support Ukraine.

For years following the fall of Communism and particularly after the Rose Revolution in 2003, the people of Georgia have worked to successfully build their democracy and their economy, all while fostering aspirations to join the EU and NATO.

The United States, along with European partners, have played an integral role in ensuring that the path of integration was open to Georgia and that its people had the means to implement the necessary reforms. Georgia's story has been one of success.

Georgia, strategically located on the Black Sea, is no stranger to larger geopolitical forces. Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 during the Beijing Olympics and proceeded to occupy 20 percent of its territory. Despite the persistent threat from Russia, Georgians continued to forge forward with democratic reforms and even made significant contributions to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as this legislation notes.

However, we know too well from the experience in other parts of Europe and at home that democratic progress is fragile and requires constant attention.

In February 2023, the Georgian Government introduced a foreign agents bill in its parliament that it claimed was aimed at transparency. However, the bill was set to impose burdensome restrictions on civil society organizations and independent media, stigmatizing them as foreign agents.

Following warnings from the United States and partners in Europe, as well as waves of protests, the government withdrew the bill, only to reintroduce it in April 2024. This time, despite massive protests, a Presidential veto, additional rebukes from the United States Congress, the Biden administration, and the EU, the Georgian Parliament pushed this legislation through.

Then, in another illustration of democratic backsliding, parliamentary elections were held in the fall of 2024 that were neither free, nor fair, and tainted by numerous and serious electoral violations.

This legislation is a response to the deteriorating democratic situation in Georgia. It will let the Georgian people know that we stand by them in their quest for democracy, respect for their rights, and deeper integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. This also provides a framework for appropriate cooperation with the Georgian Government going forward.

Madam Speaker, I am pleased with the bipartisan work of this bill, look forward to its passage, and hope that it has the desired effect to show the people of Georgia that Congress is watching, the United States cares, and that we want to ensure their future in Europe and NATO.

Madam Speaker, I encourage my colleagues to join in supporting this measure, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MAST. Madam Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. WILSON), the sponsor of this legislation.

Mr. WILSON of South Carolina. Madam Speaker, I thank Chairman BRIAN MAST for yielding and thank him for his leadership on behalf of the American people.

Madam Speaker, I am grateful for the bipartisan endorsement of this legislation. It is bipartisan with Republican and Democratic support and bicameral with Senate and House support of the MEGOBARI bill, which promotes the brave people of the Republic of Georgia.

For more than 155 days, the freedom-loving people of Georgia have peacefully taken to the streets in defense of the future and soul of their nation. They drape themselves in the flags of the United States and carry posters of our President, Donald Trump, as an indication of their love and affection for freedom and democracy.

Their will is clear: They will not allow the illegal regime of corrupt Bidzina Ivanishvili to drive their country into ruin and be dependent on the failed Soviet Union.

Georgia is a Black Sea nation that has always prized its hard-won freedom. Sadly, the will of the people is being subverted by the illegitimate Georgian Dream regime, an American-hating Mafia cabal that seeks to sell the country to U.S. adversaries, including the Chinese Communist Party, practically giving away a port on the Black Sea that should be for the people of Georgia.

They are also subservient to the regime in Tehran, who we know launched attacks against Israel just yesterday; and war criminal Putin, who seeks to indeed make the people of Georgia subservient.

The Georgian people are among the bravest and most pro-American in the world. I have had the opportunity, with three of my sons serving with Georgian troops across the world in Afghanistan and Iraq, to see how brave and capable the troops of Georgia are. Georgian troops have fought alongside American troops in the global war on terrorism and had no limits on the assignments that they would undertake bravely and competently.

In 2020, I was grateful to lead the Republican Study Committee national security report under then-chairman and now Speaker MIKE JOHNSON calling for sanctions on Ivanishvili. Republicans saw the threat then posed by this thug and his cronies.

Georgian Dream has moved swiftly to criminalize the association with America since the election of October 2026. It rejected bids by American companies for construction of their strategic deep-sea port to the Chinese Communist Party. Every major building contract, over \$100 million in U.S. dollars, has been awarded to the Chinese Communist Party or affiliated companies or state-owned companies of the Chinese Communist Party.

This blocks America from the Middle Corridor and cuts off land access to critical minerals in Central Asia,

which, additionally, want to be friends of America and friends of Western civilization. The regime peddles in daily anti-American propaganda accusing top officials of the United States Government, including President Trump and the very appreciated Senate Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman JIM RISCH, of corruption and acting as tools of the deep state.

In fact, just last week, there was a statement by government officials that Donald Trump was a tool of the deep state.

As the Trump administration State Department's spokesman, Tammy Bruce, said:

"Regarding continuing anti-democratic actions taken by the Georgian Dream government—as Vice President VANCE said in Munich, you cannot win a democratic mandate by censoring your opponents or putting them in jail, nor can you win one by disregarding your basic electorate on questions like who gets to be a part of our shared society."

This bill provides for sanctions against Georgian Dream thugs for their illegal actions, and it also provides for stronger bilateral ties after confirmation of Georgia's return to adherence to its constitution.

Madam Speaker, I urge support for this legislation for the mutual benefit of the people of Georgia and the people of the United States.

Mr. OLSZEWSKI. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. COHEN).

Mr. COHEN. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Madam Speaker, Georgia has long been a great friend to the United States. I went to Georgia for their election when they elected the Georgian Dream ticket about 12 years ago, but the Georgian Dream party has turned into the Georgian nightmare.

In America, Dr. King had a dream, and that dream still lives. Yet, the dream in Georgia, the country, is no longer alive and is pulling that country closer to our adversaries.

The illegitimate Georgian Dream party led by Ivanishvili rigged the October 2024 election, and they truly did rig it in that situation. It has been facing mass protests ever since. Every Sunday, there are mass protests in Georgia protesting deprivation of freedoms and liberties.

The Georgian Dream has orchestrated crackdowns on citizens, including banning the freedom of speech and assembly in Georgia, using violence against protesters, and abusing the court process to wrongfully imprison and charge protesters.

The Georgian people have protested for over 150 consecutive days and are still protesting today, especially on Sundays. They are calling for free and fair elections and the release of political prisoners.

The United States has long supported freedom in Georgia and now is no different. The MEGOBARI Act is an expression of that support.

As ranking member of the Helsinki Commission, I am proud to be the lead Democrat on the MEGOBARI bill along with my friend, Representative JOE WILSON.

This Act will evaluate all Georgian Dream officials for sanctions. If they are found to have undermined Georgian democracy or engaged in corruption, they will be sanctioned.

It also creates a report on Russian intelligence assets in Georgia and Russia-China cooperation undermining Georgian sovereignty. What is going on is basically a revolution where Ivanishvili, who runs the party and has investments in Russia, is trying to bring them closer to Russia and Putin.

Lastly, the bill envisions a stronger U.S.-Georgia relationship once Georgia returns to its traditional Euro-Atlantic path mandated in its own constitution and demanded by its people.

Madam Speaker, I thank Congressman JOE WILSON and the other co-leads of this important legislation, Congressman VEASEY and Congressman HUDSON, and I urge its passage.

Mr. MAST. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. DAVIDSON).

Mr. DAVIDSON. Madam Speaker, I thank the chairman for yielding.

Madam Speaker, I generally support everything that the chairman supports. This is a wrongheaded bill. Our colleagues need to say "no" to this. The American people did not send us here to expand America's security blanket to more parts of the world.

We don't have to get involved in every conflict we are invited to, and we certainly don't need to seek out extra ones. We can wish the people of Georgia well without expanding our commitment to be Europe's defense force with a blank check to defend every country. Admittedly, Georgia can't really defend themselves well against Russia. They are not even spending 2 percent of their GDP on defense in the current state. That is a minimum for admission into NATO.

My colleagues couldn't blame them for thinking that it doesn't really matter because even the biggest countries, like Germany, haven't historically hit that threshold either, but their economy isn't that big. Even if they were spending more, it wouldn't matter.

Madam Speaker, this is the wrong approach to national security, and it also further dilutes the effectiveness of our sanctions regime. I think it is a terrible idea. I think my constituents are wondering: Why we are doing this instead of the things that we campaigned on? I hope we get focused on an America-first foreign policy. This isn't it.

Madam Speaker, I oppose it, and I urge everyone else to, as well.

Mr. OLSZEWSKI. Madam Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield myself the balance of my time for the purposes of closing.

Madam Speaker, H.R. 36 works to show the people of Georgia that the

United States remains committed to its Euro-Atlantic aspirations and provides a framework for appropriate co-operation with the Georgian Government in light of worrying democratic backsliding in the country.

I thank my colleagues again for their steadfast support and leadership on this issue in support of Georgia's ambitions to join NATO and the EU, and I hope my colleagues will join me and support this bill.

Madam Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. MAST. Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, I firmly believe that every country in the world should choose the United States of America as their first partner and our allies over dictatorships like Russia and China. It is essential that these countries walk the walk.

American largesse will not be taken advantage of by those who accuse the United States of being part of a global war party or the global deep state.

Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this measure and stand with the people of Georgia and an America-first foreign policy, and I yield back the balance of my time.

□ 1545

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. MAST) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 36.

The question was taken.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.

Mr. MAST. Madam Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this motion will be postponed.

ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE PREVENTION ACT

Mr. MAST. Madam Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 1486) to impose sanctions with respect to economic or industrial espionage by foreign adversarial companies, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 1486

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Economic Espionage Prevention Act".

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) On March 14, 2024, the Department of State notified Congress of the following:

(A) People's Republic of China exports of semiconductors to Russia have increased substantially since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

(B) In the second half of 2023, China exported between \$25,000,000 and \$50,000,000 in

additional semiconductors to Russia every month relative to pre-invasion levels.

(C) During the same period, China also exported between \$50,000,000 and \$100,000,000 in additional exports to Russia every month to known transshipment hubs.

(D) These exports include both Chinese and United States-branded semiconductors (integrated circuits), according to analysis of commercially available trade data by the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce, and are almost certainly supporting Russia's military capabilities based on Ukrainian analysis of recovered Russian weapons.

(E) Because of the prevalence of United States manufacturing equipment in global semiconductor supply chains, nearly all chips produced worldwide, including in the People's Republic of China, are subject to United States export controls if destined for Russia or Belarus.

(F) All advanced semiconductors described on the Commerce Control List have been subject to a license requirement if destined to an entity in Russia since its further invasion of Ukraine.

(2) On April 3, 2024, Deputy Secretary of State, Kurt Campbell, said "I think we have assessed, over the course of the last couple of months that Russia has almost completely reconstituted militarily. And after the initial setbacks on the battlefield delivered to them by a brave and hearty group in Ukraine, with the support of China in particular, dual use capabilities and a variety of other efforts, industrial and commercial, Russia has retooled and now poses a threat to Ukraine . . . But not just to Ukraine, its new found capabilities pose a longer term challenge to stability in Europe and threatens NATO allies."

SEC. 3. REPORT.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of relevant Federal departments and agencies, as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, a written report that contains the following:

(1) An analysis and description of the extent to which any foreign person who is a citizen of the People's Republic of China or an entity organized under the laws of the People's Republic of China, or any foreign person or entity controlled by or operating at the direction of the Government of the People's Republic of China—

(A) is knowingly a material source of critical components necessary for the manufacture of weapons, vehicles, and other military equipment by the defense industrial base of the Russian Federation;

(B) has knowingly delivered critical components to or entered into any agreement relating to the sale or delivery of critical components with any entity operating in the defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation;

(C) has knowingly delivered critical components to or entered into any agreement relating to the sale or delivery of critical components with any country or entity with which the defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of Russian Federation are cooperating in support of Russia's war against Ukraine; or

(D) has knowingly delivered critical components to or entered into any agreement relating to the sale or delivery of critical components with a foreign person that knowingly and directly provides these components to the defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation.

(2) The extent to which—

(A) any foreign person that is a citizen of the People's Republic of China or an entity

organized under the laws of the People's Republic of China has knowingly engaged, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, in transactions with a person that is part of, or operates on behalf of, the defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation;

(B) any foreign person identified pursuant to subparagraph (A) has engaged in transactions which would constitute a significant transaction with persons that have been sanctioned for being part of, or operating on behalf of, the defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation; or

(C) any foreign person identified pursuant to subparagraph (A) has been subjected to sanctions imposed pursuant to sections 231 and 235 of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9525 and 9529).

(b) FORM AND AVAILABILITY.—

(1) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(2) AVAILABILITY.—The unclassified portion of the report required by subsection (a) may also be made available to the public.

SEC. 4. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO ECONOMIC OR INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE BY FOREIGN ADVERSARY ENTITIES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—On and after the date that is 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President (a) may impose the sanctions described in subsection (c) against any of the foreign persons described in subsection (b).

(b) FOREIGN PERSONS DESCRIBED.—A foreign person is described in this subsection if the President determines on or after the date of the enactment of this Act that the person is a foreign adversary entity that knowingly engages in—

(1) economic or industrial espionage with respect to trade secrets or proprietary information owned by United States persons;

(2) the provision of material support or services to a foreign adversaries' military, intelligence, or other national security entities; or

(3) the violation of United States export control laws.

(c) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions that may be imposed with respect to a foreign person under subsection (b) are the following:

(1) PROPERTY BLOCKING.—The exercise of all powers granted to the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in property and interests in property of the foreign person if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

(2) INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—

(A) VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—An alien described in subsection (b) is—

(i) inadmissible to the United States;

(ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and

(iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).

(B) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—An alien described in subsection (b) is subject to revocation of any visa or other entry documentation regardless of when the visa or other entry documentation is or was issued.

(ii) IMMEDIATE EFFECT.—A revocation under clause (i) shall take effect immediately and automatically cancel any other