

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 2458, the Secure Space Act.

Advancements in satellite technology have enabled broadband internet to be deployed at commercial scale. We must protect these systems from foreign adversaries. The Secure Space Act would prohibit the Federal Communications Commission from granting a license for geostationary orbit and nongeostationary orbit satellite systems if they are owned or controlled by an entity that provides communications equipment that pose an unacceptable risk to U.S. national security. That is common sense.

I thank Chairman GUTHRIE and Ranking Member PALLONE for their leadership on this particular bill, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 2458, the Secure Space Act, bipartisan legislation that I introduced last month with Energy and Commerce Chair GUTHRIE.

There is no question that we are once again in the midst of a new space age. It is opening a variety of new frontiers, curiosity, and innovation, including the use of satellites in space to provide broadband and other communications services.

As the demand for satellite services increases, so does the need to protect these communications networks from untrusted actors and equipment. We can't risk having our satellite networks face the same challenges we have seen in some of our other communications networks, which may be more challenging given the fact that satellites operate globally. It is, therefore, imperative that we ensure the satellite marketplace and its relevant supply chains are protected from threats by nontrusted actors.

H.R. 2458 helps meet these objectives. This legislation will extend the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act framework to the licensing of both geostationary and nongeostationary orbit satellites as well as the authorization of U.S. Earth stations. Effectively, this legislation will prevent entities identified as national security risks from gaining a license or authorization to access the U.S. satellite market. This is especially relevant given that the combined satellite fleets of China and Russia have grown by about 70 percent in the last few years.

By applying the Secure and Trusted framework to the satellite industry, we will take another crucial step toward protecting the public from untrusted entities and our foreign adversaries. The requirements in this legislation will not only benefit our Nation but will also help further the United

States' ability to protect our allies, as they, too, rely on these global satellite networks for broadband and emergency services.

I thank Chair GUTHRIE for working with me on this bipartisan bill.

Mr. Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues to support this timely legislation to protect Americans from untrusted actors seeking to use our communications networks against us.

Mr. Speaker, I urge support for the legislation, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Mr. Speaker, in closing, I urge a "yes" vote on this particular bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BILIRAKIS) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 2458.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

□ 1600

PROMOTING RESILIENT SUPPLY CHAINS ACT OF 2025

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 2444) to establish a critical supply chain resiliency and crisis response program in the Department of Commerce, and to secure American leadership in deploying emerging technologies, and for other purposes.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 2444

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the "Promoting Resilient Supply Chains Act of 2025".

SEC. 2. ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF COMMERCE FOR INDUSTRY AND ANALYSIS.

In addition to the responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act, the Assistant Secretary shall have the following responsibilities:

(1) Promote the stability and resilience of critical supply chains and critical and emerging technologies that strengthen the national security of the United States.

(2) Lead the Working Group established pursuant to section 3 and consult covered nongovernmental representatives, industry, institutions of higher education, and State and local governments in order to—

(A) promote resilient critical supply chains; and

(B) identify, prepare for, and respond to supply chain shocks to—

(i) critical industries;

(ii) critical supply chains; and

(iii) critical and emerging technologies.

(3) Encourage the growth and competitiveness of United States production and manufacturing in the United States of emerging technologies.

(4) Assess the resilience, diversity, and strength of critical supply chains and critical and emerging technologies.

(5) In consultation with the Secretary of State and the United States Trade Representative, support the availability of critical goods from domestic manufacturers, domestic enterprises, and manufacturing operations in countries that are allies or key international partner nations.

(6) Assist the Federal Government in preparing for and responding to supply chain shocks to critical supply chains, including by improving flexible manufacturing capacities and capabilities in the United States.

(7) Consistent with United States obligations under international agreements, encourage and incentivize the reduced reliance of domestic enterprises and domestic manufacturers on critical goods from countries that are described in section 7(2)(B).

(8) Encourage the relocation of manufacturing facilities that manufacture critical goods from countries that are described in section 7(2)(B) to the United States and countries that are allies or key international partner nations to strengthen the resilience, diversity, and strength of critical supply chains.

SEC. 3. CRITICAL SUPPLY CHAIN RESILIENCE WORKING GROUP.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Assistant Secretary shall establish a working group to be known as the "Supply Chain Resilience Working Group" (in this title referred to as the "Working Group") composed of the Federal agencies that rely upon the Industry and Analysis Business unit analysis, including agencies enumerated in subsection (c).

(b) ACTIVITIES.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Assistant Secretary shall carry out the following activities:

(1) In consultation with the Working Group—

(A) assessing, mapping, and modeling critical supply chains, including for critical and emerging technologies, which may include—

(i) modeling the impact of supply chain shocks on critical industries (including for critical and emerging technologies), and critical supply chains;

(ii) assessing the demand for and supply of critical goods, production equipment, and manufacturing technology needed for critical supply chains, including critical goods, production equipment, and manufacturing technology obtained by or purchased from a person outside of the United States or imported into the United States; and

(iii) assessing manufacturing, warehousing, transportation, and distribution related to critical supply chains;

(B) identifying high priority gaps and vulnerabilities in critical supply chains and critical industries (including critical industries for critical and emerging technologies) that—

(i) exist as of the date of the enactment of this Act; or

(ii) are anticipated to occur after the date of the enactment of this Act;

(C) identifying potential supply chain shocks to a critical supply chain that may disrupt, strain, or eliminate the critical supply chain;

(D) evaluating the capability and capacity of domestic manufacturers or manufacturers located in countries that are allies or key international partner nations to serve as sources for critical goods, production equipment, or manufacturing technology needed in critical supply chains;

(E) evaluating the effect on market stability that may result from the disruption, strain, or elimination of a critical supply chain;

(F) evaluating the state of the manufacturing workforce, including by—

(i) identifying the needs of domestic manufacturers; and

(ii) identifying opportunities to create high-quality manufacturing jobs; and

(G) identifying and describing necessary tools, including commercially available risk assessment tools, that leverage data and industry expertise to provide insights into critical supply chain vulnerabilities, including how such tools fulfill the requirements described in subparagraphs (A) through (F).

(2) In consultation with State and local governments, the Working Group, and (as appropriate) countries that are allies or key international partner nations—

(A) identifying opportunities to reduce gaps and vulnerabilities in critical supply chains and critical industries;

(B) encouraging consultation between the Federal Government, industry, covered nongovernmental representatives, institutions of higher education, and State and local governments to—

(i) better respond to supply chain shocks to critical supply chains and critical industries (including critical industries for emerging technologies); and

(ii) coordinate response efforts to supply chain shocks;

(C) encouraging consultation between the Federal Government and the governments of countries that are allies or key international partner nations;

(D) identifying opportunities to build the capacity of the United States in critical supply chains, critical industries, and emerging technologies;

(E) identifying opportunities to build the capacity of countries that are allies or key international partner nations in critical industries (including critical industries for emerging technologies) and critical supply chains; and

(F) developing and assessing contingency plans and coordination mechanisms to improve the response of critical supply chains and critical industries to supply chain shocks.

(c) **WORKING GROUP MEMBERSHIP.**—The Working Group shall include a representative from each Federal agency that relies on the analysis of the Industry and Analysis business unit, including—

- (1) the Department of State;
- (2) the Department of Defense;
- (3) the Department of Homeland Security;
- (4) the Department of Transportation;
- (5) the Department of Energy;
- (6) the Department of Agriculture;
- (7) the Department of the Interior;
- (8) the Department of Health and Human Services;

(9) the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; and

(10) the Small Business Administration.

(d) **DESIGNATIONS.**—The Assistant Secretary shall—

(1) not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, designate—

- (A) critical industries;
- (B) critical supply chains; and
- (C) critical goods;

(2) provide for a period of public comment and review in carrying out paragraph (1); and

(3) update the designations made pursuant to paragraph (1) not less frequently than once every 4 years, including designations for technologies that are not described in section 7(2)(B) that the Assistant Secretary considers necessary.

(e) **IMPLEMENTATION REPORT.**—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Assistant Secretary shall submit to the relevant committees of Congress a report that—

(1) details supply chain activities, including applicable activities described in subsection (b) and responsibilities described in

section 2, that the Assistant Secretary has conducted over the past year;

(2) describes supply chain data collected, retained, and analyzed by the Assistant Secretary over the past year;

(3) identifies and describes necessary tools, including commercially available risk assessment tools, that leverage data and industry expertise to provide insights into critical supply chain vulnerabilities, including how such tools fulfill each responsibility described in subsection (b);

(4) identifies and describes all Federal agencies with authorities or responsibilities described in subsection (b); and

(5) identifies Federal agencies, programs, and bureaus with duplicative purposes to fulfill any of the authorities or responsibilities described in subsection (b).

(f) **NATIONAL STRATEGY AND REVIEW ON CRITICAL SUPPLY CHAIN RESILIENCY AND MANUFACTURING IN THE UNITED STATES.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Assistant Secretary, in consultation with the Working Group, covered nongovernmental representatives, industries, institutions of higher education, and State and local governments, shall submit to the relevant committees of Congress a report that—

(A) identifies—

(i) critical infrastructure that may assist in fulfilling the responsibilities described in section 2;

(ii) critical and emerging technologies that may assist in fulfilling the responsibilities described in section 2, including such technologies that may be critical to addressing preparedness, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities relating to critical supply chains;

(iii) critical industries, critical supply chains, and critical goods designated pursuant to subsection (d);

(iv) other supplies and services that are critical to the crisis preparedness of the United States;

(v) substitutes for critical goods, production equipment, and manufacturing technology;

(vi) methods and technologies, including blockchain technology, distributed ledger technology, and other critical and emerging technologies, as appropriate, for the authentication and traceability of critical goods; and

(vii) countries that are allies or key international partner nations;

(B) describes the matters identified and evaluated under subsection (b)(1), including—

(i) the manufacturing base, critical supply chains, and emerging technologies in the United States, including the manufacturing base and critical supply chains for—

- (I) critical goods;
- (II) production equipment; and
- (III) manufacturing technology; and
- (ii) the ability of the United States to—

(I) maintain readiness with respect to preparing for and responding to supply chain shocks; and

(II) in response to a supply chain shock—

- (aa) surge production in critical industries;
- (bb) surge production of critical goods and production equipment; and

(cc) maintain access to critical goods, production equipment, and manufacturing technology;

(C) assesses and describes—

(i) the demand and supply of critical goods, production equipment, and manufacturing technology;

(ii) the production of critical goods, production equipment, and manufacturing technology by domestic manufacturers;

(iii) the capability and capacity of domestic manufacturers and manufacturers in countries that are allies or key international partner nations to manufacture critical goods, production equipment, and manufacturing technology; and

(iv) how supply chain shocks could affect rural, Tribal, and underserved communities;

(D) identifies threats and supply chain shocks that may disrupt, strain, or eliminate critical supply chains, critical goods, and critical industries (including critical industries for emerging technologies);

(E) with regard to any threat identified under subparagraph (D), lists any threat or supply chain shock that may originate from a country, or a company or individual from a country, that is described in section 7(2)(B);

(F) assesses—

(i) the resilience and capacity of the manufacturing base, critical supply chains, and workforce of the United States and countries that are allies or key international partner nations that can sustain critical industries (including critical industries for emerging technologies) through a supply chain shock; and

(ii) the effect innovation has on domestic manufacturers;

(G) assesses the flexible manufacturing capacity and capability available in the United States in the case of a supply chain shock; and

(H) develops a strategy for the Department of Commerce to support the resilience, diversity, and strength of critical supply chains and critical and emerging technologies to—

(i) support sufficient access to critical goods by mitigating vulnerabilities in critical supply chains, including critical supply chains concentrated in countries that are described in section 7(2)(B);

(ii) consult with other relevant agencies to assist countries that are allies or key international partner nations in building capacity for manufacturing critical goods;

(iii) recover from supply chain shocks;

(iv) identify, in consultation with the Working Group and other relevant agencies, actions relating to critical supply chains or emerging technologies that the United States may take to improve responses to supply chain shocks;

(v) protect against supply chain shocks relating to critical supply chains from countries that are described in section 7(2)(B); and

(vi) make specific recommendations to implement the strategy under this section and improve the security and resiliency of manufacturing capacity and supply chains for critical industries (including critical industries for emerging technologies) by—

(I) developing long-term strategies;

(II) increasing visibility into the networks and capabilities of domestic manufacturers and suppliers of domestic manufacturers;

(III) identifying and mitigating risks, including—

(aa) significant vulnerabilities to supply chain shocks; and

(bb) exposure to gaps and vulnerabilities in domestic capacity or capabilities and sources of imports needed to sustain critical industries (including critical industries for emerging technologies) or critical supply chains;

(IV) identifying opportunities to reuse and recycle critical goods, including raw materials, to increase resilient critical supply chains;

(V) consulting with countries that are allies or key international partner nations on—

(aa) sourcing critical goods, production equipment, and manufacturing technology; and

(bb) developing, sustaining, and expanding production and availability of critical goods, production equipment, and manufacturing technology during a supply chain shock; and

(VI) providing guidance to other relevant agencies with respect to critical goods, supply chains, and critical industries (including critical industries for emerging technologies) that should be prioritized to support United States leadership in the deployment of such technologies.

(2) PROHIBITION.—The report submitted pursuant to paragraph (1) may not include—

(A) critical supply chain information that is not aggregated;

(B) confidential business information of a private sector entity; or

(C) classified information.

(3) FORM.—The report submitted pursuant to paragraph (1), and any update submitted thereafter, shall be submitted to the relevant committees of Congress in unclassified form and may include a classified annex.

(4) PUBLIC COMMENT.—The Assistant Secretary shall provide for a period of public comment and review in developing the report submitted pursuant to paragraph (1).

(g) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Assistant Secretary shall enter into an agreement with the head of any relevant agency to obtain any information, data, or assistance that the Assistant Secretary determines necessary to conduct the activities described in subsection (b).

(h) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section may be construed to require any private entity—

(1) to share information with the Secretary or Assistant Secretary;

(2) to request assistance from the Secretary or Assistant Secretary; or

(3) to implement any measure or recommendation suggested by the Secretary or Assistant Secretary in response to a request by the private entity.

(i) PROTECTION OF VOLUNTARILY SHARED CRITICAL SUPPLY CHAIN INFORMATION.—

(1) PROTECTION.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, critical supply chain information (including the identity of the submitting person or entity) that is voluntarily submitted under this section to the Department of Commerce for use by the Department for purposes of this section, when accompanied by an express statement described in subparagraph (B)—

(i) shall be exempt from disclosure under section 552(b)(3) of title 5, United States Code (commonly referred to as the “Freedom of Information Act”);

(ii) is not subject to any agency rules or judicial doctrine regarding ex parte communications with a decision-making official;

(iii) may not, without the written consent of the person or entity submitting such information, be used directly by the Department of Commerce, any other Federal, State, or local authority, or any third party, in any civil action arising under Federal or State law if such information is submitted in good faith;

(iv) may not, without the written consent of the person or entity submitting such information, be used or disclosed by any officer or employee of the United States for purposes other than the purposes of this section, except—

(I) in furtherance of an investigation or the prosecution of a criminal act; or

(II) when disclosure of the information would be—

(aa) to either House of Congress, or to the extent of matter within its jurisdiction, any committee or subcommittee thereof, any joint committee thereof, or any subcommittee of any such joint committee; or

(bb) to the Comptroller General of the United States, or any authorized representative of the Comptroller General, in the course of the performance of the duties of the Government Accountability Office;

(v) may not, if provided to a State or local government or government agency—

(I) be made available pursuant to any State or local law requiring disclosure of information or records;

(II) otherwise be disclosed or distributed to any party by such State or local government or government agency without the written consent of the person or entity submitting such information; or

(III) be used other than for the purpose of carrying out this section, or in furtherance of an investigation or the prosecution of a criminal act; and

(vi) does not constitute a waiver of any applicable privilege or protection provided under law, such as trade secret protection.

(B) EXPRESS STATEMENT.—The express statement described in this subparagraph, with respect to information or records, is—

(i) in the case of written information or records, a written marking on the information or records substantially similar to the following: “This information is voluntarily submitted to the Federal Government in expectation of protection from disclosure as provided by the provisions of the Promoting Resilient Supply Chains Act of 2025.”; or

(ii) in the case of oral information, a written statement similar to the statement described in clause (i) submitted within a reasonable period following the oral communication.

(2) LIMITATION.—No communication of critical supply chain information to the Department of Commerce made pursuant to this section may be considered to be an action subject to the requirements of chapter 10 of title 5, United States Code.

(3) INDEPENDENTLY OBTAINED INFORMATION.—Nothing in this subsection may be construed to limit or otherwise affect the ability of a State, local, or Federal Government entity, agency, or authority, or any third party, under applicable law to obtain critical supply chain information in a manner not covered by paragraph (1), including any information lawfully and properly disclosed generally or broadly to the public and to use such information in any manner permitted by law. For purposes of this subsection, a permissible use of independently obtained information includes the disclosure of such information under section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code.

(4) TREATMENT OF VOLUNTARY SUBMITTAL OF INFORMATION.—The voluntary submittal to the Department of Commerce of information or records that are protected from disclosure by this section may not be construed to constitute compliance with any requirement to submit such information to an agency under any other provision of law.

(5) INAPPLICABILITY TO SEMICONDUCTOR INCENTIVE PROGRAM.—This subsection does not apply to the voluntary submission of critical supply chain information in an application for Federal financial assistance under section 9902 of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116-283).

SEC. 4. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT.

(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—The Secretary shall produce a report—

(1) identifying the duties, responsibilities, resources, programs, and expertise within the offices and bureaus of the Department of Commerce relevant to critical supply chain resilience and manufacturing innovation;

(2) identifying and assessing the purpose, legal authority, effectiveness, efficiency, and

limitations of each office or bureau identified under paragraph (1); and

(3) providing recommendations to enhance the activities related to critical supply chain resilience and manufacturing innovation of the Department of Commerce, including—

(A) improving the effectiveness, efficiency, and impact of the offices and bureaus identified under paragraph (1);

(B) coordinating across offices and bureaus identified under paragraph (1); and

(C) consulting with agencies implementing similar activities related to critical supply chain resilience and manufacturing innovation.

(b) SUBMISSION OF REPORT.—Not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the relevant committees of Congress the report required by subsection (a), along with a strategy to implement, as appropriate and as determined by the Secretary, the recommendations contained in the report.

SEC. 5. NO ADDITIONAL FUNDS.

No additional funds are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this title.

SEC. 6. SUNSET.

This title and all requirements, responsibilities, and obligations under this title shall terminate on the date that is 10 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 7. DEFINITIONS.

In this title:

(1) AGENCY.—The term “agency” has the meaning given that term in section 551 of title 5, United States Code.

(2) ALLY OR KEY INTERNATIONAL PARTNER NATION.—The term “ally or key international partner nation”—

(A) means a country that is critical to addressing critical supply chain weaknesses and vulnerabilities; and

(B) does not include—

(i) a country that poses a significant risk to the national security or economic security of the United States; or

(ii) a country that is described in section 503(b) of the RANSOMWARE Act (title V of division BB of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023; Public Law 117-328; 136 Stat. 5564).

(3) ASSISTANT SECRETARY.—The term “Assistant Secretary” means the Assistant Secretary of Commerce assigned by the Secretary to direct the office of Industry and Analysis.

(4) COVERED NONGOVERNMENTAL REPRESENTATIVE.—The term “covered nongovernmental representative” means a representative as specified in the second sentence of section 135(b)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2155(b)(1)), except that such term does not include a representative of a non-Federal government.

(5) CRITICAL GOOD.—The term “critical good” means any raw, in process, or manufactured material (including any mineral, metal, or advanced processed material), article, commodity, supply, product, or item for which an absence of supply would have a debilitating impact on—

(A) the national security or economic security of the United States; and

(B) either—

(i) critical infrastructure; or

(ii) an emerging technology.

(6) CRITICAL INDUSTRY.—The term “critical industry” means an industry that—

(A) is critical for the national security or economic security of the United States; and

(B) produces or procures a critical good.

(7) CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE.—The term “critical infrastructure” has the meaning given that term in section 1016 of the Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001 (42 U.S.C. 5195c).

(8) **CRITICAL SUPPLY CHAIN.**—The term “critical supply chain” means a supply chain for a critical good.

(9) **CRITICAL SUPPLY CHAIN INFORMATION.**—The term “critical supply chain information” means information that is not customarily in the public domain and relates to—

(A) sustaining and adapting a critical supply chain during a supply chain shock;

(B) critical supply chain risk mitigation and recovery planning with respect to a supply chain shock, including any planned or past assessment, projection, or estimate of a vulnerability within the critical supply chain, including testing, supplier network assessments, production flexibility, supply chain risk evaluations, supply chain risk management planning, or risk audits; or

(C) operational best practices, planning, and supplier partnerships that enable enhanced resilience of a critical supply chain during a supply chain shock, including response, repair, recovery, reconstruction, insurance, or continuity.

(10) **DOMESTIC ENTERPRISE.**—The term “domestic enterprise” means an enterprise that conducts business in the United States and procures a critical good.

(11) **DOMESTIC MANUFACTURER.**—The term “domestic manufacturer” means a business that conducts in the United States the research and development, engineering, or production activities necessary for manufacturing a critical good.

(12) **EMERGING TECHNOLOGY.**—The term “emerging technology” means a technology that is critical for the national security or economic security of the United States, including the following:

(A) Technologies included in the American COMPETE Act (title XV of division FF of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021; Public Law 116-260; 134 Stat. 3276).

(B) The following technologies:

(i) Artificial intelligence.

(ii) Automated vehicles and unmanned delivery systems.

(iii) Blockchain and other distributed ledger, data storage, data management, and cybersecurity technologies.

(iv) Quantum computing and quantum sensing.

(v) Additive manufacturing.

(vi) Advanced manufacturing and the Internet of Things.

(vii) Nano technology.

(viii) Robotics.

(ix) Microelectronics, optical fiber ray, and high performance and advanced computer hardware and software.

(x) Semiconductors.

(xi) Advanced materials science, including composition 2D, other next generation materials, and related manufacturing technologies.

(13) **INSTITUTION OF HIGHER EDUCATION.**—The term “institution of higher education” has the meaning given that term in section 101 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001).

(14) **MANUFACTURE.**—The term “manufacture”—

(A) means any activity that is necessary for the development, production, processing, distribution, or delivery of any raw, in process, or manufactured material (including any mineral, metal, and advanced processed material), article, commodity, supply, product, critical good, or item of supply; and

(B) does not include software unrelated to the manufacturing process.

(15) **MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY.**—The term “manufacturing technology” means a technology that is necessary for the manufacturing of a critical good.

(16) **PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT.**—The term “production equipment” means any component, subsystem, system, equipment, tool-

ing, accessory, part, or assembly necessary for the manufacturing of a critical good.

(17) **RELEVANT COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.**—The term “relevant committees of Congress” means the following:

(A) The Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate.

(B) The Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives.

(18) **RESILIENT CRITICAL SUPPLY CHAIN.**—The term “resilient critical supply chain” means a critical supply chain that—

(A) ensures that the United States can sustain critical industry, including emerging technologies, production, critical supply chains, services, and access to critical goods, production equipment, and manufacturing technology during a supply chain shock; and

(B) has key components of resilience that include—

(i) effective private sector risk management and mitigation planning to sustain critical supply chains and supplier networks during a supply chain shock; and

(ii) minimized or managed exposure to a supply chain shock.

(19) **SECRETARY.**—The term “Secretary” means the Secretary of Commerce.

(20) **STATE.**—The term “State” means each of the several States, the District of Columbia, each commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States, and each federally recognized Indian Tribe.

(21) **SUPPLY CHAIN SHOCK.**—The term “supply chain shock”—

(A) means an event causing severe or serious disruption to normal operations or capacity in a supply chain; and

(B) includes—

(i) a natural disaster;

(ii) a pandemic;

(iii) a biological threat;

(iv) a cyber attack;

(v) a geopolitical conflict;

(vi) a terrorist or geopolitical attack;

(vii) a trade disruption caused by—

(I) a country described in paragraph (2)(B);

or

(II) an entity or an individual subject to the jurisdiction of such a country; and

(viii) an event for which the President declares a major disaster or an emergency under section 401 or 501, respectively, of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5170; 42 U.S.C. 5191).

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BILIRAKIS) and the gentlewoman from Michigan (Mrs. DINGELL) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material in the RECORD on this particular bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 2444, the Promoting Resilient Supply Chains Act of 2025, led by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. JAMES), my good friend and a very effective Member of Congress.

I thank my colleagues, Representative JAMES, Representative HOUCIN,

Representative DINGELL, who is now the ranking member at this particular time, and Representative KELLY of Illinois for their bipartisan legislation.

During the pandemic, our country saw all too well the effects that weak supply chains can have on businesses and the American people. It is important that we, as a country, better prevent and mitigate insecurities within our supply chains to better protect our economic and national security.

This legislation is paramount to protecting such American security. By mapping and monitoring our supply chains and mitigating future vulnerabilities, we will also secure our global leadership in the advancement and development of emerging technologies.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join me in voting for this particular bill, H.R. 2444, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mrs. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 2444, the Promoting Resilient Supply Chains Act. I thank my co-leads of this bill, Representatives JOHN JAMES, ROBIN KELLY, and ERIN HOUCIN.

This bipartisan bill builds on the work we have done in recent years to strengthen American manufacturing, foster innovation, and protect both our economic and national security. It gives the Federal Government the tools and the authorities needed to map, monitor, and respond to supply chain vulnerabilities before they escalate into full-blown crises.

This legislation includes critical provisions from last Congress' Supply Chains Act, which I co-led, including a provision to designate the Assistant Secretary of Commerce to lead a governmentwide supply chain resilience effort.

It also ensures input from the Department of Labor and lays out a national strategy to coordinate action and prevent future disruptions. Leaving our manufacturers and suppliers vulnerable creates fragile supply chains that threaten both our economic and national security. This bill is a critical step toward preventing debilitating shortages.

Mr. Speaker, we must invest, rebuild, and protect our industrial base from threats to innovation and competitiveness. For too long, poorly negotiated trade deals, job outsourcing, and the decline of unionization have hollowed out our industrial base, leaving manufacturers and suppliers vulnerable. We have a responsibility to rebuild American manufacturing and protect workers because doing so is essential to both our economic strength and our national security.

Supply chain legislation is vital to our long-term competitiveness as a country, and I am glad to see that progress is being made on this bill.

Mr. Speaker, I strongly urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to support H.R. 2444, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. JAMES), my good friend and a very effective Member of Congress.

Mr. JAMES. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of my bill, H.R. 2444, the Promoting Resilient Supply Chains Act of 2025.

I especially thank my chairman, friend, and mentor, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BILIRAKIS), for his leadership and support. I also thank my good friend, the gentlewoman from Michigan (Mrs. DINGELL), who has been a mentor to me on the ways of D.C. and bipartisanship. The gentlewoman has been a family friend for such a long time.

I also have the pleasure of sharing the opportunity on this bill with ERIN HOUGHIN, my classmate; ROBIN KELLY; and PAT RYAN, my West Point classmate. This is an example of Congress coming together, reaching across the aisle, and working in the best interests of the American people. There are so many more instances of this type of bipartisanship than what may be seen on the news. Yet, Mr. Speaker, this is exactly how Congress is supposed to work, and I am very proud of my bill.

No matter how you slice it and no matter what industry, there is not a single American who isn't impacted by supply chains. In Michigan's 10th Congressional District, supply chains are the equivalent of rocket fuel, providing the firepower for the number one manufacturing district in the entire country to power Michigan's local and State economy.

Having strong, reliable supply chains is essential to ensuring that every American can get the food, fuel, medication, and every other consumer good that they desire.

This bipartisan bill is about bringing jobs back home and lowering costs for hardworking families. In today's world, supply chains are no longer just about cheaper prices at Meijer or Wal-Mart, they are vital to America's national security interests, as well.

Mr. Speaker, we must do everything in our power to ensure that our Nation's supply chain is resilient, shock resistant, and protected from nefarious foreign adversaries; this includes the Chinese Communist Party. The threat from China is real, and the time to act is now.

During COVID, we witnessed the risks of depending on a hostile supply chain with shortages in medicine, PPE, ventilators, and critical healthcare supplies when they forced us to rely on our adversaries for these lifesaving resources.

I will say that again. During a pandemic caused by a Chinese-made virus, the American people were forced to depend on the CCP for lifesaving supplies. That will never happen again.

It is ludicrous and absurd, a clear wake-up call that we would be foolish not to heed. To achieve a strong, resilient supply chain, we must have a co-

ordinated, whole-of-government approach that decreases our dependence on adversaries and leverages American ingenuity. It is crucial for our economic and national security.

Promoting resilient supply chains is a step in the right direction. This legislation specifically will create a supply chain resiliency program to identify and address gaps in critical industries and emerging technologies, establish an early warning system to predict and prevent supply chain disruption, and reduce dependence on adversarial nations by incentivizing domestic manufacturing.

Resilient global supply chains are the cornerstone of American innovation and leadership, and we must take clear and decisive action in the global competition.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this legislation, H.R. 2444, the Promoting Resilient Supply Chains Act of 2025.

Mrs. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, I urge our colleagues on both sides of the aisle to support H.R. 2444, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Mr. Speaker, in closing, again, I commend Representative JAMES for his great work on this particular bill. It is very necessary.

Mr. Speaker, I encourage a "yes" vote on the bill, obviously, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BILIRAKIS) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 2444.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2025

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 2482) to reauthorize the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 2482

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the "National Telecommunications and Information Administration Reauthorization Act of 2025" or the "NTIA Reauthorization Act of 2025".

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

Sec. 2. Definitions.

TITLE I—REAUTHORIZATION

Sec. 101. Reauthorization of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration Organization Act.

Sec. 102. NTIA Consolidated Reporting Act.

TITLE II—OFFICE OF SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT

Sec. 201. Office of Spectrum Management.

TITLE III—OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Sec. 301. Office of International Affairs.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) COMMISSION.—The term "Commission" means the Federal Communications Commission.

(2) NTIA.—The term "NTIA" means the National Telecommunications and Information Administration.

(3) UNDER SECRETARY.—The term "Under Secretary" means the Under Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information.

TITLE I—REAUTHORIZATION

SEC. 101. REAUTHORIZATION OF THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION ORGANIZATION ACT.

(a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—Section 151 of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration Organization Act is amended by striking "\$17,600,000 for fiscal year 1992 and \$17,900,000 for fiscal year 1993" and inserting "\$57,000,000 for fiscal year 2025 and \$57,000,000 for fiscal year 2026".

(b) UNDER SECRETARY OF COMMERCE FOR COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION.—

(1) UNDER SECRETARY; DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY.—

(A) UNDER SECRETARY.—The National Telecommunications and Information Administration Organization Act (47 U.S.C. 901 et seq) is amended by striking "Assistant Secretary" each place it appears and inserting "Under Secretary".

(B) DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY.—Section 103(a) of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration Organization Act (47 U.S.C. 902(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following:

"(3) DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY.—The Deputy Under Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information shall—

"(A) be the principal policy advisor of the Under Secretary;

"(B) perform such other functions as the Under Secretary shall from time to time assign or delegate; and

"(C) act as Under Secretary during the absence or disability of the Under Secretary or in the event of a vacancy in the office of the Under Secretary."

(2) CONTINUATION OF CIVIL ACTIONS.—This subsection, and the amendments made by this subsection, shall not abate any civil action commenced by or against the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information before the date of the enactment of this Act, except that the Under Secretary shall be substituted as a party to the action on and after such date.

(3) CONTINUATION IN OFFICE.—The individual serving as the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information and the individual serving as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act may serve as the Under Secretary and the Deputy Under Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information, respectively, on and after that date without the need for renomination or reappointment.

(4) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, regulation, document, paper, or other record of the United States to the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information shall, on and after the date of the enactment of this Act, be deemed to be a reference to the Under Secretary.