

(vi) Sensitivity of Technology:

The highest level of classification of defense articles, components, and services included in this potential sale is UNCLASSIFIED.

(vii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: December 17, 2024.

ARMS SALES NOTIFICATION

Mr. CARDIN. Madam President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification, the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant information is still available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the notifications that have been received. If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such an annex is available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations Committee, room SD-423.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEFENSE SECURITY
COOPERATION AGENCY,
Washington, DC.

Hon. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 24-34, concerning the Army's proposed Letter(s) of Offer and Acceptance to the Government of Norway for defense articles and services estimated to cost \$130 million. We will issue a news release to notify the public of this proposed sale upon delivery of this letter to your office.

Sincerely,

MICHAEL F. MILLER,
Director.

Enclosures.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 24-34

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of Norway.

(ii) Total Estimated Value:

Major Defense Equipment* \$105 million.

Other \$25 million.

Total \$130 million.

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase: Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case NO-B-VRY was below congressional notification threshold at \$2.79 million (no MDE) and included Precision Guidance Kit (PGK) cutaway models; fuze wrenches; enhanced portable inductive artillery fuze setters; GPS antennae and cables; improved Platform Integration Kits; PGK-associated hardware for testing; labor support; training aids; technical data and reports; U.S. Government technical assistance; incidental travel; transportation; PGK spare parts; equipment training; and related elements of logistics and program support. The Government of Norway has requested the case be

amended to include eight thousand one (8,001) M1156A1 PGK multi-option fuzes. This amendment will cause the case to exceed the notification threshold, and thus notification of the entire program is required. The above notification requirements are combined as follows:

Major Defense Equipment (MDE): Eight thousand one (8,001) M1156A1 PGK multi-option fuzes.

Non-Major Defense Equipment: The following non-MDE items will also be included: PGK cutaway models; fuze wrenches; enhanced portable inductive artillery fuze setters; GPS antennae and cables; improved Platform Integration Kits; PGK-associated hardware for testing; labor support; training aids; technical data and reports; U.S. Government technical assistance; incidental travel; transportation; PGK spare parts; equipment training; and related elements of logistics and program support.

(iv) Military Department: Army (NO-B-VRY).

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: None.

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None known.

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: December 17, 2024.

*As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Norway—M1156A1 Precision Guidance Kits Fuzes

The Government of Norway has requested to buy eight thousand one (8,001) M1156A1 Precision Guidance Kit (PGK) multi-option fuzes that will be added to a previously implemented case whose value was under the congressional notification threshold. The original Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case, valued at \$2.79 million, included PGK cutaway models; fuze wrenches; enhanced portable inductive artillery fuze setters; GPS antennae and cables; improved Platform Integration Kits; PGK-associated hardware for testing; labor support; training aids; technical data and reports; U.S. Government technical assistance; incidental travel; transportation; PGK spare parts; equipment training; and related elements of logistics and program support. This notification is for eight thousand one (8,001) M1156A1 PGK multi-option fuzes. The following non-MDE items will also be included: PGK cutaway models; fuze wrenches; enhanced portable inductive artillery fuze setters; GPS antennae and cables; improved Platform Integration Kits; PGK-associated hardware for testing; labor support; training aids; technical data and reports; U.S. Government technical assistance; incidental travel; transportation; PGK spare parts; equipment training; and related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total program cost is \$130 million.

This proposed sale will support the foreign policy goals and national security objectives of the United States by improving the security of a NATO Ally that is an important force for political stability and economic progress in Europe.

The proposed sale will improve Norway's capability to meet current and future threats and enhance its interoperability with U.S. and other allied forces. This proposed sale will enhance Norway's artillery and mid-range fire capability. Norway will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment into its armed forces.

The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The principal contractor will be Northrop Grumman Innovation Systems, located in

Dulles, VA. There are no known offset agreements in connection with this potential sale.

Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to Norway.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 24-34

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act

Annex Item No. vii

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:

1. The M1156A1 Precision Guidance Kit (PGK) is a cannon artillery fuze which uses the Global Positioning System to increase the delivery accuracy of standard 155 mm high explosive ammunition. The NA37 M1156A1 includes M-code capability and eliminates the need for an anti-tamper coating to protect critical KDP technology. It is also a height-of-burst fuze, which uses a proximity sensor to cause the round to burst in the air over the enemy, increasing lethality.

2. The highest level of classification of defense articles, components, and services included in this potential sale is SECRET.

3. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the information could be used to develop countermeasures that might reduce system effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or advanced capabilities.

4. A determination has been made that Norway can provide substantially the same degree of protection for the sensitive technology being released as the U.S. Government. This sale is necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined in the Policy Justification.

5. All defense articles and services listed in this transmittal have been authorized for release and export to the Government of Norway.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT FOR THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2025

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, this explanation reflects the status of negotiations and disposition of issues reached between the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025.

The explanation shall have the same effect with respect to the implementation of this Act as if it were a joint explanatory statement of a conference committee.

I ask unanimous consent that the explanatory statement for the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT ON THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2025

The following is the Explanatory Statement to accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 ("the Act"), which has been included as Division F of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025. The Explanatory Statement

reflects the result of negotiations between the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (together, “the Committees”). The Explanatory Statement shall have the same effect with respect to the implementation of the Act as if it were a joint explanatory statement of a conference committee.

The classified nature of U.S. intelligence activities prevents the Committees from publicly disclosing many details concerning their final decisions regarding funding levels and policy direction. Therefore, the Committees have prepared a classified annex—referred to here and within the annex itself as “the Agreement”—that contains a classified Schedule of Authorizations and describes in detail the scope and intent of the Committees’ actions.

The Agreement authorizes the Intelligence Community to obligate and expend funds as requested in the President’s budget and as modified by the classified Schedule of Authorizations, subject to applicable reprogramming procedures.

The classified Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated into the Act pursuant to Section 6102 of the Act. It has the status of law. The Agreement supplements and adds detail to clarify the authorization levels found in the Act and in the classified Schedule of Authorizations.

This Explanatory Statement incorporates by reference, and the Executive Branch shall comply with, all direction contained in the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report to accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (S. Rept. 118–181) and in the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Report to accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (H. Rept. 118–662). The Agreement supersedes all classified direction in the classified annexes to accompany S. Rept. 118–181 and H. Rept. 118–662 related to programs and activities authorized by the Schedule of Authorization.

The Executive Branch is further directed as follows:

STUDY ON THREATS POSED BY CITIZENSHIP-BY-INVESTMENT PROGRAMS

The Committees are concerned with the threats to the United States posed by citizenship-by-investment programs operated by foreign governments. A recent Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) report highlighted the ease of identity laundering, bribery and corruption that result from these programs, as well as the freedom of movement offered to malign actors, sanctioned individuals, weapons and human traffickers, and terrorists. The FATF and OECD report noted that these programs “make it challenging for compliance professionals at [financial institutions] or other businesses to engage in accurate due diligence,” undermine visa controls and sanctions enforcement, and facilitate the movement of individuals who have violated the law to other jurisdictions to avoid arrest.

The Committees therefore direct the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), in coordination with the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis of the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the heads of any other elements of the Intelligence Community the Director considers appropriate, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, to submit to the Committees a study on the threat posed to the United States by foreign citizenship-by-investment programs and the investments allowed under such programs; and provide to the committees a briefing on the results of the study.

The study shall include the following:

1. A detailed description of the threats posed to the national security of the United States by citizenship-by-investment programs;

2. The types of investments or contributions which an individual may make in exchange for citizenship under a foreign government’s citizenship-by-investment program, including investments in, or donations or transfers to, the government of a foreign country or any person, business, or entity in such foreign country, or for the benefit of a foreign country;

3. The use of such programs to evade sanctions or taxes, facilitate or finance crimes related to national security, including terrorism, weapons trafficking or proliferation, cybercrime, drug trafficking, human trafficking, and espionage, or any other activity which furthers the interests of a foreign adversary or undermines the integrity of the immigration laws or security of the United States, or undermines the United States and its interests through any other means identified by the Director;

4. The foreign countries whose citizenship-by-investment programs pose the greatest threat to the national security of the United States;

5. Recommendations for any additional resources or authorities necessary to counter such threats; and

6. A description of opportunities to counter such threats.

STUDY ON THREAT POSED BY FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN UNITED STATES AGRICULTURAL LAND

The Committees note that foreign ownership and investment in U.S. agricultural land—which includes farmland, pastures, and forest land—has grown almost 50% since 2017, according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). While foreign investors in U.S. agricultural land are required to submit forms describing their transactions to USDA by the *Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of 1978* (7 U.S.C. §3501) (AFIDA), AFIDA was not designed to identify potential national security concerns.

The Committees therefore direct the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in coordination with the elements of the Intelligence Community the Director considers appropriate, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, to (1) submit to the Committees a study on the threat posed to the United States by foreign investment in agricultural land in the United States, and (2) provide to the committees a briefing on the results of the study.

The study shall include the following:

1. Data and an analysis of agricultural land holdings, including current and previous uses of the land disaggregated by sector and industry, held by a foreign person from a country identified as a country that poses a risk to the national security of the United States in the most recent annual report on worldwide threats issued by the Director pursuant to section 108B of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. §3043b) (commonly known as the “Annual Threat Assessment”), a non-market economy country, or any other country that the Director determines to be appropriate;

2. An analysis of the proximity of the agricultural land holdings to critical infrastructure and military installations;

3. An assessment of the threats posed to the national security of the United States by malign actors that use foreign investment in agricultural land in the United States;

4. An assessment of warning indicators and methods by which to detect potential threats from the use by foreign adversaries of agricultural products for nefarious ends; and

5. An assessment of additional resources or authorities necessary to counter threats identified during the study.

INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT OF ECONOMIC COERCION BY THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION

The Committees direct that, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research shall submit a classified intelligence assessment to the Committees that (1) outlines economic coercion efforts by the People’s Republic of China in the Indo-Pacific region, and (2) describes measures that have been, or could be, taken to enhance the resilience of countries in the region to such coercion.

CLASSIFIED ANNEX TO REPORT ON MISSION EFFECT OF CIVILIAN HARM

Section 6323 of the Act requires the DNI, acting through the National Intelligence Council, to submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report examining the extent to which civilian harm that occurs during counterterrorism operations informs analyses of the Intelligence Community on the mission success of campaigns to degrade, disrupt, or defeat foreign terrorist organizations.

The Committees direct that this report include a classified annex, to be submitted to the Committees, that provides an inventory of (1) collection gaps and challenges that may affect the analysis of the success or failure of campaigns against terrorist groups, and (2) actions taken by the DNI to mitigate such gaps and challenges.

REPORT ON ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER DEDICATED TO STRATEGIC COMPETITION

Section 6307 of the Act, among other things, codifies the National Intelligence Management Council and expresses the sense of Congress that the DNI should create a role in the Council for a National Intelligence Manager dedicated to the People’s Republic of China.

The Committees direct the DNI, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and in consultation with the heads of elements of the Intelligence Community determined appropriate by the Director, to submit to the Committees a report that examines the potential effects of establishing a new national intelligence center dedicated to strategic competition, which would:

1. Integrate all-source intelligence on the plans and intentions of strategic competitors;

2. Synchronize intelligence collection efforts among the elements of the Intelligence Community;

3. Optimize resource investments made by elements of the Intelligence Community in support of strategic competition;

4. Integrate the work of other national intelligence centers that is relevant to strategic competition; and

5. Inform the President, Congress, and other policymakers as they craft and execute the United States’ approach to strategic competition.

The report shall seek to incorporate lessons learned from previous Intelligence Community reorganizations, including those undertaken pursuant to the *Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004* (P.L. 108–458). The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE WORKFORCE

The Committees find that—

1. From its inception, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) has met joint warfighter requirements because of a workforce that includes Intelligence Community

and Department of Defense civilians and uniformed service members;

2. The NRO has achieved success, in part, because the Department of Defense has consistently fulfilled its longstanding commitment to assign Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Guardians to positions at the NRO;

3. The NRO is negatively affected—and its ability to meet warfighter requirements diminished—when the United States Space Force does not assign Guardians to the NRO at a rate that meets the NRO requirements;

4. The NRO and the Space Force jointly benefit from Guardian assignments at the NRO; and

5. The NRO and Space Force are negatively affected by the Space Force's uneven emphasis on developing space operators without similar emphasis on developing Guardians with space acquisition and engineering expertise.

Therefore, the Committees direct the DNI and the heads of any other departments and agencies the Director deems relevant to provide quarterly updates to the appropriate congressional committees on the status of the Department of Defense fulfilling its commitment to assign uniformed personnel to the NRO.

INCREASED EFFORT AND RESOURCES IN THE FIELD OF GEOMATICS

The Committees find that—

1. The Intelligence Community and the broader United States Government require professionals with advanced training in geomatics and geodesy, and the preservation of these skillsets is crucial to advancing geospatial intelligence tradecraft for the United States for national security and military operations;

2. The Intelligence Community should use existing authorities to engage in novel ways with academic and industry partners to ensure the Intelligence Community's demand signal for geomatics and geodesy professionals is received by the largest possible number of United States citizens while also seeking to foster a culture of academic excellence and research to propel the field of geomatics forward at the pace of innovation;

3. By engaging with academic and industry partners, the Intelligence Community can help speed the reversal of the current trend wherein the United States not only produces fewer geomatics scientists and engineers compared to its global competitors and potential adversaries, but such competitors and adversaries also provide them with training and expertise that could be used against the United States;

4. There is abundant opportunity for the Intelligence Community to advance its growing need for geomatics and geodesy professionals by partnering with American universities and researchers with proven experience in diverse fields who can lead the way to solving the United States most vexing geomatics challenges; and

5. The Intelligence Community must balance the increasing demand for recruiting the best geomatics and geodesy talent while still ensuring a dedicated and patriotic workforce with allegiance to the Constitution and the United States Government.

REMEMBERING MITSUYE ENDO TSUTSUMI

Ms. HIRONO. Madam President, today I rise to honor the late Mitsuye Endo Tsutsumi on the 80th anniversary of the historic Supreme Court decision in her case *Ex parte Endo* for her courageous contributions to civil rights.

Mitsuye Endo was born on May 10, 1920, in Sacramento, CA. After grad-

uating from Sacramento Senior High School, she attended secretarial school and began a clerical job with the California Department of Employment. Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, Ms. Endo was fired from her State civil service job due to her race. She joined a lawsuit challenging California's wrongful termination of civil servants with Japanese ancestry, beginning her fight against the unjust treatment of Japanese Americans during World War II.

After Executive Order 9066 was signed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Mitsuye Endo and over 120,000 other Japanese Americans were forcibly removed and incarcerated in desolate camps in the interior of the country. They were incarcerated behind barbed wire and armed guards under the pretense that they posed a threat to national security on the basis of their race. Ms. Endo and her family were incarcerated for 3 years, first at Tule Lake, CA, and later at Topaz, UT, both euphemistically referred to as "Relocation Centers."

Mitsuye Endo stood up for what she knew was right and filed a lawsuit challenging her incarceration in July 1942. While her case was pending in the Supreme Court, the government offered her an immediate leave permit, which would have resulted in the dismissal of her lawsuit. She refused to accept the permit, even though it meant she had to remain incarcerated for over 1 more year. She stated, "The fact that I wanted to prove that we of Japanese ancestry were not guilty of any crime, that we were loyal American citizens, kept me from abandoning the suit."

On December 18, 1944—80 years ago, today—the Supreme Court unanimously ruled in Mitsuye Endo's favor, holding that "concededly loyal" Japanese Americans could not be imprisoned without cause. Ms. Endo's case played a crucial role in ending incarceration; news of the Court's pending decision prompted President Roosevelt to announce the closure of the camps just 1 day before the Court's decision.

Even after her passing in 2006, Mitsuye Endo Tsutsumi's legacy of courage and integrity lives on in the thriving Japanese American communities across the country.

Thank you, Mitsuye Endo Tsutsumi, for your contributions to this Nation.

RECOGNIZING TENNESSEE'S 134TH AIR REFUELING WING

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Madam President, for almost a century, the U.S. Armed Forces' Distinguished Flying Cross has honored airmen who have demonstrated heroism and extraordinary achievement in aerial flight. Earlier this month, 11 members of the Tennessee Air National Guard's 134th Air Refueling Wing joined this distinguished group of honorees for their courageous actions in defense of Israel.

After Iran fired more than 300 drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles

toward the Jewish state on April 13, 2024, the aircrews of the 134th jumped into action to help defend our cherished ally, supplying tens of thousands of pounds of fuel for U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles that worked to intercept the threats. To accomplish this feat, the aircrews flew into dangerous airspace without onboard defensive systems or advanced situational awareness tools, facing great risk while ensuring the fighters could remain focused on their mission. With the 134th's support, U.S. Forces joined our coalition partners and Israeli defenses in eliminating nearly 99 percent of inbound drones, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles, saving countless lives.

On behalf of all Tennesseans, I extend my heartfelt congratulations to the 134th Air Refueling Wing on this well-deserved honor. Through their skill, determination, and valor, these 11 Airmen served our Nation admirably while helping defend our ally in a moment of great danger.

TRIBUTE TO MAJOR MICHAEL MARFUT

Mr. KING. Madam President, today I wish to recognize MAJ Michael Marfut, U.S. Army, for his outstanding work on behalf of the people of Maine and the Nation as a 2024 Department of Defense Legislative Fellow serving in my Washington, DC, office.

Over the past year, Mike has been integral in shaping my foreign policy and defense priorities. He helped secure several provisions in the fiscal year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act—FY25 NDAA—that will make our country stronger and safer. Mike led my staff in orchestrating important appropriations for the Department of Defense, Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy. He also helped lead an excellent congressional delegation to the Antietam Battlefield. His contributions to office morale and our collective work product are emblematic of his good character, competence, and strong work ethic.

Throughout his tenure in my office, Mike demonstrated a level of professionalism and hard work I have come to expect—but not take for granted—from Department of Defense Legislative Fellows. Indeed, he follows a long line of accomplished military officers who have made impactful contributions to my office and U.S. national security policy. Over the course of the year, Mike prepared and advised me on wide-ranging and complex matters under consideration before the Senate Armed Services Committee. His attention to detail has served me well; Mike managed over 400 individual authorization and appropriation requests and over 600 markup amendments. He brought his operational and leadership expertise to assist me in the Strategic Forces Subcommittee briefings and deliberations which resulted in critical