

And these floods can destroy homes, businesses and leave them—if they don't destroy them right away, they can leave them moist. And when it is moist, it begins to rot from the inside. And homes that families have lived in for over 50 years that have never flooded before can become unlivable.

So if you come down to Louisiana or California or Pennsylvania or West Virginia or other things, and you ask folks in the bottom of a riverbed, for example, if a flood can upend their life, they will say emphatically yes.

So if we know the answer is an emphatic yes, then what can Congress do about it, if anything? Well, we have a mechanism to address it, the National Flood Insurance Program which currently ensures 4.7 million American families. It is a Federal program, and we are the ones that can change it to make it more reliable, more affordable, more sustainable.

But the challenge is that it is a tough topic. A lot of folks in Congress just don't understand the issue. And so we need to have the understanding, but then we also need the political will.

Now, this has just kind of—boom—up, up, up in urgency. The Federal Emergency Management Agency recently implemented a new risk assessment called Risk Rating 2.0. Now Risk Rating 2.0 affects Louisiana, the Gulf Coast—frankly, all coasts and anyplace where there is a river or stream that can overflow, and it particularly affects folks who are lower income.

Sometimes people say that the flood insurance program is a program for rich people. Not true; 62 percent of all NFIP policies are in parishes or counties where the median household income is below the national average of \$54,000. And truth be told that, as we again just saw in California—what you think of as a desert State—flooding can occur in any State.

So if we look here, here are NFIP claims by cost: 44 out of 50 States have had over \$50 million of National Flood Insurance Program claims from 1978 to 2021. And there are only 6 States that have less than \$50 million in claims; 13 States have had over a billion in damage, and they are all over the map. It is Virginia—and not just the coastal states—it is Missouri; it is the States on the gulf; it is California; it is going up the northeast. This is geographically distributed.

And, by the way, these are the States hit hardest, but they are not the only States. Every State has had at least an NFIP claim somewhere, sometime, because every State is affected by flooding.

Now, the way the program is currently being conducted, however, is putting it into what is called an actuarial death spiral. Rising premiums mean fewer can afford the insurance. So let's set this up. Right now, you have people at high risk; and the way insurance works is it spreads it over plans over homes that have a lower risk. But if you raise everybody's pre-

miums dramatically, the people who are at lowest risk will drop their coverage. And so you have the same amount of risk, but now it is concentrated upon a smaller pool of homes. That concentration raises the rates even more. And those who are the lowest risk in that pool drop their insurance, which further concentrates. That is called an actuarial death spiral.

I hate to put it this way, but it is visual. Think of when you flush the toilet and it begins to spin, and then that spin goes down. Well, that spinning is that death spiral, and the water in the pool gets smaller and smaller and smaller until it is gone and there is no one left who can afford the cost for the insurance, and it ceases to exist.

Now, by the way, this is true of every insurance program. I am describing the National Flood Insurance Program, but this actuarial death spiral is actually known to be just an insurance—that is just how insurance works. If your pool gets too small, risk too concentrated, the whole thing goes away.

But the problem is, what is happening to the National Flood Insurance Program ignores the fact that the program is actually a bargain. And this is the real problem: When I have telephone townhalls and meeting with constituents, they tell me that their property—their property insurance, their casualty insurance—if you add that to their flood insurance, it is now more than their mortgage. So they are making the tough decision: Do I either leave my home, or do I drop my coverage?

So let's just talk a little bit more about Risk Rating 2.0. First, recognize that this rate hike that we are currently going under could have been stopped with the stroke of a President's pen. Either President Biden or President Trump could have told FEMA to delay or cancel the implementation.

In 2019, my staff worked with and my office worked with the Trump administration to successfully delay the implementation because of concerns about how FEMA was calculating costs. The concern remains, but the Biden administration has decided to go forward, ignoring the concerns of people in Louisiana and elsewhere.

The results are that about 900,000 people have dropped their insurance because they cannot afford it—900,000. That is the beginning of this death spiral we spoke of.

Now, there is some promising news. The Banking Committee recently had a hearing on the National Flood Insurance Program that I put forward, and we got excellent input. There is a consensus that no family in America should be forced to move because of unaffordable flood insurance premiums, that flood insurance premiums should remain affordable, accessible, and accountable to the taxpayer and sustainable to the future.

So my challenge to my colleagues: Designate somebody on your staff. This

is a complicated topic. But whether a Californian, a Virginian, a Missourian, you name a State that is in yellow of some tint, ask somebody on your staff to become familiar with the flood insurance program. Then let's come together and move the legislation that will reform it.

The first issue is to gain understanding, then the second issue is to have the political will. If we do this, we can maintain a program which has meant so much to Americans in every State—but certainly in 43 out of 50 States—to enable them to maintain the coverage to protect them should their home flood, that they would be able to build back.

I yield the floor.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from Illinois.

Ms. DUCKWORTH. I ask that the scheduled vote begin immediately.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

CLOTURE MOTION

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Pursuant to rule XXII, the Chair lays before the Senate the pending cloture motion, which the clerk will state.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

CLOTURE MOTION

We, the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, do hereby move to bring to a close debate on the nomination of Executive Calendar No. 543, Jasmine Hyejung Yoon, of Virginia, to be United States District Judge for the Western District of Virginia.

Charles E. Schumer, Richard J. Durbin, Alex Padilla, Tina Smith, Elizabeth Warren, Raphael G. Warnock, Gary C. Peters, Tim Kaine, Richard Blumenthal, Jack Reed, Sheldon Whitehouse, Peter Welch, Mark R. Warner, Christopher A. Coons, Tammy Duckworth, Benjamin L. Cardin, Debbie Stabenow.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. By unanimous consent, the mandatory quorum call has been waived.

The question is, Is it the sense of the Senate that debate on the nomination of Jasmine Hyejung Yoon, of Virginia, to be United States District Judge for the Western District of Virginia, shall be brought to a close?

The yeas and nays are mandatory under the rule.

The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant bill clerk called the roll.

Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from New Hampshire (Ms. HASSAN), the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. MENENDEZ), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mrs. SHAHEEN), the Senator from Arizona (Ms. SINEMA), and the Senator from Michigan (Ms. STABENOW) are necessarily absent.

Mr. THUNE. The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Indiana (Mr. BRAUN), the Senator from North Dakota (Mr. CRAMER), the Senator from Texas (Mr. CRUZ), the Senator from Mississippi (Mrs. HYDE-SMITH), and the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. KENNEDY).

The yeas and nays resulted—yeas 52, nays 38, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 85 Ex.]

YEAS—52

Baldwin	Heinrich	Reed
Bennet	Hickenlooper	Rosen
Blumenthal	Hirono	Rounds
Booker	Kaine	Sanders
Brown	Kelly	Schatz
Butler	King	Schumer
Cantwell	Klobuchar	Smith
Cardin	Lujan	Tester
Carper	Manchin	Tillis
Casey	Markey	Van Hollen
Collins	McConnell	Warner
Coons	Merkley	Warnock
Cortez Masto	Murkowski	Warren
Duckworth	Murphy	Welch
Durbin	Murray	Whitehouse
Fetterman	Ossoff	Wyden
Gillibrand	Padilla	
Graham	Peters	

NAYS—38

Barrasso	Grassley	Risch
Blackburn	Hagerty	Romney
Boozman	Hawley	Rubio
Britt	Hoeven	Schmitt
Budd	Johnson	Scott (FL)
Capito	Lankford	Scott (SC)
Cassidy	Lee	Sullivan
Cornyn	Lummis	Thune
Cotton	Marshall	Tuberville
Crapo	Moran	Vance
Daines	Mullin	Wicker
Ernst	Paul	Young
Fischer	Ricketts	

NOT VOTING—10

Braun	Hyde-Smith	Sinema
Cramer	Kennedy	Stabenow
Cruz	Menendez	
Hassan	Shaheen	

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HEINRICH). On this vote, the yeas are 52, the nays are 38.

The motion was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.

CLIMATE CHANGE

Mr. WHITEHOUSE. Mr. President, I am back again with the old battered "Time to Wake Up" graphic here. The Smithsonian can't have it quite yet.

This "Time to Wake Up" climate report starts with the unfortunate proposition that we are in terrible danger on climate. Obviously, a critical part and an essential explanation of the danger is that the Republican Party has been turned, by fossil fuel industry dark money, into little more than the political wing of the fossil fuel industry, slavishly dependent on the fossil fuel polluters to fill up its super PACs and shameless about parroting the polluters' obnoxious lies.

But all that happens in the political world; where the danger gets real is in the physical world. And a recent study suggests that we have, perhaps, already blown through the 1.5 degrees of world heating safety limit.

That 1.5-degree limit was always just an estimated upper bound. Unlike many estimates, it could have been too high. It could be that the true safety barrier was always below 1.5 degrees.

But in any event, assume that it actually is 1.5 degrees, which is sort of the midpoint of the estimates. Well, it is starting to look like we may be losing even against that metric.

Here is a chart that summarizes over a thousand different projections that have been done from different sources as to where our CO₂ emissions are going to take us. It is actually more than 1,200 different scenarios.

Some of them take global temperature increase over 5 degrees of increase, which will lead to disruption on an astonishing scale that leaves many parts of the planet uninhabitable, as presently experienced.

So there are an awful lot of them. Some of them, we have already made decisions that make them impossible to achieve. Some of them are essentially dead letters. If you look at the ones that are still viable and at the ones that—this is the 1.5-degree safety barrier. If you look at those 1,200 scenarios and you look at the ones that are still viable and get us, at some point, back under 1.5 degrees, do you know how many of them there are? Eleven. Out of 1,200 predicted scenarios, 11 are all that is left to keep us at some point below 1.5 degrees. Almost all of them blow significantly over 1.5 degrees and then come back down, which makes investments in carbon capture extremely important.

But that is not a whole lot of shots out of 1,200 scenarios that we started with. And each of them is ranked by where we are on the different components that get us there: carbon removal technology, carbon removal with land interventions—planting trees and so forth—carbon intensity reduction, energy demand adjustment, and less methane. In every single one of those categories, these are ranked as challenging. None of this is easy. All of it is going to require real effort, real diligence, and serious attention to the problem.

So we are not in good shape. And that is the sad and bitter news. We could have been in good shape. Back in 2007, 2008, and 2009, there was bipartisan work happening on climate change in this Chamber all the time. And then came the Supreme Court's wretched decision in *Citizens United* and the instantaneous response by the fossil fuel industry to flood politics with its money and the instantaneous response by Republicans to abandon all of their bipartisan climate work and pitch us into a lost decade-plus on climate action.

That is where a lot of these that could have gotten us out of trouble disappeared in that lost decade of fossil fuel dark money blocking American democracy's ability to respond to this problem.

So to stay below the 1.5-degree safety threshold requires two measures. Again, these are estimates. It could well be that we need to do more than this, but these are the ones we are working with. One is reducing emis-

sions by roughly half by 2030. And the other is reaching net zero by 2050.

So here is the latest estimate of how we are doing with respect to the 2030 50-percent reduction goal. That is what this line is. That is 50-percent reduction in carbon emissions by 2030. And here is where we are. And here are a bunch of different scenarios and how they end up.

The only one—the only scenario that gets us to this goal by 2030—here is 2030, if you can't see it from the television—the only thing that gets us there is a carbon fee, putting a price on carbon emissions so that it is no longer free to pollute.

Let's say we go ahead with a carbon fee but part of the IRA gets pulled away—that is this purple line—we miss by a little. Let's say we go with the clean electricity standard instead of a carbon fee; we miss by more.

Let's say that we expand the IRA—do more of that positive investment through the IRA but without a carbon price—we miss by even more.

Here is where we are under current law—this red line. Here is where we are under current law if the EPA's proposed emission rules go into effect. That is our current likely outcome. And as you can see, that is a long way from 50 percent by 2030. That blows through it sometime after 2035.

If there are no new emissions rules just under the IRA, we are all the way out to 2040 before we cross that safety threshold. And if we do what our Republican friends, at the behest of the fossil fuel industry, are threatening to do, which is to repeal the IRA and block the new emissions rules, you are out here. And who knows when you get to 50 percent.

So to hit that first target, we have to wrap our minds around carbon pricing—pricing polluter emissions. Polluters should pay for the pollution they cause. It is not complicated. But they have been able to get away with it.

Of course, if you are living in a polluter money la-la land, none of this is real to you. And the numbers that matter to you are how much money get poured into your super PACs by polluters, not what the scientists are carefully analyzing and saying and modeling.

But if you are out of climate-denial polluter la-la land, and you are trying to grapple with this as a real problem in the real world, carbon pricing is essential.

So where are we on that? Well, I have two bits of good news. One is that, just like many major corporations do, the Biden administration has put an internal price on carbon at a very respectable \$190 per ton. And the Office of Management and Budget—the OMB—has given guidance to executive Agencies to build that internal price on carbon into all their relevant decision-making.

What is an internal price on carbon? It means that the government's decisions have to bake into their decision-making—the \$190 per ton price on carbon. If you are buying fleets of cars,