

the Basic Law to once again fundamentally erode the rights and freedoms of Hong Kongers.

I am also especially concerned about Beijing's use of transnational repression on our shores, where we have seen democracy advocates, including a U.S. citizen, charged under the national security law, with rewards offered for their capture.

This bill is necessary right now because we need to ensure that Hong Kong's economic and trade offices in the United States are not being used by Beijing to execute its transnational repression here in the United States against those simply standing for freedom and democracy.

I hope all of our colleagues will join all of us here on the floor in supporting this timely and important bill.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time for the purpose of closing.

Mr. Speaker, I thank Mr. SMITH as well as Mr. MCGOVERN and their bipartisan cosponsors for bringing this bill forward.

The tragedy that has unfolded in Hong Kong and the ripping up of an international treaty by the Chinese Communist Party is a stark lesson that Beijing cannot be trusted, which we have to learn, especially when it comes to deterrence in Taiwan. We cannot allow what happened in Hong Kong to happen to the democracy in Taiwan.

We also cannot allow the Chinese Communist Party to use Hong Kong's economic and trade offices as a back door into the United States. They must not be able to use the preferential treatment previously afforded to the city and society they continue to brutalize and oppress.

For these and many other reasons, I urge all Members to vote in favor of H.R. 1103, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. BARR) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 1103, as amended.

The question was taken.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this motion will be postponed.

#### ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE PREVENTION ACT

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 8361) to impose sanctions with respect to economic or industrial espionage by foreign adversarial companies, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 8361

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

#### SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Economic Espionage Prevention Act".

#### SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) On March 14, 2024, the Department of State notified Congress of the following:

(A) People's Republic of China exports of semiconductors to Russia have increased substantially since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

(B) In the second half of 2023, China exported between \$25,000,000 and \$50,000,000 in additional semiconductors to Russia every month relative to pre-invasion levels.

(C) During the same period, China also exported between \$50,000,000 and \$100,000,000 in additional exports to Russia every month to known transshipment hubs.

(D) These exports include both Chinese and United States-branded semiconductors (integrated circuits), according to analysis of commercially available trade data by the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce, and are almost certainly supporting Russia's military capabilities based on Ukrainian analysis of recovered Russian weapons.

(E) Because of the prevalence of United States manufacturing equipment in global semiconductor supply chains, nearly all chips produced worldwide, including in the People's Republic of China, are subject to United States export controls if destined for Russia or Belarus.

(F) All advanced semiconductors described on the Commerce Control List have been subject to a license requirement if destined to an entity in Russia since its further invasion of Ukraine.

(2) On April 3, 2024, Deputy Secretary of State, Kurt Campbell, said "I think we have assessed, over the course of the last couple of months that Russia has almost completely reconstituted militarily. And after the initial setbacks on the battlefield delivered to them by a brave and hearty group in Ukraine, with the support of China in particular, dual use capabilities and a variety of other efforts, industrial and commercial, Russia has retooled and now poses a threat to Ukraine. . . . But not just to Ukraine, its new found capabilities pose a longer term challenge to stability in Europe and threatens NATO allies."

#### SEC. 3. REPORT.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of relevant Federal departments and agencies, as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, a written report that contains the following:

(1) An analysis and description of the extent to which any foreign person who is a citizen of the People's Republic of China or an entity organized under the laws of the People's Republic of China, or any foreign person or entity controlled by or operating at the direction of the Government of the People's Republic of China—

(A) is knowingly a material source of critical components necessary for the manufacture of weapons, vehicles, and other military equipment by the defense industrial base of the Russian Federation;

(B) has knowingly delivered critical components to or entered into any agreement relating to the sale or delivery of critical components with any entity operating in the de-

fense or intelligence sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation;

(C) has knowingly delivered critical components to or entered into any agreement relating to the sale or delivery of critical components with any country or entity with which the defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of Russian Federation are cooperating in support of Russia's war against Ukraine; or

(D) has knowingly delivered critical components to or entered into any agreement relating to the sale or delivery of critical components with a foreign person that knowingly and directly provides these components to the defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation.

(2) The extent to which—

(A) any foreign person that is a citizen of the People's Republic of China or an entity organized under the laws of the People's Republic of China has knowingly engaged, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, in transactions with a person that is part of, or operates on behalf of, the defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation;

(B) any foreign person identified pursuant to subparagraph (A) has engaged in transactions which would constitute a significant transaction with persons that have been sanctioned for being part of, or operating on behalf of, the defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation; or

(C) any foreign person identified pursuant to subparagraph (A) has been subjected to sanctions imposed pursuant to sections 231 and 235 of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9525 and 9529).

(b) FORM AND AVAILABILITY.—

(1) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(2) AVAILABILITY.—The unclassified portion of the report required by subsection (a) may also be made available to the public.

#### SEC. 4. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO ECONOMIC OR INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE BY FOREIGN ADVERSARY ENTITIES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—On and after the date that is 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President (a) may impose the sanctions described in subsection (c) against any of the foreign persons described in subsection (b).

(b) FOREIGN PERSONS DESCRIBED.—A foreign person is described in this subsection if the President determines on or after the date of the enactment of this Act that the person is a foreign adversary entity that knowingly engages in—

(1) economic or industrial espionage with respect to trade secrets or proprietary information owned by United States persons;

(2) the provision of material support or services to a foreign adversaries' military, intelligence, or other national security entities; or

(3) the violation of United States export control laws.

(c) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions that may be imposed with respect to a foreign person under subsection (b) are the following:

(1) PROPERTY BLOCKING.—The exercise of all powers granted to the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in property and interests in property of the foreign person if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

(2) INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—

(A) VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—An alien described in subsection (b) is—

- (i) inadmissible to the United States;
- (ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and
- (iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).

(B) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—An alien described in subsection (b) is subject to revocation of any visa or other entry documentation regardless of when the visa or other entry documentation is or was issued.

(ii) IMMEDIATE EFFECT.—A revocation under clause (i) shall take effect immediately and automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the alien's possession.

(d) EXCEPTIONS.—

(1) EXCEPTION FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.—Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any activity subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any authorized intelligence activities of the United States.

(2) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.—Sanctions under subsection (c)(2) shall not apply with respect to the admission of an alien if admitting or paroling the alien into the United States is necessary to permit the United States to comply with—

(A) the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States; or

(B) other applicable international obligations.

(3) EXCEPTION TO CARRY OUT OR ASSIST LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES.—Sanctions under subsection (c)(2) shall not apply with respect to an alien if admitting or paroling the alien into the United States is necessary to carry out or assist law enforcement activity in the United States.

(e) WAIVER.—The President may waive the application of sanctions under this section with respect to a foreign person for renewable periods of not more than 180 days each if the President determines and submits to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains a determination of the President that such a waiver is in the national security interests of the United States.

(f) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.—

(1) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may exercise the authorities provided to the President under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to the extent necessary to carry out this section.

(2) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of subsection (a) or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out that subsection shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of that section.

(3) PROCEDURES AND GUIDELINES FOR SANCTIONS.—The President shall establish procedures and guidelines for the implementation and enforcement of sanctions imposed under this section.

(4) ANNUAL REPORT.—

(A) Unless the exception in subparagraph (B) applies, not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and for

each of the 5 years thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on any notable developments regarding economic or industrial espionage activities by foreign persons.

(B) The President shall not be required to submit the annual report described by subparagraph (A) if the President has imposed sanctions as authorized under this section within the previous calendar year.

(g) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—For purposes of this section, a transaction shall not be construed to include participation in an international standards-setting body or the activities of such a body.

#### SEC. 5. CLARIFYING AMENDMENTS.

Section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702) is amended—

(1) in subsection (b)—

(A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking “, directly or indirectly”;

(B) in paragraph (3)—

(i) by striking “including but not limited to” and all that follows through “news wire feeds.” and inserting “except to the extent that the President determines that such imports and exports would seriously impair his ability to deal with any national emergency declared under section 202.”; and

(ii) by striking “under section 5 of the Export Administration Act of 1979, or under section 6 of such Act” and inserting “under other statutory or regulatory export control authorities”; and

(C) in paragraph (4), by inserting “, except to the extent that the President determines that such imports and exports would seriously impair the ability to deal with any national emergency declared under section 202” before the period at the end; and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

“(d) RULES OF CONSTRUCTION RELATING TO SENSITIVE AND PERSONAL DATA.—The communication, the importation to a country, or the exportation from a country, directly or indirectly, whether commercial or otherwise, of bulk sensitive personal data or of source code used in a connected software application may not be construed to constitute—

“(1) a ‘postal, telegraphic, telephonic, or other personal communication’, for purposes of subsection (b)(1); or

“(2) an importation from a country, or an exportation to a country, of ‘information or informational materials’, for purposes of subsection (b)(3).”.

#### SEC. 6. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

(2) ECONOMIC OR INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE.—The term “economic or industrial espionage” has the meaning given that term in section 1637(d) of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015.

(3) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term “foreign person” means any person that is not a United States person.

(4) KNOWINGLY.—The term “knowingly”, with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result, means that a person has actual knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the result.

(5) OWN, PROPRIETARY INFORMATION, AND TRADE SECRET.—The terms “own”, “proprietary information”, and “trade secret” have the meanings given those terms in section 1637(d) of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Author-

ization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (50 U.S.C. 1708(d)).

(6) PERSON.—The term “person” means an individual or entity.

(7) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term “United States person” means—

(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or

(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.

(8) FOREIGN ADVERSARY.—The term “foreign adversary” means the countries listed in section 7.4 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. BARR) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. MEEKS) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kentucky.

#### GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on this measure.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Kentucky?

There was no objection.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 8361, the Economic Espionage Prevention Act, introduced by my colleague and friend from Georgia, Mr. MCCORMICK.

Today, our adversaries are working more closely than ever before. The Chinese Communist Party is providing massive industrial and economic support to Russia's renewed invasion of Ukraine.

In fact, our State Department assesses that in the second half of 2023, China supported the transfer of nearly \$300 million worth of semiconductors to Russia, including for use in missiles and drones.

Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell said: “I think we have assessed over the course of the last couple of months that Russia has almost completely reconstituted militarily . . . with the support of China in particular.”

The Economic Espionage Prevention Act is therefore essential to changing the nature of the battlefield in Ukraine. This bill addresses cooperation between the CCP and Russia's defense industrial base by providing for sanctions against Chinese and Iranian individuals and entities that violate U.S. export control laws, engage in economic or industrial espionage, or support the Russian defense industrial base.

The bill also requires the State Department to issue a report identifying Chinese individuals and entities that are supporting the Russian defense industrial base.

The United States and our allies cannot stand for China's decisive support

of Russia's illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. The Chinese companies providing that support must be subjected to the full weight of our sanctions regime.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this bipartisan bill, and I reserve the balance of my time.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
Washington, DC, September 3, 2024.

Hon. MICHAEL MCCAUL,  
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,  
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN MCCAUL: I write regarding H.R. 8361, the Economic Espionage Prevention Act. Provisions of this bill fall within the Judiciary Committee's rule X jurisdiction, and I appreciate that you consulted with us on those provisions. The Judiciary Committee agrees that it shall be discharged from further consideration of the bill so that it may proceed expeditiously to the House floor.

The Committee takes this action with the understanding that forgoing further consideration of this measure does not in any way alter the Committee's jurisdiction or waive any future jurisdictional claim over these provisions or their subject matter. We also reserve the right to seek appointment of an appropriate number of conferees in the event of a conference with the Senate involving this measure or similar legislation.

I ask that you please include this letter in your committee's report to accompany this legislation or insert this letter in the Congressional Record during consideration of H.R. 8361 on the House floor. I appreciate the cooperative manner in which our committees have worked on this matter, and I look forward to working collaboratively in the future on matters of shared jurisdiction. Thank you for your attention to this matter. Sincerely,

JIM JORDAN,  
Chairman.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,  
Washington, DC, September 6, 2024.

Hon. JIM JORDAN,  
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,  
Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN JORDAN: Thank you for consulting with the Foreign Affairs Committee and agreeing to be discharged from further consideration of H.R. 8361, the Economic Espionage Prevention Act, so that the measure may proceed expeditiously to the House floor.

I agree that your forgoing further action on this measure does not in any way diminish or alter the jurisdiction of your committee, or prejudice its jurisdictional prerogatives on this measure or similar legislation in the future. I would support your effort to seek appointment of an appropriate number of conferees from your committee to any House-Senate conference on this legislation.

I will seek to place our letters on this bill into the Congressional Record during floor consideration. I appreciate your cooperation regarding this legislation and look forward to continuing to work together as this measure moves through the legislative process.

Sincerely,  
MICHAEL T. MCCAUL,  
Chairman.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 8361, as amended, and I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, 2½ years ago, we saw an unprovoked and brutal invasion of Ukraine by Russia, an act that has de-

stabilized Europe and challenged the principles of sovereignty and self-determination. This blatant aggression is a direct attack on the international order that has kept the peace for decades.

Though Russia's illegal behavior is uniquely indefensible, countries such as China that have aggressively done business with the Russian military-industrial defense base are certainly not blameless.

The United States Government, including the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in a bipartisan manner, has engaged in extensive diplomacy to discourage countries from providing financial and material support for the Russian invasion.

The Biden-Harris administration has also used economic statecraft, including expansive export controls, to prevent key dual-use electronics items from reaching Moscow. Full blocking sanctions are a particularly formidable economic weapon, and the Biden-Harris administration has begun to use this part of the arsenal.

Bipartisan support for this legislation affirms that position, and financial sanctions must be on the table.

Finally, by imposing sanctions on the PRC and other entities that are fueling Russia's military machine, we send a clear message: We will not stand idly by while Ukraine's sovereignty is trampled.

This bill underscores the importance of unity among nations in opposing tyranny and supporting democracy.

Mr. Speaker, I encourage my colleagues to support this bill, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. MCCORMICK), a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the author of this bill.

Mr. MCCORMICK. Mr. Speaker, since illegally invading Ukraine, the Russian Federation has become reliant on the People's Republic of China for the supply of semiconductors and other critical dual-use technologies.

The State Department notified Congress this March that the PRC exports of semiconductors significantly increased last year compared to the pre-invasion levels.

These semiconductors are critical to aspects of the Russian war effort, including electronic warfare, command and control, and targeting. These components allow Russia to terrorize Ukrainian civilians with ballistic missile strikes at will.

The prevalence of U.S. manufacturing equipment in global semiconductor production means nearly all are subject to U.S. export controls if destined for Russia or Belarus.

My bill seeks to reduce Russia's access to these semiconductors by authorizing sanctions on foreign countries and adversaries that materially support Russia's military and intelligence services, violate U.S. export laws, and steal U.S. intellectual property.

It further requires a report on whether China is providing significant support to Russia's military and updates existing law to provide greater flexibility to pursue sanctions against China and other foreign adversaries if they violate these export controls.

The PRC may publicly claim that they do not provide material support to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but their continued provision of dual-use technologies with military applications demonstrates otherwise.

Cutting off the supply of semiconductors will seriously hamper the Russian war effort and show the world that we will not allow our adversaries to work together in destroying sovereign nations and undermining the international system.

I thank Chairman MCCAUL, Ranking Member MEEKS, and my bipartisan colleagues on the Committee on Foreign Affairs for supporting the bill before us today. I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 8361.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, H.R. 8361, as amended, is a valuable bill that grants the administration important authorities with necessary flexibility to sanction the PRC and other foreign businesses in league with the Russian defense industry base. I think this is something we all agree upon, and I urge all of my colleagues to vote "yea" on this legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I thank Representative MCCORMICK for his bill and for his service, as well as Chairman MCCAUL, Ranking Member MEEKS, and Judiciary Committee Chairman JIM JORDAN for working to bring this bipartisan bill to the floor to ensure that we address China's support for Russia's defense industrial base.

There should be no doubt that the Chinese Communists are aiding and abetting Putin in his illegal aggression against Ukraine. General Secretary Xi and Putin have described the bilateral alliance between the PRC and Russia as a no-limits relationship. The material support that China is providing Russia with the semiconductors is evidence of that.

Mr. Speaker, that is why I urge all Members to support H.R. 8361, and I yield back the balance of my time.

□ 1800

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. BARR) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 8361, as amended.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AGREEMENT ENHANCED CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION ACT OF 2024

Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 5245) to amend the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 to require certain congressional notification prior to entering into, renewing, or extending a science and technology agreement with the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 5245

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

**SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

This Act may be cited as the "Science and Technology Agreement Enhanced Congressional Notification Act of 2024".

**SEC. 2. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) The signing and implementation of the agreement between the United States and the People's Republic of China, known as the "Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China on Cooperation in Science and Technology", signed in Washington on January 31, 1979 ("CST Agreement"), and its many subsequent implementing arrangements, has led to the development of many science and technology programs.

(2) Section 1207 of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (22 U.S.C. 6901 note) required the Secretary of State to publish biennial reports detailing how the CST Agreement has benefited the economy, military, and industrial base of the People's Republic of China, a requirement that was repealed by Congress in 2016.

(3) The CST Agreement was last extended in 2018 by the Trump Administration after amending it to address United States concerns about the science and technology practices of the People's Republic of China.

(4) The People's Republic of China has restricted United States researcher access in China despite its commitments in the CST Agreement otherwise. This includes reportedly withholding avian influenza strains vital for United States vaccine development and cutting off United States access to coronavirus research in 2019, including United States-funded work at the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) science and technology cooperation with the People's Republic of China can be a useful tool of United States foreign policy and should be pursued when it reinforces and advances the values and interests of the United States;

(2) no research undertaken as part of a science and technology agreement should enable the People's Republic of China's development of dual-use and critical technologies that threaten United States national security;

(3) a science and technology agreement with the People's Republic of China should include human rights protections and projects undertaken as part of it should not directly or indirectly enable human rights abuses, including the persecution of Uyghurs in Xinjiang;

(4) a science and technology agreement with the People's Republic of China should include provisions to safeguard the safety of United States researchers and their intellectual property, as well as enhance their research access in China; and

(5) any renewal, extension, or changes to the CST Agreement should be made to ensure that United States and Chinese joint research is safer and remains beneficial for United States interests.

**SEC. 3. ENHANCED CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION REGARDING SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AGREEMENTS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**

(a) NOTIFICATION REQUIRED.—Not later than 15 days before the date on which a renewal or extension of the CST Agreement, or the entry into or a renewal or extension of any other science and technology agreement with the Government of the People's Republic of China or an entity of the People's Republic of China, enters into effect, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a notification containing each of the matters described in subsection (b).

(b) MATTERS DESCRIBED.—The matters described in this subsection are, with respect to the science and technology agreement for which a notification is submitted under subsection (a), the following:

(1) The full text of such agreement and any annexes or side letters.

(2) A detailed justification for such agreement, including an explanation of the reasons for which entering into, renewing, or extending such agreement, as applicable, is in the national interest of the United States.

(3) An assessment of any risks posed by such agreement, and the checks it includes to prevent the transfer of technology or intellectual property capable of—

(A) harming the national security interests of the United States; or

(B) enabling of the People's Republic of China's military-civil fusion strategy.

(4) An explanation for how the Secretary of State intends to build in human rights protections for any scientific and technology collaboration conducted under such agreement.

(5) An assessment of the ways in which the Secretary will be able to prescribe terms for, and continuously monitor, the commitments and contracts made by the Government of the People's Republic of China or entity of the People's Republic of China under such agreement.

(6) A summary of changes or updates to the agreement that were secured to strengthen the United States ability to engage in science cooperation with the People's Republic of China in a way that is safer, more beneficial for the United States, or allows for stronger United States oversight over joint research.

(7) Such other information relating to such agreement as the Secretary of State may determine appropriate.

(c) APPLICABILITY.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The notification requirements under subsection (a) shall apply with respect to any science and technology agreements entered into, renewed, or extended on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(2) EXISTING AGREEMENTS.—For any science and technology agreement between the United States Government and the People's Republic of China that is in effect as of the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes each of the matters described in subsection (b) with respect to such existing agreement, not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

**SEC. 4. ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS.**

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, shall submit to Congress a report on—

(1) the implementation of each science and technology agreement with the People's Republic of China, including implementing arrangements, entered into pursuant to the notification requirements under section 3; and

(2) all activities conducted under each such agreement.

(b) CONTENTS.—Each report required by subsection (a) shall also include each of the following:

(1) An accounting of all joint projects and initiatives conducted under the CST Agreement and its implementing arrangements since the previous report (or, in the case of the first report, since the CST Agreement was entered into), including the name of each project, agreement, or implementing arrangement.

(2) An evaluation of the benefits of the CST Agreement to the United States economy, scientific leadership, innovation capacity, and industrial base of the United States.

(3) An estimate of the costs to the United States to administer the CST Agreement during the period covered by the report.

(4) An evaluation of the benefits of the CST Agreement to the economy, to the military, and to the industrial base of the People's Republic of China.

(5) An assessment of how the CST Agreement has influenced the foreign and domestic policies and scientific capabilities of the People's Republic of China.

(6) Any plans of the Secretary of State for improving the monitoring of the activities and the People's Republic of China's commitments established under the CST Agreement.

(7) An assessment of any potential risks posed by ongoing science cooperation with the People's Republic of China.

(c) FORM.—Each report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form and may include a classified annex.

**SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS.**

In this Act:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term "appropriate congressional committees" means the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

(2) CST AGREEMENT.—The term "CST Agreement" means the agreement between the United States and the People's Republic of China known as the "Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China on Cooperation in Science and Technology", signed in Washington on January 31, 1979, and its protocols, as well as any sub-agreements entered into pursuant to such Agreement on or before the date of the enactment of this Act.

(3) IMPLEMENTING ARRANGEMENT.—The term "implementing arrangement", with respect to the CST Agreement or any other science and technology agreement, includes any sub-agreement or sub-arrangement entered into under the CST Agreement or other science and technology agreement between—

(A) any Federal governmental entity of the United States; and

(B) any governmental entity of the People's Republic of China, including state-owned research institutions.

(4) SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AGREEMENT.—The term "science and technology agreement" means any treaty, memorandum of