

If any of these companies are engaged in activities that are objectionable, let's hold them accountable, but it should be as the result of a thorough process.

Again, I will close by saying I am one of the few persons here who is sanctioned by China, who cannot travel there. My family can't travel there according to their press release. They don't like me at all. The reason why they don't is because we have passed legislation that has been effective and that has worked.

We have an opportunity to do that here. There are no amendments. This bill has been brought to the floor that really has all these incredible consequences. There are no amendments allowed. There has been no input from other committees. Here, take it or leave it.

We ought to leave it and go back to the drawing board and get this right. We could figure this out in a matter of days. We can get this right. Let's do it. Let's do it, and let's do it in a way that holds China to account.

The final thing I will say is what we have been hearing from the regulatory agencies, that by naming these companies in a bill, you are giving them the heads up. They can change their name and reincorporate in the Cayman Islands and come back, and we are playing whack-a-mole with them. There is a better way to do this. Let us work together and get there.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. COMER. Mr. Speaker, in closing, we have heard here today broad consensus among my House colleagues that U.S. taxpayer dollars should not go to foreign biotechnology entities that steal Americans' genetic data, contribute to a foreign adversary's military, or support the violation of human rights.

The BIOSECURE Act addresses this national security problem by clearly prohibiting a Federal agency from procuring any biotechnology equipment or service from a company controlled by a foreign adversary, such as the CCP.

Americans saw firsthand during the COVID pandemic what happens when a foreign adversary acts irresponsibly in the biotechnology sector. China restricted the export of vital medical equipment to the United States, refused to tell the world about COVID when it first emerged, and covered up evidence related to the origins of COVID-19.

This bill is a necessary step toward protecting Americans' sensitive healthcare data from a foreign adversary like the CCP before the U.S. biomedical and healthcare sector becomes even more dependent upon Chinese-influenced organizations. It is critical that we pass the BIOSECURE Act before more harm is done.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote in support of this national security bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Ms. ESHOO. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 8333, the BIOSECURE Act which is critical legislation to prohibit federal contracts with biotechnology companies connected to foreign nations of concern to protect the U.S. national security, economic security and privacy.

Companies with ties to foreign adversaries, in particular the People's Republic of China, pose threats to the privacy and security of Americans. Under PRC law, any entity owned by or affiliated with Chinese companies could be compelled by the Chinese government to provide data on Americans.

The legislation addresses concerns about foreign nations' access to sensitive data on Americans by prohibiting federal contracts with biotechnology providers connected to foreign adversaries such as BGI, a PRC-affiliated company, its subsidiary MGI Americas, Complete Genomics, WuXi AppTec, and WuXi Biologics.

The legislation prevents funding from federal agencies to be spent on equipment or services provided by biotechnology companies of concern, including (1) entities subject to the jurisdiction, direction, control, or operated on behalf of the government of a foreign adversary, (2) entities involved in the manufacturing, distribution, provision, or procurement of a biotechnology equipment or service, and (3) entities which pose a risk to U.S. national security based on specified activities.

This legislation is an important step to protect American patients, our nation's biotechnology industry, and our national security from exploitation by hostile foreign entities, and I urge all my colleagues to support this bill and vote yes so we can pass this bill today.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. COMER) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 8333, as amended.

The question was taken.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds being in the affirmative, the yeas have it.

Mr. MCGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this motion will be postponed.

#### COUNTERING CCP DRONES ACT

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 2864) to amend the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 to provide for the addition of certain equipment and services produced or provided by DJI Technologies to the list of covered communications equipment or services published under such Act, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 2864

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

#### SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

*This Act may be cited as the "Countering CCP Drones Act".*

#### SEC. 2. ADDITION OF CERTAIN EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES OF DJI TECHNOLOGIES TO COVERED LIST.

(a) *IN GENERAL.*—Section 2(c) of the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 (47 U.S.C. 1601(c)) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(5) The communications equipment or service being—

“(A) telecommunications or video surveillance equipment produced by Shenzhen Da-Jiang Innovations Sciences and Technologies Company Limited (commonly known as ‘DJI Technologies’) (or any subsidiary or affiliate thereof); or

“(B) telecommunications or video surveillance services, including software, provided by an entity described in subparagraph (A) or using equipment described in such subparagraph.”.

(b) *CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.*—Section 2 of the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 (47 U.S.C. 1601) is amended by striking “paragraphs (1) through (4)” each place it appears and inserting “paragraphs (1) through (5)”.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. LATTA) and the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. PALLONE) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio.

#### GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material in the RECORD on the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?

There was no objection.

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this legislation, H.R. 2864, the Countering CCP Drones Act, led by the gentleman from New York (Ms. STEFANIK).

DJI Technologies is the largest drone manufacturer in the world. Their drones are used by hobbyists, public safety agencies, and private companies to capture images from above, protect the public, and monitor critical infrastructure. Despite its significant presence, DJI is based in China, and it has known ties with the Chinese Communist Party, which represents a national security risk to the United States.

As we know, companies with ties to the CCP operate in an environment tightly intertwined with the Chinese Communist Government, raising serious concerns about the level of influence and potential for exploitation by the CCP.

For example, under China's 2017 National Intelligence Law, these companies are required to support, provide assistance to, and cooperate with China's national intelligence work, wherever they operate, which would and could jeopardize Americans. This threat is especially significant with DJI given how their drones are used within the United States, and we must act to address this threat.

H.R. 2864 adds telecommunications or video surveillance equipment and surveillance services produced or provided

by DJI Technologies to the FCC's covered list, which is a list of communications equipment or services that pose an unacceptable risk to national security. As a result of being placed on this list, the FCC could no longer authorize DJI drones going forward.

This legislation is forward looking. It only applies to drones that DJI seeks FCC authorization for after this bill becomes law. It would not affect the authorization of drones already in use today. It is imperative we move forward with these efforts to remove the threat posed by DJI.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 2864, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 2864, the Countering CCP Drones Act. Our country's communications networks help support many parts of our daily lives and play an essential role across almost every sector of our economy. Robust networks allow Americans to have easier access to doctors, teachers, and job opportunities, and they are also vital to our Nation's critical infrastructure, public safety systems, supply chains, and government functions.

This is unlikely to change anytime soon. In fact, as technology advances, our networks are only expected to become even more embedded in everyday life.

This growing reach has made our communications networks targets that face constant threats from adversarial nations and others. In the last few months, we have seen reports that hacking groups linked to China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran are gaining access to our communications networks to conduct surveillance, collect massive amounts of data, and manipulate our elections.

As a result, there is a real risk that the information that they collect could be used to launch cyberattacks on our critical infrastructure and undermine our democratic values of free speech and expression, as well as civil and human rights.

Fortunately, Congress has acted with strong bipartisan support to bolster the defense of our communications networks. My bipartisan Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act, which became law in 2020, established a list of equipment and services that pose a national security risk and prevent their use in our communications networks.

H.R. 2864 builds on that bipartisan work by adding the telecommunications and video surveillance equipment and services provided by so-called DJI Technologies, better recognized as the equipment and services used in their drones, to the Federal Communications Commission's covered list. With this action, Congress will ensure that future versions of DJI drones cannot be imported, marketed, or sold in the United States.

DJI Technologies and its drones have repeatedly been flagged by the Federal Government as a national security risk. Since DJI is the global leader in drone manufacturing and has ties to the Chinese Communist Party, its drone technology and the data it collects could be exploited by the CCP to enable the theft of sensitive American data and compromise critical infrastructure in the United States.

This is especially true given that recent figures indicate that DJI controls almost 90 percent of the consumer drone market in North America, and DJI drones are often used by local law enforcement agencies for public safety operations.

With this bill, we continue our vigilance in protecting American data as well as our communications networks and other critical infrastructure from rogue nation-states.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 2864, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from New York (Ms. STEFANIK), the bill's sponsor.

Ms. STEFANIK. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chair for yielding time.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of my bipartisan legislation, the Countering CCP Drones Act.

First, I thank Chairwoman CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Chairman LATTA, Ranking Member PALLONE, and the Energy and Commerce Committee for their bipartisan support of this legislation and others that seek to end Communist China's malign influence in America.

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Additionally, I will thank my colleague, Majority Leader SCALISE, for bringing these bills to the floor that clearly demonstrate that House Republicans will continue to lead in countering Communist China.

The Chinese Communist Party is working to undermine American sovereignty by forcing Americans to rely and depend on unsecure Communist Chinese technology.

Nowhere is this more evident than in the drone industry.

In 2015, the CCP launched the "Made in China 2025" initiative, which leveraged aggressive subsidies, direct CCP investment, and unfair trade practices to artificially drive down the cost of Chinese-manufactured drones undercutting American companies and ensuring the rest of the world was forced to rely on Communist China for unsecured drone technology.

Due to these authoritarian policies, America has been flooded with drones manufactured by the CCP-controlled drone company DJI.

Allowing artificially cheap DJI drones to monopolize our skies has decimated American drone manufacturing and given our greatest strategic adversary eyes in our skies.

Over the last 7 years, the U.S. Government has publicly confirmed time

and time again that DJI drones are being used to collect information on U.S. critical infrastructure and pose significant risks to U.S. national security.

Moreover, DJI is on the U.S. Department of Defense's list of Chinese military companies because it directly advances the modernization efforts of the People's Liberation Army. Not only does DJI improve the equipment of our greatest strategic adversary, which could one day be used against U.S. servicemembers, they also actively aid the CCP in carrying out genocidal crimes against ethnic minorities.

It is past time we end Communist China's role as the world's drone factory.

My legislation, the Countering CCP Drones Act, will place DJI on the FCC's covered list, which will prohibit new models of DJI drones from operating in America. This will initiate a much-needed transition period to improve the competitiveness of U.S. drone companies, remove Chinese spy drones from our skies, and end our reliance on CCP-manufactured drones.

For too long, we have allowed Communist China leverage over our critical industries through their malign drone monopoly. As drones become increasingly integrated into our military, law enforcement, agriculture, and critical infrastructure, the U.S. must build our domestic manufacturing capabilities.

Make no mistake, Communist China will use the successes of its "Made in China 2025" initiative to undercut American global leadership and domestic security. We have 3 months to reverse the course of these successes. The passage of my Countering CCP Drones Act is a critical step in that direction.

Mr. Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues to join me in supporting this bill.

Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I have no additional speakers, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. MOOLENAAR).

Mr. MOOLENAAR. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of Conference Chair STEFANIK's bill, the Countering CCP Drones Act. This bill would add Chinese drone company DJI to the FCC covered list, meaning that any future models of DJI drones would be prohibited from operating on U.S. telecommunications infrastructure.

DJI poses a real national security risk to the United States given its deep partnership with the Chinese military, its expressed allegiance to the Chinese Communist Party, and its surveillance technology operating across U.S. soil. What is more, that very same technology equips the CCP's genocide of the Uyghur people in Xinjiang.

Understanding these risks, the Pentagon placed DJI on its blacklist as a Chinese military company. The Treasury Department forbids Americans from investing in DJI. The Commerce Department restricts U.S. companies

from exporting technology to DJI. It is time for Congress to do its part and to start winding down DJI's presence in the United States.

Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I simply urge support for this legislation on a bipartisan basis, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I further urge support of H.R. 2864. This bill, again, came out of the Energy and Commerce Committee 43-0, and I urge passage of the legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. LATTA) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 2864, as amended.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

#### MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

A message in writing from the President of the United States was communicated to the House by Ms. Avery M. Stringer, one of his secretaries.

#### FOREIGN ADVERSARY COMMUNICATIONS TRANSPARENCY ACT

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 820) to direct the Federal Communications Commission to publish a list of entities that hold authorizations, licenses, or other grants of authority issued by the Commission and that have certain foreign ownership, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 820

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

#### SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

*This Act may be cited as the "Foreign Adversary Communications Transparency Act".*

#### SEC. 2. LIST OF ENTITIES HOLDING FCC AUTHORIZATIONS, LICENSES, OR OTHER GRANTS OF AUTHORITY AND HAVING CERTAIN FOREIGN OWNERSHIP.

(a) *IN GENERAL.*—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Commission shall publish on the internet website of the Commission a list of each entity—

(1) that holds a license issued by the Commission pursuant to—

(A) section 309(j) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 309(j)); or

(B) the Act of May 27, 1921 (47 U.S.C. 34 et seq.; commonly known as the "Cable Landing Licensing Act") and Executive Order 10530 (3 U.S.C. 301 note; relating to the performance of certain functions vested in or subject to the approval of the President); and

(2) with respect to which—

(A) a covered entity holds an equity or voting interest that is required to be reported to the Commission under the ownership rules of the Commission; or

(B) an appropriate national security agency has determined that a covered entity exerts control, regardless of whether such covered entity

holds an equity or voting interest as described in subparagraph (A).

(b) *RULEMAKING.*—

(1) *IN GENERAL.*—Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Commission shall issue rules to obtain information to identify each entity—

(A) that holds any authorization, license, or other grant of authority issued by the Commission (other than a license described in subsection (a)(1)); and

(B) with respect to which a covered entity holds an equity or voting interest that is required to be reported to the Commission under the ownership rules of the Commission.

(2) *PLACEMENT ON LIST.*—Not later than 1 year after the Commission issues the rules required by paragraph (1), the Commission shall place each entity described in such paragraph on the list published under subsection (a).

(c) *PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT EXEMPTION.*—A collection of information conducted or sponsored by the Commission to implement this section does not constitute a collection of information for the purposes of subchapter I of chapter 35 of title 44, United States Code (commonly referred to as the "Paperwork Reduction Act").

(d) *ANNUAL UPDATES.*—The Commission shall, not less frequently than annually, update the list published under subsection (a), including with respect to any entity required to be placed on such list by subsection (b)(2).

(e) *DEFINITIONS.*—In this collection:

(1) *APPROPRIATE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.*—The term "appropriate national security agency" has the meaning given such term in section 9 of the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 (47 U.S.C. 1608).

(2) *COMMISSION.*—The term "Commission" means the Federal Communications Commission.

(3) *COVERED COUNTRY.*—The term "covered country" means a country specified in section 4872(d)(2) of title 10, United States Code.

(4) *COVERED ENTITY.*—The term "covered entity" means—

(A) the government of a covered country;

(B) an entity organized under the laws of a covered country; and

(C) a subsidiary or affiliate of an entity described in subparagraph (B), regardless of whether the subsidiary or affiliate is organized under the laws of a covered country.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. LATTA) and the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. PALLONE) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio.

#### GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and insert extraneous material in the record on the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?

There was no objection.

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 820, the Foreign Adversary Communications Transparency Act, led by the gentlewoman from New York's 21st District.

The Chinese Communist Party and other foreign adversaries present security threats to our critical infrastructure. Entities with ties to these countries could be called upon to support and assist their national intelligence

work, jeopardizing the security of American data and communications networks. As a result, the presence of their equipment in our networks pose a significant threat to our national security.

Over the years, Congress has worked to address these threats from passing legislation to rip-and-replace Huawei and ZTE equipment from our networks by encouraging TikTok to divest from its CCP-controlled parent company, ByteDance. We must build on this work by bringing transparency into the ways our foreign adversaries operate in our networks.

This legislation requires the FCC to annually publish a list of entities with ties to our adversaries, Communist China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, that hold a license, authorization, or other authority granted by the FCC.

Understanding which adversaries are present in our communications networks as well as the threat they pose is necessary to strengthen our networks.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman from New York's 21st District for her leadership on this bill and the chair of the Energy and Commerce Committee for her leadership moving this bill to the floor.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 820, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 820, the Foreign Adversary Communications Transparency Act.

Last week, the Department of Justice indicted two Russian nationals over payments made to several extreme rightwing American influencers in an attempt to tip the scales in our Nation's upcoming elections. This is an extremely disturbing and stark reminder of the length that foreign adversary countries will go to use our media and communications networks to disrupt and divide us, weakening our country for their own benefit.

Whether it is through social media, equipment, or the communications networks itself, we have seen these operations time and time again, which is why we must stay vigilant to minimize these risks or avoid them all together.

Today, we are taking additional action to stay ahead of these risks. H.R. 820 will shed some light on the investments of foreign adversaries in our country's communications networks.

Every day these networks carry Americans' most sensitive personal data. We must have a clear understanding if any foreign adversary countries, or the companies operating within those countries, are investors in our communications networks.

This is critically important because, unfortunately, we have too often seen foreign adversary governments or those beholden to them target these networks and the devices and applications running on top of them as a way to disrupt our daily lives or to conduct espionage campaigns.