

my office—be granted floor privileges until May 4, 2023.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDERS FOR THURSDAY, MAY 4, 2023

Mr. SCHUMER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it stand adjourned until 10 a.m., Thursday, May 4; that following the prayer and pledge, the morning hour be deemed expired, the Journal of proceedings be approved to date, the time for the two leaders be reserved for their use later in the day, and morning business be closed; that following the conclusion of morning business, the Senate proceed to executive session to resume consideration of the Hunt nomination postcloture and that all time be considered expired at 11:30 a.m.; further, that following the cloture vote on the Shogan nomination, notwithstanding rule XXII, the Senate resume consideration of the Gupta nomination, with the time until 1:45 p.m. equally divided between the two leaders or their designees, and at 1:45 p.m. the Senate vote on the motion to invoke cloture on the nomination; further, that if any nominations are confirmed, the motions to reconsider be considered made and laid upon the table and the President be immediately notified of the Senate's action.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SCHUMER. For the information of the Senate, there will be two rollcall votes at 11:30 a.m. and one at 1:45 p.m.

ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT

Mr. SCHUMER. Madam President, if there is no further business to come before the Senate, I ask that it stand adjourned under the previous order, following the very, very learned remarks of Senator SULLIVAN.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from Alaska.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Madam President, I thank the majority leader for his fine compliment to me on the Senate floor about learned remarks. I appreciate that.

Mr. SCHUMER. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. SULLIVAN. I appreciate that very much.

Not if you are going to take away your compliment—if you are going to keep it, I will yield.

Mr. SCHUMER. I just want to reserve the right to read the remarks before closing debate.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Actually, I think you will appreciate these remarks.

Mr. SCHUMER. I thank the Senator. I yield the floor and am looking forward to the Senator's remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.

U.S. NAVY

Mr. SULLIVAN. Madam President, recently, there have been numerous articles in the media about the U.S. Navy's lack of amphibious ships—one that I would like to submit for the RECORD, headlined "Grounding of U.S. Marine Unit Spotlights Lack of Ships in Asia-Pacific," can be found online at <https://www.wsj.com/articles/grounding-of-u-s-marine-unit-spotlights-lack-of-ships-in-asia-pacific-757315b4>.

(Mr. WHITEHOUSE assumed the Chair.)

In this piece, the writer leads with how the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, a rapid response force of the Marine Corps designed for quick deployment on three Navy ships—what we call an "amphibious ready group"—how they were forced to abandon a training exercise because the amphibious warships that they are supposed to train on were not available due to maintenance problems.

Here is what the article said in part:

The Marine unit's grounded status illustrates the larger obstacles the United States is facing as it tries to pivot its military to handle the challenges from China. Overall, defense officials said the Navy doesn't have enough amphibious ships to transport marines, and a central part of the Marine Corps's mission is to hop from island to island in the Asia-Pacific and harry Chinese forces in the event of a conflict.

By the way, Mr. President, the Marines are really good at this. They have been doing it for decades. But they need ships.

Another article from Defense News is also a recent one about the lack of amphibious ships and the problem that poses. This one is from another part of the world but very recent. The article starts with how hundreds of American citizens were stranded in war-torn Sudan.

It says:

Hundreds of Americans in war-torn Sudan last month needed a way out of the country, but the U.S. Marine Corps, the go-to service for such rescues [of American citizens] couldn't help.

The article continued:

Typically, this kind of mission would be standard for the Navy and Marine Corps' amphibious ready group—

A Marine expeditionary unit, or what we call in the Marine Corps a MEU, a MEU-R, a Marine expeditionary unit, an amphibious ready group—three ships, super well trained, special operations capable, can go anywhere in the world, kick the door in, save American citizens.

The article continues:

For the Americans who fled to the coast [in Sudan] the Pentagon sent an auxiliary transport ship—

that they contracted out, I believe, from another country—to shuttle them safely to . . . Saudi Arabia.

It was, in essence, a self-evacuation of U.S. citizens.

Mr. President, NPR reported that the buses actually took hundreds of Americans to the Port of Sudan. Imagine—imagine—my colleagues, what would have happened had those Americans, traveling in contract buses in the middle of a civil war, got caught in the crossfire.

The article that I just quoted was entitled "Marines want 31 amphibious ships. The Pentagon disagrees. Now what?" I ask unanimous consent to have that article printed in the RECORD at the end of my remarks.

Finally, Mr. President, there was another recent article from Defense One. Its title was "Navy On Path To Violate 31-Amphibious-Ship Requirement in 2024."

Now, Mr. President, this is what I wanted to get to. Last year, in the Armed Services Committee, we held a number of hearings with the Navy and the Marine Corps saying: What is the minimum number of amphibious ships that would enable the Marine Corps to do its global force response mission—the minimum number? After many hearings, after much discussion with the Marines and Navy, we came up, in a bill of mine, with a minimum of 31 ships.

This bill in the Armed Services Committee last year passed unanimously. Every Democrat and every Republican voted for it.

The law now reads as follows. I know this is a little small, but here is the new U.S. Code that has the new language. It says:

The naval combat forces of the Navy shall include not less than 11 operational aircraft carriers and not less than 31 operational amphibious warfare ships, of which not less than 10 shall be amphibious assault ships—

What we call in the Marine Corps "big-deck assault ships" that can carry helicopters and Ospreys and Harriers and now F-35 Bravos. That was the law. That passed. The President signed it.

Here is the problem. The U.S. Navy is violating the law. The U.S. Navy is treating that law—31 amphibs, a minimum—as a suggestion from the Congress, as an option from the Congress.

How do I know? Because we had a hearing 2 weeks ago on the Armed Services Committee, and the Secretary of the Navy essentially said: We are looking at different options for the President's budget on how many amphibs that the Navy is going to have.

And, currently, the Navy presented a budget that doesn't have 31 amphibs.

I had some cross words with the Secretary of the Navy, the CNO of the Navy, because they are violating the law. And I will tell you, my Democratic and Republican colleagues on the Armed Services Committee were supportive of what I was saying. We had a hearing on the Armed Services Readiness Subcommittee yesterday. The Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Franchetti, said that the Navy was "studying the issue."

The Navy can't study the issue anymore. The Navy needs to follow the

law. The U.S. Congress has done the studies. We need the ships.

But here is what the Navy presented to the Armed Services Committee 2 weeks ago. They provided us their 30-year shipbuilding plan for the Navy. Right here is the 31 amphib ship statutory minimum that is required by the law. Here is the Navy shipbuilding plan for the next 30 years. You see in the numbers, these are different options: plan one, plan two, plan three.

You might notice the Navy never gets to 31 amphib. So the Secretary of the Navy, the CNO of the Navy, and the Vice CNO of the Navy came to the Congress in the last 2 weeks and said: Your 31 amphib ship requirement, we are going to ignore it. Your 31 amphib ship requirement, Congress, United States of America, we are going to violate that.

This is unacceptable. The U.S. Navy, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of Defense should not be thumbing their nose at the Congress, and, worse, they should not be violating the law and not trying to abide by the law. They are saying, for 30 years, we are going to ignore the Congress, and we are going to ignore the laws of the United States of America.

This cannot happen. This cannot happen.

Let me end with this. Whether you are a Democrat or a Republican, whether you are a hawk on defense issues or a dove on defense issues, if you are a U.S. Senator, this should make you really mad. This should make you really mad.

Last year, the Congress spoke. And, again, on the Armed Services Committee, on which I serve, it was unanimous. Every member of that committee who had studied the issue said, at a minimum, the Navy needs 31 amphib so the U.S. Marine Corps can do its mission around the world. Everybody agreed. We passed the law.

The Navy, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of Defense are thumbing their nose at this body, are breaking the law as we speak, are intending to break the law for the next 30 years. That is their 30-year shipbuilding plan. It never hits 31 ships.

But here is the worst thing they are doing, and this is a real serious issue. They are putting the lives of American citizens at risk. Why do I say that? Well, let me end where I began, with Sudan, the rescue of American citizens. Again, normally, that is a mission tailor-made for the U.S. Marine Corps, whether in an embassy or another dangerous part of the world—what we call a noncombatant evacuation operation, a NEO. The Marines do them all the time. They bring up their amphib, launch helos, launch support craft, helicopters, fighters, if they need the air support.

The capability of a MEU-R to go rescue American citizens—a lot of them—is unsurpassed by any service in the world.

The U.S. Marines do it all the time. But guess what they can't do it with-

out? They can't do it without amphibious ships. And right now, we don't have enough. So we dodged a bullet 2 weeks ago in Sudan.

American citizens were put on buses and driven across dangerous parts of Sudan in a civil war, for hours after hours, and got to a port, self-evacuated on some other country's ships. We are so lucky that those Americans did not get killed or wounded—did not get killed or wounded—because there was no Marine Corps to rescue them.

I am going to keep raising this issue. The Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Navy, today, are violating the law. Today, they have no intention of meeting this 31 amphib ship requirement, and American citizens are at risk. And the next time we might not be so lucky. The next time Americans somewhere around the world need to be rescued, the next time an enemy of our country does something nefarious to our citizens, our national interests, and we don't have the ability to respond as a Marine Corps because we don't have the ships, we are going to know who is responsible.

I yield floor.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From Defense News, May 2, 2023]

MARINES WANT 31 AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS. THE PENTAGON DISAGREES. NOW WHAT?

(By Megan Eckstein)

WASHINGTON.—Hundreds of Americans trapped in war-torn Sudan last month needed a way out of the country, but the U.S. Marine Corps, the go-to service for such rescues, couldn't help.

Typically, this kind of mission would be standard for the Navy and Marine Corps' amphibious ready group and Marine expeditionary unit, made up of 2,300 Marines aboard three ships who are trained to fight their way into and evacuate citizens from dangerous locations.

Instead, as violence surged, the Pentagon relied on drones to monitor a 500-mile escape route from the capital of Khartoum to the Red Sea city of Port Sudan. For the Americans who fled to the coast, the Pentagon sent an auxiliary transport ship to shuttle them to safety in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

It was a complicated and risky self-evacuation.

At the same time, off the coast of Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, the Bataan ARG and 26th MEU were conducting a noncombatant evacuation simulation—training for the very operation Americans in Sudan needed. But the group stayed put because it wasn't yet certified for global missions.

The Navy didn't have another set of ready amphibious ships to deploy from the East Coast on short notice.

All of this followed a similar situation a few months earlier, when service leaders were unable to send a team to Turkey and Syria to provide aid after a 7.8-magnitude earthquake rocked the region.

Maj. Gen. Roger Turner, the Marine Corps' operations division director, told Defense News the naval forces "have this razor-thin capacity" with amphibious ships, and when emergencies arise, "there's no capacity to react."

It's a trend that could continue.

Today, the Navy has 31 amphibious ships—what the Marine Corps considers the bare

minimum it needs—but the Pentagon plans to shrink the fleet below that number in fiscal 2024. As a result, Turner anticipates the Corps will be more challenged to respond to global crises.

Throughout last year and into this spring, that number—31—has been at the center of debates, as the Navy, Marine Corps, Defense Department, Congress and industry weigh in on how many amphibious ships the military needs, what they should look like and how much they should cost.

Now, the argument is about to come to a head.

In June, the Pentagon is expected to complete a study on whether to continue buying amphibious ships and, if so, what capabilities those vessels will have.

The final decision is expected to have major ramifications for the Marine Corps and defense contractor Ingalls Shipbuilding, a division of HII.

For example, the study might back a requirement for 31 ships and recommend continuing to build San Antonio-class vessels at a cost of about \$2 billion each. Or the report could recommend a new design that would cost less per ship—an idea the Corps already rejected, and one that could disrupt Ingalls' production line.

Or there's a third option: The report could call for a continued pause in the Pentagon buying amphibious ships, which could force Ingalls to close its production line and would force the Marine Corps to reevaluate its amphibious operations plans.

But unless the Office of the Secretary of Defense approves the continued construction of ships, or unless Congress overrides the Pentagon, "trying to maintain even a minimal [amphibious] presence is going to be really difficult," Turner said.

This comes at a time when he said "aggressive behavior of the [People's Republic of China] is driving people to us; they want us to be the security partner of choice," making American amphibious presence all the more important today.

Outsider observers like Mackenzie Eaglen, an expert in military readiness at the American Enterprise Institute think tank, believe the debate itself is problematic.

"Funding disagreements signal indecision to our adversaries on the role of this capability," she warned.

A 31-SHIP REQUIREMENT

For years, the Marine Corps had a requirement of 38 amphibious ships, with the caveat it would accept 34 in a fiscally constrained environment.

This requirement was based on the rationale that the service needed 38 ships to move two entire Marine expeditionary brigades into combat for a forcible entry.

In July 2019, Gen. David Berger took command of the service and quickly released a document titled "Commandant's Planning Guidance" that backed away from the requirement of transporting those two brigades, saying the Corps would fight differently in the future.

Since then, a range of concepts have emerged, focused on the idea that small units would already be dispersed throughout the Pacific region to be able to tamp down an emerging conflict until additional forces arrive.

The Marine Corps began talking publicly about a 31-ship requirement in 2021, and the Navy acknowledged that requirement in 2022.

According to the director of the Maritime Expeditionary Warfare Division, Shon Brodie, the 31-ship figure is based on an idea that the fleet should do three things:

Keep two three-ship amphibious ready groups at sea at any given time.

Support contingency plans that call for five three-ship amphibious ready groups to deploy on short notice.

Allow for enough ready ships—those not tied up in maintenance—that some would be available for training Marines in events like fleet exercises.

The requirement is specifically divided up into 10 amphibious assault ships (made up of the America-class LHAs and Wasp-class LHDs that host fixed-wing jets like the F-35B), and 21 medium-sized amphibious vessels (either the aging Whidbey Island-class LSDs or the newer San Antonio-class LPDs). An amphibious ready group includes one amphibious assault ship and two medium-sized ships.

Brodie told Defense News this 31-ship requirement is backed by studies undertaken from 2008 to 2022, and reflects ships' recent maintenance readiness rates, which hover around 40%.

That rate means in a fleet of 31 ships, 12 or 13 might be available at any given time. If six are supposed to be deployed, and another six are getting ready to deploy next, that leaves little to no additional capacity for training or surging in response to natural disasters or conflicts.

This low readiness rate has complicated the discussion and is a key reason the Marine Corps considers 31 ships the bare minimum.

Pilots with the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit fly over the amphibious transport dock Anchorage on Dec. 8, 2022. (Sgt. Brendan Custer/U.S. Marine Corps)

Bryan Clark, director of the Center for Defense Concepts and Technology at the Hudson Institute think tank, said 31 ships is the right number, but noted "presence is now the driver, rather than warfighting lift requirements."

While the amphibious ready group and Marine expeditionary unit, or ARG/MEU, team still can storm an island and take it from enemy forces, the group is most often used to train alongside partners and allies, respond to friendly nations after a natural disaster, or rescue American citizens trapped in dangerous countries.

Eaglen said this emphasis on presence as a means of deterrence has contributed to the disagreement with the Pentagon over the 31-ship requirement.

"The rub as I see it between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Marine Corps is over amphib ship requirements for operational plans, versus the additional duties of crisis response (and to a lesser extent building partner capacity) the Marines have on a daily basis," she told Defense News. "To me, the commandant is saying he wants and needs more ships for tasks scoped outside [of warfighting]."

Dakota Wood, a senior research fellow for defense programs at the Heritage Foundation, acknowledged concerns over the amphibious ships' survivability against Chinese anti-ship missiles, but said "large-scale combat operations against a highly capable enemy like China is only part of the story."

"Much has been made about China being the most substantial security challenge for the U.S., but Navy-Marine Corps forces, made possible with Marines embarked aboard Navy amphibious ships, have repeatedly [proved] their worth across a range of small crises in various parts of the world," he told Defense News.

FLEET UNDER FIRE

Though the Marine Corps maintains it needs 31 ships, the Pentagon has not committed to that requirement.

DoD officials have not spoken publicly on the matter. Asked by Defense News whether the Office of the Secretary of Defense backs the 31-ship requirement, Pentagon spokesman Chris Sherwood said the requirement can't be considered in isolation and the de-

partment is "focused on having the right mix of capabilities to meet the objectives of the 2022 National Defense Strategy."

The Navy's fiscal 2023 budget request, shaped by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the White House before going to Congress, called for truncating the San Antonio-class production line after one final ship that fiscal year. This move would end the San Antonio program after 16 ships, rather than the planned 26.

The FY24 request advances that plan, including no additional LPDs in the five-year spending plan.

With the Marine Corps and the Pentagon at odds, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the services are conducting a capability and cost analysis to consider alternative ship designs and acquisition strategies that might lower the cost of future amphibious ships. That study is set to conclude in June.

U.S. Navy vessels sail with a Royal Thai Navy ship and a South Korean ship while transiting the Gulf of Thailand during the exercise Cobra Gold on March 3, 2023. (MC3 Joshua Martinez/U.S. Navy)

Marine Corps, and later Navy, leaders have pushed to buy these ships in multiyear procurement contracts, which must generate cost-savings as a condition of service secretaries approving them. These savings are often on the order of 10%. But a top Marine general told Defense News that the Office of the Secretary of Defense wants larger savings by paring down the ship design and capability.

Lt. Gen. Karsten Heckl, the deputy commandant for combat development and integration, told Defense News in March that Pentagon officials had presented him with several rough drawings of ship designs that would be cheaper than the current LPDs.

"None of them are acceptable," he said. "They're trying to reduce cost by reducing my requirement. The answer to reduced cost would have been to exercise [two previous congressional authorizations for multi-ship contracts], one of which was a five-ship and would have saved the American taxpayers almost \$900 million."

Heckl, speaking at the annual Sea-Air-Space conference in April, said the Marines had in 2014 worked with the Navy to scale down the LPD design to the cheaper Flight II design, now under construction at Ingalls Shipbuilding. "We drove out cost. We're done."

Berger, who was part of that 2014 effort, made the same point in an April 18 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, saying that "every bit of efficiency [was] squeezed out" of the LPD design.

"If there's another effort to reduce that further, I know that we went to the minimums in 2014," the commandant added.

When Navy leadership first rolled out the plan to nix future LPDs, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike Gilday said that as the service prepares for a potential fight against China, it must prioritize programs most relevant to that conflict.

But more recently, top Navy officials said they would like to continue buying LPDs. Gilday told reporters in early April: "We agree on the 31 requirement, we agree on leveraging the multiyear procurement in terms of doing a bundle buy, and hopefully this study that ends in June informs these next steps."

Sherwood, when asked about the Pentagon's commitment to restart LPD buys in FY25 and to use multiyear procurement authority, said the Office of the Secretary of Defense plans to "address the next purchase in our FY25 budget."

Lawmakers last year included a provision in the FY23 National Defense Authorization

Act giving the commandant of the Marine Corps the authority to set the requirement for amphibious ships. That effectively makes the congressionally mandated requirement 31.

TODAY'S PLAN

The Navy's FY24 long-range shipbuilding plan, released April 17, envisions a dwindling amphibious fleet unless a compromise can be reached on building a future LPD-like ship.

Until the amphibious ship study determines the future of the San Antonio program—whether to continue or truncate it; whether to buy ships one at a time or commit to a multi-ship buy; whether to keep the Flight II design or pare it down further—the Navy's existing long-range plan does not include buying medium amphibious ships.

It continues retiring the aging Whidbey Island LSDs, though, calling for six of the 10 remaining ships to be retired from FY24 to FY26.

Under the baseline plan—the long-range ship plan includes three potential options—the fleet of 31 amphibious vessels today would sit at 29 in a decade, 24 in two decades and 19 in three decades.

If the Navy were to continue buying the San Antonio-class LPDs every other year, for about a billion dollars a year, the fleet could instead sit at 34 in a decade, 34 in two decades and 33 in three decades.

The San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock Fort Lauderdale is seen moored in Florida ahead of its July 30, 2022, commissioning ceremony. (Sgt. Gavin Shelton/U.S. Marine Corps)

Clark said the Office of the Secretary of Defense may not want the Navy to spend \$2 billion every other year for a ship it doesn't highly value right now, particularly because that cadence would generate a fleet slightly larger than the Corps' 31-ship requirement.

On the other hand, if the Navy stops the production line, lets the fleet size shrink and then later opts to restart the production line, the cost might be exorbitant—if Ingalls could even reconstitute its workforce and supply base.

"Are you better off buying those ships? Is that actually cheaper in the long run than it would be to stop the production line and turn around and restart it?" Clark said. "It may be that it almost becomes a wash."

That's the case with aircraft carriers: The Navy essentially pays HII's Newport News Shipbuilding to keep the production line "activated and fully manned" in order to keep the sole builder of nuclear-powered carriers viable, Clark said. The line isn't perfectly optimized, as that would create a larger fleet than the Navy needs, but it delivers a new ship every five to six years, and the Navy retains the industrial base to produce these complex ships.

This arrangement "ends up being slightly cheaper than if you started and stopped and started the construction line multiple times," Clark explained. "The question is: Does Congress or [the Office of the Secretary of Defense]—mostly Congress—want to take that longer term view and say, 'We're just going to keep building LPDs on two-year centers because in the end it's cheaper than to stop and start this line, unless you don't think you need LPDs [for future operations]?'"

Several experts expressed concern the Pentagon won't take long-term measures, like approving multi-ship contracts, to build and maintain a 31-ship fleet.

Brent Sadler, a senior research fellow for naval warfare and advanced technology at the Heritage Foundation, told Defense News that the Office of the Secretary of Defense and its Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office "don't see value in amphibs in

a China fight, and therefore [they are] not worth the money.”

Eaglen added that the the Office of the Secretary of Defense “is concerned some amphibys are too slow and therefore easy targets after the shooting starts” with China, despite the Marine Corps seeing amphibious ships and the surface connectors they haul as “critical to fighting inside the First Island Chain using Marines as a stand-in force.” (The first island chain stretches from Japan’s East China Sea islands through the Philippines.)

“Ultimately, Congress will be the adjudicator, and they will again side with the commandant,” she predicted.

THE COST OF FALLING SHORT OF A 31-SHIP FLEET

Berger told the Senate committee that not having enough ships puts at risk Marines’ ability to deter or win a war, plus their ability to respond to global crises.

“You have to be there with allies and partners because they have to believe that the United States is not running away from them, is going to be there even when things get tough,” he said.

The commandant added that “if you still believe . . . three amphibious ships loaded up with 2,300 Marines, if they have a deterrent value, and I think they do, then you want them right in the adversary’s grill, right in their face where they can see them all the time . . . Can we afford conventional deter-

rence? Absolutely yes, because the alternative is a lot worse.”

U.S. Marines sit in formation in combat rubber raiding crafts during a launch and recovery exercise with the amphibious transport dock New Orleans in the Philippine Sea on Aug. 6, 2022. (Lance Cpl. Yvonne Iwae/U.S. Marine Corps)

Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen. Eric Smith during a panel discussion at Sea-Air-Space said the service is providing as much airlift as possible for its forces in the Pacific, allowing Marines to get to exercises and respond to problems.

But there are still gaps when no ARG/MEUs are patrolling the Pacific, and Smith warned those would increase if the fleet size decreases.

If Americans traveling or working abroad find themselves in the middle of a violent uprising, “you better hope it’s in the months that we have an ARG/MEU ready to come get you. If you’re a combatant commander and somebody tries to close down a SLOC, a sea line of communication, you’re going to want to hope that’s during the months that we’re there.”

Calling the ARG/MEU the “crown jewel of our expeditionary crisis response capability,” Turner said “with the minimum of 31 ships that has been established and the readiness challenges that we’re facing that we discussed, really the confluence between

capacity and readiness has pinched that capability in ways that are really not helpful.”

If the Navy continues down its path of decommissioning the old LSDs and not replacing them with new LPDs, “trying to maintain even a minimal ARG/MEU presence is going to be really difficult.”

“At a time that we should be adding capability, we’re actually reducing capability,” Turner said.

ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 10 A.M. TOMORROW

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate stands adjourned until 10 a.m. tomorrow.

Thereupon, the Senate, at 8:46 p.m., adjourned until Thursday, May 4, 2023, at 10 a.m.

CONFIRMATIONS

Executive nominations confirmed by the Senate May 3, 2023:

THE JUDICIARY

ORELIA ELETA MERCHANT, OF NEW YORK, TO BE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.

WESLEY L. HSU, OF CALIFORNIA, TO BE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA.