

Had I been present, I would have voted yes to confirm his nomination to be Vice Chairman for Supervision of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System for a term of four years.

Mr. President, on July 13, 2022, I was absent for rollcall vote No. 251, Executive Calendar No. 676, the motion to invoke cloture on the nomination of Owen Edward Herrnstadt, of Maryland, to be a Member of the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank of the United States due to testing positive for COVID-19.

Had I been present, I would have voted yes to proceed with his nomination to be a Member of the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank of the United States.

Mr. President, on July 13, 2022, I was absent for rollcall vote No. 252, Executive Calendar No. 676, the confirmation of the nomination of Owen Edward Herrnstadt, of Maryland, to be a Member of the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank of the United States due to testing positive for COVID-19.

Had I been present, I would have voted yes to confirm his nomination to be a Member of the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank of the United States.

Mr. President, on July 13, 2022, I was absent for rollcall vote No. 253, Executive Calendar No. 908, the motion to invoke cloture on the nomination of Kate Elizabeth Heinzelman, of New York, to be General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency due to testing positive for COVID-19.

Had I been present, I would have voted yes to proceed with her nomination as General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. President, on July 14, 2022, I was absent for rollcall vote No. 254, Executive Calendar No. 908, the confirmation of the nomination of Kate Elizabeth Heinzelman, of New York, to be General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency due to testing positive for COVID-19.

Had I been present, I would have voted yes to confirm her nomination to be General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. President, on July 14, 2022, I was absent for rollcall vote No. 255, Executive Calendar No. 968, the motion to invoke cloture on the nomination of Julianna Michelle Childs, of South Carolina, to be United States Circuit Judge for the District of Columbia Circuit due to testing positive for COVID-19.

Had I been present, I would have voted yes to proceed with her nomination to be United States Circuit Judge for the District of Columbia Circuit.

#### AFGHANISTAN

Mr. HAWLEY. Mr. President, following my submission yesterday, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the next part of an investigation directed by the U.S. Central

Command concerning the Abbey Gate bombing in Afghanistan in August 2021.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### ACTS-SCK-DO

Subject: Findings and Recommendation—Attack Against U.S. Forces Conducting NEO at Hamid Karzai International Airport on 26 August 2021.

##### (b) Training.

(i) Prior to deploying to the CENTCOM AOR in the spring of 2021, the units assigned to the SPMAGTF completed typical pre-deployment training, focused on their core METs (exhibits 53, 55, 56, 57, 76, 77, 79, 80, 81). Additionally, 2/1 conducted training at the Infantry Immersion Trainer (IIT) at Camp Pendleton, where they trained on embassy reinforcement and crowd control operations (exhibits 76, 77, 86). While deployed, 2/1's companies were distributed throughout the AOR, and conducted various training events that would prove beneficial while operating at HKIA later in their deployment.

(ii) Echo Company, 2/1 conducted two Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MRXs), along with STP, CLD-21 and MWSD-373, at PSAB in July 2021, where they focused on ECC operations and security and response to a MASCAL event (exhibits 53, 54, 56, 57, 76). Echo Company, 2/1 also conducted non-lethal weapons training at PSAB and additional medical training in Kuwait (exhibit 82).

(iii) Golf Company, 2/1 deployed three platoons to Jordan, and one platoon initially to Djibouti, and then to PSAB, where it supported the Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) mission. In Jordan, Golf Company focused on its core METs, but had the unique opportunity to train alongside the U.K.'s 2 PARA, and the 77th Royal Jordanian Marine Battalion (77th RJMB). Training with 2 PARA helped build a level of interoperability and familiarity that proved useful when Golf Company, 2/1 served alongside 2 PARA at Abbey Gate, HKIA, whereas training with 77th RJMB helped Golf Company Marines grow accustomed to operating with non-native English speakers, a skill that also proved useful at HKIA (exhibits 53, 76, 77, 80, 86, 89, 90). Third Platoon, Golf Company, 2/1 received extensive medical training while serving as the TRAP platoon, to include Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC), Combat Trauma Management (CTM) training, and Valkyrie walking blood bank training (exhibits 86, 98). The rest of Golf Company conducted Combat Life Saver (CLS) refresher training, TCCC refresher training, and MASCAL training in Jordan, while Golf Company's junior Hospital Corpsmen conducted CTM and Valkyrie training prior to deploying to HKIA in support of the NEO (exhibits 77, 98).

(iv) Fox Company, 2/1 deployed to the BEC, where the company executed fixed site security and crowd control operations, and trained on non-lethal weapons employment, all of which prepared them to operate at Abbey Gate (exhibit 81). All 2/1 companies discussed ROE and the importance of treating people at the gates of HKIA with empathy and respect prior to deploying to HKIA (exhibits 53, 54, 56, 57, 76, 77, 78, 81). The STP completed multiple MASCAL drills while deployed at Al Jaber, Kuwait and PSAB, prior to deploying to HKIA (exhibit 66).

##### e. Leadership.

(1) Key Finding. COMREL and Task Organization. The task organization worked. This was in large part due to pre-existing or quickly forged relationships among leaders at the highest echelons and adaptability at the lower echelons.

(a) The 82nd Airborne Division, led by MG Donahue, executed their mission with a clear

chain of command (exhibits 10, 121, 124, 125). The Division rapidly adapted to the changing situation, as they were responsible for security of the airhead, support to the NEO, planning for the retrograde of all personnel and equipment, demilitarization of arms and equipment, and executing the JTE (exhibits 121, 125). In addition to security, the Division conducted initial screening and recovery of AMCITS, LPRs, locally hired embassy personnel, SIV applicants, and at risk Afghans at South and West Gates (exhibit 148). Once identified and screened, these evacuees were processed through the ECC for manifesting and departure from HKIA (exhibits 121, 125).

(b) General McKenzie established the NEO COMREL, and officially granted 82nd Airborne TACON of JTF-CR (exhibit 10, 11, 238). In reality, JTF-CR was TACON to USFOR-A FWD, and merely coordinated with the 82nd Airborne Division (exhibits 18, 21, 40, 125). This adjusted COMREL, along with the mixing of tactical responsibilities, resulted in the 82nd conducting airfield security and NEO for one sector, and JTF-CR conducting airfield security and NEO in another sector (exhibits 15, 121, 125, 143, 155). The senior officers made this division of tasks work under the circumstances with adjusted COMREL, mutual trust, and shared understanding.

##### (2) Engaged and Responsive Leaders.

(a) The leadership of the U.S. Forces tasked with conducting a NEO at HKIA worked collaboratively to adapt in an uncertain, chaotic, ambiguous, and high-threat environment. U.S. Forces experienced rapidly changing, complex relationships and compressed timelines to conduct a NEO. These leadership challenges were exacerbated by the reality that the Taliban, who could be described as a supporting effort, were operating under a unity of effort as opposed to a unity of command (exhibits 53, 125). This was demonstrated at each location around the perimeter of HKIA, where Taliban assistance ranged from actively supporting crowd control, to non-support, and even actively taunting the Marines (exhibits 23, 53, 100, 102, 125, 146). RADM Vasely, MG Donahue, and BG Sullivan conducted Key Leader Engagements (KLE) to coordinate activities, ensure mission accomplishment, and protect the force (exhibits 21, 23, 125). Their coordination with the Taliban facilitated crowd control and force protection, and minimized the incidence of kinetic engagements between U.S. Forces, and Taliban (exhibits 53, 104, 125). While the ROE may not have been entirely clear at all times, due to the rapidly changing situation, U.S. Forces retained the right to self-defense, the ability to engage individuals committing hostile acts or demonstrating hostile intent, and the ability to utilize riot-control measures in defense to protect the force and civilians.

(b) Military leadership at every level was engaged and responsive, enabling security of the airhead, executing the NEO, and planning to execute the Joint Tactical Exfiltration (JTE). There were numerous examples of great leadership during an operation amounting to simultaneous combat, evacuation, and humanitarian tasks during a compressed time, with constrained resources, and severe restrictions on terrain. There are three examples to highlight, the first being how leadership engaged the NSU and Taliban forces to assist with inner and outer perimeter security and checkpoint screening. Another example was the emplacement of the Chevron obstacle at Abbey Gate, which in combination with outside influences, had a profound impact on the flow of evacuees. The last example was the battlefield rotations conducted before 26 August and immediately before the blast at Abbey Gate. It should be noted that several leaders and Marines interviewed stated operations at

HKIA were so chaotic, that even with the tremendous amounts of training conducted prior to deployment, no training would be able to prepare someone for what they faced (exhibits 107, 101). All of these examples tested leaders' ability to remain flexible in a dynamic environment and challenged them to rise above adversity.

(c) These challenges began when civilians breached the perimeter and started to occupy the southern area of HKIA on 15 August (exhibits 15, 53, 54, 56). This caused the JTF-CR to send 50 out of 53 personnel, emptying their JOC, to assist in pushing back the crowd (exhibit 15). It took almost everyone on the airfield to get the civilians off the runway in order to continue operations (exhibit 15, 53, 54, 56). Leadership recognized that they had to build and leverage relationships in order to provide better security and screening. This led to negotiations between RADM Vasely, the NSU, and the Taliban (exhibit 53). The NSU helped to clear the airfield and manned their gate, while MG Donahue instructed the Taliban regarding which areas they would need to control and clear to facilitate the NEO (exhibit 18, 21, 123, 125). The Taliban would later establish outer checkpoints and, more notably, provide security at the Chevron outside the outer corridor of Abbey Gate (exhibits 54, 77, 81, 84, 85, 86, 89).

(d) The coordination to install the Chevron, which ultimately changed the dynamics at Abbey Gate, involved the U.K., Taliban and the Commander of Golf Company, 2/1 Marines, (TEXT REDACTED) The U.K. Forces devised the idea and the placement location, but were having trouble executing (TEXT REDACTED) and other members of the senior leadership were conducting KLEs with the Taliban to discuss security and future operations (exhibit 54, 18). (TEXT REDACTED) had the Taliban move the broken vehicles that were in the way and preventing the Chevron from being emplaced, and help to help to control Afghan civilians (exhibit 77). The Taliban would later provide security in front of and on top of the Chevron containers (exhibits 54, 77, 81, 84, 85, 86, 89). (TEXT REDACTED) also coordinated with the MEU engineers to use their equipment to move jersey barriers and emplace the containers forming the Chevron (exhibits 54, 77, 81, 84, 85, 89, 103). This helped to create stand-off between troops and the crowd and control the flow of personnel coming into the Abbey Gate for processing.

(e) Leadership, from USFOR-A FWD down to the company level, would visit the gates to ensure the Service members were cared for and to gather situational awareness of the rapidly changing environment. The USFOR-A FWD team would visit gates multiple times a day (exhibit 21, 22, 23). The USFOR-A FWD (TEXT REDACTED) would visit the gates to check on Marines/Soldiers and to provide reports on the current conditions and situation at the gates (exhibits 17, 21, 96). On 26 August, just before 1700, BGen Sullivan, (TEXT REDACTED) (all of JTF-CR) had visited Abbey Gate and left the area 20 minutes before the blast (exhibits 17, 19). (TEXT REDACTED) 3/10 IBCT, (TEXT REDACTED) 2/501 PIR, and (TEXT REDACTED) 1/8 visited Abbey Gate on 26 August as well (exhibits 104, 123, 126). The (TEXT REDACTED) of 2/1, (TEXT REDACTED) attended a meeting at the Barron Hotel with Taliban and U.K. Forces to discuss the impending closure of Abbey Gate at 1600 on 26 August. As he was leaving Abbey Gate, (TEXT REDACTED) was caught in the blast (exhibits 53, 90).

(f) Leaders on the ground engaged with their teams in order to work through the evolving situation. They were coordinating support with friendly units while also nego-

tiating with the NSU and Taliban to provide security for gate operations and retrograde planning. Junior leaders were empowered to make and execute decisions, as demonstrated through the emplacement of the Chevron. Overall, military leaders executed the mission and protected their Marines and Soldiers to the best of their ability.

#### f. Medical Considerations.

(1) Key Finding. The wounds sustained by the KIA were so catastrophic none could be saved. Medical providers at multiple echelons stated access to additional advanced treatment and equipment would not have saved more lives. The capability at HKIA's Role II-E saved several Service Members who otherwise would have succumbed to their wounds. Providers stated the capability at HKIA was the most robust they had experienced in an operational setting. Every Service Member who could have been saved with medical treatment survived due to the medical capability at HKIA.

#### (2) Capabilities.

(a) Role II. Throughout the Afghanistan NEO, there were two Role II facilities at HKIA, one on North HKIA (NHKIA), referred to at times as the NATO Role II, Role II-E, or the Military Treatment Facility (MTF), had the most robust capability, while a second facility at Camp Alvarado was operated by 1/82 IBCT medical personnel (exhibits 66, 98, 128, 130, 131). The MTF hosted eight surgical teams, including three Army Forward Resuscitative Surgical Teams (FRST), one Army light surgical team, two U.S. SOSTs, one Norwegian SOST, and one U.K. surgical team. The MTF had two ORs, with the ability to surge to four patients simultaneously, and space for seven intensive care unit (ICU) and 14 ward patients, with the ability to surge on both. The MTF also had CT scanning and x-ray capability, a lab, a pharmacy, and an ER that operated 24 hours a day (exhibits 128, 131). According to multiple medical officers, the MTF at HKIA had more assets and capability than any field facility they had ever seen (exhibits 66, 128, 130, 131). The second Role II facility, located at Camp Alvarado, was operated by personnel from 1/82 IBCT and hosted an Army FRSD. The FRSD was capable of providing limited damage control surgery and resuscitation (exhibit 130).

(b) Role I. There were two Role I-E facilities at HKIA throughout the NEO. The 24th MEU's STP operated next to the PAX Terminal on NHKIA, while the SPMAGTF's STP operated out of a building between East Gate and Abbey Gate. The MEU STP had two physician assistants (PA), two nurses, and 15 corpsmen (exhibit 16). The SPMAGTF STP had two ER doctors, one PA, two nurses, and 12 corpsmen (exhibit 66). In addition to the two Role I-E facilities, the U.K. operated a Role I facility out of the Barron Hotel, in vicinity of Abbey Gate (exhibits 77, 98).

(3) MASCAL Plan. Prior to executing the NEO, the MASCAL plan for HKIA was not comprehensive, in that it did not incorporate every compound surrounding the airfield. Instead, the existing MASCAL plan only referred to NHKIA, where the aforementioned NATO Role II/MTF was located. Leading up to the NEO, TF MED leadership began refining the MASCAL plan, and attempted to designate CCPs and evacuation routes throughout the airfield (exhibit 128). The updated plan was not finalized prior to the beginning of the NEO, and as a result, during the NEO the MASCAL plan was reduced to, "In the event of a MASCAL event, utilize all available vehicles to transport casualties to the MTF as quickly as possible (exhibits 66, 128, 130, 131)". The lack of a comprehensive MASCAL plan caused some frustration and concern for units operating away from NHKIA (exhibit 66). Despite the lack of a

comprehensive plan, each unit conducted internal MASCAL rehearsals that undoubtedly contributed to the rapid, successful response witnessed following the Abbey Gate attack of 26 August (exhibits 66, 98, 128, 130, 131).

(4) Medical Rules of Engagement (MEDROE). At the start of the NEO, the MEDROE were unclear among the various medical providers (exhibits 66, 130, 131). The SPMAGTF STP and 1/82 IBCT Role II were initially under the impression they were to adhere to the standing CENTCOM MEDROE, which was complicated by the fact that service members were coming into close, regular contact with large numbers of civilians at the HKIA gates (exhibits 66, 130). After operating for several days under an ambiguous MEDROE, TF MED's (TEXT REDACTED) passed guidance to all providers at HKIA stating that they were responsible for providing care to anyone within the gates of the airfield (exhibits 66, 130, 131). The lack of initial clarity regarding MEDROE presented a challenge for some medical providers, and served as a source of frustration (exhibit 66).

(5) MASCAL Preparations Prior to 26 August. Upon his arrival at HKIA, 82nd Airborne's Commander, MG Donahue, identified the likelihood of a MASCAL event during the course of the NEO, and tasked the 82nd's senior medical officer with preparing for a MASCAL (exhibit 125). In the days leading up to the attack on 26 August, units at all echelons conducted MASCAL rehearsals (exhibits 16, 18, 21, 66, 98, 128, 130, 131). In response to the increased threat leading up to 26 August, the SPMAGTF STP (TEXT REDACTED) ran MASCAL rehearsals in her clinic, and staged an ambulance with an en route care team inside the inner gate at Abbey Gate on the evening of 25 August (exhibit 66). Beginning on the morning of 26 August, Golf Company, 2/1 established a CCP inside the outer gate, and consolidated medical supplies, litters, and corpsmen at the CCP in anticipation of a potential attack and MASCAL event (exhibits 77, 98). Following a phone call from the USFOR-A FWD (TEXT REDACTED) at 1310 on 26 August warning of a likely attack, TF MED (TEXT REDACTED) consolidated all medical personnel at the MTF, and kept them on standby throughout the afternoon so that they were prepared to respond rapidly to a MASCAL (exhibit 131).

g. Chronology/Timeline of Events. See enclosure 9.

#### 4. Recommendations.

a. TBI Screening. During the course of the investigation, it became apparent Service Members received inconsistent evaluation for concussion and TBI after the attack at Abbey Gate. Since the initial medical evacuation of the wounded, twelve Service Members have been added to the list of those wounded in action; many for TBI. I therefore recommend forwarding findings and recommendations to all CENTCOM Service Component Commanders for consideration that all Service Members at Abbey Gate during the attack, and present in any blast zone depicted in exhibit 137, slide 7, be evaluated for TBI.

b. Mental Health Evaluation. A consistent trend during interviews with young Marines were stories involving traumatic injuries and death of children, separation of families at gates, and outright rejection of evacuees culminating in their distraught return to the civilian population outside the gate. During the response to the attack at Abbey Gate, young Marines heroically recovered the wounded and rendered life-saving care. Others carried the bodies of their deceased friends away from the canal. In consideration of the mental and emotional strain placed on these young Marines and other Service Members, I recommend forwarding

the findings and recommendations to all CENTCOM Service Component Commanders. Recommend mental health evaluations and treatment options for all personnel executing entry control point operations at Abbey Gate from 17-26 August. Evaluations and treatment options should also be pursued for personnel involved in the medical response to the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August.

c. Interagency NEO Doctrine. Many leaders observed planning and execution with interagency partners was difficult, because there was no shared understanding or baseline concepts common to the various entities involved in the execution of NEO. To address this shortcoming, I recommend forwarding this investigation to the Joint Staff for consideration in drafting and publication of interagency doctrine for Non-combatant Evacuation Operations.

d. Further Investigation. During an interview with Platoon Commanders of Golf Company, 2/1 Marines, a Platoon Commander stated a civilian was killed by a flash bang grenade. The investigator did not pursue the line of questioning, because of the group setting and potential for misconduct and a rights advisement. After speaking with my legal advisor, I assessed this line of inquiry was outside my scope to investigate and would incur a significant delay in meeting my timeline and mandate. I recommend forwarding exhibits 84 and 128 to MARCENT for potential investigation into statements made by the Platoon Commander from Golf Company, 2/1 Marines, concerning a possible civilian casualty caused by use of a flash bang grenade.

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (TEXT REDACTED) or at (TEXT REDACTED) (TEXT REDACTED) LANCE G. CURTIS BG, USA Investigating Officer

#### REMEMBERING CHARLES H. COOLIDGE AND HERSHEL W. "WOODY" WILLIAMS

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Mr. President, in its mission statement, the National Medal of Honor Heritage Center in Chattanooga, TN, highlights the values of patriotism, citizenship, courage, integrity, sacrifice, and commitment as central to the character of every Medal of Honor recipient. When put into action, these values culminate in uncommon acts of heroism.

Today, I have the privilege of recognizing two heroes whose valor on the battlefield earned them the Medal of Honor and the admiration of their countrymen: Charles H. Coolidge of Tennessee and Hershel W. "Woody" Williams of West Virginia. We lost Charles last year and Woody just a few weeks ago, but their legacies remain a celebration of the sacrifice, resilience, and service of the 16 million men and women who served in the Armed Forces during World War II and saved the world from the horrors of authoritarianism. The Senate came together and rallied around one final tribute to the era's Medal of Honor recipients, and on July 14, Woody Williams became just the seventh American to lay in honor in the rotunda of the U.S. Capitol. It was a lovely, fitting way to show our gratitude not only to Woody, but to all the World War II Medal of Honor recipients we lost before him.

I can think of no better way to keep this spirit of camaraderie alive than to put their legacies to work on behalf of younger generations who are just beginning to understand that the preservation of freedom for all humanity will require much more than bold words.

Liberty is not an act of sheer will, but a reflection within a people of the same values that prompted Charles and Woody to put themselves between their brothers in arms and enemy troops. On behalf of all Tennesseans, I thank these brave men for their commitment to the common cause of freedom and pray that all our Nation's leaders will endeavor to follow in their footsteps.

#### TRIBUTE TO ELI DICKEN

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. President, I rise to formally express my gratitude for the heroic actions of my fellow Hoosier, Eli Dicken, at the Greenwood Park Mall.

On Sunday, July 17, 2022, in the midst of unimaginable tragedy, Eli boldly stepped forward into danger to save the lives of others. As a murderer committed a heinous act of violence at the Greenwood Park Mall, Eli, after directing others around him to get to safety, drew his own firearm, and fired upon the attacker, ultimately taking his life and saving the lives of countless innocent bystanders. Within 15 seconds, Eli was able to stop an even greater tragedy. As Chief James Ison of the Greenwood, IN, Police Department noted, Eli's actions "were nothing short of heroic" and "many more people would have died . . . if it was not for his heroism." Eli's actions were possible due to this own bravery and because of actions taken by the State of Indiana to ensure that law-abiding citizens are freely able to exercise their constitutional right to keep and bear arms.

I mourn the three innocent lives that were taken and pray for the families and communities that this senseless tragedy has affected. I also pray for the continued recovery of those wounded in the attack, who were in part saved by Eli's decisive actions and also by the exceptional response and care of first responders. So today, I add my own voice to those honoring Eli and express my gratitude for his selfless courage.

#### ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

#### 100TH ANNIVERSARY OF WDEL RADIO

• Mr. CARPER. Mr. President, I rise today on behalf of Delaware's congressional delegation in honor of the 100th anniversary of Delaware's first radio station, WDEL. The station was born on July 22, 1922, when amateur radio operator and shop owner Willard Wilson aired the first news reports and music out of his home in Wilmington, DE, on what was then WHAV. Over the years, the station changed its call letters to WDEL and moved out of Wilson's home to various spaces in down-

town Wilmington, where listeners could tune in to hear many famous "big bands" live from the Gold Ballroom of the Hotel Du Pont. Today, the station has a home on Shipley Road and has grown to provide local news, talk and traffic reports, with thousands of listeners from Delaware and our surrounding States tuning in daily to hear from WDEL's recognizable voices on the airwaves.

Just like our home State's motto, WDEL has been "first" many times when it comes to broadcasting. In 1933, WDEL became one of the first radio affiliates for Major League Baseball, airing the Philadelphia A's games. Today, you can still catch the crack of the bat on its signals 101.7 FM or 1150 AM during the Philadelphia Phillies season. WDEL was also the first in Delaware to provide real-time, locally produced traffic reports, filling a need when other stations weren't covering the busy roads in the Delaware region. The station also was one of the first stations to hire women for on-air positions when it wasn't popular to do so.

Over the years, WDEL has covered many historic moments in Delaware, including Presidential visits from Harry Truman, John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and, of course, Delaware's own Joe Biden. WDEL has also covered the moments that capture the cultural fabric of Delaware, including broadcasts from the Greek, Italian, and Polish festivals, as well as the Wilmington Flower Market, and has a long history of giving back to the community by supporting Nemours Children's Hospital, Ronald McDonald House, Sunday Breakfast Mission, and many other children's charities, shelters, and soup kitchens.

WDEL's dedication to its listeners was awarded numerous times over the years. WDEL was named Medium Market Station of the Year by the National Association of Broadcasters—NAB—named News Operation of the Year by the Chesapeake AP Broadcasters Association several times, and was honored with the Edward R. Murrow Award for Overall Excellence twice, and the NAB's prestigious Crystal Award for public service.

On behalf of both U.S. Senator CHRIS COONS and U.S. Representative LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, I rise today to honor WDEL radio on a century of hard work and dedication to serving the community. The station that started as just one among 100 in the country has withstood a century of change and innovation and has been recognized as among the best in the Nation. We wish its employees and listeners many more years of this incredible news service on the airwaves.●

#### TRIBUTE TO RALPH HIPP

• Mr. MARSHALL. Mr. President, I rise today to honor and recognize Mr. Ralph Hipp of Topeka, KS.

Mr. Ralph Hipp announced this week that he will be retiring September 2