

been, and continues to be, a vital U.S. partner for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East.

The proposed renewal of C-17 aircraft support will provide the Government of the UAE with a credible defense capability, provide strategic and humanitarian airlift, and ensure interoperability with U.S. forces. The UAE already operates the C-17 and will have no difficulty absorbing the additional sustainment into its armed forces.

The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The prime contractor will be The Boeing Company, Chicago, IL. The purchaser typically requests offsets. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

Implementation of this proposed sale may require the assignment of up to twelve (12) U.S. Government or contractor representatives to the UAE. Implementation of this proposed sale will require periodic Program Management Reviews in the United States or in the UAE.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

#### VOTE EXPLANATION

Mr. HAWLEY. Mr. President, had there been a recorded vote, I would have voted no on the confirmation of Executive Calendar No. 987, Stephen Henley Locher, of Iowa, to be United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa.

#### VOTE EXPLANATION

Mr. LUJÁN. Mr. President, I was unavailable for rollcall vote No. 246, on Executive Calendar No. 1037, Steven M. Dettelbach, of Ohio, to be Director, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. Had I been present, I would have voted yea.

#### GLOBAL LEARNING LOSS ASSESSMENT ACT

Mr. CARDIN. Mr. President, I rise today to speak about the bipartisan Global Learning Loss Assessment Act, S. 552, which I introduced along with Senator BOOZMAN last year. This bill requires the U.S. Agency for International Development, or USAID, to submit a report to Congress that assesses learning loss, identifies gaps in access to education, and outlines the response that is needed to help students recover from COVID-19 and reach their full potential. I applaud the advancement of this bill, which was voted on favorably in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee earlier today and will now move to the Senate floor for consideration. I should note that the House companion bill passed the House in June 2021. So it is time for the Senate to act.

The COVID-19 pandemic has forced schools around the world to suspend in-person learning as a measure to contain the spread of the virus and safeguard public health. Even before the pandemic began, UNESCO reported that 258 million children were out of

school globally, including 130 million girls. Now, the pandemic has disrupted the education of an estimated 90 percent of the world's student population—over 1.6 billion children and youth—who saw their schools close at some point due to COVID-19.

We already know that school closures lead to interrupted learning, poor nutrition, gaps in childcare, increased dropout rates, exposure to violence, and social isolation. What is more, students already at a disadvantage before COVID-19 will experience greater learning loss, thereby worsening inequity and inequality in education.

School closures are especially burdensome for girls, who are frequently expected to shoulder more household responsibilities and are more vulnerable to gender-based violence—GBV. For example, according to a study by the United Nations Development Program, school closures in Sierra Leone necessitated by the Ebola pandemic led to increased instances of sexual- and gender-based violence, teenage pregnancy, school dropout, and child labor for girls.

Restrictions associated with COVID-19 have also made girls more vulnerable to child and early forced marriage. The United Nations Population Fund—UNFPA—estimates that 13,000,000 more child marriages could take place by 2030 than would have without the pandemic, and when a girl gets married, her education almost always stops.

When school closures occur, a significant percentage of distance learning alternatives rely exclusively on online platforms. However, according to UNICEF, two-thirds of the world's school-aged children do not have an internet connection in their homes, with that number rising to about 90 percent of students in sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, schools and local education centers frequently have inadequate internet connectivity.

The Global Learning Loss Assessment Act will help improve the quality and reach of international education assistance by giving Congress the information we need to assess the status of education worldwide. The critical information included in the report produced by USAID will be used to inform future policy, oversight, and programmatic decisions by Congress and USAID, and will help ensure that our partner countries are better prepared to respond to future crises that could disrupt the education system.

Specifically, the USAID report shall include: an assessment of learning loss globally and of the impact on U.S. basic education programs; an overview of distance learning in low resource contexts; a description of the barriers to education or distance learning for marginalized children; data on USAID programs that have been supporting learning during the pandemic; an overview of how USAID has, independently and in coordination with partners, adapted basic education programming during the COVID-19 pandemic to sup-

port continued learning; and a description of the authorities and resources USAID needs to continue to support education programs during and after the pandemic to mitigate learning loss and help students get back on track.

The Global Learning Loss Assessment Act has been endorsed by several important NGOs, including the Basic Education Coalition, Cambridge Education, Catholic Relief Services, Chemonics International, Childhood Education International, Food for the Hungry, Global Campaign for Education-US, Jesuit Refugee Service/USA, Luminos Fund, RESULTS, RISE Institute, RTI International, Save the Children, Unbounded Associates, UNICEF USA, World Education, and World Learning.

I look forward to the opportunity for this important bill supporting education worldwide to be adopted by the Senate.

#### AFGHANISTAN

Mr. HAWLEY. Mr. President, following my submission yesterday, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the next part of an investigation directed by the U.S. Central Command concerning the Abbey Gate bombing in Afghanistan in August 2021.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendation—Attack Against U.S. Forces Conducting NEO at Hamid Karzai International Airport on 26 August 2021

(r) The SPMAGTF EOD Team, attached to 2/1, conducted a post blast analysis at 0620 on 27 August with U.K. Forces EOD and Taliban security (exhibits 5, 65). EOD concluded the blast was either a vest or backpack detonated on the far side of the canal held above the waist, directly across from 1st Platoon, Golf Company Marines (exhibit 5). EOD deduced this location from the fragmentation pattern in the nearside canal wall, fragmentation in the PSYOP vehicle, and blast burns on the wall on the far side of the canal (exhibit 5). The fragmentation from the vest or backpack was primarily ball bearings (exhibits 5, 95). Open source news reported the Taliban had recently freed the individual bomber, (TEXT REDACTED) on 15 August from the Parwan Detention Facility near Bagram Air Base (exhibit 165). The investigation found no evidence to support a conclusion the bomber used U.S. identification to clear Taliban checkpoints on the approaches to the Abbey Gate canal. There were multiple avenues of approach to the canal, continuously used by Afghans to bypass Taliban checkpoints (exhibits 76, 102). The bomber likely used one of these avenues. Further, no Marine mentioned that any person used U.S. identification to move closer to their position in relation to the attack.

(s) There was no complex attack; it was a single suicide bomber not accompanied by enemy small arms fire.

(i) Immediately following the blast, nearly all Marines and personnel reported small arms fire (see all exhibits with 2/1 Marines, 24th MEU). There is wide variation of thought on where the firing originated and who was actually doing the firing. Many Marines described personnel near the canal as the source of outgoing small arms fire immediately following the blast. Many Marines, to

include snipers in the tower, also recall fire from the Chevron area into the outer gate and from the East (see all exhibits with 2/1 Marines, 24th MEU). Marines from Golf Company described seeing individuals on a roof near a water tank to their east, one with a camera and one with a rifle (exhibits 86, 87). These Marines stated they fired on the individuals after confirming they posed a threat, and that they suppressed the threat (exhibits 86, 87, 88). Golf Company Marines reported U.K. Forces occupied the position in that building shortly after the attack, but (TEXT REDACTED) 2 PARA, stated his soldiers never occupied a position in that building (exhibits 86, 87, 88, 127, 148). Several key leaders from 2/1 stated it was unlikely Marines received fire from the East, as Taliban members had occupied those buildings throughout the NEO (exhibits 53, 76, 77). The 2/1 Marines S2 stated that friendly forces occupied all elevated positions around Abbey Gate (exhibit 76). Soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division provided overwatch of Abbey Gate from a tower 75 meters north of the outer gate tower. (TEXT REDACTED) was in the tower during and after the blast, and was confident small arms fire came from the vicinity of the Barron Hotel and not the Chevron or the East (exhibit 144). (TEXT REDACTED) also had visual of one Afghan civilian on a rooftop near Abbey Gate, but this individual posed no threat (exhibit 144). It is unlikely Marines received fire from buildings to the East of Abbey Gate. If they did, it was far more likely to have originated from a rogue Taliban member, than it was part of a complex attack.

(ii) Marines who reported hearing small arms fire after the blast most likely heard friendly warning shots. Golf Company, 2/1 Marines specifically identified members of the Recon Company, 24th MEU as shooting from near the canal after the explosion (exhibits 77, 87, 88). (TEXT REDACTED) of the 2nd Marine Recon Company, stated during their interview that (TEXT REDACTED) fired unsuppressed warning shots (two hammered pairs) at an individual who positioned himself to observe the Marines' reaction to the blast and had been in the crowd acting suspiciously before the blast (exhibit 106, 184, 237). (TEXT REDACTED) fired the rounds southwest, down the canal, toward the Barron Hotel. The rounds would have crossed the frontage of Marines, who were entering the canal to recover casualties and take up security positions, which would have contributed to their perception that they were taking fire (106, 237). No Marines beyond the Recon element Staff NCOs, and those firing at the individuals near the water tank, describe having positive identification of any targets (exhibits 62, 66, 86, 87, 88, 106). This includes the snipers in the Abbey Gate tower and Soldiers in the tower to the North, who had the best vantage point (exhibit 62, 144).

(iii) In addition to the Recon element firing warning shots, (TEXT REDACTED) 2 PARA, confirmed U.K. Troops fired warning shots to help control the crowd in vicinity of the Barron Hotel (exhibits 127, 148). The Bravo Company, 2/501 PIR (TEXT REDACTED) was in the outer corridor, south of the blast area, and described seeing two U.K. Soldiers firing their weapons at a 45-degree angle into the air, towards the northeast (exhibit 124). These rounds also would have crossed in front of Golf 2/1 Marines, contributing to their confusion about taking fire.

(iv) Claims by the Marines to have heard or felt fire originating from outside Abbey Gate should be attributed to both the 2 PARA and Marine Recon personnel firing warning shots, and their potential for disorientation post blast (exhibits 76, 95, 106, 127, 148). Many of the Marines we interviewed were at Abbey Gate. The vast majority of those Marines

were within the blast radius and suffered potential TBIs or concussions from the event (exhibits 62, 63, 77, 88, 91, 92, 93, 95, 164). There was a tremendous amount of smoke, and tear gas canisters were ruptured and pouring chemicals into the blast area, further limiting visibility, and responsiveness (exhibits 63, 89, 127). Nearby observers noted the overwhelming noise from the wounded and civilian crowd fleeing the area (exhibit 148). Marines at the canal were already exhausted and were now experiencing sensory overload (exhibits 77, 127). It is unknown whom Marines engaged holding a weapon on a rooftop immediately following the blast, or even if this actually occurred. (exhibits 76, 77, 87, 88). During the interviews, fellow Marines expressed skepticism and doubt about possible positive identification of targets (exhibits 87, 88). It is worth noting the only Marines who reported receiving fire following the explosion were junior Marines, with no prior combat experience. (TEXT REDACTED) and other leaders concluded there was no complex attack, merely the belief there was one (exhibits 53, 76, 77, 102, 148).

(t) Interviews with Marines at Abbey Gate post-attack revealed no information supporting a conclusion fratricide or civilian casualties resulted from reaction to the blast. Open source research found no reporting to support a conclusion warning shots or engagement of targets in response to the attack caused additional harm to civilians. Marines did report stopping civilians from running through the gate after the attack, and presenting deadly force to stop civilians with bags from approaching or using hones, but no shots were fired in these instances (exhibit 63). A Platoon (TEXT REDACTED) from 2/1 Marines, (TEXT REDACTED) stated during a group interview he witnessed a flash bang grenade detonate near a civilian's head (exhibit 84). He stated the incident did not appear intentional and assumed the injury resulted in death (exhibit 84). This incident took place during the confrontation at Abbey Gate on 20 August between Golf Company and unruly civilians who breached the gate (exhibit 84). (TEXT REDACTED) Surgeon at the Role II-E, recalled treating a civilian with an eye injury that may have been from Abbey Gate (exhibit 128).

(u) The reaction to the blast, and the immediate CASEVAC, by the 2/1 Marines, and adjacent Army and Marine units, were nothing short of incredible. All wounded personnel were evacuated from the canal blast site to the inner gate CCP in 15 minutes (exhibit 53). All the wounded were evacuated by vehicle to the Role II-E at North HKIA in less than one hour (exhibit 66). Marines flooded the blast area, worked through tear gas, and expeditiously moved over 30 personnel nearly 100 meters to the CCP (exhibits 62, 63, 64, 65, 76, 77, 88, 92). Marines used riot control shields as makeshift litters and a Marine immediately cut multiple holes in the fence to shorten the distance from the blast site to the CCP (exhibits 62, 63, 88, 92). At the CCP, Navy corpsmen, and Marines with additional medical training, were assessing and stabilizing the wounded rapidly (exhibits 63, 77, 98, 144). The situation was chaotic. With many leaders injured, it was difficult to determine if anyone was truly in charge, but collectively the task of triage and movement was successfully accomplished (exhibits 53, 57, 66, 76, 77, 78, 90, 98, 124, 128, 131). At least twenty vehicles rotated through Abbey Gate to move the wounded either to the SPMAGTF's STP Role I-E facility, positioned between Abbey and East Gates, or directly to the Role II-E at North HKIA (exhibits 66, 124). The STP Role I-E facility treated four urgent surgical patients, to include 2/1 Marine (TEXT REDACTED)

during the MASCAL event (exhibit 66). The STP also treated injured Afghan civilians for over an hour and half after the attack (exhibit 66). All wounded from Abbey Gate were evacuated from HKIA rearward to CONUS by 0700 on 27 August.

(v) After the blast and recovery of all Marines and U.S. personnel, (TEXT REDACTED) Echo Company (TEXT REDACTED) took control of the outer gate, closed the gate and focused on internal security (exhibits 56, 77) (TEXT REDACTED) focused internally on his company, which sustained heavy casualties (exhibit 77). The SPMAGTF EOD Team attached to 2/1 conducted a search for secondary devices and sensitive items after the gate was closed (exhibit 65). U.K. Forces took over security of the canal and outer corridor, but the blast dispersed the crowd considerably (exhibits 15, 17, 18, 53, 56, 65, 77). At approximately 0200 on 27 August, (TEXT REDACTED) Bravo Company, 2/501 PIR, began to transition his company into Abbey Gate to relieve Echo Company and 2/1 Marines (exhibit 124). By 0500, Bravo Company had taken responsibility for security of Abbey Gate (exhibit 124). U.K. Forces did not complete their operations at Barron Hotel and fully retrograde through the inner gate of Abbey Gate until 0700 (exhibits 124, 127).

(w) 2/1 Marines consolidated in North HKIA and received the task of demilitarizing equipment in preparation for the JTE (exhibits 54, 57, 77). At approximately 1300 on 27 August, they attended the Ramp Ceremony and the KIA from the blast were evacuated rearward (exhibits 14, 54, 100). Before departing HKIA, but after completion of demilitarization, 2/1 Marines were tasked to police call the PAX Terminal area of trash and debris (exhibits 54, 56). 2/1 Marines perceived this order to be punishment for some of their excessive demilitarization efforts, namely defacing and breaking property that was not supposed to be broken (exhibit 56). MG Donahue specifically commented on the excessive destruction by 2/1 Marines, stating DoS and 82nd had to intervene (exhibit 125). He overtly noted Golf Company Marines, led by (TEXT REDACTED) were not involved in the destruction and had set the standard for all units operating at the gates throughout the NEO (exhibit 125). The 2/1 Marines departed in two groups, with Fox Company (-), Golf Company, and Weapons Company departing for Camp Buehring, Kuwait on 28 August and 2/1 Battalion HQ with Echo Company departing on 29 August for PSAB (exhibit 54).

c. Force Protection, specifically including pertinent issues associated with; Force Posture, and Gate Operations.

(1) Key Finding. The attack was not preventable at the tactical level without degrading the mission to maximize the number of evacuees.

(2) Force Posture

(a) Manning. Abbey Gate was operated by 2/1 Marines throughout the NEO (exhibits 53, 56, 77, 100). On 19 August, Golf Company consisted of three platoons, and was reinforced by two additional platoons of Fox Company, when they established operations at Abbey Gate (exhibits 77, 81). From 19–22 August, Golf Company was responsible for Abbey Gate and relieved by Echo Company on 22 August (exhibits 56, 77). From 22–25 August, Echo Company, with four platoons, reinforced by two Weapons Company platoons, was responsible for Abbey Gate. At approximately 1600 on 25 August, Golf Company reinforced by Fox Company platoons, resumed responsibility of Abbey Gate (exhibits 56, 77). Echo Company, reinforced by Weapons Company platoons, was tasked to prepare Abbey Gate for closure and RIP with 1/82 IBCT (exhibits 56, 57). On the afternoon of 26 August,

the size and aggressiveness of the crowd increased (exhibits 53, 56, 77). (TEXT REDACTED) tasked Echo Company to assume operation of the inner corridor to facilitate Golf Company's need to allocate more platoons for crowd control in the outer corridor (exhibits 53, 56, 77). At the time of the blast, approximately seven platoons were operating Abbey Gate. This consisted of three from Golf Company, two from Fox Company, and two from Echo Company (exhibits 53, 56, 77, 81). Steady state manning was generally five to six platoons (exhibits 53, 56, 77).

(b) Rest Cycle. Companies rotated between Abbey Gate, QRF, rest, and evacuee security for those waiting for processing or flights (exhibits 53, 56, 57, 77). While establishing the gate, rest cycles were initially by opportunity only, resulting in infrequent and short periods for Marines to sleep during 72-hour periods at the gate (exhibits 53, 56, 57, 77). After gate operations normalized, the companies were able to establish a sustainable rest cycle, with one platoon rotating to a rest shift for six or eight hours (exhibits 53, 56, 77, 81). Because of the tempo of operations, all units at HKIA experienced challenges establishing rest cycles (exhibits 13, 15, 53, 57, 76).

(c) Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). Marines at Abbey Gate consistently maintained full PPE while working in the outer corridor and canal areas (exhibits 54, 89, 98). PPE included plate carrier, small arms protective inserts (SAPI), eye protection, ballistic helmet, and issued combat gloves (exhibit 55, 89, 98). Marines could remove PPE during rest periods. In the inner corridor, behind protective cover (exhibits 83, 89). Marines occasionally removed their helmets to humanize themselves and deescalate confrontations with civilian evacuees (exhibits 83, 89). Marines affected by the blast were universally wearing their PPE, as evidenced by statements, autopsy results, and JTAPIC analysis (exhibits 77, 83, 89, 138, 145). The one known exception was (TEXT REDACTED) 1st Platoon (TEXT REDACTED). At the time of the blast, he removed his helmet to engage with a civilian evacuee at the canal wall (exhibit 83, 92). JTAPIC analysis demonstrated helmets and SAPIs were effective in stopping all fragmentation (exhibit 138).

(d) Crowd Control Measures. The most effective method of crowd control was physical presence and interaction by Marines with the crowds (exhibits 56, 77, 80, 129). Professional actions, verbal commands, physical force, and riot control shields prevented crowds from breaching the gate (exhibits 56, 77, 80, 89). Forces utilized warning shots with varying degrees of success at HKIA (exhibits 53, 54, 100, 117, 118). 2/1 Marines did not use warning shots and only used flash bang grenades infrequently (exhibits 53, 54, 77, 80, 83). The employment of riot control agents (RCAs), such as tear gas, required 0-6 approval for use in defensive situations (exhibit 116, 117). 2/1 Marines employed cross cultural engagement and de-escalation with the civilian population to establish calm and decrease aggressiveness (exhibits 57, 77). The employment of PSYOP capabilities served to enhance the 2/1 Marines' techniques by communicating threat warnings, document requirements, and advisements for safety and temporary closures (exhibits 105, 129).

(e) Force Protection Measures. Abbey Gate Corridor provided some natural force protection and required additional effort by 2/1 Marines to enhance survivability.

(i) The canal running southwest to northeast initially served as a natural obstacle. The canal was approximately three meters wide and two-three meters deep, and held approximately a foot of water throughout the NEO (exhibits 172, 176-178, 192). The wall and fence of Abbey Gate bordered the canal on

the northwest, or nearside, and a wall and fence on the opposite side divided the area from private property, which created a long alley (exhibits 167, 172, 176-178, 192). The canal walls rose approximately three feet above the ground on each side, providing protection to Marines on one side, and creating an obstacle for the crowd on the other side (exhibits 167, 172, 173, 175, 177, 178, 192). Jersey barriers were located at the base of the sniper tower to impede the flow of civilians from approaching the gate on the nearside of the canal (exhibits 167, 172, 177, 178, 180, 182, 185, 192). The terrain limited the crowd from massing and overwhelming Marine formations (exhibits 167, 172, 175-178, 192).

(ii) 2/1 Marines made a significant improvement to force protection when they emplaced the shipping containers, known as the Chevron (exhibit 83, 89). This obstacle blocked the road leading to Abbey Gate from the South, reducing risk of VBIEDs and controlling the in-flow of crowds (exhibits 15, 18, 53, 77, 89). Another improvement was installation of concertina wire across the nearside canal wall to prevent civilians from climbing out of the canal (exhibits 167, 172, 176-178, 192). Snipers continuously operated from the tower to provide overwatch of Marines executing screening and to observe the crowd for potential risks to force (exhibit 62). The SPMAGTF EOD section installed two ECM devices at Abbey Gate to prevent the use of remote control detonated IEDs and inhibit the cell phone communications of potential attackers (exhibit 62, 65). When threat streams indicated an impending attack, commanders regularly stopped processing evacuees, pulled Marines back to cover, and reduced posture (exhibits 19, 77, 80, 89). Leaders utilized UAVs and RAID cameras to observe avenues of approach and maintain situational awareness to employ QRF for emergencies (exhibits 13, 15, 18, 54, 102, 125).

#### 100TH ANNIVERSARY OF LEHMAN CAVES NATIONAL MONUMENT

Ms. CORTEZ MASTO. Mr. President, I come forward today to recognize the 100th anniversary of Lehman Caves National Monument, the precursor to Great Basin National Park. Today, Great Basin National Park is a 77,000-acre expanse known for its natural beauty and wonderful trails. The Lehman Caves Monument has been managed by the National Park Service for more than half a century, prior to the creation of the larger park. Lehman Caves attracts tens of thousands of visitors each year, providing them with the opportunity to explore underground wonders.

The caves themselves were first used by Native Americans and later "rediscovered" by settlers in the late 1880s before President Warren Harding established Lehman Caves National Monument on January 24, 1922. This declaration provided for custodians of the caves to make improvements, including much-needed repairs and the creation of safer routes for tourists to explore the caves' beauty. In the 1930s, President Franklin Roosevelt transferred control of Lehman Caves to the National Park Service, enhancing work to repair and rehabilitate the caves. The caves were then added to the larger National Park legislation that officially created Great Basin National Park, which was passed by Congress

and signed into law by President Ronald Reagan on October 27, 1986. As a part of Great Basin National Park, Lehman Caves remains accessible today through tours led by park rangers.

Further, the quarter-mile long cavern is filled with spectacular geological formations, including stalactites, stalagmites, popcorn, and a wavy rock pattern of colorful flowstone, commonly referred to as "cave bacon." The cavern is also home to a number of unique species. The Great Basin cave pseudoscorpion and the Lehman Caves millipede, for example, were first found in Lehman Caves and exist only in Great Basin National Park. From its geology to its ecosystem, Lehman Caves has provided visitors with an experience unlike any other in the world.

The joy that outdoor recreation brings Nevada's residents and visitors is invaluable, and the ongoing success of monuments and parks like Lehman Caves is yet another reason that we must work to keep our natural resources healthy and available for future generations. From Lehman Caves to Lake Tahoe, Nevada's public lands are treasured by visitors and locals alike.

I am pleased to recognize Lehman Caves' 100 years of official service to our great State, and I wish Great Basin National Park staff well in continuing their work to preserve and enhance the park for many years to come. Nevadans are fortunate to have this precious natural wonder in our State, and we will continue to protect it as a part of our home.

#### ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

##### TRIBUTE TO KIRKLEY THOMAS

● Mr. BOOZMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to recognize Kirkley Thomas who is retiring as vice president of governmental affairs for Arkansas Electric Cooperative Corporation.

Kirkley is a devoted Arkansan who has proudly served the State for more than 30 years. As a graduate of Arkansas State University, he earned a bachelor of science in journalism and public relations, and he continued his education at the Economic Development Institute of the University of Oklahoma.

He began his career working as a professional staff member in the U.S. Senate for former Arkansas Senator David Pryor in 1991. He continued his service to Arkansas in positions at the University of Arkansas System and the Arkansas Economic Development Commission. Kirkley has been a reliable leader at the Arkansas Electric Cooperative Corporation since 1998 and assumed the role of vice president of governmental affairs in 2014.

My team and I have worked closely with Kirkley during his tenure on a number of initiatives to help support policies to make energy more affordable and broadband more accessible. He