

of research and development, evidence shows the returns to new products exceed normal rates of return.

Drug companies continue to raise prices on consumers without justification, and we must crack down on price gouging and enforce transparency and drug pricing. That is why I strongly support the policies the Senate Finance Committee recently released, which comprise of comprehensive reform to lower prescription drug prices for Americans.

One policy included in this package that I have long supported is empowering Medicare to begin negotiating directly for the price of prescription drugs. This is just common sense. This is what businesses do. This is a free market. We negotiate.

In the private sector, no plan sponsor or manager would ever accept responsibility without the ability to decide how to negotiate. No private sector company would parcel themselves out in order to negotiate; they would use their full size as a market force. We don't do that in Medicare. Medicare negotiations will ensure that patients with Medicare get the best deal possible on high-priced drugs.

Another policy I support in prescription drug affordability is capping Medicare patients' out-of-pocket costs at no more than \$2,000 per year. Today, there is no cap on spending for prescription drugs for seniors on Medicare. This policy will prevent Medicare beneficiaries from paying tens of thousands of dollars to purchase lifesaving drugs prescribed by their doctors.

The policies I have just outlined, along with additional reforms—and there are several others that are included in this package, including a required rebate if a drug manufacturer increases their price beyond the cost of inflation. There are other issues here to protect the solvency long term of prescription drug benefits and Medicare beneficiaries. This will make prescription drugs affordable for individuals and families who desperately need it.

I urge all my colleagues to come together to address this urgent issue. We have done the work. Now it is time to vote, getting these savings back into our constituents' pockets.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. CORTEZ MASTO). The Senator from Maryland.

EXECUTIVE CALENDAR

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate consider the following nominations en bloc: Calendar Nos. 924, 979, 982, and 983; that the Senate vote on the nominations en bloc without intervening action or debate; that the motions to reconsider be considered made and laid upon the table; that any statements related to the nominations be printed in the RECORD; and that the President immediately be notified of the Senate's action.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The question is, Will the Senate advise and consent to the nominations of Alexander Mark Laskaris, of the District of Columbia, a Career Member of the Senior Foreign Service, Class of Minister-Counselor, to be an Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Republic of Chad; Margaret C. Whitman, of Colorado, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Republic of Kenya; Michael J. Adler, of Maryland, a Career Member of the Senior Foreign Service, Class of Minister-Counselor, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Republic of South Sudan; and John T. Godfrey, of California, a Career Member of the Senior Foreign Service, Class of Minister-Counselor, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Republic of the Sudan?

The nominations were confirmed en bloc.

EXECUTIVE CALENDAR

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate consider the following nominations en bloc: Calendar Nos. 987 and 1039; that the Senate vote on the nominations en bloc without intervening action or debate; that the motions to reconsider be considered made and laid upon the table; that any statements related to the nominations be printed in the RECORD; and that the President be immediately notified of the Senate's action.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The question is, Will the Senate advise and consent to the nominations of Stephen Henley Locher, of Iowa, to be United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa; and Michael Cottman Morgan, of Wisconsin, to be an Assistant Secretary of Commerce?

The nominations were confirmed en bloc.

LEGISLATIVE SESSION

MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to legislative session and be in a period of morning business, with Senators permitted to speak therein for up to 10 minutes each.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AFGHANISTAN

Mr. HAWLEY. Madam President, following my submission yesterday, I ask

unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the next part of an investigation directed by the U.S. Central Command concerning the Abbey Gate bombing in Afghanistan in August 2021.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ACTS-SCK-DO

Subject: Findings and Recommendation—Attack Against U.S. Forces Conducting NEO at Hamid Karzai International Airport on 26 August 2021

(5) 82nd Airborne Division and 1/82 IBCT.

(a) The 82nd Airborne and 1/82 IBCT, (as the designated Immediate Response Force (IRF)), were notified for deployment at the request of Gen McKenzie (exhibits 10, 13, 21). 1/82 IBCT and 2/504 Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR) began the flow of forces to HKIA on 15 August at 2200, and arrived with approximately 300 personnel (exhibit 121). This force coordinated with JTF-CR and occupied Camp Alvarado in the northwest corner of HKIA (exhibit 121). During the period of darkness on 16–17 August, 2/501 PIR arrived to HKIA (exhibit 123). Elements of the brigade's artillery battalion arrived with the infantry battalion, making the total force about 1000 (exhibit 121). Shortly after their arrival, 2/504 began securing the airfield, as civilians had breached the South Terminal and were on the runway (exhibit 121). 2/501 were immediately put into the line at the South Terminal when they arrived a little over 24 hours later (exhibit 121). Both units took up security positions on the South and West of HKIA, and expanded to relieve Marines on the perimeter so they could begin opening gates on 19 August (exhibits 121, 123). By 18 August, 1/82 had security responsibility for all of the West side of HKIA. 2/501 had responsibility for security from the perimeter at Abbey Gate westward to the International Terminal (exhibit 123).

(b) The 82nd Airborne TAC, commanded by MG Donahue, arrived on 18 August at approximately 1200 (exhibits 121, 125). Upon arrival, MG Donahue conducted a leader's reconnaissance, assessed the perimeter and gates, met with RADM Vasely to shore up the task organization, and began initial planning for withdrawal and JTE (exhibit 125). The 82nd started clearing the HKIA road system to prepare for MASCAL events and quick reaction force (QRF) movements (exhibit 125). As part of their security task, the 82nd detained 40–50 people each night who jumped the airfield fence (exhibit 125). Additionally, 1/82 operated two gates and flowed in evacuees via the South and West Gates (exhibit 121). From 19–25 August, 2/501 processed and directed convoys of evacuees the Taliban had allowed to pass through the outer cordon at South Gate (exhibit 121). 1/82 opened West Gate periodically to allow precision evacuation passages of lines, which were coordinated movements (exhibits 121, 125). During the latter half of the NEO, South and West Gates accounted for a significant number of daily evacuees, averaging greater than 200 daily from 24–30 August, with 1600 coming through on 26 August (exhibits 125, 143). The DoS Consular rarely worked with 1/82 personnel at South Gate, so the convoys had to be American citizens (AMCITs) or Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs) to get through (exhibit 123). Starting 19 August, MG Donahue served as the primary coordinator with the Taliban LNO, (TEXT REDACTED) and spoke with him on a near daily basis (exhibit 23, 125). 1/82 IBCT subordinate unit commanders coordinated directly with the Taliban local gate commanders for security and to facilitate evacuee movements (exhibits 121, 123, 125).

(c) As part of withdrawal and JTE planning, the 82nd TAC developed a plan for a relief in place (RIP) at the gates and established timelines to facilitate withdrawal of the Marines from HKIA (exhibit 125). U.S. and U.K. Forces negotiated the timeline for closing Abbey Gate, and after changing the timeline multiple times, eventually settled on 0900 on 27 August. While the U.S. Forces wanted to close the gate as early as 24 August, the U.K. Forces needed more time to finish processing their evacuees (exhibits 121, 125). On 25 August, Bravo Company, 2/501 PIR moved behind Abbey Gate to facilitate the RIP, however the timeline moved to the right (exhibits 123, 124). (TEXT REDACTED) 2/501 PIR, attended a meeting at 1600 on 26 August with the Taliban, the U.K., and 2/1 Marines to discuss the RIP and passage of lines for the U.K. (exhibit 123). They agreed the U.K. would pass through Abbey Gate in the early morning hours of 27 August, the Marines would shut the gate, and Bravo Company, 2/501 PIR would take over security of Abbey Gate (exhibit 124). Shortly after the meeting, the attack on Abbey Gate occurred (exhibits 66, 123, 125). (TEXT REDACTED) sent his QRF, Delta Company, over to Abbey Gate, and dispatched his field litter ambulances (FLAs) to assist in the casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) (exhibit 123). Additionally, he set up his Role I facility inside Abbey Gate to assist in treating the wounded (exhibit 123). The Marines closed the gate immediately after the attack and conducted the RIP with Bravo Company, 2/501 PIR at approximately 0500 on 27 August (exhibit 124). The U.K. Forces passed through Abbey Gate at approximately 0700 on 27 August (exhibits 124, 127). Bravo Company maintained security at Abbey Gate until their departure from HKIA at approximately 2355 on 30 August.

(d) As part of JTE execution, 82nd Airborne took responsibility for demilitarization efforts at HKIA (exhibits 125, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162). Millions of rounds of ammunition, weapons, numerous military vehicles and aircraft, and U.S. Government property had to be destroyed or rendered inoperable (exhibit 125). The 82nd Airborne assigned zones of responsibility to the various units occupying HKIA to ensure they executed a methodical demilitarization plan and no information or equipment was missed (exhibits 125, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162). Cyber element subject matter experts ensured computer systems were corrupted or destroyed, and engineers dug trenches to cover equipment with cement and bury it before departure from HKIA (exhibits 125, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162).

(e) The 82nd Airborne departed HKIA and completed the JTE at approximately 0002 local on 31 August (exhibit 246).

(6) 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit.

(a) The 24th MEU was a II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)/Camp Lejeune based unit, aligned to U.S. European Command (EUCOM) for the first half of their deployment (exhibits 100, 102). In June 2021, the Secretary of Defense Orders Book realigned the MEU to CENTCOM in anticipation of a NEO (exhibits 100, 102). Throughout May and June, the MEU conducted NEO planning with JTF-CR, and executed a PDSS to HKIA in July (exhibits 100, 102). The MEU postured Marines ashore at Ahmed al-Jaber Air Base, Kuwait (Al-Jaber) in July to prepare for the potential NEO (exhibits 100, 102). Preparation included multiple rehearsals for a NEO, ECC operations, airfield security, and gate operations (exhibits 100, 101). These rehearsals continued throughout July, into August, until the MEU received notification they would deploy to HKIA on 13 August (exhibits 100, 101, 102).

(b) The MEU originally planned to frontload its ECC forces for deployment, but

the dynamic situation at HKIA forced the MEU to prioritize 1/8 Marines to ensure they had the necessary combat power on the ground (exhibit 102). On 14 August at approximately 0200, one rifle company from 1/8 Marines, a 1/8 Marines HQ element, to include 1/8 Battalion (TEXT REDACTED) and one logistics company from CLB-24 (CLB from 24th MEU) arrived at HKIA (exhibit 102). The size of the force on the ground increased with the arrival of two more rifle companies, 1/8 Marines battalion enablers (snipers, engineered, scouts), and some MEU CE personnel, to include the MEU (TEXT REDACTED) that evening (exhibit 102). The 1/8 Marines elements secured North Gate and sought to begin processing evacuees through the ECC, but civilians came through the South Terminal area and flooded the runway (exhibits 102, 104). This MEU force rebuffed the breach of the airfield on the night of 15 August and throughout the day of 16 August (exhibits 15, 18, 100, 102, 104): Echo Company, 2/1 Marines reinforced 1/8 early in the morning of 16 August, and after they forced the crowds off the runway, another breach occurred at a new opening in the southern perimeter (exhibit 104). The Marines spent all of 16 August controlling crowds and clearing runways as more forces, specifically Taliban and NSU, became available (exhibit 104).

(c) On 17 August, 1/8 Marines began establishing security at the North and East Gates and attempted to begin processing evacuees (exhibit 104). North and East Gates had approximately 3000–5000 people outside at any given time starting on 17 August (exhibit 102). JTF-CR maintained TACON of the MEU throughout the NEO, even after the change to COMREL on 17 August (exhibits 10, 11). 24th MEU retained TACON of 1/8 Marines, but only nominally had TACON of 2/1 Marines, whose Battalion Commander reported directly to the JTF-CR Commander (exhibit 53, 77, 100).

(d) From 17 August until departure on 30 August, 24th MEU managed tactical execution of the NEO, which primarily included security and initial screening at North, East, and Abbey Gates and processing evacuees at the ECC (exhibits 100, 104). 1/8 received nearly all of its combat power by the end of 18 August (exhibit 104). CLB-24 established the ECC at the PAX Terminal in North HKIA and was processing evacuees as early as 15 August (exhibit 101). During the NEO, CLB-24 Marines also conducted various support activities to resupply the gates, and assisted with base life support operations (exhibit 101). CLB-24 planned for contractors, to continue providing base support throughout the NEO, but many contractors departed early on, forcing the CLB to absorb those support responsibilities, in addition to operating the ECC (exhibit 101). The SPMAGTF's Combat Logistics Detachment assisted CLB-24 with providing combat service support to units at HKIA (exhibit 101).

(e) BLT 1/8 Marines assumed responsibility for security of North and East Gates, and the perimeter around the East side of HKIA after the 82nd Airborne arrived (exhibit 104, 155). Gate operations for North and East Gates were difficult and sporadic (exhibits 100, 102, 104). North Gate was vulnerable to attack due to a lack of standoff, an absence of obstacles or barriers, and proximity to civilian roads (exhibits 100, 102, 104). North Gate quickly became the hardest gate to control (exhibit 100). East Gate was a single gate, which was always at risk of being forced open by the crowd, because there was no standoff (exhibits 100, 102, 104). Marines at East Gate dealt with crowds crushing people against the perimeter wall, making it difficult to open the gate (exhibit 102). The Taliban provided support at both North and East Gates, but the Taliban commander at

North Gate was the least helpful (exhibits 125, 146). North, East, and Abbey Gates closed from 20–22 August due to a lack of flights and capacity within HKIA. In total, there were 18000 evacuees waiting to fly out, which created a humanitarian and security problem (exhibits 102, 104). The JTF-CR Commander closed North Gate from 23–25 August, except for some targeted entries, because of the VBIED threat (exhibits 100, 102). East Gate closed permanently on 24 August because of the threat of mortars from the Taliban, and an inability to process evacuees without losing control of the gate (exhibits 100, 102, 104). By 25 August, Abbey Gate was the only gate operating in the MEU's sector of HKIA (exhibit 102).

(f) Aside from 1/8 Marines' rifle companies, additional MEU elements supported gate operations. BLT 1/8's (TEXT REDACTED) tasked his engineer platoon to support North, East, and Abbey Gates (exhibits 103, 104). The engineers spent a disproportionate amount of time improving East Gate, shoring up gaps in the perimeter to prevent fence jumpers, and removing towers on the exterior of the perimeter (exhibit 103). The engineers emplaced shipping containers to form the obstacle at the southern end of Abbey Gate, later known as the Chevron, on the morning of 20 August (exhibit 103). Otherwise, support to Abbey Gate was limited (exhibit 103). CLB-24 provided the bulk of the personnel assigned to the Female Search Team (FST), and tasked them to support the gates and the ECC (exhibit 101). The FST began with searching women and children prior to DoS screening, then transitioned to conducting initial searches outside the gates, escorting rejected females out through the gates, and helping identify eligible evacuees in the crowds (exhibit 107). The MEU Commander re-tasked organized the 2nd Reconnaissance (Recon) element to work directly for him later in the NEO, specifically to conduct targeted recovery of privileged personnel (exhibit 108). Recon element personnel were at the gates constantly, working with 1/8 and 2/1 Marine leaders to identify and pull specific people from the crowd for processing (exhibit 108). The MEU also organized PSYOP and cyber assets under the direction of the MEU (TEXT REDACTED) for employment at the gates (exhibit 105). The PSYOP teams employed capabilities at the gates to communicate with the crowds, and provided updates on required documents or gate closures (exhibit 105).

(g) On 26 August, all the gates in the MEU sector of HKIA were closed, with the exception of Abbey Gate and occasional targeted recoveries at North Gate (exhibits 102, 104). The IED threat was well known across the MEU, but threats lacked specifics on times and locations (exhibits 100, 102, 104, 105, 106, 107). MEU leadership ensured electronic countermeasures (ECM) were active at the gates, dispersion of personnel was enforced to the greatest extent possible, snipers were in overwatch, PSYOP personnel communicated the threat to the crowd and asked people to leave, and medical assets were repositioned (exhibit 100). At the time of the blast, only the PSYOP, FST, and Recon elements of the MEU were at Abbey Gate (exhibits 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108). The paragraphs below detail the actions of these personnel. The MEU JOC immediately put additional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets over Abbey Gate, scanning for additional threats (exhibit 102). Post-blast, 1/8 Marines shifted security elements to Abbey Gate to help fill gaps, and provided numerous vehicles for CASEVAC, assisting in movement to the HKIA Role 11-E. CLB-24 also provided numerous CASEVAC vehicles to support the MASCAL (exhibit 101).

(h) On 27 August, all gates were essentially shut in the MEU sector and 1/82 IBCT secured Abbey Gate (exhibits 53, 56, 57, 100, 102, 104). CLB-24 continued to operate the ECC until 30 August, processing evacuees until two hours before their departure from HKIA. The MEU retrograded back to Kuwait primarily on 29-30 August, with the last elements departing at approximately 1000 on 30 August (exhibit 100).

(7) Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force, Ground Combat Element (GCE), 2/1 Marines.

(a) 2/1 Marines were the GCE for the CENTCOM SPMAGTF, located primarily in Camps across Kuwait and Prince Sultan Airbase (PSAB) in Saudi Arabia (exhibit 53). In July 2021, the SPMAGTF received notice it would potentially participate in NEO in Afghanistan (exhibit 53). The SPMAGTF initially task organized a "NEO Light" package, consisting of elements of Combat Logistics Detachment (CLD) and the crisis response company (Echo Company, 2/1) (exhibits 53, 54, 55). The "Light" package elements executed two mission rehearsals testing their ECC and gate operations, prior to deployment to HKIA (exhibits 53, 54, 55). In August, the SPMAGTF would task organize and deploy a "Heavy" package, that included the rest of 2/1 Marines' rifle companies (exhibits 53, 54, 55).

(b) 2/1 first arrived to HKIA at approximately 0100-0200 on 16 August (exhibits 53, 54, 55, 56, 57). The first flight included the Battalion HQ, Echo Company leadership, and one platoon from Echo Company (exhibits 54, 56). Upon arrival, the unit found the airfield breached by civilians, who were moving onto the runways (exhibits 54, 56). The Battalion (TEXT REDACTED) immediately tasked Echo Company to assist with clearing the runway, in hopes of resuming flight operations (exhibit 54). Over the next 24 hours, Echo Company was part of the line holding the southern perimeter with 3/10 IBCT, 1/82 IBCT, and 1/8 Marines (exhibit 56). There were several breaches of the perimeter and crowds gained access to the runway, attempted to board C-17s, and pushed towards the North HKIA compounds (exhibits 56, 76). Forces pushed the crowds back after NSU units joined the line, and the crowds recognized there were no more flights to board (exhibits 56, 76). 2/1 Marines, specifically Echo Company, were part of the security perimeter at HKIA from approximately 0600 on 16 August until 19 August, when they were relieved by units from 1/82 IBCT (exhibit 53).

(c) Force flow over the next two days brought in parts of the 2/1 Battalion HQ, Fox Company (-), Golf Company, Weapons Company, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams, the Shock Trauma Platoon (STP), and finally the remainder of Echo Company (exhibits 56, 76, 65, 66). These units focused on securing the southern perimeter from the Domestic Terminal to Abbey Gate from 17-19 August (exhibit 76). Once 1/82's relief of the perimeter began, Golf Company, Fox Company (-), Combined Anti-Armor Team (CAAT) platoons, and Battalion Snipers moved to Abbey Gate (exhibits 53, 76, 77, 81, 83, 89). U.K.'s 2 PARA were at the outer Abbey Gate, as well as Air Force Pararescue (PJ) personnel and small partner nation elements (exhibits 53, 76, 77, 89). After initially planning to push from Abbey Gate to Camp Sullivan, 2/1 Marines opted not to execute due to the size of the crowds and lack of Taliban support to extend the perimeter (exhibits 53, 76, 81). Instead, (TEXT REDACTED) tasked the battalion to open the outer gate to begin processing evacuees (exhibits 53, 76, 81, 89). Opening the gate required an entire platoon, sometimes reinforced, to keep the crowds from breaching the outer gate and accessing the Abbey

Gate's inner corridor (exhibits 53, 76, 77, 81, 89). 2/1 Marines processed approximately 750 evacuees through Abbey Gate on 19 August, but only after tremendous effort to hold the gate (exhibits 53, 76, 77, 81, 89).

(d) In order to enable safe and efficient gate operations, (TEXT REDACTED) Golf Company, 2/1 (TEXT REDACTED) decided to push the crowds back to an area beyond the Barron Hotel egress lane. This would ensure U.K. Forces had better access to the gate from their evacuee staging area (exhibits 53, 77, 89). In the early morning hours of 20 August, platoons from Golf and Fox Companies opened the outer gate, and methodically forced the smaller crowd back nearly 200 meters (exhibits 53, 76, 77, 81, 89). (TEXT REDACTED) coordinated with U.K. Forces and MEU Engineers to emplace six shipping containers in the main south to north roadway leading to Abbey Gate to form a disrupting obstacle and aid in crowd control (exhibits 53, 76, 77, 81, 88, 89). The Taliban agreed to provide outer security beyond the containers, and the U.K. Forces and 2/1 provided security inside the containers, guarding the Barron Hotel egress route and canal areas (exhibits 53, 76, 77, 81, 88, 89). The containers became known as the "Chevron" (exhibits 18, 21, 53, 76, 77, 81, 88, 89). The emplacement of the Chevron on 20 August established the structural layout of Abbey Gate for the duration of the NEO, as depicted in enclosures 12 and 13.

250TH ANNIVERSARY OF BUXTON, MAINE

Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I rise today to commemorate the 250th anniversary of the town of Buxton, ME. It is a great pleasure to celebrate the generations of industrious and caring people who have made Buxton a wonderful place to live, work, and raise families.

Named for the famous spa town in England, Buxton has a rich history. For thousands of years, the Saco River Valley was home to the Abenaki. In 1728, the Massachusetts General Court granted land to establish a settlement that was called Narragansett Number One. As the population grew, the town of Buxton was incorporated on July 14, 1772.

The early settlers turned the dense forests and fertile soil into a thriving lumber industry and productive farms. With the Saco River providing power, sawmills and gristmills were built, followed by woolen mills, tanneries, churches, libraries, and flourishing retail stores.

Education has been central to Buxton from the start. The first schoolmaster arrived in 1761, more than a decade before incorporation. Soon, 17 homes in town hosted one-room schools so that every youngster was within walking distance.

Buxton's early prosperity as an industrial center produced many fine examples of New England architecture. Today, several homes, businesses, and the First Congregational Church are listed on the National Register of Historic Places.

Also on the Register is the Buxton Powder House, built by the townspeople at a cost of \$59 to store ammunition and arms during the War of 1812.

Since then, the people of Buxton have joined together to erect monuments and memorials in tribute to the patriots who have defended freedom throughout our Nation's history.

The spirit that built Buxton is evident today in many ways. Countless volunteers have come together to make the town's sestercentennial a memorable celebration. For nearly 30 years, townspeople have generously supported the Buxton Toy Box that helps bring holiday cheer to children. Buxton's active involvement on the Saco River Corridor Commission shows a commitment to protect the natural resources that are vital to the quality of life.

Nothing better demonstrates the Buxton spirit than a special moment at this year's annual town meeting on June 18, when the townspeople honored Deputy Chief Gene Harmon of the Buxton Fire-Rescue Department for 60 years of dedicated service to his community and his neighbors.

Buxton's 250th anniversary is a time to celebrate the people who pulled together, cared for one another, and built a great community. Thanks to those who came before, Buxton, ME, has a wonderful history. Thanks to those there today, it has a bright future.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

RECOGNIZING THE STENNIS PROGRAM FOR CONGRESSIONAL INTERNS

• Mr. WICKER. Madam President, a number of our congressional interns this summer have greatly profited from a program conducted by the Stennis Center for Public Service. The Stennis Program for Congressional Interns is designed to enhance the internship experience for exceptional future leaders, giving them an inside look at how Congress works and enabling them to learn from senior staffers across both parties. These bipartisan relationships will serve them well throughout their future careers supporting Congress.

Interns are selected based on their employment experience, college course load, and prospective service to Congress. This summer, 18 interns were chosen for this prestigious opportunity. These interns serve us on both sides of the aisle, working for Democrats and Republicans in both the House and Senate.

I congratulate the interns on completing this distinguished program. I also thank the Stennis Center and their Senior Stennis Congressional Staff Fellows for providing a meaningful experience and promoting bipartisan work.

I ask that the names of the 2022 Summer Stennis Congressional Interns and the offices in which they serve be printed in the RECORD.

The material follows:

Jack Behan, Office of U.S. Senator Sam Peters; Courtney Cochran, House Committee on Natural Resources; Carmen Evans, Office