

REVISIONS TO ALLOCATION TO SENATE COMMITTEES
(Pursuant to Section 3003 of S. Con. Res. 14, the Con-
current Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2022)
(\$ in billions)

	2022	2022–2026	2022–2031
Finance:			
Budget Authority	2,929.972	15,675.717	37,803.344
Outlays	3,025.410	15,761.012	37,875.037
Adjustments:			
Budget Authority	7.650	7.079	–2.380
Outlays	7.144	7.079	0.000
Revised Allocation:			
Budget Authority	2,937.622	15,682.796	37,800.964
Outlays	3,032.554	15,768.091	37,875.037

PAY-AS-YOU-GO SCORECARD FOR THE SENATE
(Revisions Pursuant to Section 3003 of S. Con. Res. 14,
the Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal
Year 2022)
(\$ in billions)

	Balances
Current Balances:	
Fiscal Year 2022	0
Fiscal Years 2022–2026	0
Fiscal Years 2022–2031	0
Revisions:	
Fiscal Year 2022	7.144
Fiscal Years 2022–2026	7.079
Fiscal Years 2022–2031	0
Revised Balances:	
Fiscal Year 2022	7.144
Fiscal Years 2022–2026	7.079
Fiscal Years 2022–2031	0

CONFIRMATION OF C.B.
SULLENBERGER III

Mr. LEE. Mr. President, On December 2, 2021, the Senate confirmed C.B. Sullenberger III to be Representative of the United States to the International Civil Aviation Union—ICAO—with the rank of Ambassador. After receiving responses to a series of written questions to the nominee, I remain concerned about this nominee’s approach to the Ambassador position.

In response to questions on balancing regulation with the need for an open environment for innovation, Mr. Sullenberger emphasized a position that favored more regulation at the expense of innovation, as well as deference to standards established internationally rather than those generated in the U.S. I do not disagree with the need for essential safety standards to protect the flying public; however, I believe Mr. Sullenberger’s views cross a threshold in which the automatic preference for government regulation, particularly international government regulation, risks stunting the growth of aviation startups in emerging technology, entrench the largest players, and result in the exclusion of State and local jurisdictions from conversations in emerging areas of unmanned flight below the airspace of manned aviation.

Finally, based on Mr. Sullenberger’s responses, I am not convinced that he would properly advocate that the United States lead at ICAO in setting standards that would swiftly bring civil supersonic air travel to fruition. For these reasons, I did not offer my consent to confirm Mr. Sullenberger unanimously and instead requested a voice vote.

DEMOCRACY SUMMIT

Mr. CARDIN. Mr. President, I rise today—on International Anti-Corruption Day, as declared by the United Nations—to speak about the Democracy Summit that President Biden is convening today and tomorrow, to which government leaders from 110 countries have been invited. It will also include a range of leading civil society actors, business and labor leaders, civic educators and investigative journalists, philanthropists, and nonprofit leaders as speakers and participants.

Undeterred by the Coronavirus pandemic, the Biden administration has organized a global virtual gathering with participants tuning in from six continents. It is an ambitious, even audacious, undertaking.

And it comes at a critical time, as the world is now 15 years into a global democratic recession, according to the well-respected watchdog organization Freedom House. In its widely cited annual survey of freedom, it has reported that, in each of the past 15 years, more countries have seen their democracy scores decline than the number of countries whose scores have improved. And last year, during the height of the global pandemic, nearly 75 percent of the world’s population lived in a country that saw its democracy score deteriorate last year.

For a President who has pledged to put democratic values at the heart of American foreign policy, it is fitting and proper that he should convene the democratic leaders of the world and other relevant parties to plan the revitalization of global democracy.

Of course, readers of the annual Freedom House assessment will know that there are not 110 well-functioning, effective democracies in the world and that way too many poorly performing nominal democracies have been invited to this gathering, thus diluting its character.

While some conspicuously back-sliding countries, like Hungary and Turkey, have not been invited, there are numerous back-sliding pseudo-democracies, including the current governments of the Philippines and Pakistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia, Bolsonaro’s Brazil among others, that unfortunately have been included.

Then there is India, which dropped from Free to Partly Free status in Freedom in the World 2021, which contributes significantly to the fact that 75 percent of the world’s people last year resided in countries moving away from democracy. Yet the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, after its sustained crack down on critics during the past 2 years and the atrocious scapegoating of Muslims, who were disproportionately blamed for the spread of the virus and faced attacks by vigilante mobs, has been invited to the Democracy Summit.

Members of the Senate will also know that there has been precious little information sharing with this body

about the contours of the summit. There has been no discussion with us about the invitation list or the way forward from this week’s summit, which I see as a missed opportunity for the Biden administration.

On the other hand, I was proud to be able to participate in a side event convened last Friday morning by the House Democracy Partnership for a discussion with legislators from other countries about the important role that parliaments can and do play in leading their governments to address the enduring and universal problem of corruption. I want to congratulate Representative DAVID PRICE of North Carolina for his leadership of that important initiative and for convening a productive international exchange of views last week in the run up to the President’s gathering. One of the main take-aways from that webinar was that it is always incumbent on the legislatures of the world to press forward with laws that instruct and enable executive branch officials to elevate their work to combat corruption.

This is the main topic of my intervention today, to discuss one of the hopeful aspects of the President’s Democracy Summit, which is the central role that the battle against corruption is playing in the proceedings and to underscore the leading role that we in the Congress must take to compel further action from our colleagues in the executive branch.

History tells us that they will likely not do so on their own. In fact, the history of anti-corruption laws in the United States is replete with fervent opposition from the executive branch, whether during Democratic administrations or Republican, to virtually every measure proposed in the Congress. This was true of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, which barred U.S. companies and their officials from paying bribes in foreign countries. The executive and the business community declared that this would end the ability of American corporations to do business around the world, which turned out not to be true, of course.

Indeed, it became in due course a foundational element in the United Nations Convention Against Corruption—UNCAC—and other elements of the international architecture of the battle against corruption.

Yet the executive has continued to oppose every measure introduced in Congress to address kleptocrats and human rights abusers, including the original Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 and its successor, the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act of 2016.

This is especially ironic because, since the enactment of the 2016 law, both Republican and Democratic administrations have been utilizing the law frequently and to good effect. Indeed, today, Secretary of State Tony Blinken announced that—on the occasion of International anti-Corruption

Day—the Department of State has designated 12 individuals from 7 countries for significant corruption and also named another 18 family members. In five of the designations, the Treasury Department has invoked Global Magnitsky sanctions for their roles in corruption.

The Democracy Summit is being built around three principal themes: defending against authoritarianism, promoting respect for human rights, and fighting corruption. Corruption is the means and the method for kleptocratic rulers around the world to steal from their own people and to stash their wealth in safe havens, most often in the democratic Western world. This is directly and intimately connected to the undermining of the rule of law and the repression of human rights in these same countries—which is why I was so pleased to see that, on June 3 of this year, President Biden declared the fight against corruption to be “a core national security interest.” And he directed his National Security Advisor to develop a comprehensive strategy to address the problem.

Accordingly, earlier this week, in the run-up to the Democracy Summit, the White House published the first “United States Strategy on Countering Corruption.”

The strategy is a 38-page document that describes several major lines of effort in the new strategy. Among the document’s commitments are pledges to crack down on dirty money in U.S. real estate, to require certain gatekeepers to the U.S. financial system such as attorneys, accountants, and investment advisers to perform greater due diligence on their prospective clients, and to make it a crime for foreign officials to solicit or accept bribes from U.S. companies.

If this strategy is matched with appropriate resources, it has the power to fundamentally change the calculus for kleptocrats and redirect stolen funds back to the original problems they were meant to fund such as fighting the pandemic, countering the effects of climate change, funding economic development and opportunity.

We in the Congress can do our part by passing pending legislation that would further strengthen the hand of the U.S. Government in this effort. While there are a number of valuable proposals pending, there are two that I suggest would be the most impactful and necessary.

The first is the Combating Global Corruption Act, S. 14, which I introduced and was cosponsored by my Republican friend from Indiana, Mr. YOUNG, which would create an annual global report, modeled in some ways on the Trafficking-in-Persons report, in which the State Department would assess how earnestly and effectively the governments of the world are living up to the commitments they have made in international treaties and covenants. The report would also place the countries of the world in 3 tiers, according

to how well they are doing. And for those in the lowest performing tier, likely the governments that are actually kleptocracies, the bill asks that the executive branch assess government officials in those places for possible designation for Global Magnitsky sanctions.

The second is the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, S. 93, which I introduced and was cosponsored by my Republican friend from Mississippi, Mr. WICKER, which would permanently reauthorize the existing Global Magnitsky framework and to widen the aperture of the law to encompass more bad actors and actions.

Both these measures have been reported favorably and unanimously by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and both are ready for final action by the Senate. As President Biden convenes the Democracy Summit today, with its major focus on the battle against corruption, it would be timely for the Senate to demonstrate our resolve as well.

So I hope that my colleagues here in the Senate will agree in the coming days to adopt these two bills, so that we may take them to the House of Representatives, where they also enjoy bipartisan support, and get them onto the desk of President Biden during the coming year. Participating governments in the Democracy Summit, including the United States, are making commitments to strengthen their own democracies in the next 12 months, in advance of a second summit that is envisioned for next December.

The American position will be enhanced if we have enacted these laws before then.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that selected excerpts of the “United States Strategy on Countering Corruption” be printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

UNITED STATES STRATEGY ON COUNTERING
CORRUPTION

PURSUANT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY
MEMORANDUM ON ESTABLISHING THE FIGHT
AGAINST CORRUPTION AS A CORE UNITED
STATES NATIONAL SECURITY INTEREST—DE-
CEMBER 2021

Introduction

When government officials abuse public power for private gain, they do more than simply appropriate illicit wealth. Corruption robs citizens of equal access to vital services, denying the right to quality healthcare, public safety, and education. It degrades the business environment, subverts economic opportunity, and exacerbates inequality. It often contributes to human rights violations and abuses, and can drive migration. As a fundamental threat to the rule of law, corruption hollows out institutions, corrodes public trust, and fuels popular cynicism toward effective, accountable governance.

Moreover, the impacts of corruption frequently reverberate far beyond the immediate environment in which the acts take place. In today’s globalized world, corrupt actors bribe across borders, harness the international financial system to stash il-

licit wealth abroad, and abuse democratic institutions to advance anti-democratic aims. Emerging research and major journalistic exposes have documented the extent to which legal and regulatory deficiencies in the developed world offer corrupt actors the means to offshore and launder illicit wealth. This dynamic in turn strengthens the hand of those autocratic leaders whose rule is predicated on the ability to co-opt and reward elites.

On June 3, 2021, President Biden established the fight against corruption as a core national security interest of the United States. As he wrote in National Security Study Memorandum-1 (NSSM-1), “corruption threatens United States national security, economic equity, global antipoverty and development efforts, and democracy itself. . . . [B]y effectively preventing and countering corruption and demonstrating the advantages of transparent and accountable governance, we can secure a critical advantage for the United States and other democracies.”

Pursuant to NSSM-1, Federal departments and agencies have conducted an interagency review to take stock of existing U.S. Government anti-corruption efforts and to identify and seek to rectify persistent gaps in the fight against corruption. In parallel with this review, departments and agencies have begun to accelerate and amplify their efforts to prevent and combat corruption at home and abroad; bring transparency to the United States’ and international financial systems; and make it increasingly difficult for corrupt actors to shield their activities.

This first United States Strategy on Countering Corruption builds on the findings of the review and lays out a comprehensive approach for how the United States will work domestically and internationally, with governmental and non-governmental partners, to prevent, limit, and respond to corruption and related crimes. The Strategy places special emphasis on the transnational dimensions of the challenges posed by corruption, including by recognizing the ways in which corrupt actors have used the U.S. financial system and other rule-of-law based systems to launder their ill-gotten gains.

To curb corruption and its deleterious effects, the U.S. Government will organize its efforts around five mutually reinforcing pillars of work:

- Modernizing, coordinating, and resourcing U.S. Government efforts to fight corruption;
- Curbing illicit finance;
- Holding corrupt actors accountable;
- Preserving and strengthening the multilateral anti-corruption architecture; and,
- Improving diplomatic engagement and leveraging foreign assistance resources to advance policy goals.

By pursuing concrete lines of effort that advance strategic objectives under each of these pillars, and integrating anti-corruption efforts into relevant policy-making processes, the United States intends to lead in promoting prosperity and security for the American people and people around the world.

The Impacts of Corruption

From the small-town hospital administrator who demands bribes in exchange for life-saving services, to the globe-trotting kleptocrat who offshores an embezzled fortune, corruption harms both individuals and societies. The effects of corrupt acts are frequently both direct and indirect. When government officials steal from public coffers or fix a contract to reward a political crony, these actors directly transfer funding from essential services to private interests. Corruption also indirectly contributes to reduced public trust in state institutions, which in turn can add to the appeal of

illiberal actors who exploit popular grievances for political advantage.

Whether grand corruption perpetrated by powerful elites, or administrative corruption carried out by lower-level officials interacting directly with the public, corrupt acts harm the public interest, hamper countries' development, and diminish state capacity. Corruption has been shown to significantly curtail the ability of states to respond effectively to public health crises and to address climate change, migration, and inequities of all forms, while contributing to state fragility. Countries with high levels of corruption are more likely to have populations that suffer from human rights abuses, and are less likely to address those abuses. And states with endemic corruption are more vulnerable to terrorist networks, transnational organized and gang-related criminals, and human traffickers.

Corruption's increasingly globalized nature—fueled in part by transnational illicit finance and criminal networks, as well as exploitation of the licit financial system—imposes steep costs on ordinary citizens and good governance alike. In particular, transnational corruption driven by political and economic elites with the aid of complicit financial and legal service providers undermines lower income countries' ability to advance the welfare of their citizens and perpetuates aid dependency. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development's Economic Development in Africa Report 2020, for example, every year an estimated \$88.6 billion—equivalent to 3.7 percent of Africa's GDP—leaves the continent in the form of illicit capital flight.

Corrupt actors exploit deficiencies in anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) systems and processes—as well as in other critical transparency, reporting, business, real estate, and tax regimes—to use public contracting, concessions, and procurement processes for personal enrichment. Corrupt elites and non-state armed groups enrich themselves through illicit proceeds and trade of high-value commodities, including gold, wildlife, timber, petroleum, and other natural resources. Across an ever-more connected and digital world, corrupt actors exploit oversight and regulatory weaknesses in jurisdictions around the world to divert and hide the proceeds of their acts. And by leaving their financial systems vulnerable to illicit assets—through anonymous shell companies, opaque transactions, and under-regulated professional service providers—rule-of-law-based societies continue to provide entry points for corrupt actors to launder their funds and their reputations. Such activity negatively impacts average citizens in the United States, tilting the economic playing field against working Americans, enabling criminals to flourish and foreign adversaries to subversively peddle their influence, perpetuating growth-dampening inequality, and contributing to pricing out families from home ownership through real estate purchases.

In parallel, authoritarian regimes and their proxies have been shown to engage in bribery and other corrupt acts as a means to advance their strategic goals, while exploiting the international financial system to offshore illicit gains, and influence elections and policies in democratic states. Corruption in the form of state-directed cross-border investments from authoritarian states, for example, has had a corrosive effect on institutions in developing countries. Such practices harm the competitive landscape of financial markets, and often have long-term corrosive impacts on governance and human rights standards. The U.S. Government will continue to study the weaponization of corrup-

tion to understand its use and impacts on the United States, other democracies, and countries around the world, as well as how to thwart and build resilience against this evolving threat.

While the U.S. Government has long recognized countering corruption as an important foreign policy goal, a growing understanding of corruption's strategic impact and the increasing interconnectedness of the global economy underscores the need for a new approach. For the U.S. Government to effectively counter contemporary corruption, we must recognize the transnational dimensions of the challenge, and respond in a manner that is both systemic and tailored to local conditions. Doing so will require addressing vulnerabilities in the U.S. and international financial systems; bolstering international best practices, regulations, and enforcement efforts; supporting the role of non-governmental actors; building political will and recognizing when it is absent; and consistently pursuing accountability through a combination of diplomatic engagement, foreign assistance, and enforcement actions.

The United States will continue to evaluate and implement measures as needed to further safeguard our financial system, and will work with like-minded partners and relevant multilateral institutions to do the same. We will make it harder to hide the proceeds of ill-gotten wealth in opaque corporate structures, reduce the ability of individuals involved in corrupt acts to launder funds through anonymous purchases of U.S. real estate, and bolster asset recovery and seizure activities. We will innovate, adapt, partner, and learn, so as to maximize the potential for diplomatic tools, including foreign assistance and targeted sanctions, to stem corruption and to hold corrupt actors accountable, while expanding efforts to ensure that foreign assistance and engagement do not inadvertently contribute to corrupt practices. And we will continue to vigorously enforce the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and other statutory and regulatory regimes via criminal and civil enforcement actions.

Countering corruption is not a simple task. Changing embedded cultures of corruption requires significant political will, and achieving sustained progress can take decades. Positive change requires consistent leadership, public accountability, an empowered and impartial judiciary, and a diverse and independent media. Mindful of these realities, the United States will increase support to state and non-state partners committed to reform, boost the capacity of other governments to tackle corruption, and empower those, including activists, investigative journalists, and law enforcement on the front lines of exposing corrupt acts. We will bolster and promote public-private partnerships to more consistently bring in the private sector as critical actors in the fight against corruption, help level the playing field and improve the international business climate, and lead in international fora as we work to curb the ability of actors to hide ill-gotten wealth behind anonymity. Our closest engagement will be with our most committed allies and partners, including with respect to the influence of strategic corruption deliberately employed by authoritarian governments.

Illustrative Types of Corruption

Corruption takes on many forms and is used to further various illicit behaviors. Illustrative types of corruption include, but are not limited to:

Grand corruption: when political elites steal large sums of public funds or otherwise abuse power for personal or political advantage.

Administrative corruption: the abuse of entrusted power for private gain—usually by low to mid-level government officials—in interactions with citizens and the private sector, including to skirt official regulations and extort citizens in exchange for their basic services.

Kleptocracy: a government controlled by officials who use political power to appropriate the wealth of their nation. Can include state capture.

State capture: when private entities improperly and corruptly influence a country's decision-making process for their own benefit.

Strategic corruption: when a government weaponizes corrupt practices as a tenet of its foreign policy.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND CUBA

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have an NJ.com article by Roland Armando Alum, titled "Opinion: Six Decades After Dictator's Assassination, Dominican Republic Flourishes While Cuba Is Miserable" be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SIX DECADES AFTER DICTATOR'S ASSASSINATION, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC FLOURISHES WHILE CUBA IS MISERABLE

(By Roland Armando Alum)

As we commemorate Memorial Day this weekend in the U.S., the Dominican Republic's people mark 60 years since the fall of Rafael Trujillo's dictatorship on May 30, 1961. Considered Latin-America's bloodiest dictator, Trujillo beleaguered Dominicans for 31 years, until a patriots' cabal executed him with the secret assistance of U.S. officials.

Up to the 1959 rise of the Fidel & Raúl Castro brothers in Cuba, Trujillo was unmatched as the despotic model in the Americas, as historian Lauren Derby noted in "The Dictator's Seduction" (2009). It behooves us to draw some chronological contrasts from both countries in the last six decades, developments that—incidentally—have affected our own local demographics.

Indeed, northern New Jersey is home to sizable and dynamic Hispanic communities of Cubans and Dominicans; some of them have attained prominent positions in every walk of life (admittedly, sometimes to the chagrin of self-appointed "guardians-of-the-gate").

Ironically, the geneses of the Dominican and Cuban emigration are opposite. Dominicans began to emigrate en masse after 1961, when freedom of movement became guaranteed; while Cubans fled in disapproval of the Castros' converting the previous Pearl of the Antilles into a bankrupt vassal state of the now defunct Soviet empire. In summer-1980 alone, about 1.5 percent of Cuba's population "voted with their feet" via the unprecedented Mariel Freedom Flotilla, many of whose refugees and their descendants flourished in this great Garden State of ours.

Both countries emerged from traditional militaristic dictatorships around the same time, 1961 for the D.R., and 1959 for Cuba, after Afro-Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista fled the island-nation. Cuba's undeniably remarkable economic prosperity was accomplished despite Batista's relatively brief authoritarianism (1952-58) and the pitfalls of the preceding 1902-1952 republican epoch.

Conversely, conditions were wretched in the D.R. while Trujillo was ruling the country as a private fiefdom. The instability that